Succession Law – Registered Will – Suspicious Circumstances – Reversal of Appellate Court Judgment – Plaintiff claimed ½ share in suit land based on Will executed by father Sardara Singh – Defendants challenged Will citing testator’s terminal illness, proximity of death, delay in disclosure, and dubious attestation – High Court held that mere registration of Will is not enough where Will is shrouded in suspicious circumstances – Will discarded as not proved in accordance with law [Paras 30–43].

Attesting Witness – Credibility – Non-acquaintance with Testator – Procedural Irregularity – One attesting witness unfamiliar with testator’s personal life – Name handwritten while other’s was typed – Admitted signing at behest of other witness and lacked basic knowledge of testator – Not credible to prove Will [Paras 34–36].

Proof of Will – Inconsistencies in Testimony – Onus on Propounder Not Discharged – Time of execution, presence of witnesses, and names mentioned in Will contradicted in depositions – No explanation for exclusion of legal heirs – No reason for non-production of Will at time of mutation – Held: Will not proved beyond doubt [Paras 38–42].

Coparcenary Property – Limited Right to Bequeath – Plaintiff’s Claim Unsupported – Even if testator had right to bequeath ¼ share under Section 30 of Hindu Succession Act, Will still had to be proved valid – Suspicion around Will remained unresolved – Plaintiff entitled only to his legal ¼ share [Paras 28–29].

Permanent Injunction – Not Maintainable Against Co-sharer – Legal Error by First Appellate Court – Injunction granted against co-sharers found unsustainable in law – No injunction can be granted against co-owner without partition – First Appellate Court's judgment set aside [Para 46–47].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree dated 11.03.2016 passed by First Appellate Court set aside – Trial Court’s judgment dated 24.04.2014 restored – Will dated 07.06.2005 held to be surrounded by suspicious circumstances – Plaintiff entitled only to monetary relief as decreed by trial court – No relief granted on basis of Will.

Civil Law – Written Statement – Signature Requirement – Right to Lead Evidence – Trial court denied defendant no.2 permission to lead evidence holding that written statement was unsigned – High Court noted that written statement was signed by defendant no.1 and accepted as written statement on behalf of all defendants by Original Side of High Court – Replication also treated it as written statement of all defendants – Held: Technical objection regarding signature could not defeat substantive right to lead evidence, especially when written statement stood accepted on record [Paras 1–4].

Evidence – Defendant’s Right – Examination of Witness – Petitioners sought permission to examine one witness on behalf of defendant no.2 – Respondent fairly did not oppose setting aside of impugned order – Held: Defendant no.2 entitled to examine one witness subject to trial court schedule and convenience [Paras 4–5].

Supervisory Jurisdiction – Article 227 – Interference with Procedural Orders – Impugned order found to be hyper-technical and causing miscarriage of justice – High Court exercised supervisory jurisdiction to set aside the order and issued directions for expeditious disposal of suit [Paras 4–5].

Decision: Impugned order dated 10.03.2025 set aside – Defendant no.2 permitted to examine one witness – Trial court directed to record evidence on scheduled date or fix fresh date as per convenience – Trial court requested to dispose of suit expeditiously – Petition and applications disposed of by consent of parties.

Judicial Review – Tender Matters – Disputed Questions of Fact – Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 – Petitioner sought cancellation of tender and award in his favour alleging higher revised bid and violation of tender conditions – Rival parties produced mutually contradictory documents regarding the amount of revised bid submitted – Held: Where adjudication requires examination of disputed and contested facts and authenticity of documents, High Court would not exercise writ jurisdiction – Parties relegated to civil remedies [Paras 11–14].

Tender Process – Financial Bid – Alleged Non-Consideration of Revised Bid – Petitioner claimed submission of revised bid of Rs. 62,22,222/- whereas tendering authority asserted last valid revised bid was Rs. 11,00,000/- – Both sides relied upon separate acknowledgments and bid documents – Court held that determination of which document was genuine required leading of evidence – Such controversy not amenable to adjudication under Article 226 [Paras 12–13].

