Facts:

The case involved the appellant, Jasbir Singh, and the respondents, Tara Singh and others, who were tried under various sections of the Indian Penal Code for forgery of documents related to property ownership. The trial court had initially imposed a sentence, which was appealed by the respondents. The High Court reduced the sentence considering factors such as prolonged trial and the advanced age of the respondents.

Issues:

The appropriateness of the sentence imposed by the trial court and subsequently reduced by the High Court, considering the gravity of the offences and mitigating circumstances.

Held:

The Court, after reviewing the case, emphasized the importance of considering factors such as the gravity of the offence, mitigating circumstances, and societal perspective on justice in determining an appropriate sentence. The Court held that unless there are mitigating circumstances not considered by the trial court, arbitrary reduction of the sentence by the appellate/revisional court is not justified. Additionally, the Court stressed that the purpose of punishment should reflect society's demand for justice against criminals and that appropriate punishment must be proportional to the gravity of the offence committed.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment, and remitted the matter back to the High Court for passing an appropriate order in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The property in question was subject to proceedings under the Ceiling Act, with the maximum compensation payable for excess land declared under the Ceiling Act assessed at Rs. 2 lakhs.

Issues:

The valuation of the vacant land appurtenant to the property for wealth tax assessment purposes, considering the provisions and impact of the Urban Land Ceiling Act.

Held:

The valuation of the asset under consideration must be in accordance with Section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. This valuation should be based on the last day of the previous year, typically March 31, preceding the assessment year. The assessing officer is tasked with estimating the price the asset would fetch if sold in the open market, considering a hypothetical situation.

The property being subject to the Ceiling Act would depress its value. Thus, the valuation could not exceed Rs. 2 lakhs, the maximum compensation payable under the Ceiling Act for the relevant assessment years.

The excess land had not been acquired by the government under the Ceiling Act, but the process had commenced, and the maximum compensation payable was determined at Rs. 2 lakhs.

The assessing officer's valuation, without considering the impact of the Ceiling Act, was deemed incorrect. The restrictions and prohibitions under the Ceiling Act would depress the property's value.

Given the maximum compensation limit of Rs. 2 lakhs under the Ceiling Act, the estimated price of the property for wealth tax assessment purposes could not exceed this amount.

It's noted that the compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs pertains only to the excess land covered by the Ceiling Act. The valuation for wealth tax purposes should consider this amount for the excess land and add the market value of the remaining land.

Decision: The appeals were allowed.

Facts:

The plaintiffs-respondents sought to include property owned by the appellant Housing Board, under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, in a suit for partition. This property was originally held by an intermediary under Section 6 of the 1953 Act. The Subordinate Judge granted a temporary injunction against the property, despite the Housing Board not being party to the suit.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiffs-respondents had the right to include the Housing Board's property in the suit for partition.

Whether the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction against the Housing Board without their involvement in the suit proceedings.

Held:

The plaintiffs-respondents lacked the right to include the Housing Board's property in the suit for partition. The Subordinate Judge's decision to allow the amendment of the suit schedule was erroneous.

The grant of temporary injunction against the Housing Board's property by the Subordinate Judge was unjustified. Temporary injunctions can only be granted against parties to the suit. Furthermore, the grant of police protection without involving the Housing Board in the original suit proceedings was legally impermissible.

The Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain any suit concerning the property governed by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. Therefore, the temporary injunction was not binding on the Housing Board and could not be enforced against them or their agents.

Decision: The appeals of the appellant Housing Board were allowed. The interim order of temporary injunction was deemed not binding on the Housing Board. Moreover, the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to deal with the property in question, as per the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953.

Facts:

Kosha Investments Ltd. acquired shares of Snowcem India Ltd. (SIL), making it one of SIL's promoters.

SEBI conducted an investigation from June 1999 to August 1999, during which there was a notable increase in SIL shares' price and trading volume.

SEBI issued a show cause notice to Kosha Investments Ltd. alleging breach of Regulations of 1997.

SEBI found Kosha Investments Ltd. failed to make a public announcement as required by Regulation 11(1) after acquiring shares exceeding the permissible limit.

Kosha Investments Ltd. argued it was regularly involved in SIL shares' sale and purchase and did not exceed the 5% limit at any point.

The Tribunal ruled in favor of SEBI, stating Kosha Investments Ltd. had exceeded the 5% limit during the relevant period.

Issues:

Whether Kosha Investments Ltd. complied with Regulation 11(1) of the Regulations of 1997 after acquiring shares exceeding the permissible limit.

Whether Regulation 14(2) applies to postpone the requirement of public announcement until the conversion of securities into voting rights.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the findings of the Tribunal and SEBI. It held that Regulation 11(1) mandates a public announcement when the acquisition exceeds 5%, regardless of subsequent divestments within the financial year. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument regarding Regulation 14(2), as it was not raised before the original authorities and deemed it a desperate plea.

The Court's decision underscores the importance of complying with SEBI regulations regarding substantial acquisition of shares and takeovers, emphasizing the mandatory nature of such provisions.

Facts:

Mithusinh Pannasinh Chauhan (Appellant) was injured in a road accident involving a bus owned by the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation.

He filed a claim petition seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) partly allowed Chauhan's claim and awarded him compensation, which was partially challenged by both Chauhan and the Corporation in separate appeals.

The High Court partly allowed the Corporation's appeal and reduced the compensation awarded to Chauhan, while dismissing Chauhan's appeal for enhancement of compensation.

