Criminal Law – Quashing – Scheduled Castes – Conversion to Christianity – Loss of SC Status – SC/ST Act – Clause 3 of Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 – Appellant, born into the Madiga community (Scheduled Caste), converted to Christianity and served as a Pastor for over ten years – FIR registered for caste-based assault and atrocity offences under the SC/ST Act – High Court quashed proceedings holding appellant could not claim SC status after open and sustained practice of Christianity – Held: High Court correct – Appellant, by professing Christianity, is excluded from Scheduled Caste status under Clause 3 of the Presidential Order, which admits no exception – Appeal dismissed [Paras 41–61].

Scheduled Castes – Meaning of "Professes" – Clause 3 of Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 – The term "professes" in Clause 3 connotes an open, public declaration or active practice of a religion discernible to all – Mere personal belief or private conviction is insufficient – Serving as a Pastor, conducting regular Sunday prayer meetings, and holding office as Treasurer of a Pastors' fellowship for over ten years constitutes unequivocal and open profession of Christianity within the meaning of Clause 3 – Person so professing Christianity cannot be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste irrespective of caste of birth [Paras 36–42].

Postulates for Determining SC/ST Status after Conversion – Principles Laid Down – (a) Claimant must belong to a notified caste or tribe under the Presidential Orders; (b) No person professing a religion other than Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist can claim Scheduled Caste status – bar is categorical and absolute; (c) No statutory benefit predicated on SC membership is available to a person excluded under Clause 3; (d) A person cannot simultaneously profess a non-specified religion and claim SC status for statutory benefits; (e) Reconversion requires proof of original caste membership, bona fide reconversion with complete renunciation, and acceptance by the original community – all three conditions are cumulative and mandatory; (f) Loss of SC status entails automatic termination of all statutory entitlements; (g) For Scheduled Tribes, religion-based exclusion does not apply – determination turns on continuance of tribal attributes, customs, and community recognition – assessment is fact-specific [Para 55].

State Government Order – G.O. Ms. No. 341 dated 30.08.1977 – Inapplicable to Statutory Benefits – The Andhra Pradesh Government Order extending non-statutory concessions to SC converts to Christianity and Buddhism explicitly excludes statutory benefits including reservations and protections under central enactments – State has no authority to enlarge or modify the Presidential Order under Article 341 – The SC/ST Act being a parliamentary statute is outside the scope of the State Government Order – Confirmed by Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment in a parliamentary reply dated 03.08.2021 [Paras 45–50].

Caste Certificate – Insufficient to Override Presidential Order – Mere possession of a caste certificate cannot confer SC status contrary to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 – Administrative grant of a certificate by the State must be in consonance with the Presidential Order – Three cumulative tests to be satisfied: proof of original caste membership, reconversion to the original religion, and community acceptance – Failure to establish even one test renders the claim unsustainable [Paras 58–59].

SC/ST Act – Foundational Requirement – Victim's SC Status – Quashing of IPC Offences – The SC/ST Act is applicable only where the victim is a bona fide member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes – Once foundational status stands extinguished, proceedings under the Act cannot be sustained – On the IPC offences of wrongful restraint, hurt, and criminal intimidation, the prosecution case rested solely on the appellant's statement with no independent corroboration – Witnesses did not support the allegation of a large group assault; LW-9 who accompanied the appellant made no allegation of assault or restraint – Continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process [Paras 60–69].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court's quashing of proceedings against respondent Nos. 2 to 7 under the SC/ST Act and the IPC confirmed.

Criminal Law – Rape and SC/ST Act – Conviction under Section 376 IPC and Section 3(xii) of SC/ST Act – Reliability of Child Witness – Conviction Restored – Respondent accused of sexually assaulting a nine-year-old girl in a cowshed – Trial Court convicted the accused; High Court acquitted him citing contradictions and the improbability of the victim traveling 16 km within two hours – Held: High Court's approach of picking holes in a case that withstood cross-examination is flawed; testimony of the child witness (PW-1) was positive, unequivocal, and corroborated by medical evidence (PW-7) – Acquittal set aside and conviction restored [Paras 1–14].