Tender Conditions – Clause 6.3 of RFP – Mandatory Notice of 7 Days for Opening of Financial Bids – Admitted infraction by tendering authority – Effect of Violation – Held: Mere violation of tender condition does not ipso facto vitiate tender process unless serious prejudice is demonstrated – Petitioner failed to establish prejudice caused due to non-issuance of notice, especially in light of disputed facts regarding presence of petitioner’s representative and bid amount – No ground for annulment of tender or grant of contract [Paras 15–18].

Natural Justice – Prejudice – Requirement of Proof – Even where procedural lapse is admitted, Court must be satisfied that such lapse resulted in real and demonstrable prejudice to the complaining party – In absence of clear proof of prejudice, extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 ought not to be exercised [Paras 16–18].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – No interference with tender process or award in favour of successful bidder – Liberty implicit to petitioner to pursue appropriate civil remedies – No order as to costs – Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 13(1)(d) – Allegation of Criminal Misconduct – Revenue officials alleged to have illegally compounded offences by collecting lesser amounts – Held: In absence of a prescribed minimum compounding fee during the relevant period, levy of a lesser amount by itself does not constitute criminal misconduct or cause pecuniary loss to the State [Paras 3–5, 15].

Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules – Power to Compound – Change of Competent Authority – Prior to 05.06.2015, revenue officials were empowered under S.R.O. No.860/1995 – After issuance of G.O.(P) No.77/2015/ID dated 05.06.2015, power vested exclusively with officers of the Mining and Geology Department – Revenue officials ceased to have authority thereafter [Paras 5–6, 14].

Repeal and Re-enactment – Saving of Notifications – Sections 6 and 24, General Clauses Act – Continuation of earlier notifications only if not inconsistent with the re-enacted provisions – Held: On introduction of KMMC Rules, 2015 and issuance of fresh Government Order, earlier notification stood superseded and ceased to operate from 05.06.2015 [Paras 6–7, 14].

Quashment of FIR – Accused Nos.4 and 7 – Acts Prior to 05.06.2015 – Offences compounded before coming into force of new Government Order – Held: Accused Nos.4 and 7 were competent authorities at the relevant time and no minimum fee existed – No offence made out – Proceedings quashed [Paras 12, 17].

Quashment of FIR – Accused No.2 – Acts After 05.06.2015 – Compounding of offences after loss of authority under new Government Order – Held: Compounding in seven cases without jurisdiction – Investigation justified – Quashment refused [Paras 13, 16–17].

Absence of Minimum Compounding Fee – Effect – Minimum compounding fee prescribed only in 2017 – Even duly authorised Geologists levied nominal amounts prior thereto – Held: No automatic inference of pecuniary loss or corrupt intent in such circumstances [Paras 4, 11, 15].

Inherent Powers of High Court – Section 528 BNSS – Partial Quashment – Court entitled to distinguish between accused based on period, authority and nature of acts – Partial quashment permissible and justified [Para 17].

Decision – Petition partly allowed – Entire proceedings quashed against Accused Nos.4 and 7 – Quashment declined in respect of Accused No.2 – Interim stay vacated – Investigation to proceed against Accused No.2 in accordance with law [Paras 17–18].

Criminal Law – Murder and Attempt to Murder – Conviction under Sections 302 and 307 IPC – Acquittal on Appeal – Appellant convicted by Trial Court for shooting deceased and injuring two others – High Court finds that prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt due to serious contradictions in ocular, medical and scientific evidence – Held: Conviction unsustainable – Benefit of doubt extended – Appellant acquitted [Paras 24–45].

Evidence – Injured Eyewitnesses – Reliability – PW16 and PW19 projected as injured eyewitnesses – Their versions regarding manner of assault, weapon used and nature of injuries materially inconsistent with medical evidence – PW16 claimed gunshot injury with broken teeth but no bullet residue or corroboration found – PW19 alleged assault by pistol butt, whereas medical evidence showed sharp-cut injuries – Held: Injured eyewitnesses not of “sterling quality” and not reliable for sustaining conviction [Paras 19–22, 31–34].

