U.P. Stamp (Valuation of Property) Rules, 1997, Rule 7(3) - Spot Inspection - Requirement of Notice - District Magistrate conducted spot inspection without issuing notice to the petitioner - Inspection report indicated land was situated in Vista Farmhouse Colony with cemented roads and boundary walls - Petitioner contended violation of procedural rules - Held, while Rule 7(3) stipulates that the Collector may inspect property after due notice, the failure to issue notice constitutes a mere irregularity and not an illegality unless the petitioner demonstrates substantial prejudice. Since the petitioner failed to provide specific evidence to refute the physical findings of the report, the inspection remains valid. [Paras 6, 12, 18-22].

Indian Stamp Act, 1899, Section 47A - Market Value - Potentiality of Land - Valuation based on proximate use - Petitioner purchased land as agricultural but surrounding areas were developed for residential purposes and sold as small plots - Held, following the Full Bench decision in Smt. Pushpa Sareen vs. State of U.P., the market value must be determined considering the use to which the land is reasonably capable of being put in the proximate future. The potentiality of the land as on the date of execution of the instrument is a material factor, and the Collector is justified in considering commercial/residential activities in the vicinity. [Paras 23-26].

Indian Stamp Act, 1899, Sections 33 and 40(b) - Deficiency of Stamp Duty - Suppression of facts - Sale deed executed by petitioner as Director of a construction company - Modus operandi involved purchasing agricultural land and quickly selling it as residential units - Finding of residential utility at the time of execution - Held, the impugned orders determining deficiency, imposing penalty, and interest are supported by both facts and law; suppression of actual land nature justifies the demand. [Paras 8-9, 23, 27].

Decision: All writ petitions are dismissed – Impugned orders for deficiency of stamp duty and penalty affirmed.

Civil Law - Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, Section 50 - Succession to Male Bhumidhar - Married Daughter - Exclusion from Inheritance - Land originally held by a male bhumidhar (Ram Singh) was mutated in 1966 in equal shares between his son and married daughter (Rajban). Held, Section 50 of the DLRA provides a specific order of succession which includes an unmarried daughter but excludes a married daughter. Succession opens at the time of the death of the tenure-holder and is governed by the statute as it stood then. The married daughter, not being a statutory heir, did not acquire any inheritable interest despite the revenue entry. [Paras 19-20, 40].

Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, Sections 50, 51 and 53 - Nature of Mutation - Fiscal Entry vs Title - Petitioners claimed title through long-standing mutation and possession. Held, mutation entries are maintained solely for fiscal purposes and revenue administration. They do not, by themselves, create, vest, enlarge, or extinguish title. Inheritable rights in agricultural holdings governed by the DLRA cannot be created merely by a mutation entry in the absence of a legally recognised mode of transfer or devolution. [Paras 23-25, 34, 38].

General Principles of Law - Waiver, Estoppel and Family Arrangement - No Estoppel against Statute - Petitioners invoked waiver and long-term acquiescence by the son (Chander). Held, there can be no estoppel against statute. Conduct cannot confer a status which the law withheld. Mere silence or long-standing revenue entries do not constitute a legally operative abandonment of statutory rights in agricultural land. A family settlement must be specifically pleaded and proved with a juridical foundation, which was absent in the present case. [Paras 26-31, 39].

Precedents - Prospective Overruling - Applicability of Ram Mehar v. Mst. Dakhan - Conflict between personal law and DLRA. Held, judicial decisions are generally declaratory of what the law has always been. In the absence of an express direction for prospective operation by the court, a ruling remains retroactive. The Financial Commissioner was justified in applying the authoritative view in Ram Mehar (1972) that succession to bhumidhari rights is strictly governed by the DLRA and not general personal law, regardless of the earlier administrative understanding or the Gopi Chand (1964) decision. [Paras 32-36].

Constitution of India, Articles 226 and 227 - Supervisory Jurisdiction - Limits of Review - Challenge to Financial Commissioner's order. Held, the High Court’s supervisory role is limited to checking for legal misdirection, jurisdictional error, or manifest perversity. It is not a rehearing on facts. As the Financial Commissioner identified the correct legal position regarding the effect of mutation entries, no ground for interference is made out. [Paras 37-38, 42].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Financial Commissioner's order dated 14/11/2006 upheld – No legal or jurisdictional infirmity found.

