Service Law – Pension – Forfeiture of Past Service on Resignation – Context: The deceased employee, a conductor with DTC, resigned after 29 years of service. The resignation was accepted, but a subsequent request to withdraw it was declined. The legal heirs claimed pension, arguing the resignation should be treated as voluntary retirement given the length of service – Held: Under Rule 26 of the CCS Pension Rules, 1972, resignation entails forfeiture of past service unless allowed to be withdrawn in public interest. The Court refused to re-classify the resignation as voluntary retirement, noting that doing so would obfuscate the legal distinction between the two concepts and render Rule 26 nugatory. Consequently, the employee is not entitled to pensionary benefits – Paras 9.1, 9.6, 17.

Labour Law – Payment of Gratuity – Entitlement upon Resignation – Context: The Corporation denied gratuity to the resigned employee, relying on the forfeiture clause in the Pension Rules – Held: Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 mandates that gratuity is payable to an employee on termination of employment after rendering continuous service of not less than five years, including cases of resignation. As the Corporation failed to produce any exemption notification under Section 5 of the 1972 Act, the employee is entitled to gratuity despite the resignation – Paras 10, 10.1, 10.2.

Service Law – Leave Encashment – Concession by Employer – Context: Claim for leave encashment by the legal heirs of the resigned employee – Held: The Counsel for the Respondent fairly submitted that there is no bar to releasing leave encashment. The Court directed the release of the same to the family members – Para 11.

Decision: Appeal partly allowed - The Appellants are entitled to Gratuity and Leave Encashment with interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of resignation till payment. The claim for Pension is dismissed - Paras 12.

Revenue Law – Correction of Revenue Map – Jurisdiction under Section 30 of U.P. Revenue Code – Challenge to remand order by High Court – Application by private respondents for map correction dismissed in 1998 and affirmed in appeal in 2001 – After more than 17 years, same issue re-agitated under new Code – Authorities again dismissed application and appeal – High Court wrongly set aside those orders and remanded for fresh consideration – Held: High Court misinterpreted Section 30 – Jurisdiction under Section 30 available only for correction of clerical errors or omissions, not for re-opening settled location of plots – Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside [Paras 2, 4, 5.1, 8, 10, 12–15, 18]

Finality of Orders – Bar on Re-litigation – Private respondents’ application for correction of plot location under 1901 Act dismissed in 1998 and upheld in appeal in 2001 – Order attained finality – No subsequent challenge made – Held: Private respondents were barred from raising same issue after 17 years under new Code – Such attempt amounted to forum shopping and abuse of process – No cause of action arose post purchase as sale was with knowledge of location – Re-agitating same issue impermissible [Paras 3, 3.1, 4, 9, 14]

Interpretation of Section 30, U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 – Scope Limited to Error/Omission Correction – Section empowers Collector to maintain and annually update maps and correct errors or omissions – Not intended to permit re-allocation or change of location of plots already finalised – Word “also” in provision indicates limited scope for correction, not reopening concluded disputes – High Court misread provision by allowing substantive change under guise of correction – Held: Change of location of plot does not fall within ambit of Section 30 – Application rightly dismissed by revenue authorities [Paras 12, 13, 14]

Judicial Discipline – Remand Orders – Interference by Supreme Court – High Court remanded matter on misinterpretation of statute – Held: Though normally Supreme Court does not interfere with remand orders, in cases where remand causes multiplicity of litigation due to erroneous legal understanding, interference is warranted – Courts must avoid unnecessary remands – Reference to Satyadhyan Ghosal, M.C. Mehta, Sudhir Kumar Singh, and Krishnadatt Awasthy – Remand in present case based on flawed legal premise, hence liable to be set aside [Paras 6, 16, 17]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 21.09.2023 of High Court set aside – Orders dated 15.01.2020 (by Respondent No.4) and 25.04.2023 (by Respondent No.5) restored – Private respondents’ attempt to reopen settled issue disallowed – No further relief to be granted to them [Para 18]