Medical and Forensic Evidence – Contradiction with Ocular Testimony – Decisive Role – Medical evidence did not support prosecution version of firearm injuries – Ballistic report conclusively established that bullet recovered from deceased’s skull did not match recovered revolver – Held: Scientific evidence completely demolishes prosecution theory regarding use of firearm by appellant [Paras 24(ii), 29–30, 39–40].

Evidence – Recovery under Section 27, Evidence Act – Evidentiary Value – Revolver allegedly recovered pursuant to disclosure by appellant – However, ballistic evidence ruled out use of recovered firearm in commission of offence – Held: Recovery loses probative value when seized weapon is forensically unconnected with crime [Paras 24(ii), 27, 29–30].

Criminal Trial – Place of Occurrence – Failure to Establish – Prosecution unable to prove precise locus of crime – Site plan did not indicate shops or hotels of parties – No bloodstains, cartridges, bullet marks or forensic traces recovered – Held: Failure to establish place of occurrence creates serious doubt and strikes at root of prosecution case [Paras 24(vi), 36–37].

Criminal Law – Chain of Circumstances – Breaks and Missing Links – No recovery of knife though injuries suggested sharp weapon – No seizure of motorcycles allegedly present – No independent or natural witnesses examined – Several prosecution witnesses turned hostile – Held: Chain of evidence fractured at multiple points, rendering prosecution version unreliable [Paras 23–24, 38, 41].

Criminal Jurisprudence – Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt – Benefit of Doubt – Court reiterates that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof – Where two views possible, one favouring accused must prevail – Held: Prosecution failed to bridge gap between “may be true” and “must be true” – Appellant entitled to benefit of doubt [Paras 25–28, 42–45].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and order of conviction dated 06/09/2017 and 07/09/2017 set aside – Appellant acquitted of offences under Sections 302, 307, 324 and 326 IPC – Appellant to be released forthwith if not required in any other case, subject to compliance with Section 437A CrPC.

Criminal Contempt – Scandalising the Court – Repeated Allegations of Case Fixing and Corruption – Accused made reckless, false and unsubstantiated allegations against Members of Central Administrative Tribunal and Judges of the High Court in pleadings, affidavits, representations and oral submissions – Allegations included “case-fixing-deal-crime”, corruption, illicit relationships and criminal conspiracy – Held: Such allegations are scurrilous, scandalous and intended to lower the authority of courts and squarely fall within Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act [Paras 1–4, 11–12, 18].

Criminal Contempt – Abuse of Judicial Process – Conduct of Party-in-Person – Accused persisted with contemptuous pleadings even during contempt proceedings – No denial of imputations made – Evidence led by accused did not rebut charges but reiterated allegations – Held: Conduct amounts to aggravated contempt in the face of the Court and interference with administration of justice [Paras 10, 14–15, 18–19].

Criminal Contempt – Freedom of Speech – Limits – Defence of Fair Criticism Not Available – Accused sought to justify allegations as whistleblowing and criticism – Held: Freedom under Article 19(1)(a) does not extend to unfounded, malicious and scandalous attacks on Judges and judicial institutions – Fair criticism permissible, but imputing motives, corruption and collusion without basis constitutes contempt [Paras 7, 17].

Criminal Contempt – Proof of Charges – Documentary and Oral Evidence – Complainant examined and 18 documents marked establishing repeated scandalous statements – Accused admitted authorship of statements during cross-examination – Held: Charges proved beyond doubt; accused failed to discredit prosecution evidence or show mitigating circumstances [Paras 15, 18].

Sentence – Criminal Contempt – Determination of Punishment – Accused showed no remorse and continued adamant stance – Gravity of contempt, repetitive nature of allegations and impact on public confidence in judiciary considered – Held: Deterrent punishment necessary to uphold majesty of law [Paras 19–23].