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, Sections 2(zk), 2(zn), 3, 4 and 5 - Promoter - Real Estate Project - Requirement of Registration - Element of Sale - Respondent obtained land on lease from a Trust for 29 years and 11 months to develop a commercial building with rights to sub-lease but no right to sell ownership - U.P. RERA rejected registration while Appellate Tribunal directed it - Held, the purpose of 'selling' is sine-qua-non for a person to be a 'promoter' under Section 2(zk) and for a project to be a 'real estate project' under Section 2(zn). In the absence of a sale component, the activity does not attract the provisions of the Act. A lessee with restricted rights of possession and sub-leasing without the power to transfer title by sale is not required to seek registration under Section 4. [Paras 30-38, 47-49].

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, Section 4(2)(l)(A) - Application for Registration - Legal Title - Authentication of title where land is owned by another - Held, while the statute provides for authentication of title for land owned by third parties, the statutory scheme primarily governs projects undertaken for the purpose of sale to allottees. Where the developer lacks the legal authority to sell plots, apartments, or buildings under the lease terms, the project falls outside the ambit of the Act. [Paras 43-48].

Interpretation of Statutes - Literal Rule of Construction - Intent of Legislature - Maxim A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum - Held, court must read sections in their literal sense and cannot rewrite them. The legislature consciously used the term 'sale' in defining the scope of RERA. When the language of a statutory provision is clear and unambiguous, it must be presumed that the legislature deliberately employed such words to give effect to the object of the Act, which is to regulate projects intended for sale. [Paras 39-41].

Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Sections 54 and 105 - Distinction between Sale and Lease - Held, a lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy property for a certain time, whereas a sale is a transfer of ownership for a price. RERA registration is predicated on the promoter's ability to execute a registered conveyance deed in favour of the allottee under Section 17, which is impossible where the developer only holds leasehold rights without the power of sale. [Paras 13, 31-33].

Decision: Appeal disposed of – Order of the Appellate Tribunal set aside to the extent it directed registration – Appellant Authority is under no obligation to provide registration number or Login ID as the respondent's project is beyond the purview of the Act – Authority directed to withdraw Form-D prohibitory/restrictive clauses against the Respondent.

Criminal Law - Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 - Section 138 - Quashing of Proceedings - Non-signatory Spouse - Liability under Section 138 is strictly in personam requiring a mandatory identity-link between the account holder, the drawer, and the signatory - Petitioner being a total stranger to the account and non-signatory to the instrument cannot be prosecuted - Held - To compel a non-signatory to undergo trial to prove a negative is a manifest failure of justice - [Paras 25-31]

Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 - Section 141 - Vicarious Liability - Sole Proprietorship - A sole proprietorship is not a Company within the meaning of Section 141 as it lacks a separate legal identity from its proprietor - Liability in a proprietorship begins and ends with the proprietor alone - Marital relationship is not a legal substitute for a partnership deed - Held - Roping in a spouse as a person in charge of a sole proprietorship is a legal fallacy and impermissible - [Paras 32-37, 61]

Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 - Section 138 Proviso (b) - Statutory Demand Notice - Gross Discrepancy - Dishonoured cheque was for 36,07,687 while the demand notice claimed only 7,607 - Statute requires a demand for the said amount of money meaning the exact cheque amount - Held - A notice claiming a fraction of the debt misleads the drawer and is non-est in the eyes of law - Cause of action never matures without a valid notice - [Paras 38-44]

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 202 - Mandatory Inquiry - Out-of-state Accused - Section 202 (now Section 225 BNSS) makes it obligatory for a Magistrate to inquire or direct investigation when the accused resides beyond the court's territorial jurisdiction - Requirement acts as a judicial sieve to prevent harassment of distant residents - Held - Mechanical issuance of process against a resident of Karnataka by a Kolkata court without mandatory inquiry constitutes a jurisdictional error - [Paras 45-52]

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 - Section 528 - Inherent Powers - Abuse of Process - Complainant used ambiguous description of proprietorship/partnership to circumvent restrictive boundaries of NI Act and suppressed the true legal status of the entity - Held - Initiation of proceedings against the non-signatory wife was a strategic attempt to exert extra-legal pressure and constituted a blatant abuse of the process of law - Proceedings quashed - [Paras 53-60]

Decision: Criminal Revisional Application allowed – Proceedings in Case No. CS/35126/2022 pending before the Learned 7th Judicial Magistrate at Calcutta are quashed insofar as they relate to the Petitioner – Petitioner discharged and all bail bonds/warrants cancelled – Trial Court directed to proceed against remaining accused.

