Facts:

The case involved the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation as the appellant and Ragupathi Ragavan and others as the respondents. The dispute arose from the distribution of funds from the liquidation of Theni Cooperative Urban Bank Ltd.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's direction to the Official Liquidator to distribute remaining funds to depositors instead of repaying them to the Corporation was in line with statutory provisions.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's direction contradicted the statutory provisions outlined in the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, particularly Section 21, which mandates repayment to the Corporation after initial payments to depositors. The Court emphasized the Act's guarantee of repayment of Rs. 1 lakh to each depositor and prohibited payments exceeding this amount without regard to statutory provisions. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and directing the Official Liquidator and Special Officer to act in accordance with statutory provisions.

Payment to Depositors—The object with which the Act has been enacted has been stated hereinabove in a nutshell. The object was to insure the depositors so that they may not have to stand in a queue before the Official Liquidator for every paisa deposited by them with the concerned bank.—High Court to the Official Liquidator and the Special Officer of the Bank, which is in liquidation, whereby they have been directed to pay the unpaid amount to the depositors instead of paying the same to the Corporation.—Regulation 22 also provides that the Official Liquidator, after making necessary provision for the expenses in relation to the liquidation proceedings and for declaration of dividend, as prescribed in the Regulations, has to make payment to the Corporation.—High Court should not have given the direction which, if complied with, would run contrary to the statutory provisions incorporated in the Act.—Even if one looks at the entire issue from different point of view, one would believe that all the depositors have by and large equal right. If the amount deposited is less than Rs. 1 lakh, each depositor gets the amount in full, but if the deposit is exceeding Rs. 1 lakh, then only the amount which is in excess of Rs. 1 lakh may not be given to the depositor, unless the bank in liquidation is having sufficient funds which can be given to all on pro-rata basis after providing for expenditure in the liquidation proceedings and after repaying the amount to the Corporation as per the provisions of the Act. The Act in a way guarantees repayment of Rs. 1 lakh to each depositor. The High Court or any other authority has no power to direct payment in excess of Rs. 1 lakh by ignoring statutory provisions of the Act and the Regulations made thereunder.—High Court had exceeded its authority while giving a direction to the Official Liquidator, which is not in consonance with the statutory provisions and therefore, we set aside the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge as also by the Division Bench and direct the Official Liquidator and the Special Officer to act in accordance with the statutory provisions.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Jayant Bhushan, Jaideep Gupta, Senior Advs., Kuldeep S. Parihar, H.S. Parihar, Puneet Jain, Chisti Jain, Chhaya Kirti, Pratibha Jain, C.S.N. Rao, Santhana Krishnan, A. Ramesh, K.N. Rai, G. Sivabalamurugan, Anish Mohammad, L.K. Pandey, A.D.N. Rao, A. Venka

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

The appellant, Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd., filed civil appeals against Sanjay Dalia & Anr. concerning territorial jurisdiction issues under Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act.

The appellant's principal place of business was in Mumbai, and the cause of action also arose there. However, the appellant had a branch office in Delhi.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act provide jurisdiction to the Delhi court despite the appellant's principal place of business being in Mumbai?

How should the provisions be interpreted to balance convenience for both parties?

Held:

The provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act must be interpreted purposively. While the appellant can file a suit where they reside or carry on business, if the cause of action arises where they reside or carry on business, the suit must be filed at that place.

The intention behind the provisions was to provide convenience to plaintiffs, not inconvenience defendants. The court must interpret statutes to prevent inconvenience to parties.

The Explanation to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure clarifies that once a corporation has a subordinate office where the cause of action arises, the suit must be filed at that place.

Cause of action is essential for filing a suit, and Section 20 of the CPC recognizes the territorial jurisdiction of courts where the cause of action arises.

The court must avoid causing counter mischief to defendants while providing relief to plaintiffs under the provisions in question.

Decision: The court held that since the appellant's principal place of business and cause of action were in Mumbai, the provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act did not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi court. Therefore, the Delhi court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suits.

Facts:

The respondent, Registrar of the National Institute of Technology (NIT), faced allegations of financial and administrative irregularities. The Principal & Secretary of NIT issued an order of dismissal against the respondent.

Issues:

The legality of the dismissal order was contested, primarily on the basis that the Principal & Secretary lacked the authority to issue such an order.

The question revolved around whether the authority to dismiss the respondent rested with the Board of Governors (BOG) of NIT or with the Principal & Secretary.

Held:

The resolutions passed by the Board of Governors (BOG) demonstrated their active involvement in monitoring, dealing with, and deciding the case against the respondent. The BOG authorized the Principal & Secretary to handle the matter in consultation with the Chairman of the BOG and to take necessary actions, including passing appropriate orders.

The resolutions, although not explicitly mentioning "dismissal," provided the Principal & Secretary with broad powers to take necessary actions, including dismissal, depending on the outcome of the departmental inquiry. This approach avoided prejudging the issue against the respondent and ensured compliance with procedural fairness.

Considering the contents of the resolutions, it became evident that the dismissal order was effectively passed by the BOG, and the Principal & Secretary merely signed the order on behalf of the BOG, based on the authorization granted to them.

The principle of ratification was applied, which retroactively validated the actions taken by the Principal & Secretary, even if initially unauthorized. The subsequent approval by the BOG ratified their actions, making the dismissal order lawful.

Decision: The dismissal order, being passed by the Competent Authority (BOG) as prescribed in the Rules, was deemed legal and proper. Consequently, the order passed by the High Court, which may have challenged the dismissal, was set aside.