Decision: Accused convicted for Criminal Contempt under Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Sentenced to simple imprisonment for four months and fine of Rs.2,000/- – Conviction warrant directed to be issued – Accused taken into custody forthwith – Petition disposed of.

Transfer of Property Act - Mortgage by Conditional Sale vs. Sale with Condition to Repurchase - Interpretation of Document - Intention of Parties - Section 58(c) of TP Act - A transaction is a "sale with a condition to repurchase" rather than a "mortgage by conditional sale" if the document clearly transfers absolute title, grants the purchaser the right to deal with the property, and lacks a debtor-creditor relationship or a clear intention to secure a loan- The intention of the parties must be gathered primarily from the unambiguous language of the document itself.

Property Law - Mortgage by Conditional Sale - Sale with Condition to Repurchase - The appellants challenged the first appellate court's decree for redemption of mortgage, arguing that the document dated 2nd July 1962 was a sale with a condition to repurchase, not a mortgage by conditional sale- The original vendor failed to exercise the repurchase option within the stipulated five-year period- The High Court, in second appeal, examined the terms of the document and the intention of the parties- Held: The document was a sale deed with a condition to repurchase, not a mortgage by conditional sale- The terms clearly indicated an absolute transfer of title to the purchaser, including the right to deal with the property, and there was no debtor-creditor relationship or intention to secure a loan- The consideration amount, though low, was not the sole factor for interpretation- Since the right to repurchase was extinguished after five years (1967) due to non-exercise, the plaintiff, as the vendor's son, was not entitled to seek redemption of a non-existent mortgage 27 years later- The first appellate court erred in misinterpreting the document- Paras [1-30]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 58(c) - Determining Nature of Transaction - Held: To determine whether a transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale with a condition to repurchase, the intention of the parties is paramount and must be gathered from the recitals of the document itself- If the language is plain and unambiguous, it must be given its true legal effect- Surrounding circumstances, such as property valuation, are relevant only if the language is ambiguous- Key factors include the existence of a debt, debtor-creditor relationship, and the right to deal with the property- Paras [15, 16, 17, 20, 27, 28]

Limitation Act, 1963 - Redemption of Mortgage - Held: A suit for redemption of mortgage must be filed within the prescribed limitation period- If the transaction is determined to be a sale with a condition to repurchase, and the right to repurchase is extinguished due to non-exercise within the stipulated time, a subsequent suit for redemption of mortgage is not maintainable- Paras [13, 26, 30]

Decision: Second Appeal allowed- The judgment and decree of the first appellate court are quashed and set aside- The trial court's judgment dismissing the suit is confirmed- Paras [31].

Trademark Law - Infringement - Passing Off - Well-Known Mark - Section 159(5) of Trade Marks Act, 1999 - Interim Injunction - The use of a deceptively similar mark, even for different services, by a defendant with knowledge of the plaintiff's well-known registered trademark, constitutes infringement and passing off, warranting an interim injunction- The "saving" provision of Section 159(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, does not protect such use if the plaintiff's mark was registered after the 1999 Act and the defendant's adoption is dishonest.

Trademark Infringement - Passing Off - Well-Known Mark - Interim Injunction - The plaintiff, Federal Express Corporation, sought an interim injunction against the defendants, Fedex Securities Private Ltd. & Ors., for using the mark "FEDEX" in their corporate names and domain names, alleging infringement, passing off, and dilution of its well-known trademark- The defendants argued protection under Section 159(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, claiming prior use for financial services before the 1999 Act and distinctiveness from the plaintiff's courier services- Held: The plaintiff established a strong prima facie case- The mark "FEDEX" is a well-known registered trademark- The defendants' adoption of "FEDEX" was dishonest and an afterthought, as their explanation for its origin was implausible and inconsistent- The addition of "Securities" does not negate deceptive similarity- Section 159(5) does not apply as the plaintiff's Class 36 registration was post-1999 Act, and the defendants' use constitutes a "new use" amounting to infringement- The continuous use of a deceptively similar trading name, even for different services, amounts to infringement under the 1958 Act and passing off- Delay or acquiescence cannot be pleaded by dishonest adopters- Balance of convenience favors the plaintiff, and irreparable loss would occur if an injunction is not granted- Interim injunction granted- Paras [1-87]