Criminal Law - SFIO Complaint – Companies Act – Bonds Under Section 91 BNSS – Physical Presence – Petitioner was summoned as accused in a complaint filed by SFIO against 81 persons in connection with alleged fraud in 88 companies of SRS Group, wherein loans of Rs.528 crores were obtained from banks/financial institutions on the basis of false financial statements – Petitioner was never arrested during investigation – Petitioner applied under Section 91 BNSS for permission to furnish bonds without physical appearance before the Special Court – Trial Court dismissed the application holding that Section 91 BNSS does not envisage furnishing of bonds in the absence of the accused – Held: Trial Court committed no error; a bare reading of Section 91 BNSS makes it clear that bonds can be furnished only when the person is present in Court – However, direction issued to trial Court to follow Tarsem Lal guidelines and to not take the petitioner into custody if bonds are not accepted or found not in order, fixing the next date beyond two weeks [Paras 1–3, 21–24].

Tarsem Lal Principles – Applicability to Companies Act Complaints – Section 448 Companies Act 2013 – The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement (AIR 2024 SC 2512) in the context of complaints under PMLA were held applicable pari materia to complaints under Section 448 of the Companies Act, 2013, since Section 4 of PMLA and Section 448 of the Companies Act are similar provisions – Held: Once the accused was not arrested during investigation, the procedure of issuance of summons, acceptance of bonds under Section 91 BNSS, and the safeguards against automatic custody as outlined in Tarsem Lal, apply to such complaints also [Paras 17, 18, 19].

Tarsem Lal – Scheme Summarised – Upon filing of complaint where accused was not arrested during investigation: summons and not warrant to be issued; accused appearing on summons not to be treated as in custody and not required to apply for bail; Special Court may direct furnishing of bond; if accused fails to appear, bailable warrant first, then non-bailable warrant; bond under Section 91 BNSS is only an undertaking to appear and does not amount to grant of bail; if warrant or proclamation already issued, accused cannot be let off merely by furnishing bond but must apply for cancellation of warrant; when accused appears on cancellation application, custody not to be insisted upon if undertaking given to appear regularly; after filing of complaint, Investigating Agency cannot independently arrest the accused [Para 18].

Proclamation – Section 82 Cr.P.C. – First Prayer – Petitioner challenged order dated 19.04.2024 issuing proclamation – Held: Summons, bailable warrants and warrants of arrest were repeatedly issued and the petitioner did not appear; proclamation was the only course left for the trial Court; this prayer has no merit and is rejected [Para 16].

Via Media – Petitioner's Apprehension of Custody – Direction to Trial Court – Court noted the petitioner's anxiety about appearing in Court due to apprehension of being taken into custody if bonds are not accepted, which is a common concern at district level – Held: A via media is required; petitioner directed to appear before the trial Court on the next date; trial Court directed to entertain application for recalling of warrant and for permission to furnish bonds in light of Tarsem Lal; if bonds are not accepted or not found in order, trial Court shall not take petitioner into custody but shall fix the next date beyond two weeks to enable the petitioner to avail legal remedies [Para 24].

Decision: Petition partly allowed – Order dated 17.05.2025 dismissing the application under Section 91 BNSS set aside qua the petitioner – Trial Court directed to follow the dictum of Tarsem Lal – Prayer for quashing of proclamation order dated 19.04.2024 dismissed.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Dishonour of Cheque – Revision – Concurrent Findings – Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction – Revisionist-convict challenged concurrent conviction and sentence upheld by both trial court and appellate court — Trial court sentenced revisionist to imprisonment till rising of court with compensation of Rs.7,40,000/- inclusive of interest at 8% per annum from the date of institution of complaint, with default simple imprisonment of four months — Both courts extensively analysed the evidence and defence raised by the revisionist — Held: Scope of revisional jurisdiction is extremely narrow and does not extend to re-appreciation of evidence; interference is warranted only on a finding of perversity in the judgments below; where both courts below have concurred in conviction and sentence, the scope for interference is further limited; no perversity, incorrectness, illegality or impropriety found in the impugned judgments [Paras 6, 9–10].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Defences Raised – Non-filing of Income Tax Returns – Misuse of Cheques – Shifting of Defence – Revisionist contended before the High Court that the complainant's failure to file income tax returns showing the loan transaction was fatal to the prosecution, and that cheques given in some other property dispute were misused and labelled as loan repayment cheques — Held: Before the trial court, the defence taken was entirely different — that two blank signed cheques were stolen from his office drawer by someone and misused; the plea of misuse in a property dispute is a new case set up for the first time before the revisional court and cannot be entertained — Further, the revisionist admitted in his Section 313 CrPC statement that he had signed the cheque in question and that he had received the statutory notice; the trial court correctly held that filling of particulars on a cheque by the complainant does not constitute material alteration where the drawer does not dispute his signature [Paras 4, 7].