Arbitration Law – Termination of Proceedings – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sections 25, 30, 32, 38 – Interpretation of Tribunal's Power – The Supreme Court held that Section 32 of the Act is exhaustive and covers all cases of termination of arbitral proceedings. The power of the arbitral tribunal to terminate proceedings under the scheme of the Act lies only in Section 32(2). Sections 25, 30, and 38 merely denote the circumstances in which the tribunal would be empowered to take recourse to Section 32(2) and thereby terminate the proceedings. [Paras 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 415(I), 415(II), 415(III), 415(IV), 415(V), 415(VI)].

Arbitration Law – Termination of Proceedings – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 32 – Effect of Termination – The expression "the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal shall terminate" in Section 32 and its omission in Sections 25, 30, and 38 cannot be construed to mean that the nature of termination under Section 32(2) is distinct from termination under the other provisions. The expression "mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal" is descriptive of the tribunal's function to adjudicate disputes. Irrespective of the reason for termination (final award, withdrawal of claims, default by claimant, or impossibility), the legal effect is the same: the arbitral tribunal is divested of authority to act in the reference. The common thread across Sections 25, 30, 32, and 38 is that termination, for varied reasons, concludes the arbitral reference and extinguishes the tribunal's authority. [Paras 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 415(I), 415(II), 415(III), 415(IV), 415(V), 415(VI)].

Arbitration Law – Termination of Proceedings – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sections 25, 32(2), 38 – Consequences of Termination – Termination of proceedings under Sections 25 and 38 is not a trivial procedural formality but penalizes inertia and recalcitrance. Allowing re-initiation of arbitration after termination due to contumacious conduct would defeat procedural self-responsibility and lead to "Tribunal Hopping." Therefore, termination under Section 25 or 38 is an order under Section 32(2). [Paras 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 415(I), 415(II), 415(III), 415(IV), 415(V), 415(VI)].

Arbitration Law – Arbitrator's Fees – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 38, Fourth Schedule – Consent and Revision of Fees – The Sole Arbitrator initially determined fees based on the Fourth Schedule with parties' consent. Upon filing of counter-claims, the fees were revised based on the Fourth Schedule. The Court in Afcons (supra) held that the Fourth Schedule is a model fee schedule and binding, and parties cannot object to fees fixed in accordance with it if no consensus is reached. While the Sole Arbitrator should have sought consent for revised fees, the termination of proceedings due to non-payment was not bad in law, as the parties had initially agreed to the Fourth Schedule and refused to pay their share for their own claims. [Paras 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424].

Arbitration Law – Arbitrator's Fees – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 38 – Payment Responsibility – Section 38 mandates equal sharing of fees, and if one party defaults, the other may pay; if both decline, the tribunal may suspend or terminate proceedings. A claimant is responsible for their own claims' fees, and a respondent for their counter-claims' fees, including the other party's share if the latter defaults. The arbitral tribunal had no alternative but to terminate proceedings when appellants refused to pay requisite fees for their claims. [Paras 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424].

Arbitration Law – Remedy against Termination Order – Arbitral Tribunal's Power – Where an arbitral tribunal terminates proceedings, the appropriate remedy is to first file an application for recall of such order before the arbitral tribunal itself. The arbitral tribunal possesses inherent procedural power to recall an order terminating proceedings to correct patent or procedural errors, not to revisit merits. If the recall application is dismissed, the aggrieved party can approach the court under Section 14(2) of the Act to determine if the arbitrator's mandate legally terminated. [Paras 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 415(VII), 415(VIII), 415(IX), 415(X), 410, 411, 412].

Arbitration Law – Remedy against Termination Order – Court's Power – The court can then set aside the termination order and remand the matter or appoint a substitute arbitrator under Section 15. A fresh application under Section 11 to initiate a second round of arbitration is not permissible. [Paras 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 415(VII), 415(VIII), 415(IX), 415(X), 410, 411, 412].

