Service Law – Dismissal from Service – Discrepancy in Date of Birth – Fraud Not Established – Petitioner appointed as Assistant Teacher in 2014 on the basis of Purva Madhyama certificate (2001) reflecting date of birth as 07.07.1987 – Dismissed vide order dated 27.06.2019 on the ground that High School certificate of 1998 reflected date of birth as 02.07.1984 – Neither the foundational certificates were alleged to be forged nor was it shown that any undue advantage was derived – Held: Mere discrepancy in date of birth across certificates, without proof of deliberate concealment or resultant benefit, does not constitute fraud or misconduct warranting cancellation of appointment – Impugned order quashed – Petitioner directed to be reinstated, without back wages for the intervening period [Paras 44–78].

Fraud – Essential Ingredients – Proof Required – Fraud cannot be presumed and must be established by cogent and unimpeachable evidence – Non-disclosure of earlier certificates reflecting a different date of birth must be shown to be purposeful, calculated and actuated by intent to deceive – Where the certificate relied upon for appointment is genuine, issued by a competent authority, and no allegation of fabrication is raised, mere omission does not amount to fraud – Held: Absence of mens rea and absence of undue advantage are decisive factors – Charge of fraud unsustainable on facts [Paras 45–46, 62–63].

Misconduct – Non-Disclosure of Earlier Certificate – Proportionality – Suppression of a material fact vitiates appointment only where it is deliberate and results in conferment of an undue advantage – Where the discrepancy is neither calculated to secure unfair benefit nor distorts the selection process, cancellation of appointment would be wholly disproportionate – Doctrine of proportionality must guide exercise of power [Paras 54–55].

Eligibility – Date of Birth – No Advantage Derived – Even accepting the date of birth as reflected in the High School certificate (02.07.1984), the petitioner remained within the bounds of eligibility – In absence of any consequential gain in terms of age relaxation or eligibility, the foundational element of fraud is wholly absent – Non-disclosure, in such circumstances, remains, at best, an irregularity [Para 47].

Precedent – Applicability – Division Bench Ruling – Reliance placed on Division Bench decision in Special Appeal No. 987 of 2024 (arising from Ashok Kumar Singh vs. State of U.P.) to the effect that mere possession or disclosure of an additional qualification, not relied upon by the selection committee and conferring no tangible advantage, does not ipso facto establish fraud – Sine qua non for sustaining fraud is a deliberate design to secure an advantage materially impacting selection [Paras 64–69].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned order dated 27.06.2019 passed by Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Mau quashed – Respondents directed to permit petitioner to resume duties forthwith – No salary for intervening period on the principle of "no work, no pay" – Liberty reserved to respondents to initiate proceedings if documents subsequently found to be false or fabricated [Paras 77–81].

Matrimonial Law – Cruelty – Section 13(1)(ia) HMA – Divorce Decree Set Aside – Marriage solemnized on 11.11.1997; parties separated from 11.04.2004; husband filed for divorce in January 2006 alleging cruelty; wife filed for restitution of conjugal rights in August 2008 – Family Court allowed the divorce petition and dismissed the restitution petition by judgment dated 28.11.2011 – On appeal, the Division Bench finds that none of the three primary incidents of cruelty alleged by the respondent-husband (dated 11.05.2003, 11.04.2004 and 05.07.2005) were established by cogent, corroborated evidence – Held: Divorce decree set aside; respondent's subsequent remarriage does not deter the Court from passing the order [Paras 1–53].

Cruelty – Proof – Cumulative Effect – Burden of Proof on Petitioner – Cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA must be of such gravity that it makes it reasonably impossible for the aggrieved spouse to live with the other – Instances of cruelty are to be considered in their cumulative effect and not in isolation – Mere trivial irritations and ordinary wear and tear of married life do not constitute cruelty – The burden of proving cruelty lies on the petitioner who alleges it; the standard of proof is preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt – Held: Family Court erroneously shifted the burden of proof onto the appellant-wife and drew adverse inferences against her without compelling reasons [Paras 26–47, 51].

Section 73 Evidence Act – Handwriting Comparison – Procedural Fairness – Natural Justice – The Family Court invoked Section 73 of the Evidence Act at the conclusion of final arguments, asking the parties to write lines for comparison purposes without informing them of the purpose or the provision being invoked – Adverse inference was then drawn against the appellant for her hesitance in providing her handwriting – Held: Exercise of power under Section 73 requires that parties be informed as a prerequisite of procedural fairness; comparison must be undertaken sparingly and supplemented by expert opinion where the document is of substantial consequence; conducting comparison covertly and drawing adverse inference for resistance, without informing the party that the handwriting will be used for comparison, is against the principles of natural and fair justice and cannot be sustained – Such exercise was an attempt to support the view already taken by the Court rather than a fair procedure to reach the truth [Paras 33–37].