Decision: Revision petition dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/- to be paid by the revisionist to the respondent — Impugned judgments of conviction and sentence upheld — Revisionist directed to pay the complete fine amount to the respondent within three days, failing which the trial court to initiate procedure for default sentence — Pending application disposed of.

Maintenance – Section 125 CrPC – Interim Maintenance – Educated Wife – Qualification vs. Actual Employment – Petitioner challenged the interim maintenance order contending that Opposite Party No.1-wife holds M.A. and B.Ed. degrees, had been provisionally selected as Sikhya Sahayaka, and is thus qualified to earn – Family Court had found that despite the claim, no prima facie document was produced to establish actual employment and, accordingly, treated Opposite Party No.1 as having no source of income – High Court, on the date of hearing, recorded the statement of counsel for Opposite Parties that the wife is not employed till date – Held: The Family Court passed a reasoned order after considering the contentions of parties; without going into merits so as not to prejudice the final disposal of the Section 125 CrPC proceeding, interim maintenance modified to Rs.15,000/- per month to wife and Rs.10,000/- per month (inclusive of educational expenses) to the son, operative from the date of filing of application i.e. 23.04.2022 [Paras 4–8].

Maintenance – Divorced Wife – Entitlement Under Section 125 CrPC – Ex-parte Divorce Decree – Opposite Party No.1 had obtained an ex-parte divorce decree against the petitioner from the Fifth Additional Family Court, Chennai in Original Petition No. 2456 of 2020 – Petitioner contended that consequent upon divorce, the wife lost marital status and was not entitled to maintenance – Family Court held that since there was no material to show remarriage of the wife after the divorce decree, she, being a divorced wife, was entitled to maintenance under Section 125(1) Explanation (b) CrPC – High Court did not disturb this finding [Para 5].

Maintenance – Suppression of Income by Husband – The petitioner had disclosed net salary of Rs.1,27,000/- per month without disclosing gross salary or producing salary documents – Family Court found the petitioner made an attempt to suppress his exact income – Personal hand loan claimed by the petitioner not taken into account as it is not a compulsory deduction from salary [Para 5].

Maintenance – Arrears and Litigation Expenses – Direction – Litigation expenses of Rs.10,000/- directed to be paid within four weeks – Arrear maintenance to be paid in six monthly instalments after adjusting the amount already paid pursuant to interim order of High Court dated 06.02.2025 – Family Court, Balasore requested to endeavour disposal of C.R.P. No. 112 of 2022 within six months from the date of this order, the proceeding having been pending since 2022 [Paras 10–13].

Decision: CRLMP disposed of – Impugned order modified – Interim maintenance reduced to Rs.15,000/- per month for wife and Rs.10,000/- per month for son from the date of application – Order subject to final order to be passed by the Family Court in C.R.P. No. 112 of 2022.

Commercial Courts – Order XI Rule 1 CPC – Leave to File Additional Documents – "Power, Possession, Control or Custody" – Certified Copies as Public Documents – The petitioners filed a commercial suit for specific performance of an oral agreement for sale of land – They subsequently filed I.A. No. 271 of 2025 seeking leave to place 133 additional documents on record including certified copies of sale deeds, Gram Panchayat resolutions, VMRDA challans, and Google map images – The learned Special Judge rejected the application holding that these documents could have been obtained with reasonable efforts at the time of institution of the suit – Held: Documents which could be obtained from public authorities cannot be deemed to be in "power, possession, control or custody" of a party unless actually obtained; the date of a document being prior to the institution of the suit does not automatically make it available in the power, possession, control or custody of the plaintiff at the time of filing; the finding of the Special Judge that documents could have been obtained with reasonable efforts is not a finding that they were in actual power, possession, control or custody and is therefore not sustainable [Paras 33–34].