Arbitration Law – Remedy against Termination Order – Constitutional Remedy (Article 227) – The Act, 1996, being a complete code, generally restricts challenges to interlocutory orders under Article 227, except in exceptional circumstances like want of good faith or where the litigant is remediless. Termination of proceedings under Section 32(2) that results in termination of proceedings can be challenged under Article 227 if no other statutory remedy exists. A party who, by obdurate stance, allows proceedings to terminate should ordinarily not be allowed to re-initiate arbitration to prevent "Tribunal Hopping" and misuse of the arbitral system. [Paras 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 415(VII), 415(VIII), 415(IX), 415(X), 410, 411, 412].

Arbitration Law – Legislative Reform – Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 2024 – Suggestions for Consolidation and Clarification – The Court noted the persistent procedural issues in Indian arbitration, particularly regarding termination of proceedings. It suggested that the Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 2024, should consolidate the power to terminate proceedings into a single provision (like SIAC or LCIA Rules) or clarify contradictory phraseology to ensure consistency. The Bill should explicitly define the nature and effect of termination, the arbitral tribunal's authority to entertain recall applications, and provide a proper remedy against termination orders. [Paras 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 413, 414].

Arbitration Law – Legislative Reform – Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 2024 – Suggestions for Statutory Appeal – Parliament should consider a statutory appeal under Section 37 of the Bill against termination orders, similar to orders under Section 16. A policy decision is needed on whether a belligerent party should be allowed to re-initiate arbitration after wilful termination. [Paras 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 413, 414].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Matter remanded to the High Court for appointment of a substitute arbitrator.

Criminal Law – Conviction under IPC and SC/ST Act – Acquittal – Appellants convicted by Special Court for offences under Sections 354, 323 IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST Act based on victim’s complaint of assault and caste-based abuse – High Court affirmed conviction – Supreme Court finds inconsistencies in victim’s and her brother’s (PW-2) testimonies – Medical evidence not fully supporting prosecution version – Witnesses from locality not examined despite claim that many saw the incident – Held: Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction unsustainable [Paras 7, 9, 14–18, 20–22]

Evidence Law – Hostile Witness – Admissibility of Testimony – Held: The evidence of a hostile witness cannot be totally rejected if it supports either the prosecution or the accused; it must be subjected to closer scrutiny. The High Court erred in ignoring the testimony of PW-4 (a relative of the victim) solely because he was declared hostile. PW-4’s deposition regarding a scuffle at a crowded Ganesh Puja pandal supported the defense theory of how injuries were sustained, offering a probable alternative to the prosecution's narrative. [Paras 19, 21]

SC/ST Act – Section 3(1)(xi) – Motive based on Caste – Held: A finding that an offence was committed simply because the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste cannot be recorded abruptly without evidence. The High Court’s conclusion that the offence was committed "simply for reason that the complainant was belonging to scheduled caste" was termed perverse, as neither the victim nor the eyewitness (PW-2) deposed that the accused acted based on the victim's caste identity. [Para 20]

Criminal Law – Appreciation of Evidence – Medical vs. Ocular Evidence – Held: Significant discrepancies existed between the ocular version and medical evidence. The victim alleged nail marks on her back, and PW-2 alleged bleeding from the nose/mouth, but the medical officer (PW-5) found no such specific injuries, noting only simple scratches consistent with a fall or being dragged. This medical opinion corroborated the defense version of a scuffle/fall at a pandal rather than the assault described in the FIR. [Paras 10, 15-16]

Criminal Law – Non-examination of Independent Witnesses – Held: The prosecution failed to examine any independent witnesses from the locality despite the claim that "many people" had seen the incident. The failure to produce independent witnesses, coupled with the fact that no one intervened during the alleged assault, rendered the testimony of the interested witness (PW-2) unbelievable. [Paras 14, 18]