Facts:Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) appealed against assessments made under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. The main contention was the interpretation of an exemption notification (GSR 307(E) dated 31.03.1983) under Section 24AA of the Surtax Act. The ONGC had entered into agreements with various foreign companies for services related to mineral oil extraction, but these agreements did not involve direct association or participation of the ONGC or the Central Government in the extraction process.

Issues:The primary issue revolved around the interpretation of the exemption notification and whether the agreements entered into by ONGC with foreign companies for services related to mineral oil extraction were covered under the exemption.

Held and Decision:The Court emphasized the importance of strict interpretation of tax laws and exemption notifications. It held that the exemption was granted only to foreign companies with whom the Central Government had agreements for direct association or participation in mineral oil extraction. The exemption did not extend to foreign companies providing services or facilities related to mineral oil extraction. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the orders of the High Court.

Paragraphs with relevant para no. in this judgment:Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 contain the crux of the court's holding and decision.

Facts:

The case concerns the authority of the PNGRB under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2008, to fix transportation tariffs for consumers of natural gas.

Issues:

Whether the PNGRB has the power to regulate transportation tariffs for consumers of natural gas, including the maximum retail price and network tariffs.

Held:

The PNGRB is empowered under Section 22(1) of the Act to regulate transportation tariffs for common carriers, contract carriers, or city/local natural gas distribution networks, subject to the provisions of the Act.

Section 11 and the expression "subject to" in Section 22 indicate that the PNGRB's powers are conditional and must yield to other provisions of the Act. The focus is on common carriers or contract carriers, not consumers.

The legislative intent, as per the scheme of the Act, does not include entities beyond common carriers or contract carriers. The Act deliberately excludes entities not specified under Section 11.

The Act does not confer the power to regulate network tariffs or compression charges for consumers on the PNGRB. Therefore, the regulations framed by the PNGRB in this regard are declared ultra vires.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision that the regulations in question are ultra vires the PNGRB's powers under the Act.

Facts:

The respondent filed a civil suit against the appellants seeking various reliefs, including injunctions and damages for alleged defamation.

The respondent also filed a notice of motion seeking interim relief during the pendency of the suit.

The court granted ex parte ad-interim relief to the respondent but did not conclude the hearing on the notice of motion for two years.

The respondent filed a contempt petition alleging violations of the ex parte interim order by the appellants.

The court entertained the contempt petition and issued a show cause notice to the appellants.

Subsequently, the respondent filed another affidavit alleging fresh contempts by the appellants.

Issues:

Prompt disposal of the main case and related motions.

Alleged violations of the ex parte interim order by the appellants.

Held:

The Court refrained from making findings on the merits of the issues and instructed the lower courts to decide the matter strictly in accordance with the law. The Court directed the single judge of the High Court, who was handling the main civil suit and the notice of motion, to dispose of the notice of motion on its merits promptly, preferably within three months. The Supreme Court stayed the contempt proceedings until the disposal of the notice of motion. All issues, including the appellants' potential remedies under the Contempt of Courts Act, were kept open for consideration at the appropriate stage.

The appeals stand accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The Appellant owned land leased to the Indian Oil Corporation for operating a retail outlet dealership.

The dealership agreement was terminated due to a Supreme Court decision, prompting eviction proceedings by the Corporation.

The Appellant challenged the eviction order, claiming the lease agreement terminated with the dealership agreement.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the dealership agreement automatically terminated the lease agreement.

Applicability of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.

Held:

The lease agreement and dealership agreement were separate documents, and termination of one did not affect the other (Para 18).

The Public Premises Act applied, and the Appellant was considered a trespasser after termination of the dealership (Para 19).

The Appellant's argument for reconsideration under a new policy was rejected; if policy permits, the Appellant could apply without obstructing Corporation's operations (Para 20).

The appeal was dismissed, and the Appellant directed to vacate the premises within four weeks, failing which would result in contempt of court (Para 22).

Facts:

The case involved a bomb blast resulting in fatalities and injuries. The charge sheet was filed under sections of the TADA Act, IPC, and Explosives Substance Act. A confession was recorded under section 15 of the TADA Act, implicating the accused. The trial court rejected the confession due to language discrepancies.

Issues:

Admissibility of confession under Section 15(1) of the TADA Act.

Language requirement for recording confessions.

Corroboration requirement for using confessions against co-accused.

Held:

The confession under Section 15(1) of the TADA Act is admissible against the maker, co-accused, abettor, or conspirator if recorded in accordance with statutory requirements and guidelines.

The requirement to record confessions in a specific language under Rule 15(1) of the TADA Rules is discretionary, not mandatory. Recording in the language of communication between the accused and the recording officer is permissible.

The confession must be corroborated generally by other evidence on record when used against co-accused.

Decision: The acquittal of one accused was set aside as his confession was admissible and sufficiently corroborated. However, the acquittal of the other accused was affirmed due to lack of corroboration.

Facts:

The dispute arose when the Tahasildar imposed luxury tax on a building consisting of 13 residential apartments based on the total plinth area of the entire building. The respondent challenged this tax imposition in the Kerala High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether luxury tax should be levied on each residential apartment individually, considering the plinth area of each apartment, or whether the plinth area of all apartments should be aggregated for tax calculation.

Held:

The Court extensively analyzed the relevant sections of the Kerala Building Tax Act, particularly Section 2(e), Section 2(k), and Section 5A. It emphasized the importance of purposive interpretation to serve the legislative intent. The Court concluded that luxury tax should be levied based on the plinth area of each residential apartment, considering them as separate units. It rejected the idea of aggregating the plinth area of all apartments for tax calculation. The Court clarified that if an individual owns multiple apartments in a building, luxury tax should be computed based on the aggregate plinth area subject to the cap provided under Section 5A of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remanded to the revenue authority to compute the luxury tax accordingly.