Facts:

The appellant, Akhilesh Kumar Singh, contested the reservation of a single post in a cadre for promotion, arguing against its constitutionality. The respondent, Ram Dawan, sought promotion to the post of Clerk in a college governed by the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Despite being eligible and applying for promotion, Ram Dawan's promotion was not granted due to an advertisement for filling the post.

Issues:

Whether a singular post in a cadre could be reserved for promotion from Class IV employees under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that promotion from feeder cadres does not constitute reservation under the Constitution. It analyzed relevant regulations and precedents, concluding that reservation applies only to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes, not to promotion from feeder cadres. The Court cited previous decisions to support its interpretation, emphasizing that the concept of reservation is distinct from quotas in promotional cadres.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the imposition of anti-dumping duty during the interregnum period between the expiry of a provisional duty notification and the imposition of the final anti-dumping duty.

Issues:

The legality and validity of imposing anti-dumping duty during the gap period between the lapse of provisional duty and the imposition of final duty.

Held:

The correct interpretation of Rule 20 of the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995 is pivotal in determining the legality of imposing anti-dumping duty during the interregnum period.

Sub-rule (2)(a) of Rule 20 allows for the imposition of final anti-dumping duty from the date of imposition of provisional duty, limited to the period during which provisional duty is applicable.

The interpretation must align with the object of making laws in conformity with the WTO Agreement, indicating that anti-dumping duty cannot be levied during the gap period between provisional and final duty.

The court discussed the principles regarding the interpretation of domestic legislation in light of international treaty obligations, emphasizing the need for consistency and uniformity in the application of international law across signatory nations.

Decision: The court ruled that anti-dumping duty cannot be levied during the period between the lapse of provisional duty and the imposition of final duty, aligning with the principles of international law and the objective of uniformity in treaty obligations.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance, possession, and injunction regarding a land agreement.

The defendant agreed to sell land to the plaintiff but later declined to execute the sale deed despite receiving earnest money.

The trial court initially directed the refund of earnest money, which was challenged in the first appellate court and then the High Court.

The High Court modified the decree, affirming specific performance subject to certain conditions.

Issues:

Whether specific performance should be granted in the circumstances of the case.

Held:

The Court, after considering the arguments and circumstances, decided not to interfere with the High Court's findings. It was noted that possession was not given to the plaintiff at the time of the agreement, and the area of the land agreed to be sold was not clear. Therefore, the plaintiff had not suffered substantial losses due to the contract. Instead of affirming the decree of specific performance, the Court directed the defendants to refund the earnest money accepted by the original defendant, along with interest, within three months. Failure to comply would result in the dismissal of the appeal. The plaintiff was also allowed to withdraw the deposited amount. Appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

Maharaja Jagat Singh ("LMJS") held shares in multiple companies before his demise.

Dispute arose over the entitlement to these shares between the DR Group (Rajkumar Devraj and Rajkumari Lalitya Kumari) and the UD Group (cousins of LMJS).

The DR Group obtained a succession certificate jointly with their grandmother, Gayatri Devi, who inherited the shares from LMJS. They also obtained transfer deeds from Gayatri Devi.

Legal challenges were raised by the UD Group regarding the validity of the succession certificate and the entitlement of the DR Group to the shares.

Proceedings were initiated before the Company Law Board (CLB) and later appealed to the High Court.

Issues:

Whether there is a real dispute over the entitlement of the DR Group to the shares.

Whether the succession certificate obtained by the DR Group is valid and conclusive evidence of their entitlement to the shares.

Whether the interim orders obtained by Gayatri Devi herself affect the rights of the DR Group.

Held:

The Court upheld the decision of the High Court, affirming the rectification of share registers in favor of the DR Group based on the succession certificate and transfer deeds executed by Gayatri Devi. The court emphasized that there was no real dispute over the entitlement of the DR Group to the shares, and the succession certificate was deemed valid. The interim orders obtained by Gayatri Devi did not bar the DR Group from claiming their rights.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the rectification of share registers in favor of the DR Group, affirming their entitlement to the shares based on the succession certificate and transfer deeds executed by Gayatri Devi.

Facts:

An altercation between the appellant Ranjit Sarkar and the deceased Anil Das occurred on June 17, 2007, over the draining of rainwater through a paddy field. During the altercation, Ranjit Sarkar struck Anil Das on the head with a wooden file, resulting in severe injuries. Anil Das succumbed to his injuries the following day. The appellant was charged under Section 302 IPC for the offence.

Issues:

The court was to determine the appropriate charge applicable to the actions of the appellant, Ranjit Sarkar, in the altercation that led to the death of Anil Das.