Evidence – Appreciation of Testimony – Child Witness – Guidelines – Competency and Corroboration – Held: There is no hard and fast rule for testing child competency; it depends on the Trial Judge’s satisfaction regarding the witness's ability to distinguish truth from falsehood – Non-administration of oath does not render testimony unusable – If a child witness withstands cross-examination, conviction can be based solely on such testimony, though seeking corroboration is a matter of prudence – Solitary testimony of a prosecutrix is sufficient if it inspires confidence [Paras 7–10, 13].

Criminal Procedure – Appreciation of Evidence – Minor Inconsistencies vs. Material Contradictions – Mathematical Precision – Held: Human perception and memory are imperfect; trivial discrepancies do not make evidence unreliable – Courts should not attach undue importance to variations that do not affect the core of the case – The High Court’s reliance on the "improbability" of traveling 16 km in two hours was misplaced as the factum of sexual assault remained undisturbed – Courts do not look for mathematical precision in proving the timeframe of an offence [Paras 8, 11–12].

Legal Procedure – Victim Anonymity – Protection of Identity – Section 228-A IPC – Disclosure of Survivor’s Name – Held: Disclosure of a sexual assault survivor’s identity causes social stigma and reputational harm – The mandate of Section 228-A IPC and the victim-centered orientation of the 1983 amendments must be followed strictly – Use of the victim's name in court records deprecated – Directions issued to all Registrars General of High Courts to ensure compliance with the proscription in Section 228-A IPC as per Nipun Saxena v. Union of India [Paras 5, 15].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of acquittal set aside – Respondent-accused directed to surrender forthwith to serve the remainder of the sentence – Directions issued regarding victim anonymity.

Arbitration – Arbitration Agreement – Absence of Mutuality – Coram Non Judice – Octroi collection contract entered between petitioner and Ambernath Municipal Council – After dispute over reserve price, petitioner approached State Government requesting appointment of an arbitrator – State Government, acting under Section 143-A(3) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act, 1965, unilaterally appointed Commissioner, Konkan Division as arbitrator – Municipal Council, then functioning under a State-appointed Administrator, was given barely nine days' notice and participated under compulsion – Arbitrator delivered award within 42 days – Civil Court made award a rule of court – High Court set aside the award holding no valid arbitration agreement existed – Held: The basic requirement of an arbitration agreement under Section 2(a) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, namely consensus ad idem, was completely absent – Arbitrator lacked inherent jurisdiction – Entire proceedings were coram non judice and the award was non-est – SLP dismissed [Paras 17–20, 26].

Statutory Power – Section 143-A(3) – Scope – Power to Issue Policy Directions Does Not Include Power to Appoint Arbitrator – Section 143-A(3) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act, 1965 empowers the State Government to issue general or special orders to regulate the collection of octroi and the procedure therefor – Held: Such power is confined to policy directions regarding the manner and procedure of octroi collection – Under no circumstances can this provision be extended to appoint an arbitrator between the Municipal Council and its agent in the absence of any statutory or contractual basis – State Government had no jurisdiction to foist arbitration on parties governed by a concluded contract [Paras 18–19].

Contract – Dispute Resolution Clause – Not an Arbitration Agreement – Clause 22 of the contract provided for reference of disputes to the Collector, with appeals to the Divisional Commissioner and thereafter to the Urban Development Department – Held: Clause 22 is a departmental dispute-resolution mechanism and not an arbitration agreement – It leaves no space for alternative dispute resolution – Octroi being an important source of municipal income, dispute resolution was intentionally kept within the governmental hierarchy – Access to justice for the agent could only be through judicial review, civil or statutory remedies [Para 22].