Trade Marks Act, 1999 - Section 159(5) - Applicability - "Continued Use" - Held: Section 159(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, is a savings clause that protects the "continued use" of a particular registered trademark that was not an infringement under the 1958 Act- However, this provision does not apply to new uses or where the plaintiff's mark was registered after the commencement of the 1999 Act, especially when the defendant's adoption is dishonest and the use falls under new categories of infringement introduced by the 1999 Act (e.g., dilution, use on business papers)- Paras [69, 71, 72]

Trademark Law - Dishonest Adoption - Equitable Pleas - Delay and Acquiescence - Held: A defendant who dishonestly adopts a trademark with full knowledge of the plaintiff's reputation cannot raise equitable pleas such as delay or acquiescence to deny injunctive relief- The plaintiff's prompt objection to the impugned use further negates any claim of acquiescence- Paras [34, 35, 84]

Trademark Law - Deceptive Similarity - Corporate Name - Held: The use of a phonetically identical word like "FEDEX" as part of a corporate name, even with an additional descriptive word like "Securities," is likely to cause deception and confusion, suggesting a sister concern or agency relationship with the well-known trademark holder- The distinctiveness of the well-known mark is paramount- Paras [74, 80, 83]

Decision: Interim Application allowed- Temporary injunction granted restraining defendants from using "FEDEX" or any deceptively similar mark/name- Operation of judgment stayed for six weeks to allow appellate remedy- Paras [87, 88, 91].

Default Bail – NDPS Act – Section 36A(4) – Extension of Investigation Period – Petitioner arrested on 15.05.2025 – Statutory period of 180 days expired on 11.11.2025 – Special Court granted extension of 120 days on 31.10.2025 on report of SPP – Accused neither produced physically nor virtually and no notice given at the time of consideration of extension – Held: Non-production and absence of notice is a gross illegality affecting personal liberty under Article 21 – Extension order unsustainable – Indefeasible right to default bail accrued to the petitioner [Paras 30–32, 45–48, 54–58].

Criminal Procedure – Default Bail – Section 187 BNSS – Nature of Right – Default bail is a constitutional safeguard flowing from Article 21 and not a mere procedural formality – Continued detention beyond statutory period without a valid extension is illegal [Paras 36–41].

NDPS Act – Section 36A(4) – Extension of Time – Mandatory Compliance – Public Prosecutor’s report must indicate progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention – Compliance also requires affording the accused an opportunity to oppose the extension – Failure vitiates the extension order [Paras 35, 45–46].

Notice to Accused – Extension of Custody – Physical or Virtual Production Mandatory – Accused must be informed that application for extension is being considered – Mere production for judicial remand on the same day does not amount to valid notice – Absence of accused is not a curable irregularity but a violation of fair procedure under Article 21 [Paras 46–48, 51–53].

Judicial Custody – Same Day Production – Distinction – Order recording that accused was “in JC” does not establish presence at the time of hearing of extension application – Record must reflect production or participation of accused when extension is considered [Paras 51–53].

Default Bail Application – Erroneous Rejection – Trial Court rejected default bail on ground that extension had already been granted – Held: Since extension itself was illegal, rejection of default bail could not be sustained – Right to default bail revived automatically on expiry of 180 days [Paras 55–57].

Relief – Orders Set Aside – Extension order dated 31.10.2025 and order dated 13.11.2025 rejecting default bail quashed – Petitioner held entitled to default/statutory bail – Bail granted on conditions including furnishing of bond and surety – Petition allowed [Paras 58–60].

Decision: Petition allowed – Order dated 31.10.2025 granting extension of investigation and order dated 13.11.2025 rejecting default bail set aside – Petitioner granted default/statutory bail subject to conditions.