Facts:

Shabnam and Salim were co-accused in a murder case involving seven members of Shabnam's family.

They were convicted and sentenced to death by the Sessions Court, a decision upheld by the High Court and confirmed by the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The legality of issuing death warrants immediately after the dismissal of criminal appeals.

The necessity of allowing convicts to exhaust all legal remedies, including review petitions and mercy petitions, before execution.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of exhausting all legal remedies available to the convicts before execution. The right to file a review petition, as provided under Article 137 of the Constitution, is of high procedural sanctity.

The right to file mercy petitions to the Governor and President, as enshrined in Article 72 and Article 161 of the Constitution, remains intact. The power to pardon death sentences is a constitutional remedy independent of the judiciary.

Execution of death warrants before the exhaustion of all legal remedies would violate Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.

Human dignity is a fundamental aspect recognized under Article 21 of the Constitution, which extends beyond the confirmation of a death sentence. The process from confirmation to execution must uphold human dignity to a reasonable extent.

The court quashed the death warrants issued by the Sessions Judge, emphasizing the need to follow prescribed procedures and guidelines laid down by both the High Court and the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the appellants assaulted and caused the death of Basavaraj over a land dispute. However, the Trial Court found the prosecution witnesses' testimonies unreliable, citing unnatural conduct and inconsistencies. Specifically, it noted that the witnesses, despite claiming to witness the assault, did not intervene to help Basavaraj and returned home even after the assailants fled the scene. Additionally, they made no attempt to provide aid to Basavaraj, who was left injured for several hours until the police arrived.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution has proved the charges against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt?

Whether the conduct of the prosecution witnesses renders their testimonies unreliable?

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the Trial Court's decision, finding the prosecution's version of events unpersuasive. It highlighted various inconsistencies, including the destruction of the original complaint and the introduction of a new narrative by the police. The Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

Therefore, the appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appellants were acquitted of all charges. Consequently, the appellants were to be released from custody immediately unless required for any other case.

Facts:

The respondent, employed as a Field Supervisor in the appellant bank since 1981, faced charges of misconduct in 1984 and financial irregularities in 1987. He was removed from service in 1991 after inquiries and subsequent dismissal of his appeal by the Board of Directors of the appellant bank. The respondent challenged these actions in the High Court, arguing that essential documents and witness lists were not provided to him during the disciplinary proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the documents, which formed the basis of the charges against the respondent, were provided to him during the disciplinary proceedings.

Held:

The Court upheld the decisions of the High Court, emphasizing the importance of providing essential documents to the accused in disciplinary proceedings to ensure a fair trial. As the documents were not adequately provided in this case, the order of punishment could not be sustained. Additionally, considering the respondent had been out of employment since 1991, a lump sum payment of Rs. 5,00,000 towards salary was deemed appropriate to meet the ends of justice. Therefore, the civil appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the claim of dependant family members of deceased Canara Bank employees for compassionate appointment under the 'Dying in Harness Scheme' that was in place in 1993.

Canara Bank contended that the 1993 Scheme had been replaced by a 2005 Scheme, which provided for ex-gratia payment in lieu of compassionate appointment.

The High Court directed Canara Bank to reconsider the claim of the applicant for compassionate appointment in accordance with the 1993 Scheme.

Issues:

Whether the dependant family members of a deceased Canara Bank employee were entitled to seek compassionate appointment under the 'Dying in Harness Scheme' of 1993 or the subsequent 2005 Scheme providing for ex-gratia payment.

Whether the receipt of family pension and terminal benefits by the family members of the deceased employee negated their claim for compassionate appointment.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the claim for compassionate appointment should be considered under the scheme that was in force at the time of the employee's death, which in this case was the 'Dying in Harness Scheme' of 1993.

The Court emphasized that compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to mitigate the hardship faced by the family of the deceased employee.

The Court rejected Canara Bank's contention that the family's receipt of family pension and terminal benefits negated their claim for compassionate appointment, stating that such benefits cannot be equated with compassionate appointment.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing Canara Bank's appeals and directing the bank to reconsider the cases of the applicants for compassionate appointment as per the Scheme in force at the time of the employee's death.

Facts:

Developers had projects sanctioned before March 31, 2005, with commercial usage permitted to a certain extent. These projects commenced before April 1, 2005, and were completed after this date.

Issues:

Whether the restriction on the extent of commercial area in housing projects, as introduced by the amendment to Section 80IB(10)(d) from April 1, 2005, applies to projects sanctioned before that date but completed after it.

Held:

The court held that the amendment to Section 80IB(10)(d) is prospective and came into effect from April 1, 2005.

Therefore, the restriction on commercial area does not apply to projects sanctioned and commenced earlier, even if they were completed after April 1, 2005.