Arbitration – Estoppel – Participation Under Compulsion – No Waiver – The Municipal Council, through its Administrator (a government appointee subordinate to the very officer appointed as arbitrator), had participated in the arbitral proceedings under evident compulsion – The Municipal Council raised jurisdictional objections before the Civil Court and the High Court – Held: Participation in arbitral proceedings under compulsion and without informed consent cannot amount to waiver or acquiescence so as to confer jurisdiction on an arbitrator who had none – Estoppel does not arise where the party was forced into arbitration without consent and subsequently challenged jurisdiction at the earliest opportunity [Paras 23–25].

Decision: Special Leave Petition dismissed – Judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay setting aside the arbitral award upheld – Parties to bear their own costs.

Service Law – Defence Security Corps – Second Service Pension – Condonation of Shortfall – Pension Regulations 1961 and 2008 – Appeals Dismissed – Whether DSC personnel already drawing Regular Army pension are entitled to the benefit of rounding off under Paragraphs 9 and 18 of the Pension Regulations and condonation of shortfall under Paragraphs 125 and 44 thereof – DSC constitutes a Corps of the Indian Army under Section 3(vi) of the Army Act, 1950, and DSC personnel are "Armed Forces personnel" – Pensionary provisions applicable to PBOR of the Regular Army extend equally to DSC personnel by virtue of Paragraphs 266 and 173 of the 1961 and 2008 Regulations, save where inconsistent with DSC-specific provisions – Held: DSC personnel are entitled to rounding off of qualifying service and condonation of shortfall up to 12 months – Appeals dismissed [Paras 26–51].

Qualifying Service – Rounding Off – Paragraphs 9 and 18 – Note 5 of Letter dated 30.10.1987 – Fraction of a year equal to three months and above but less than six months to be treated as a completed half-year for reckoning qualifying service – Appellants directed to first determine the actual length of qualifying service of each respondent by giving effect to this beneficial stipulation before computing any shortfall – Such rounding off is mandatory and governs all Army and DSC personnel alike [Paras 31–32].

Condonation of Deficiency – Paragraph 125/Paragraph 44 – Incorporation by Reference – Paragraphs 266 and 173 of the Pension Regulations, 1961 and 2008 expressly apply all Regular Army pensionary provisions to DSC personnel – No express prohibition against condonation exists in the DSC-specific chapter – Appellants' argument that existence of Paragraph 175 creates inconsistency so as to exclude condonation is untenable – Paragraph 175 prescribes computation of DSC pension but contains no embargo against condonation of shortfall – Held: No inconsistency between Paragraphs 175, 44, and 47 – Condonation of up to one year's shortfall available to DSC personnel [Paras 34–41].

Administrative Letters Cannot Override Regulations – Government letters dated 20.06.2017 and 22.03.2022 purporting to bar condonation of shortfall for DSC second pension are without statutory authority – Government may issue beneficial circulars or clarifications in cases of ambiguity but cannot by administrative fiat amend or override clear statutory provisions of the Pension Regulations – A regulation on the statute book cannot be deemed amended by executive letters – Such letters have been repeatedly struck down by High Courts and the AFT and cannot be revived by re-issuance [Paras 42, 19–21].

Second Service Pension – No Dual Benefit Bar – DSC second service is separate and independent from prior Regular Army service when the personnel opts not to count former service – Condonation of shortfall in DSC service does not amount to dual benefit on the same service – No bar exists under the Regulations against earning a second service pension from DSC service independent of the first – Rounding off and condonation together may render a respondent eligible for the second pension without creating any anomaly in the scheme of the Regulations [Paras 44–46].

Pension – Vested Right – Consistent Judicial View – Settled position affirmed by High Courts and larger Bench of AFT Principal Bench in Smt. Shama Kaur v. Union of India – Pension is a deferred portion of compensation for past service and, upon fulfilment of conditions, constitutes a vested and enforceable right partaking the character of property – Cannot be withheld or curtailed save by authority of law – Union of India's repeated re-issuance of struck-down prohibitory letters deprecated [Paras 40, 43, 50].