Commercial Courts – Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) CPC – Documents Required in Answer to Defendant's Case – Exclusion of Entire Rule 1 – The defendants in their written statement disputed the quantum of sale consideration paid for the transferred land of Ac.79.89 cents and raised a plea inconsistent with the plaint – To answer this specific defence, the petitioners sought to file certified copies of sale deeds – Held: Once Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) is attracted i.e., documents relevant in answer to a case set up by the defendant subsequent to filing of the plaint – the entire Rule 1 including sub-rule (5) stands excluded; the expression "this Rule" in clause (c) refers to Rule 1 as a whole and not merely sub-rule (1); sub-rule (5) being in the nature of an exception to sub-rule (1) also stands excluded when clause (c)(ii) is attracted; application for leave cannot be rejected on the basis of sub-rules (1) and (5) in such cases [Paras 36–43].

Procedural Law – Handmaid of Justice – Reasonable Cause – Liberal Construction – Provisions of Order XI Rule 1 CPC as applicable to Commercial Courts are procedural in nature and must be construed liberally to advance substantial justice – Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of effective adjudication so long as the adverse party does not suffer serious prejudice – The expression "reasonable cause" for non-disclosure must be considered in correct perspective with a view to advance substantial justice – Procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant; not an obstruction but an aid to justice [Paras 27–28, 44].

Secondary Evidence – Certified Copies of Sale Deeds – Objection as to Admissibility – Stage of Raising – Leave to receive documents is distinct from admissibility of those documents at trial – Objections under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act as to production of secondary evidence without proof of loss of primary evidence are to be raised and considered at the appropriate stage before the learned Special Judge and do not bear on the question of grant of leave to file documents [Para 45].

Decision: Civil Revision Petition allowed – Impugned order dated 04.02.2026 rejecting I.A. No. 271 of 2025 set aside – Learned Special Judge directed to take the documents on record, subject to admissibility to be considered at trial – Pending miscellaneous petitions stand closed.

Murder – Section 302/34 IPC – Common Intention – Abatement of Appeal – Surviving Appellant – Deceased Laxman was allegedly assaulted with laathis by four accused-appellants on 15.06.1982 near a well, following suspicion that Laxman had informed the police about illicit liquor manufacture at the house of Raghuver – Trial Court convicted all four accused-appellants under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment – Appellants Raghuver, Hira and Idal died during pendency of appeal and their appeals stood abated – Appeal adjudicated solely in respect of surviving accused-appellant No. 4, Chhakki [Paras 2, 11].

Section 34 IPC – Common Intention – Requirement of Premeditation, Pre-plan and Pre-concert – Prosecution witnesses Viran PW-1, Ram Dayal PW-2 and Tulsi PW-3 made only general allegations against all accused persons collectively and attributed no specific motive, cause or enmity to surviving accused-appellant Chhakki – Motive for the crime was exclusively personal to Raghuver and his brother Hira, who suspected Laxman of informing the police – Chhakki was not a family member of Raghuver and no evidence disclosed any reason for his participation – Investigating Officer PW-8 deposed that no witness stated they had seen the accused emerging from the house – Tulsi PW-3 contradicted himself in cross-examination as to whether he had seen the accused persons going from the back of the house – Held: Prosecution failed to establish premeditation, pre-plan or pre-concert between surviving accused-appellant Chhakki and the other accused-appellants; trial Court did not discuss or record any finding on common intention with reference to Chhakki; conviction with aid of Section 34 IPC is unsustainable in absence of proof of prior meeting of minds [Paras 14–20].

Section 34 IPC – Common Intention – Settled Principles – For conviction under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, the prosecution must establish that all accused shared a pre-arranged plan and that the criminal act was done in furtherance of common intention – The plan may develop on the spot but must precede the act constituting the offence; a definite conclusion as to prior concert is essential – Trial Court merely relied on the nature and extent of injuries to infer intention to kill and did not address the requirement of premeditation and prior concert in respect of Chhakki – Held: This approach is not sustainable in law, particularly in a heinous offence like murder where every ingredient must be proved beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 18–20].

Decision: Criminal appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence of surviving accused-appellant Chhakki under Sections 302/34 IPC as passed by the Sessions Judge, Lalitpur on 03.10.1983 in Sessions Trial No. 147 of 1982 set aside – Chhakki acquitted – Already on bail; need not surrender; bail bonds cancelled and sureties discharged – Appellant to comply with Section 437-A CrPC.