The judgment emphasized that developers who followed the regulations and commenced their projects as per the sanctioned plans should be entitled to the benefits under Section 80IB(10).

The court highlighted the legislative intent behind Section 80IB(10) to encourage housing projects for the weaker sections of society. It stressed the importance of interpreting tax laws to avoid harsh or absurd results.

Facts:

The appellants and respondents were parties to agreements of sale for certain properties.

The respondents initiated legal action seeking recovery of amounts paid towards these agreements when the transactions couldn't be completed.

The trial court passed ex parte decrees against the appellants when they failed to appear on hearing dates.

The appellants filed applications to set aside these ex parte decrees, citing reasons for their non-appearance.

The trial court imposed conditions for setting aside the ex parte decrees, requiring the appellants to deposit certain amounts.

The appellants challenged these conditions before the High Court, which upheld them.

Issues:

Whether the conditions imposed by the trial court for setting aside the ex parte decrees were reasonable and justified.

Whether the High Court's decision to uphold these conditions was appropriate.

Held:

The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the conditions imposed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court. The Court emphasized that while exercising discretion in such matters, the trial court should not impose unreasonable or onerous conditions, especially when the issues are yet to be decided on merits.

The Supreme Court directed the trial court to take up the suits expeditiously and dispose of them. It also ordered that the amount deposited by the appellants be invested in a Nationalized Bank for the benefit of either party.

Facts:

Shamsher Singh, the complainant, alleged that the appellant, K.L. Bakolia, demanded a bribe for contract renewal.

A sting operation was conducted by the CBI, where marked currency was handed to Bakolia, who allegedly instructed the complainant to place it under a sofa cushion.

Bakolia was convicted under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and sentenced to four years of rigorous imprisonment.

Issues:

Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by Bakolia.

Whether the conviction and sentence imposed on Bakolia were justified.

Held:

For coming to the finding of guilt for the offence Under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, firstly, there must be a demand and secondly, there must be acceptance in the sense that the accused received illegal gratification.

Courts below recorded concurrent findings that there was evidence on record to substantiate the fact that there was a demand and the complainant paid the bribe amount to the Appellant who has accepted the same.

Conviction of the Appellant Under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act is unassailable.

Interest of justice would be met by reducing the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of four years to one year rigorous imprisonment.

Judgment of the High Court is accordingly modified and this appeal is allowed in part.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over land, specifically a boundary dispute and mortgage issues arising from a default on a loan taken by the appellant Trust from the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO). As a result of the default, immovable properties, including the disputed property, were mortgaged. Part of the disputed property was exchanged by the Trust with Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (Avas).

Issues:

Whether the High Court's directive to Avas to demarcate a portion of the land as unencumbered was within the jurisdiction of Avas.

Whether writ jurisdiction can be exercised to determine property rights or declare property as encumbered.

Whether disputed questions regarding property rights should be addressed in forums where recovery proceedings are pending.

Interpretation of Section 15 of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965.

Held:

The High Court's directive to Avas to demarcate the land was beyond its jurisdiction.

It is not the function of Avas to determine property rights based on agreements between private parties.

Writ jurisdiction cannot be used to determine property rights or declare property as encumbered. Such matters fall outside the scope of writ jurisdiction.

Disputed questions regarding property rights should be addressed in forums where recovery proceedings are pending. Parties should address these issues before the appropriate tribunals.

The interpretation of Section 15 of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965, was clarified. The principle of noscitur a sociis was applied in interpreting the section.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and it was held that the writ petition filed at the Lucknow Bench was not maintainable. The property dispute should be addressed in forums where recovery proceedings are pending, and Avas is not accountable to the builder in this matter.

Facts:

Manyata Devi applied for a character/enlistment certificate necessary for contractor registration under the Irrigation Department of Uttar Pradesh.

Despite meeting other requirements, her application was refused by the District Magistrate citing her husband's criminal cases.

The High Court upheld the District Magistrate's decision, leading to Manyata Devi's appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the refusal of a character certificate based on the criminal record of the applicant's spouse is justified.

Whether the District Magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction by considering factors beyond the applicant's moral character.

Whether the denial of the character certificate was intended to prevent the applicant's husband from carrying out works through her registration.

Held:

The court held that The District Magistrate should have simply certified her character because that was the only question which the former was called upon to examine while dealing with the request made by the Appellant.

The court further stated: "The District Magistrate did not have any authority under the rules stipulating registration of contractors to consider such requests for registration or to grant or refuse the same.

The court concluded: The Court ruled that character certificates should be based solely on the applicant's moral character and not influenced by irrelevant factors such as family members' actions. Additionally, decisions regarding contractor registration should be made by the competent authority in the relevant department, not by district magistrates.