Decision: Appeals dismissed with no order as to costs – Union of India directed to determine qualifying service of each respondent giving effect to Paragraphs 9 and 18 and Note 5 of letter dated 30.10.1987, and thereafter to condone shortfall up to 12 months where applicable under Paragraphs 125 and 44 of the Pension Regulations, 1961 and 2008.

Service Law – Indian Navy – Permanent Commission – Short Service Commission Officers – ACR Grading – Structural Prejudice – SSCWOs inducted into the Navy from 1991 onwards were, as a class, ineligible for consideration for Permanent Commission until 2009, and even thereafter only in limited branches/cadres – Male SSCOs in certain non-technical branches were similarly excluded for years – During this period, Annual Confidential Reports were filled with the understanding that these officers had no career progression ahead of them – Under the bell-curve-based appraisal system, higher gradings were reserved for those with promotion prospects, resulting in systematically middling grades for the Appellants – ACRs constituted 90% of the marks in the December 2020 Selection Board, making such historical grades determinative of inter se merit – Following introduction of formal PC endorsement columns in 2009, IOs/COs routinely marked ineligible officers as "Not Recommended for PC" as a matter of policy rather than performance evaluation – Under the Approach Paper, such officers were disqualified if marked "Not Recommended for PC" in three or more of the last five ACR cycles – Held: The institutional assumption that these officers had no future in the Navy was embedded in their service records and later invoked against them at the decisive stage – The circularity of past ineligibility being transformed into deemed unsuitability has materially distorted the assessment of inter se merit and resulted in an uneven playing field [Paras 9–17].

Dynamic Vacancy Model – Vacancy Computation – Rationality – Arbitrariness – Under Regulation 203 of the 1963 Regulations, grant of PC is subject to availability of vacancies in the stabilised cadre – In the December 2020 Selection Board, the Navy applied a Dynamic Vacancy Model, distributing the total cadre deficiency by dividing it across rounds using the divisor 15, with vacancies reducing dynamically with each successive round – Appellants challenged the model as having no policy provenance and artificially suppressing vacancy numbers – Respondents justified it as a one-time mechanism necessitated by the extraordinary situation of considering 24 batches simultaneously – Held: The material time for purposes of Regulation 203 was correctly treated as 2020, being when the Selection Board was convened pursuant to judicial directions – Division of deficiency by 15 corresponds to the approximate additional years of service upon grant of PC and is anchored in service realities rather than caprice – Non-exhaustion of all vacancies is a valid policy choice open to the Competent Authority and does not violate any right of the candidates – Dynamic Vacancy Model held rational and non-arbitrary [Paras 18–43].

Natural Justice – Procedural Fairness – Non-Disclosure of Evaluation Criteria – Unlike the Army and Air Force, which formally promulgated the criteria, vacancy computation methodology, and marks apportionment before conducting Special Selection Boards pursuant to judicial directions, the Indian Navy did not disclose any such material to the assessee officers prior to the December 2020 and September 2022 Selection Boards – Officers were thus unaware that their last five ACR cycles would constitute the exclusive basis of evaluation and had no opportunity to seek redressal of adverse remarks – This opacity was contrary to basic norms of fairness and transparency and, as noted in Amit Kumar Sharma, constituted a breach of natural justice – Held: The Navy was obligated to place relevant policy material in the public domain before commencement of the selection process – Non-disclosure vitiates the selection process – AFT's findings on this aspect affirmed [Paras 44–51].