Medical Evidence – Cruelty – Insufficient Proof – The MLC issued by AIIMS in respect of the incident dated 05.07.2005 was silent on the identity of the assailant and the manner of assault – Medical records at best established that the respondent suffered injuries due to an assault, but did not establish that the injuries were inflicted by the appellant or her family members – No police investigation reports, police call records or independent witness supported the respondent's version – Self-serving testimony of the petitioner alone, without corroboration, is insufficient to establish cruelty – Held: Reasoning of the Family Court based solely on the respondent's testimony and medical documents is improper and inadequate [Paras 38–42].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and Decree of Divorce dated 28.11.2011 passed by the Family Court, Rohini Courts, Delhi set aside – No relief sought in respect of the disposal of the restitution petition under Section 9 HMA; findings thereon not disturbed – Pending applications disposed of.

Co-operative Milk Union – Government Land – Lease – Resumption – Validity of G.O. – Petitioner/E.R.C.M.P. Union challenged Ext.P15 G.O. dated 11.06.2025 bifurcating two acres of puramboke land, limiting 70 cents to the petitioner and allotting 130 cents to the 6th respondent/K.L.D. Board for a Central Government scheme – Petitioner contended that a 99-year lease was subsisting and could not be unilaterally resumed – Government contended that no formal lease deed existed and the Munnar chilling plant was never transferred to the 4th respondent/K.C.M.M.F – Held: Lease in favour of K.C.M.M.F. established through Government decisions and orders despite absence of formal deed – Munnar chilling plant included in the transfer – Government power to resume under Rule 15(4) of Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964 lawfully exercised – Sufficient notice given – Writ Petition dismissed [Paras 2, 9, 14, 19, 21].

Lease – Creation Without Formal Deed – Co-operative Entities – Government Decisions – Cabinet Resolution – Petitioner Union claimed benefit of 99-year lease granted in favour of 4th respondent/K.C.M.M.F. vide Ext.P3 G.O. dated 24.06.1985 – Government disputed existence of concluded lease in absence of formal lease deed – Held: A narration of chronological events from 1969 through Cabinet Notes (Ext.P19), G.O.s (Exts. R3(d), P3, P5, P5(a)) and valuation reports clearly establishes lease in favour of K.C.M.M.F. – Absence of formal lease deed cannot, by itself, lead to conclusion that no lease was created – Petitioner Union, acting under the Federation, is entitled to claim the benefit of such lease [Para 9].

Transfer of Munnar Chilling Plant – Whether Excluded From Lease – G.O. Interpretation – Respondents relied on clause 5.0 of Ext.R6(j) G.O. dated 07.11.1998 to contend that the Munnar chilling plant does not find mention therein and was therefore never transferred to K.C.M.M.F – Held: Ext.R6(j), issued to effect financial re-adjustments and share arrangements, cannot nullify transactions already completed – Specific reference to the Munnar chilling plant in Ext.R6(e) G.O. and earlier instruments establishes its inclusion in the transfer – Non-mention in clause 5.0 of Ext.R6(j) cannot be given extra significance against the weight of other G.O.s – If Government intended to exclude the Munnar plant from transfer, it ought to have expressly stated so and resumed possession in a manner known to law [Paras 12–14].

Government Power – Resumption of Leased Land – Rule 15(4), Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964 – Government lease of puramboke land governed by the Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960 and Rules framed thereunder – Rule 15(4) empowers the competent authority to terminate a lease after 60 days' written notice to the assignee, if land is required for Government or public purposes – Impugned Ext.P15 resumed 130 cents out of the leased 2 acres for use by the K.L.D. Board in connection with a Central Government scheme, which constitutes a public purpose – Held: Action of the Government is traceable to Rule 15(4) and legally sustainable [Paras 16–19].

Notice – Substantial Compliance – 60 Days' Notice – Rule 15(4) – Petitioner Union contended that mandatory 60 days' notice under Rule 15(4) was not given before issuance of Ext.P15 – Held: A series of meetings commencing from 01.02.2024, committee inspections, deliberations by Secretaries, and multiple opportunities to produce title documents afforded sufficient notice to the petitioner Union – The purpose of the notice requirement is to enable the lessee to relocate; since 70 cents were retained by the petitioner for its continued operations, no question of relocation arose – Doctrine of substantial compliance applies – No violation of notice requirement [Paras 20–21].