Issues:

Whether the compensation awarded by the MACT and subsequently reduced by the High Court was just and reasonable considering the nature of Chauhan's injuries and disabilities?

Whether Chauhan's appeal for enhancement of compensation should be allowed?

Held:

The Court held that the compensation awarded to Chauhan was inadequate considering the severity of his injuries and disabilities. The Court found that Chauhan had suffered significant physical and mental impairment, leading to the loss of his job as a constable. The Court disagreed with the assessments made by the lower courts regarding disability and concluded that Chauhan deserved higher compensation.

Therefore, the Court modified the impugned order, awarding Chauhan Rs. 4,00,000 as compensation, to be paid by the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. The awarded sum would carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the claim petition till realization. No costs were awarded in the case.

Facts:

The case pertains to a partition suit filed in the High Court of Calcutta regarding premises in Calcutta.

Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 initially made admissions in their written statement regarding their lack of interest in the disputed property.

After several years, they sought to amend their written statement to withdraw these admissions.

Issues:

Whether a defendant in a partition suit can withdraw admissions made in the written statement after a significant period.

The application for amendment sought to entirely withdraw admissions made in the pleadings.

Held:

The court examined the principles regarding amendments to pleadings and withdrawal of admissions. It held that while delay alone may not be decisive, a party cannot wholly withdraw a categorical admission made in the pleadings.

The court cited precedents to support this stance and emphasized that admissions can be clarified or explained through amendments but cannot be entirely withdrawn. Therefore, the application for amendment to withdraw the admissions made in the written statement was rejected. However, Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 were permitted to file an application within a specified period to explain or clarify the admissions.

The court refrained from awarding costs due to the nature of the dispute being a family property partition suit, where parties might eventually seek an amicable settlement.

Facts:The case involves a dispute arising from the condonation of delay in a substitution application filed in a civil appeal. The original plaintiff, Ram Narayan, initiated litigation against the predecessors of the present appellants, claiming tenancy termination and ownership rights. After multiple rounds of litigation and appeals, the original plaintiff passed away, leading to the abatement of the appeal due to failure to substitute his heirs within the prescribed time limit. More than eleven years later, Kaushaliya Devi, the daughter of the deceased plaintiff, filed a substitution application seeking to set aside the abatement.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the substitution application can be condoned and the abatement set aside, considering the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act.

Held:

The court held that condoning the delay of more than eleven years in filing the substitution application would be an abuse of the legal process and defeat the purpose of limitation periods. Despite arguments presented by Kaushaliya Devi's counsel regarding her inability to act promptly due to being married and living away from her father, the court found no sufficient reason to condone the delay. Therefore, the court set aside the orders passed by the High Court and the Additional District Judge/Special Judge, Gonda, and disposed of the appeals in favor of the appellants.

Facts:

The petition sought direction against the Union of India through the Ministry of Home Affairs to grant citizenship to the Chakma and Hajong Tribals who migrated to India between 1964-1969 and were settled in Arunachal Pradesh.

Representations were made alleging persecution of Chakmas and Hajongs in Arunachal Pradesh. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) approached the Court seeking to ensure the safety of Chakmas and Hajongs.

The Union of India and the State of Arunachal Pradesh presented divergent views on granting citizenship, with the State expressing reservations due to concerns over ethnic balance and cultural identity.

Issues:

Whether the Chakmas and Hajongs settled in Arunachal Pradesh are entitled to citizenship rights.

Whether the State of Arunachal Pradesh is obligated to protect the life and liberty of Chakmas and Hajongs against any threats or discrimination.

Held:

The Court held that the Chakmas and Hajongs have a legitimate right to be granted citizenship rights and cannot be discriminated against. The State of Arunachal Pradesh was directed to finalize the conferment of citizenship rights on eligible Chakmas and Hajongs and ensure compliance with directions for their protection and against discrimination. This exercise was to be completed preferably within three months from the date of the order.

Decided on : 17-09-2015

Citizenship Act, 1955 - Section 5, Section 5(1)

Citizenship Rules, 1956 - Rule 8, Rule 9

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32

Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 - Section 13

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Colin Gonsalves, Senior Advocate, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Nitesh Kumar Singh and Neha, for the Appellant; P.S. Patwalia, ASG, Sadhana Sandhu, Tushar Bakshi, Advs. for Sushma Suri, Adv., Anil Shrivastav, Rituraj Biswas and Anitha Shenoy, Advocates for the Resp

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

The petitioner submitted an application for the establishment of a new medical college but failed to submit certain required documents by the specified cut-off date.

The application was rejected by the Central Government, prompting the petitioner to challenge this decision in the Delhi High Court.

The High Court initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, but the decision was overturned by a Division Bench.

The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court via a Special Leave Petition.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the petitioner's application for the establishment of a new medical college was justified.

Whether the Supreme Court could issue directions regarding the consideration of the petitioner's application.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the deficiencies identified by the Medical Council of India during inspection, which included a shortage of teaching faculty and residents, discrepancies in patient attendance records, and infrastructural shortcomings.

The executive committee of the Medical Council of India recommended disapproval of the establishment of the new medical college for the academic years 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 due to the identified deficiencies.

The Supreme Court, considering the time schedule and legal precedents, declined to issue directions for the consideration of the petitioner's application for the specified academic years.

However, the Court left open the option for the petitioner to challenge the decision of disapproval for the academic year 2016-2017 through appropriate legal channels.