Held:

In the above facts and circumstances, having re-assessed the depositions of witnesses and other evidence on record, we are of considered opinion that the act on the part of the Appellant is covered by Part I of Section 304 Indian Penal Code. Therefore, we set aside the conviction and sentence Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. Instead, the Appellant Ranjit Sarkar is convicted Under Section 304 Part I, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years. With this modification in the conviction and sentence, the appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

Sharadamma filed a suit for declaration of title and restoration of possession in 1998, which was dismissed. She filed an appeal against this decision. During the pendency of the appeal, she transferred her interest in the property to her daughter, who further transferred it to another person.

Issues:

Whether the appellant loses the right to continue an appeal if they transfer their interest in the subject matter of the appeal during its pendency.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that merely transferring interest in the property during the appeal process does not automatically deprive the original party of the right to continue the appeal. Under Order 22, Rules 10 and 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, the suit or appeal may be continued by or against the person upon whom the interest has devolved, with the leave of the court. There cannot be a penalty of dismissal of the suit or appeal solely based on the failure of the assignee to file an application for impleadment and to continue the proceedings. It affirmed that it would be open to the assignor to continue the proceedings for the benefit of the assignee. Additionally, even if no step is taken by the assignee, the suit may be continued by the original party, and the person upon whom the interest has devolved will be bound by the decree, especially if they had knowledge of the proceedings.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint filed by Nimra Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd. against the International Advanced Research Centre for Powder Metallurgy and New Materials (ARCI) and its officials under Section 420 of the IPC, alleging cheating due to ARCI's failure to achieve targeted specifications outlined in a technology transfer agreement.

Issues:

Whether the actions of ARCI and its officials constitute the offense of cheating under Section 420 of the IPC.

Held:

The court highlighted the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offense of cheating under Section 420 of the IPC. It emphasized that to establish cheating, it's essential to prove fraudulent or dishonest intention at the outset of the transaction.

The court examined the terms of the technology transfer agreement and concluded that it was experimental in nature, with no commitment from ARCI to provide the specified products.

It was noted that ARCI had put in efforts to improve the technology, as evidenced by correspondence indicating their attempts to achieve the required specifications.

The court considered the roles of the officials from ARCI, emphasizing that they were acting in their official capacities and did not stand to receive personal benefits from the transaction.

Additionally, the court pointed out that the agreement contained an arbitration clause, indicating that disputes were intended to be resolved through arbitration, further emphasizing the civil nature of the dispute.

Therefore, the court held that the allegations in the complaint did not constitute the offense of cheating, and it quashed the criminal proceedings against ARCI and its officials.

Facts:

The case involved a tragic incident at Uphaar Cinema resulting in loss of lives and injuries due to a fire. The appellants were convicted under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Cinematograph Act.

Issues:

The quantum of sentence, with differing opinions between Justice T.S. Thakur and Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra.

Held:

The Full Bench decided to enhance the sentence to the maximum period of two years under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. However, instead of imprisonment, the appellants were directed to pay a fine of Rs. 30 crores each. If the fine is paid within three months, the sentence would be reduced to the period already undergone.

The fines imposed on the appellants were directed to be given to the Chief Secretary of the Delhi Government for setting up a new trauma center or upgrading existing trauma centers managed by the Government of NCT of Delhi. Similar directions were given in another appeal involving H.S. Panwar, with a fine of Rs. 10 lakhs.

Facts

The dispute arose between the Union of India (UOI) and Reliance Industries Limited & others regarding arbitration proceedings under Product Sharing Contracts (PSC) for Tapta and Panna Mukta oil and gas fields. The arbitration agreement stipulated that it would be governed by English law, with the juridical seat of arbitration in London.

UOI initiated arbitration proceedings in London due to disputes under the PSC. Subsequently, UOI filed a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to set aside the arbitration award. The High Court initially deemed the petition maintainable.

Issues:

Whether Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is applicable in arbitration proceedings when the juridical seat is outside India and governed by foreign law?

Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to jurisdictional issues intertwined with mixed questions of fact and law?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is not applicable when the arbitration agreement excludes its application by necessary implication and when the juridical seat of arbitration is outside India, governed by foreign law. In this case, as the arbitration agreement explicitly stated that it would be governed by English law and the juridical seat was in London, Part I of the Act was held inapplicable.

The plea that res judicata does not apply to jurisdictional issues was dismissed as the jurisdictional issue here was intertwined with mixed questions of fact and law, making res judicata applicable.

Decision: The application under section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was dismissed as an abuse of the court process. This was because it was filed after an adverse judgment from the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Thus, the order of the High Court was upheld.