Decision: Writ Petition dismissed.

Ferry Ghat – Transfer During Pendency of Writ Petition – Circumvention of Court Proceedings – Zilla Parishad transferred Ramchandrakhali ferry ghat to the Panchayat Samity by resolution dated 12.03.2025, after receipt of notice of the writ petition served on 06.01.2025 – Transfer effected despite pendency of proceedings amounts to defiance of court and an attempt to overreach the Court – Transfer held devoid of legal sanction – All subsequent acts including lease granted to added respondent declared illegal – Zilla Parishad directed to take back the ferry ghat within two weeks and float fresh tender within one week thereafter under the Jaladhara scheme notification dated 28.01.2020 [Paras 7, 9, 10].

Ferry Ghat – Classification as "Small" – Revenue Loss – Lease Amount – The Zilla Parishad sought to justify transfer on the ground that Ramchandrakhali was a small ferry ghat – Held: Classification unsustainable as the ferry ghat carries a lease amount of Rs. 17,96,850/- compared to Rs. 72,000/- for Chandipur Masjidbati ferry ghat – Panchayat Samity leased out the ghat at a much lower rent than could have been fetched by the Zilla Parishad, resulting in revenue loss to the State exchequer – Ferry ghat similarly placed with the other three ghats reverted to the Zilla Parishad; pendency of writ petition cannot be a ground to distinguish it [Paras 2, 9].

Writ Jurisdiction – Acts in Defiance of Court – Principle Against Overreaching – Where a respondent, upon receiving notice of court proceedings, hurriedly effects a transfer with a view to circumventing the impending order or to steal a march over the opponent, such act is liable to be set aside – Reliance placed on Ranjit Kumar Halder v. State of West Bengal (CPAN 1424 of 2003 in WPST No. 612 of 2003) and Daniel v. Ferguson, (1891) 2 Chancery Division 27 – Held: Transfer of ferry ghat after notice of writ petition falls squarely within this principle [Paras 8, 9].

Decision: Writ Petition disposed of – Transfer of Ramchandrakhali ferry ghat to Panchayat Samity set aside – Zilla Parishad directed to take back the ferry ghat within two weeks and float fresh tender within one week thereafter – Added respondent permitted to participate in fresh tender and to take necessary steps in accordance with law if aggrieved by acts of Panchayat Samity – Added respondent to continue operating the ferry ghat until fresh tender notice is floated – No order as to costs.

Electricity Law – Unauthorized Use – Assessment – Remand Order – Writ Petition – Maintainability – Supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227 – Petitioner electricity company assessed respondents for unauthorized use of electricity under Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003 – Appellate Authority allowed the appeal and remanded the matter for fresh assessment limited to the actual period of unauthorized use – Petitioner challenged the remand order under Article 227 – Preliminary objection raised that the Appellate Authority's order is not amenable to writ jurisdiction – Held: The Appellate Authority, being a statutory quasi-judicial body constituted under Section 127 of the Electricity Act read with the Appeal to the Appellate Authority Rules, 2004, falls within the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India – Preliminary objection rejected – However, writ petition against remand order not maintainable as no prejudice is caused, both parties having equal opportunity before the Assessing Officer – Petitions disposed of with direction to decide within six months [Paras 4–13].

Article 227 – Supervisory Jurisdiction – Quasi-Judicial Authority – Scope – Any authority constituted by statute and deciding disputes in accordance with rules made thereunder is a quasi-judicial authority amenable to supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 – High Court's power under Article 227 is wider than under Article 226 but must be exercised with great care, caution and circumspection – Jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of judgment; interference warranted only in cases of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice [Paras 10–11].

Remand Order – Writ Petition – Not Maintainable – It is trite law that a writ petition against an order of remand is not maintainable – Remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer causes no prejudice to either party, as both sides retain full opportunity to place their material on record – Order of Appellate Authority remanding matter for reassessment of tariff held to be in consonance with Section 126 of the Electricity Act [Para 12].

Section 126(5) – Electricity Act – Period of Unauthorized Use – Where the period of unauthorized use is not ascertainable, the Assessing Officer is entitled to assess usage for the entire preceding year – Remand for fresh assessment restricted to actual period of unauthorized use is consistent with the statutory scheme [Para 7].