Relief – Directions – Third Round of Litigation – Grant of Permanent Commission as One-Time Measure – This batch of appeals constitutes the third round of litigation regarding the Appellants' claim for PC before the Supreme Court – Given the inherently skewed ACRs suffered by the Appellants arising from prolonged ineligibility, a fresh Special Selection Board would not yield any equitable result – Held: Instead of remanding for yet another Selection Board, the Court exercised jurisdiction to grant PC directly as a one-time measure to: (a) SSCWOs inducted prior to January 2009; (b) SSCWOs inducted after January 2009 in branches/cadres other than Law, Education, and Naval Architecture; and (c) male SSCOs barred from PC consideration by their initial terms of service – Officers released during pendency of proceedings but falling in these categories deemed to have completed 20 years of qualifying service and entitled to pension and consequential benefits, except arrears of pay – Arrears, if any, to run from 01.01.2025 – For future Selection Boards, General Instructions laying down vacancies, criteria, and marks apportionment to be issued mandatorily before commencement of the Board [Paras 52–57].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Directions of the AFT in the Impugned Judgement dated 27.09.2024 and Impugned Orders dated 13.02.2025 and 06.03.2025 modified – PC granted as a one-time measure to specified categories of serving SSCOs subject to medical fitness and disciplinary clearance – Released officers of specified categories deemed to have completed 20 years of qualifying service and entitled to pension with effect from 01.01.2025 – Respondents directed to issue General Instructions prior to all future Selection Boards and undertake the policy examination directed by the AFT.

Service Law – Permanent Commission – Indian Air Force – Short Service Commission Women Officers – HRP 01/2019 – ACR Grading – Casual Appraisal – New Eligibility Criteria – Held, Appeals Allowed – SSCWOs commissioned after 25.05.2006 challenged denial of Permanent Commission in Boards of 2019, 2020, and 2021 – ACRs were authored in a policy environment where no prospect of long-term career progression existed for such officers – New Minimum Performance Criteria including CGPA in Mandatory In-Service Courses and Categorisation were introduced for the first time under HRP 01/2019 without sufficient transition time – First Board was precipitously convened in March 2019, barely six weeks after the policy came into force in January 2019, depriving SSCOs of any meaningful opportunity to meet the newly-prescribed criteria – AFT and High Court dismissed the challenge – Held: Both impugned judgements set aside [Paras 3–5, 12–17, 25–32].

Annual Confidential Reports – Contextual Distortion – Assessment for Limited Tenure v. Permanent Commission – ACRs of the Appellants were graded by Initiating Officers, Reviewing Officers, and Senior Reviewing Officers under a settled understanding that these SSCOs would serve only a fixed tenure with no pathway to PC – Such reports cannot be retroactively treated as reliable indicators of suitability for long-term retention and leadership – The methodological mismatch between the purpose for which ACRs were written and their subsequent deployment to deny PC is inherently unfair and arbitrary – ACRs authored without reference to career progression cannot be used to disadvantage officers in subsequent competitive selection [Paras 11–17].

Minimum Performance Criteria – Categorisation and MISC CGPA – Abrupt Introduction – HRP 01/2019 introduced, for the first time, minimum Categorisation of Category 'C' and a minimum CGPA of 6.0 in Mandatory In-Service Courses as eligibility thresholds for consideration for PC – Prior policies including HRP 03/2011 prescribed no such requirements – SSCOs had no career incentive to proactively seek Categorisation during the years of the PC embargo – Categorisation results are ordinarily available only in November of each year, making it factually impossible for SSCOs to obtain the requisite qualification before the March 2019 Board – Holding officers to criteria introduced without adequate transition time amounts to arbitrariness in the effect of the policy [Paras 20–30].

Pregnancy and Medical Category – Loss of Consideration – Officers who were on maternity leave or in temporarily lower medical category during one of the three Boards were denied one of only three prescribed opportunities for consideration under HRP 01/2019 – No compensatory provision was made by the Respondents for such officers – Held: The choice to become a parent cannot be equated with unwillingness to pursue professional advancement – Non-accommodation of such officers is arbitrary [Para 31].

