Facts:

Ganga Bai was tried along with Udai Lal and Daulat Ram under IPC Sections 302, 34, and 201 for the murder of her daughter-in-law and two minor children.

While all three were convicted by the trial court, the High Court acquitted Udai Lal and Daulat Ram due to lack of evidence. Ganga Bai's conviction was upheld based on circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

Whether Ganga Bai's conviction could be sustained based on the evidence presented, especially in light of the acquittal of her co-accused.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Ganga Bai's conviction was justified based on the evidence presented. Despite the acquittal of Udai Lal and Daulat Ram, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence linking Ganga Bai to the crime. It was noted that mere acquittal of co-accused does not automatically lead to acquittal of others involved in the crime when there is substantial evidence against them.

The court emphasized the unbroken chain of evidence against Ganga Bai, including her association with the victims, recovery of weapons at her instance, and blood-stained clothes found on her. Ganga Bai's failure to provide any explanation for this incriminating evidence further strengthened the case against her.

The court referred to the judgment in Nana Keshav Lagad Vs. State of Maharashtra to highlight the principle that the burden lies on the accused to explain incriminating evidence against them. Since Ganga Bai failed to provide any explanation, her conviction was upheld.

Thus, the appeal was dismissed, affirming Ganga Bai's conviction for murder.

Facts:

The Appellant-society advertised for a Trained Graduate Teacher to teach English and Sanskrit, giving priority to Backward Class candidates.

The Respondent, belonging to the Other Backward Class, applied for the position and was appointed on a temporary basis.

The Respondent's services were terminated twice, first in 1988 and then in 1995, leading to legal challenges and appeals.

Issues:

Whether the Respondent's appointment should be considered permanent or temporary.

Whether the termination of the Respondent's services in 1995 was justified under Rule 42(3) of the 1981 Rules.

Held:

The Court held that the Respondent's appointment was temporary, as he did not fulfill the qualifications required for the permanent vacancy.

The Court analyzed Section 5(1) of the 1977 Act and Rule 9(9)(a) of the 1981 Rules, concluding that the Respondent's appointment was in accordance with Rule 9(9)(a) as he was the most meritorious candidate among the applicants, despite lacking the required qualifications.

Regarding the termination in 1995, the Court found that the Appellant-society acted within its rights under Rule 42(3) to require the Respondent to resign due to his election campaign interfering with his duties. The Respondent's failure to comply justified the termination of his services.

Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the appeal.

Facts:

Kanachur Islamic Education Trust sought approval to establish a new medical college for the academic year 2015-16.

Despite initial approvals and certificates, subsequent inspections by the Medical Council of India (MCI) revealed significant deficiencies.

The High Court upheld the government's decision to disapprove the establishment of the medical college, citing the persistent deficiencies and irregularities found during inspections.

Issues:

Whether the disapproval of the application for establishing a new medical college by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare was justified.

Whether the deficiencies pointed out by the MCI were adequately addressed by the petitioner.

Whether the inspection process followed legal procedures.

Held:

The Court found no reason to interfere with the High Court's decision, upholding the disapproval of the application for the establishment of the medical college.

However, the petitioner was granted liberty to rectify the deficiencies and defects and instructed to approach the MCI for a fresh inspection.

The MCI was directed to conduct a thorough inspection, and if the petitioner follows the procedure, submit its report to the government for consideration regarding the grant of sanction for the academic year 2016-17.

Facts:

Rajinder Kumar, the appellant, served as a constable under the State of Haryana. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him due to unauthorized absences from duty, totaling thirty-seven days. He was found guilty and dismissed from service. Despite appeals, the dismissal was upheld.

Issues:

The proportionality of the punishment of dismissal in light of the appellant's health condition and long service record.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the seriousness of disciplinary breaches in a disciplined force like the police but noted that dismissal may not always be the appropriate punishment. Considering the appellant's health condition and long service, the Court held that compulsory retirement would have been a more suitable punishment.

Hence, the Court set aside the order of dismissal and directed that the appellant be treated as compulsorily retired from service. This decision was based on the discretion vested in the disciplinary authority to determine suitable punishment and the need to consider individual circumstances.

The Court further emphasized that the dismissal entailed forfeiture of past service, as per the Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1989.

Facts:

Saraswati Medical College filed a Special Leave Petition against the decision of the Delhi High Court dismissing its writ petition.

The college sought permission to establish a new medical college for the academic year 2015-16.

Despite the college's efforts to rectify deficiencies pointed out by the Medical Council of India (MCI), new issues were found during a surprise inspection.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the decision of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to disapprove the college's application.

Issues:

Whether the college adequately addressed all deficiencies highlighted by the MCI.