Decision: Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentence set aside. Appellants discharged from bail bonds. [Paras 23-24]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - Legally Enforceable Debt - Violation of Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 269SS - Cash Transaction exceeding Rs. 20,000 - Effect on enforceability of debt - Presumption under Section 139 NI Act - Breach of Section 269SS does not render transaction unenforceable or rebut presumptions under NI Act - Penal provision only.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 269SS - The High Court acquitted the accused in a Section 138 NI Act case, holding that a debt of Rs. 9,00,000/- extended by cash transaction violated Section 269SS of the IT Act, 1961, and thus was not a 'legally enforceable debt' - This view was based on the High Court's own judgment in P.C. Hari vs. Shine Varghese & Anr. - The Supreme Court, relying on its earlier decision in Sanjabij Tari vs. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr., held that a breach of Section 269SS of the IT Act, 1961, is subject only to a penalty under Section 271D of the IT Act, 1961 - Neither Section 269SS nor Section 271D declares such transactions illegal, invalid, or statutorily void - Therefore, a violation of Section 269SS does not render the transaction unenforceable under Section 138 of the NI Act or rebut the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act - The conclusion of law in P.C. Hari (supra) was set aside - Consequently, the very foundation of the impugned High Court judgment was deemed unsustainable - Paras 3, 5, 6, 7, 8.

Decision: Appeal allowed - Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside - Matter remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits - Parties directed to appear before the High Court on 17.02.2026 - Paras 9, 10, 11.

Criminal Law – Anticipatory Bail – Cancellation – Factors to be Considered – The Appellant (Complainant) challenged the High Court's grant of anticipatory bail to the Respondent (Accused), a Senior Accountant alleged to have embezzled over Rs. 3 Crores – Held: The High Court erred by taking a mechanical route and failing to consider the investigation status report which categorically stated the accused was on the run and custodial interrogation was necessary to recover embezzled amounts and identify accomplices – The High Court's reasoning that the accused returned half the amount and was willing to declare assets was insufficient to override the requirements of a fair investigation – Order granting bail set aside. [Paras 9-13]

Criminal Law – Custodial Interrogation – Impact of Chargesheet – The accused contended that since the chargesheet had been filed (on 22.05.2025), custodial interrogation was no longer warranted – Held: Even if a chargesheet is filed, the judgment granting bail is vitiated if it suffers from non-consideration of essential facts at the time of passing the order – The initial failure to consider the gravity of the offence and the conduct of the accused (absconding) renders the bail order legally untenable. [Para 12]

Criminal Law – Principles for Cancellation of Bail – Distinction between Appeal against Grant of Bail and Application for Cancellation – Reiterated principles from Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab – An appellate court can interfere if the order granting bail suffers from perversity, illegality, or non-application of mind to relevant factors such as the gravity of the offence and the impact on society. [Paras 7-8]

Decision: Appeal allowed. Impugned order dated 02.04.2025 set aside. Accused directed to surrender before the Trial Court within two weeks. [Paras 13, 15]

Criminal Law – Murder – Appeal Against Conviction – Acquittal - First Information Report (FIR) – Omission of Accused’s Name – informant (PW-1) lodged the FIR based on immediate information provided by the eyewitness (PW-2). The FIR stated the assailants were "two unknown masked persons" and did not name the Appellant, who was well-known to the eyewitness (her husband's brother-in-law). PW-2 later claimed in her Section 161 CrPC statement that she identified the Appellant as his mask fell off. – Held: The omission of the name of a known accused in the FIR, despite the eyewitness disclosing minute details of the incident to the informant immediately, is a material lacuna. It strikes at the root of the prosecution case and impeaches the credibility of the eyewitness. The explanation of illness/shock was rejected as the witness was capable of describing weapons and physical features at the time. - [Paras 41, 45].