Decision: Preliminary objection rejected – Writ petitions disposed of in terms of order dated 01.04.2026 in W.P. No. 16781/2014 – Parties at liberty to raise all questions before the Assessing Officer – Assessing Officer directed to decide within six months from production of certified copy of this order [Paras 12–14

Income Tax – Pre-Operative Period – Interest on Bank Deposits – Capital Receipt or Income from Other Sources – Inextricable Link Test – Appellant company incorporated in 1992 for manufacture of ecological brake-shoes – Raised loans from Directors and deposited unutilised funds in bank pending deployment for purchase of plant and machinery and payment of balance technical know-how fee – Earned interest of Rs. 1,33,151/- and Rs. 2,37,770/- for AYs 1993-94 and 1994-95 respectively – Interest adjusted against pre-operative expenses – AO on reassessment treated interest as income from other sources relying on Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals – ITAT upheld reassessment – Held: Funds were not surplus but earmarked for meeting committed project obligations and were inextricably linked to setting up of business – Ratio of Bokaro Steel Ltd. applicable and not Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals – Question of law (2) answered in favour of appellant – ITAT order set aside [Paras 48–57].

Reassessment – Section 147/148 – Change of Opinion – Assessment under Section 143(1) – Where original assessment is completed under Section 143(1) and no order under Section 143(3) is passed, the Assessing Officer cannot be said to have formed any opinion – Reassessment proceedings in such cases are not vitiated as change of opinion – Only requirement under new Section 147 (w.e.f. 01.04.1989) is that income has escaped assessment – Held: ITAT correctly upheld validity of reassessment – Question of law (1) answered in favour of Revenue [Paras 42–45].

ITAT Powers – Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction – Section 254 – ITAT has wide powers to pass such orders "as it thinks fit" on the subject matter of appeal – Powers not confined to grounds raised in memorandum of appeal – ITAT may decide any issue going to the root of the subject matter even if not specifically raised by either party, provided it falls within the confines of the subject matter of appeal – Revenue's failure to raise jurisdictional issue before ITAT did not preclude ITAT from deciding the same [Paras 46–47].

Tuticorin vs. Bokaro – Distinction – Interest on Surplus Funds vs. Inextricably Linked Funds – Where funds borrowed or raised are surplus and independently invested to generate interest, interest is taxable as income from other sources per Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals – Where funds are inextricably linked to setting up of project and temporarily deposited pending deployment, interest earned is a capital receipt liable to be set off against pre-operative expenses per Bokaro Steel Ltd. – Test is not whether there was compulsion to deposit funds but whether the funds bore an inextricable nexus with the project [Paras 54–56].

Decision: Question of law (1) answered in favour of Revenue – Question of law (2) answered in favour of Appellant – Order of ITAT set aside – Appeals allowed [Para 57].

Land Acquisition – Reference Court – Power of Remand – Jurisdiction – Land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Collector awarded compensation of Rs. 1,14,39,264/- vide award dated 13.11.2019 – Reference Court set aside the award and remanded the matter to the Collector for fresh determination under the Act of 2013 – Held: Reference Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appellate court but a court of original jurisdiction – Power of remand is an appellate power which the Reference Court does not possess – Reference Court can only affirm the award or enhance the compensation; it has no jurisdiction to set aside the award and remand the matter – Impugned judgment set aside – Matter restored to Reference Court for fresh decision on merits [Paras 8–14].

Reference under Section 18 – Nature of Proceedings – The reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award of the Collector – It is in the nature of original proceedings wherein the claimant occupies the position of a plaintiff and must establish that the compensation offered is inadequate by producing material evidence – The Reference Court exercises original jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction – Power of remand must be expressly found within the statute and no such provision exists either in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the Act of 2013 [Paras 8–9, 12].

Act of 2013 – Applicability – Reference Court held that compensation should have been determined under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, which came into force on 01.01.2014 – Even if such view were correct, the Reference Court was bound to itself determine the compensation under the Act of 2013 and could not remand the matter to the Collector – Both respondent's counsel fairly conceded that the Reference Court exceeded its jurisdiction in remanding the matter [Paras 5, 7, 12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and award dated 25.03.2023 set aside – LAR No. 1 of 2021 restored to its original number before the Reference Court – Reference Court directed to decide the reference on merits within six months from production of certified copy of this order [Paras 14–15].