Whether the MCI followed proper procedure during inspections.

Held:

In the judgment, it was held that neither the college nor the MCI completely adhered to the prescribed procedure and requirements under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. The court directed the MCI to conduct a fresh inspection within two months and submit a report. It was further ordered that the MCI should assess whether any deficiencies found are remediable.

The Union of India was tasked with making a decision within a month after receiving the final inspection report, enabling the college to proceed with the establishment process for the academic year 2016-2017. This special leave petition was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appellants, S. Nihaal Ahamed and Gayathri, sought admission to the M.B.B.S. Course for the academic year 2013-14 at a medical college affiliated with the Tamil Nadu Dr. M.G.R. Medical University.

Despite being placed in the merit list, they were denied admission due to alleged delays and malpractice by the medical college.

The appellants filed writ petitions seeking admission and were awarded compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs each by the learned Single Judge.

The Division Bench reversed the decision, denying both admission and compensation.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to admission and compensation due to the fault of the medical college.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and referring to previous judgments, including Chandigarh Administration Vs. Jasmine Kaur, upheld the compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge.

The court noted that if a candidate is not selected due to the fault of the institutions/authorities and the scope for admission is lost due to the lapse of time, appropriate compensation should be granted to offset the loss caused.

Therefore, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals and restored the order of the Single Judge awarding compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs to each appellant, along with a time schedule for payment.

Facts:

The Golden Forest India Limited (GFIL) went into liquidation, and its assets were to be sold to pay off debts. The GFIL Committee was tasked with selling these assets. The applicants participated in an auction and were declared successful bidders for several properties. However, despite fulfilling their obligations, the GFIL Committee did not hand over possession of the properties. Legal proceedings ensued, and the court directed the refund of the sale consideration and allowed the applicants to claim a refund of stamp duty from the State Government.

Issues:

Whether the applicants are entitled to claim a refund of stamp duty paid for a failed property transaction, despite the State's initial rejection on technical grounds.

Held:

The court held that the applicants are entitled to claim the refund of stamp duty from the State Government. The original purpose of the transaction failed due to circumstances beyond the applicants' control. The court's orders directing the refund of the sale consideration implied a right to claim a refund of stamp duty. The principle of equity, "actus curiae neminem gravabit" (an act of the court shall prejudice no one), supported the applicants' claim.

The court interpreted relevant sections of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and the Indian Contract Act, 1872, to support the applicants' claim. Even if the applications were dismissed on the ground of limitation, the applicants still had the right to claim the refund based on the circumstances of the case.

Facts:

The dispute involves a hundred-year-old building in Lucknow covered under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act.

The building was originally owned by Barrister Mohammad Wasim and later vested with the Custodian of Evacuee Property and settled in favor of Rai Bahadur Lakshman Das.

Appellant Anil Kalra claimed ownership along with his relatives through sale deeds executed in the 1980s.

Despite a release order issued in favor of the appellant and co-landlords, unauthorized occupants, including the respondents, occupied the building.

Issues:

Whether the respondents had the authority to occupy the building in violation of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act.

The enforcement of the release order and the future use of the building.

Held:

The court found that the respondents failed to demonstrate authority for occupying the building in violation of Section 11 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act.

The court directed the Competent Authority to execute Form-D for the release of the building and granted a three-month period for occupants to vacate voluntarily.

After this period, occupants were to be forcibly dispossessed, with assistance from the District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of Police.

The court clarified that the released building could not be let out in its existing condition and must be demolished for reconstruction, as per the purpose for which it was released.

The appeal filed by the landlord (Anil Kalra) was allowed, and the appeals filed by the respondents were dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves Essar Teleholdings Ltd. and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) before the Supreme Court of India. It stems from allegations of offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act and criminal conspiracy related to the grant of UAS licenses in 2008. The CBI filed multiple chargesheets, including a second supplementary chargesheet implicating the petitioners for offenses under Sections 120B and 420 of the IPC. The Delhi High Court appointed a Special Judge to handle cases related to the 2G scam, including those under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Essar Teleholdings Ltd. filed writ petitions challenging the jurisdiction of the Special Judge, which were dismissed by the Supreme Court. Subsequently, Essar Teleholdings Ltd. requested a joint trial, which was denied by the Special Judge.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the Special Judge, the discretion of the court in ordering a joint trial, and preventing miscarriage of justice.

Held:

The Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Special Judge appointed to handle cases related to the 2G scam. It emphasized the discretion of the court in ordering a joint trial and the importance of preventing miscarriage of justice.

The court found no infirmity in the judgment of the Special Judge, which denied the request for a joint trial. Thus, the appeal and the writ petitions were dismissed.