Transparency in Selection – Vacancy Disclosure – Respondents failed to publish the number of vacancies available branch-wise prior to the conduct of Boards of 2019, 2020, and 2021 – Such non-disclosure violates basic norms of fairness and transparency – Principle of pre-Board disclosure of vacancies, evaluation criteria, and apportionment of marks shall govern all future Selection Boards of the Air Force [Paras 33–34].

Directions – Deemed Qualifying Service – Pension – All SSCOs who were considered in all three Boards of 2019, 2020, and 2021 (including those declared ineligible in one or more Boards) shall be deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service and shall be entitled to pension and consequential benefits accordingly, except arrears of pay – Arrears of pension to be paid only from 01.01.2025 – PC granted to SSCOs already selected in 2019, 2020, and 2021 not to be disturbed – Intervenor-SSCWOs commissioned in 2011 may pursue their remedies before AFT or High Court while enjoying continued interim protection – Future Boards to be preceded by General Instructions disclosing vacancies, evaluation criteria, and mark apportionment [Paras 36–39].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgements of the AFT dated 26.09.2023 and the High Court dated 19.02.2024 set aside – Directions issued for deemed qualifying service of 20 years and pension entitlement for all SSCOs considered in the 2019, 2020, and 2021 Boards – Future Boards to follow transparency norms.

Service Law – Indian Army – Permanent Commission – Short Service Commission Women Officers – Casual Grading of ACRs – Structural Disadvantage – The Appellant-SSCWOs were commissioned between September 2010 and March 2012, at which time women in cadres other than JAG and AEC were ineligible for PC as a matter of policy – All ACRs relied upon for PC consideration were authored prior to 17.02.2020, during which period the assessing officers were aware that women officers would serve only a finite tenure and had no prospect of substantive career progression – Under the bell-curve-based appraisal system, higher grades were informally reserved for male officers for whom PC was a realistic prospect, while women received routine, middling grades – ACRs account for 75 out of 100 marks in the No. 5 Selection Board, rendering such historical grades determinative of inter se merit – Held: The institutional assumption that SSCWOs had no future in the Army was embedded in their service records and later invoked against them at the decisive stage of PC consideration – ACRs of the Appellant-SSCWOs were not graded with due diligence and fairness to determine suitability for PC, and this adversely affected their overall comparative merit – Finding of the AFT to the contrary is patently erroneous [Paras 8–20].

Disparity in Criteria Appointments and Career-Enhancing Courses – Value Judgement Component – SSCWOs were not systematically detailed for criteria appointments, which are required for classification as 'Adequately Exercised' and which materially influence the subjective value judgement component of the No. 5 Selection Board – Women officers were also excluded from the Junior Command Course and were not incentivised for optional courses during the relevant period – The policy dated 24.02.2012 requires the Selection Board, while awarding the 5 marks for value judgement, to consider appointments held and performance on courses – Held: Though disparities in the number and nature of courses do not affect the computerised evaluation of 10 marks for courses (which is merely an average of scores obtained), they materially influence the value judgement – Several Appellants fell short of the cut-off by less than 0.5 marks, rendering even a minor distortion determinative – Finding of the AFT that differential treatment in appointments and courses had no impact on results is untenable [Paras 21–34].

Vacancy Cap – 250 Vacancies Per Year – Not Sacrosanct – The policy circular dated 15.01.1991 capped PC grants at 250 per year, apportioned between batches considered in the same calendar year based on their inter se batch strengths – This cap has been breached repeatedly in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, in each instance with approval of the Competent Authority – The cap was also exceeded for SSCWOs covered by Babita Puniya directions through the Special No. 5 Selection Board – Held: The ceiling of 250 vacancies is neither rigid nor sacrosanct and may be breached where adherence would perpetuate constitutional inequality – Respondents cannot invoke the cap as a shield against corrective relief where the method of evaluation has been found structurally unfair – AFT's view upholding the cap as an absolute bar is disapproved – However, the decision to increase the cap generally remains a policy matter not amenable to judicial direction in these proceedings [Paras 37–44].