Criminal Law – Witness Credibility – Improvements and Enmity – Context: Appellant was the brother of the deceased's second wife; prior enmity existed between the families. PW-2 introduced the story of the mask falling off and voice identification four days after the incident. – Held: The belated introduction of the Appellant's name appears to be a clear manipulation devised to implicate him due to prior enmity. The testimony was full of embellishments and contradictions, rendering it unreliable. - [Paras 39, 43].

Criminal Law – Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Relevance when Accused is Known – Context: Police conducted a TIP for the Appellant despite the eyewitness claiming she knew him and had identified him during the incident. – Held: If the witness had actually named the accused, there was no justification for conducting a TIP. The fact that a TIP was conducted suggests the witness could not identify the assailants at the time of the incident. - [Para 42].

Criminal Law – Circumstantial Evidence – Recovery of Blood-Stained Articles – Context: Human blood was detected on the axe and clothes recovered from the Appellant, but the blood group could not be determined due to disintegration. – Held: Mere detection of human blood without determination of blood group is inconsequential and cannot connect the accused with the crime, especially when the primary evidence is shaky. - [Para 47].

Decision: Appeal allowed - Conviction set aside - Appellant acquitted and directed to be released forthwith. - [Paras 49-50].

Criminal Law – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 3(1)(s) – "Place within public view" – Allegations that Appellants hurled caste-based abuses at the complainant inside her house – Held: To constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s), the place must be open where members of the public can witness or hear the utterance – If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of a wall where members of the public are not present, it cannot be said to have taken place within public view – The complaint specifically averred that abuses were uttered inside the premises – Essential ingredient of "public view" not satisfied – Summoning order qua SC/ST Act quashed – Paras 10-13, 16.

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of Summoning Order – Scope of Appellate Powers – Context of summoning order issued by Special Judge and upheld by High Court despite lack of ingredients for SC/ST Act offence – Held: While appellate powers must be exercised with caution, the Court must examine the contents of the complaint as they stand – Where essential ingredients of the offence (specifically regarding public view under SC/ST Act) are prima facie absent, the Court ought to exercise powers to quash the proceedings – High Court erred in concluding the incident occurred in public view contrary to the complaint's averments – Paras 13-15.

Decision: Appeal partly allowed - Proceedings under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act quashed - Trial to proceed for offences under Sections 323 and 504 IPC - Paras 16-17.

Constitutional Law – Judicial Review of Economic Policy – Revision of Property Tax – Akola Municipal Corporation revised property tax rates after a gap of 16 years (since 2001) – High Court quashed the resolution citing procedural lapses – Held: The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by sitting in appeal over a policy decision. Tax revision falls squarely within the domain of the Corporation. Courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the legislature or its agents in matters of economic policy unless the decision is ex-facie arbitrary, perverse, or unconstitutional. Trivial procedural errors do not vitiate the entire tax regime. – [Paras 19-24, 26].

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – Locus Standi and Abuse of Process – Writ Petition by Corporator – Respondent No. 1, a sitting Corporator, filed a PIL challenging the tax revision and the tender process for property survey – Held: The PIL was a subterfuge to air individual grievances and potential business conflicts (challenging specific tenders). The petitioner did not represent the public at large but raised technical procedural objections. PILs cannot be entertained when filed to settle personal scores or business interests, especially when statutory remedies (Section 406 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act) exist. – [Paras 12-16, 18].

Municipal Laws – Financial Autonomy of Municipal Bodies – Obligation to Revise Taxes – Context: The Corporation had not revised taxes for 16 years, leading to revenue stagnation – Held: Municipal bodies have a statutory obligation and financial autonomy to generate revenue for public welfare (sanitation, health, infrastructure). Dependence on State grants weakens their functional efficacy. The revision of tax after 16 years was justified and necessary to match rising costs; the lack of revision for such a long period depicted gross laxity. – [Paras 6-9, 27].

Decision: Appeals allowed - Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside - [Paras 28-29].