Partition Suit — Limitation — Preliminary Issue — Remand — Appellants filed suit for partition of suit schedule property and declaration that the Will dated 03.03.1956 was not binding on them — Trial Court, after remand by High Court, decided issue of limitation as a preliminary issue and dismissed the suit as barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 — Held: Question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law — Whether Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (providing twelve-year limitation for enforcing right to share in joint family property) or Article 113 (residuary, three-year period) applies could not be decided without evidence — Trial Court erred in deciding the issue prior to recording of evidence — Impugned order set aside and matter remanded for trial [Paras 12, 25, 26, 27].

Limitation — Article 110 vs. Article 113, Limitation Act, 1963 — Suit by Coparceners — Where plaintiffs claim to be coparceners of the defendants and the suit schedule property devolved through a registered partition deed of 1940, the applicability of Article 110 (twelve-year period for a person excluded from joint family property) cannot be brushed aside at the preliminary stage — The issue of which Article governs the suit requires adjudication on evidence — Reliance placed on Mohinder Kumar Mehra v. Roop Rani Mehra, (2018) 2 SCC 132 [Paras 23, 26].

Preliminary Issue — Limitation as Mixed Question of Fact and Law — While limitation issues may be framed as preliminary issues, they cannot be decided solely on admitted facts when disputed questions of law and fact bearing on the applicable Article of limitation remain unresolved — The trial Court erred by selectively relying upon undisputed facts and failed to appreciate that applicability of Article 110 or Article 113 is a matter requiring evidence — Reliance placed on Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260 [Paras 22, 24, 25].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Impugned order of the trial Court dated 07.11.2012 in O.S. No. 6732/2006 set aside — Matter remanded to the trial Court to proceed with recording of evidence and thereafter decide issue No. 11 pertaining to limitation along with all other issues.

Criminal Law – Rape and Kidnapping – Acquittal – Appellant convicted by Trial Court under Sections 376 and 363 IPC for allegedly kidnapping a minor girl in a TSR and confining her for nine days during which he raped her five times – Sentenced to RI of 7 years under Section 376 IPC and RI of 2 years under Section 363 IPC – On appeal, High Court finds the testimony of the prosecutrix riddled with material inconsistencies, improbabilities, and unnatural conduct throughout the incident – Age of prosecutrix not proved in accordance with law – Prosecution failed to establish essential ingredients of the offences beyond reasonable doubt – Held: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; Appellant acquitted [Paras 1–25].

Sole Testimony – Sterling Quality – Reliability – It is settled law that conviction in sexual offence cases can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it inspires confidence and is free from material contradictions – However, the said principle is not absolute – Where the testimony suffers from improbabilities and inconsistencies going to the root of the prosecution's case, corroboration becomes necessary – In the instant case, the prosecutrix made no attempt to raise alarm during TSR journey lasting 1½ hours, failed to seek help during confinement despite proximity of neighbours and PCO owner, returned home without police assistance, and expressed concern for the Appellant's arrest rather than her own safety – Testimony held not of sterling quality and unfit to sustain conviction without corroboration [Paras 1–7, 16, 24].

Proof of Age – Minor – Secondary Evidence – Documentary Evidence – Prosecution relied on photocopies of Birth Certificate and school records to establish that the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age – No original documents produced and no foundation laid for leading secondary evidence – Parents gave contradictory statements regarding year of birth – School register entry of date of birth has no evidentiary value unless the person making the entry or furnishing the information is examined – Age of prosecutrix held not proved in accordance with law – Charge under Section 363 IPC consequently unsubstantiated [Paras 18–21].

Medical Evidence – Corroborative Value – MLC – Two-Finger Test – Medical evidence in rape cases is corroborative in nature and not substantive – MLC of prosecutrix showed no injury on her person, ruling out forcible sexual act – The now-banned two-finger test result indicating admission of two fingers created an additional possibility inconsistent with the prosecution's version – Medical evidence did not conclusively establish guilt nor complete the chain of circumstances [Para 22].

Investigation – Lapses – Non-Examination of Witnesses – Multiple lapses in investigation noted including non-examination of TSR driver, landlord of confinement premises, neighbours, and PCO owner; non-recovery of knife; absence of site plan; and inordinate delay of two months in recording statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. – Held: While defective investigation alone cannot be a ground for acquittal where reliable ocular evidence exists, in the present case the cumulative lapses coupled with an unreliable sole testimony render the prosecution's case insufficient to sustain conviction [Para 17].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment dated 18.12.2008 and order on sentence dated 20.12.2008 set aside – Appellant acquitted – Bail bond cancelled and surety discharged.