Vacancy Computation – Policy Circular dated 15.01.1991 – Correct Interpretation – The Appellants contended that the 250 vacancies were to be apportioned between the two courses commissioned in the same calendar year, making available 173 vacancies (250 minus 77 already granted to the March 2010 batch) for the September 2010 batch – Held: A plain reading of the policy circular shows that the cap of 250 applies to batches "considered in a year" and "granted Permanent Commission per year," not to batches commissioned in the same calendar year – The File Noting dated 22.01.1991 is a clarificatory document and cannot supplant the policy circular – Respondents' long-standing practice of apportioning vacancies between the batches considered in the same year of the No. 5 Selection Board is consistent with the policy – No merit in the claim of incorrect computation of vacancies [Paras 45–57].

Legitimate Expectation – Male SSCOs – No Reasonable Expectation of Exclusive Consideration – The Appellant-male SSCOs claimed that having been commissioned in September 2010, they had a legitimate expectation to compete for PC only against other male officers – Held: All Appellant-male SSCOs were commissioned after the High Court's judgment in Babita Puniya dated 12.03.2010, which held SSCWOs entitled to be considered for PC in all cadres and which operated without a stay from the date of its pronouncement – No material exists to suggest any representation that the vacancy cap would be expanded – The doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot override a constitutional mandate or an express judicial direction – Claims by male SSCOs rejected [Paras 58–64].

Decision: Appeals by Appellant-SSCWOs allowed – Appeals by Appellant-male SSCOs dismissed – AFT's Impugned Judgements dated 03.07.2024 and 04.09.2024 modified – As a one-time measure under Article 142: (i) PC already granted undisturbed; (ii) SSCWOs released during pendency of proceedings deemed to have completed 20 years of qualifying service and entitled to pension (excluding JAG and AEC cadres), arrears from 01.01.2025; (iii) SSCWOs continuing in service by virtue of court orders and having met 60% cut-off in 2020 and 2021 Boards granted PC subject to medical and disciplinary clearance; (iv) SSCWOs considered by Boards after 2021 to pursue available legal remedies; (v) Respondents directed to review evaluation methodology and cut-offs for future batches.

Central Excise – Exemption – Naphtha – Intended Use – Fertilizer Manufacture – Appellant, a Government of India PSU, procured Naphtha from HPCL at nil duty under Exemption Notification No. 4/1997-CE for use in manufacture of fertilizer and ammonia – Naphtha and natural gas were burned simultaneously in a common boiler to generate steam, which was sent to fertilizer, ammonia, turbo generator, chemical, and heavy water plants – Revenue alleged diversion of Naphtha to non-fertilizer purposes and confirmed duty of Rs. 28.55 crores – CESTAT upheld demand and Section 11AC penalty but set aside Rule 173Q and Rule 25 penalties – Held: Appeals allowed – Duty demand and penalty set aside [Paras 6–61].

Exemption Notification – "Intended Use" – Liberal Construction – The exemption notifications condition the grant of nil rate of duty on Naphtha being "cleared for the intended use" in the manufacture of fertilizer or ammonia – The word "exclusively" does not appear in the notifications – Consistent with Steel Authority of India and Dalmia Dadri Cement, the test is not actual use but intended use – Where Naphtha was procured for and fed into a common steam generation plant primarily for manufacture of fertilizer and ammonia, the benefit cannot be denied merely because the final destination of the steam could not be separately apportioned – Once eligibility for exemption is undisputed, the notification is to be construed liberally [Paras 52–54].

Naphtha in Short Supply – No Diversion – It is admitted that Naphtha was in short supply during the relevant period and was used to supplement natural gas – The total quantity of Naphtha procured was insufficient even to generate all the steam required for the fertilizer plant alone – In such circumstances, no inference of diversion of Naphtha for non-fertilizer products can be drawn – Demand computed on a proportionate basis from a common boiler is based on speculation and cannot be sustained [Paras 27.10, 27.13–27.14].

Extended Period of Limitation – Suppression – Section 11A Proviso – Revenue neutral transaction – All show cause notices related to periods beyond one year from the date of assessment – Revenue invoked the extended five-year period alleging willful suppression – Held: Invocation not justified – Appellant consistently followed Chapter X procedure, furnished all required details to the jurisdictional officer, and obtained CT-2 certificates – Availing of exemption was dependent on interpretation of the notification, which has been upheld – No deliberate or willful suppression is made out – Further, as a PSU receiving Central Government subsidy, any duty paid would have been reimbursed, making the exercise revenue neutral – Revenue neutrality precludes invocation of the extended limitation period [Paras 49–58].

Penalty under Section 11AC – Set Aside – CESTAT upheld penalty under Section 11AC while dropping penalties under Rule 173Q and Rule 25 on the ground that appellant was a recipient and not a manufacturer – Held: Penalty under Section 11AC also not sustainable in view of the finding that the duty demand itself is unsustainable and there was no willful mis-statement or suppression [Para 60].

Rectification Application – Civil Appeal Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21441/2013 – Appellant's application for rectification of CESTAT order on the ground that certain appeal grounds were not considered was rejected by CESTAT and the High Court – In view of the decision allowing the main appeals on merit, the appeal against rejection of the rectification application has been rendered academic and does not require separate adjudication [Paras 5, 27.19, 60].

Decision: Civil Appeal Nos. 2219-2220 of 2013 allowed – Orders-in-original dated 27.01.2010 and 04.02.2010 and CESTAT order dated 27.03.2012 set aside – Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 21441/2013 disposed of as having become academic – No costs.

SLP – Recall of Order – Maintainability of Miscellaneous Application after dismissal – Application sought recall of non-speaking order dismissing SLP based on subsequent developments in insolvency proceedings – Whether such MA maintainable – Held: Post-disposal MA maintainable only in rare cases such as clerical errors or impossibility of execution – Court becomes functus officio after disposal – Present case does not fall within exceptions – MA not maintainable [Paras 4–5]

Subsequent Events – Scope in disposed proceedings – Reliance on OTS, CIRP withdrawal and CoC decisions after dismissal of SLP – Whether subsequent developments can reopen final adjudication – Held: Subsequent events in separate statutory proceedings cannot be examined in collateral MA nor used to reopen concluded SLP – Remedy lies before appropriate forum [Paras 6, 9]

Doctrine of Merger – Dismissal of SLP – Effect – Held: Dismissal of SLP by non-speaking order does not attract doctrine of merger – However, absence of merger does not permit reopening through MA beyond settled parameters [Para 7]

Fraud – Allegation of suppression – Recall jurisdiction – Held: Fraud must be clearly established – Mere allegation insufficient – Non-speaking dismissal order did not rest on any representation alleged to be suppressed – No ground to recall order on fraud basis [Para 8]

IBC – Commercial Wisdom of CoC – Judicial Review – Challenge to settlement and comparative offers – Held: Decisions under Section 12A IBC fall within domain of CoC’s commercial wisdom – Courts cannot sit in appeal over such decisions or compare financial offers – Limited judicial review permissible only on statutory grounds in appropriate proceedings [Paras 10–12]

Finality of Proceedings – Reopening concluded litigation – Attempt to use MA to revisit merits and introduce new grounds beyond original lis – Held: Impermissible – Finality cannot be disturbed through collateral proceedings [Paras 6, 13]

Decision: Miscellaneous Application dismissed – Recall of order dated 25.02.2025 refused – Liberty granted to pursue remedies in appropriate forum – No opinion expressed on merits of pending civil suit or IBC proceedings.