Facts:

The case involved Joshi Technologies International Inc. challenging the denial of deductions under Section 42 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in relation to Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) with the Union of India. The PSCs between the parties lacked provisions allowing for deductions under Section 42, and the Income Tax Authorities had denied the deductions based on this. The appellant argued for the incorporation of Model Production Sharing Contract (MPSC) clauses into the PSCs to enable deductions.

Issues:

Whether deductions under Section 42 are permissible in the absence of specific provisions in the PSCs?

Can mandamus be issued to amend contracts retrospectively to incorporate provisions of Section 42?

Does the matter involve public law elements warranting the invocation of extraordinary remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution?

Held:

The Court analyzed Section 42 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, outlining the conditions for eligibility for deductions. It emphasized the primacy of the terms laid out in the PSCs, without which deductions are impermissible.

It was held that reliance on the MPSC or its clauses to construe the terms of the PSCs is impermissible.

The Court examined the intention of the contracting parties and emphasized the significance of the written terms of the PSCs, superseding any prior understanding.

Regarding mandamus, the Court clarified that in purely contractual matters, extraordinary remedies under Article 226 or 32 cannot be invoked, especially if no public law element is involved.

The Court exercised discretion and deemed the case unfit for the High Court's exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, given its contractual nature and the parties' presumed knowledge of legal provisions.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the denial of deductions under Section 42 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, due to the absence of specific provisions in the PSCs. The Court also upheld the non-issuance of mandamus in contractual matters lacking public law elements.

Facts:

The Madras Bar Association filed a writ petition (Civil) No.1072 of 2013 challenging the constitutional validity and structure of the NCLT and NCLAT under the Companies Act, 2013. The petition contended that tribunalization by the Parliament impinged upon the impartiality, fairness, and reasonableness of decision-making, thus violating the Doctrine of Separation of Powers.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of NCLT and NCLAT, the appointment criteria for technical members, the composition of the Selection Committee, and the powers granted to NCLT and NCLAT.

Held:

The court upheld the constitutional validity of NCLT and NCLAT, rejecting arguments against tribunalization and reaffirming the decision in the R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association's case (2010). The court emphasized that NCLT and NCLAT functioned as quasi-judicial fora under the Companies Act, 2013, and did not violate the basic structure of the Constitution.

The court ruled that technical members of NCLT and NCLAT should be selected only from officers holding the rank of Secretaries or Additional Secretaries with technical expertise. Provisions allowing Joint Secretaries to be eligible for appointment were declared invalid as they contradicted the court's previous ruling.

The court found fault with the composition of the Selection Committee prescribed under Section 412(2) of the Act, 2013, directing that it should consist of four members with equal representation from the administrative branch/bureaucracy and the judiciary.

The court dismissed challenges to the powers granted to NCLT and NCLAT, including the power to punish for contempt and the authority of the Central Government to constitute benches, emphasizing that these provisions were enacted by Parliament and were not unconstitutional.

The court directed the respondents (Union of India) to take remedial measures to ensure that NCLT and NCLAT are adequately manned and start functioning promptly.

Facts:

The suit involved a dispute over the title and possession of a property originally owned by Hardayal and passed through various successors.

The Plaintiff-Appellants claimed title to the property based on a Will allegedly executed in their favor by Ajuddhibai, a former owner of the property.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellants, which was upheld by the District Court, but later overturned by the High Court.

The matter reached the Supreme Court on appeal.

Issues:

Validity of the Will executed by Ajuddhibai.

Interpretation of legal provisions governing inheritance rights, specifically Section 164 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.

Whether the amendment of the plaint to include additional parties should be allowed.

Held:

The Court affirmed the High Court's findings on the validity of the Will and the limitation of the suit.

However, it disagreed with the High Court's interpretation of Section 164 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.

The Court held that the amendment of the plaint should have been allowed by the High Court, as rules of procedure should serve the interests of justice.

Therefore, the Court partly allowed the appeal, affirming some aspects of the High Court's decision but directing a reconsideration of the issue of inheritance in light of the proposed amendment to the plaint.

Facts:

M/S Tata Chemicals Ltd. imported coking coal under specific exemptions based on ash content.

The coal was tested by an independent agency, CASCO, which certified an ash content below the threshold.

Customs Inspector drew samples of the coal, contrary to established standards (IS 436), leading to a finding of ash content above the threshold.

The appellant contested the sampling procedure and the validity of subsequent test reports.

Issues:

Whether the sampling procedure followed by the Customs Inspector adhered to legal standards.

Whether the subsequent test reports, based on the flawed sampling procedure, are valid.

Held:

The court examined Section 18 of the Customs Act, which allows for testing of imported goods if deemed necessary by the proper officer. It emphasized that such power should be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily, based on established legal principles.

The court found that the samples were not drawn in accordance with IS 436 and, therefore, the subsequent test reports were invalid.

The notion of estoppel against the appellant was rejected, as there was no representative present during sampling, and even if there were, estoppel cannot override legal requirements.

The Tribunal's decision was set aside, ruling in favor of the appellant, and the appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involves a prosecution for defamation initiated against Rajdeep Sardesai and others by the Additional Commissioner of Police in Andhra Pradesh. The prosecution alleged that a news item published by the appellants implicated the second respondent in the Sohrabuddin encounter case, damaging his reputation. The appellants challenged the summoning orders issued by the Magistrate, contending that their names were not specifically mentioned in the sanction order for prosecution. They also argued that the acts attributed to the second respondent were not related to his public functions, thus not falling under Section 199 of the Cr.P.C.

Issues:

Whether the sanction for prosecution against the appellants was valid, despite their names not being specifically mentioned in the sanction order?

Whether the acts attributed to the second respondent were related to his public functions, thereby falling under Section 199 of the Cr.P.C.?

Held:

The court held that it wasn't necessary for the State Government to issue separate sanction orders against each appellant. Since they were all responsible for telecasting and publishing the allegedly defamatory news item, one sanction covering all involved parties was deemed sufficient.

The power exercised by the State Government under Section 199 of the Cr.P.C. is administrative and ministerial. The satisfaction required for sanction is subjective and lies with the State Government.

The acts attributed to the second respondent, allegedly aiding the Gujarat Police, were deemed relevant to his public functions. Determination of whether these acts fell under his official discharge of public functions or not was to be made during trial after examining all relevant facts and evidence.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals, upholding the previous sanction for prosecution against the appellants.

Facts:

Land was acquired by notification dated 12.03.2008, invoking urgency provisions and dispensing with the right of objection under section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Some landowners also challenged notifications from 1979 or 1980.

Issues:

Whether the delay in challenging the acquisition by the landowners affected the maintainability of the cases.

Whether the High Court's discretion in entertaining the writ petitions on merits despite delay should be interfered with by the Supreme Court.

Whether the High Court's directions were applicable as a precedent for future cases.

Whether the appellants' claim regarding the acquisition of their abadi land had merit.

Held:

The appellants were not aggrieved by the acquisition per se but when they found the land was used for residential development instead of industrial purposes.

The High Court exercised discretion in entertaining the writ petitions on merits despite delay, and the Supreme Court did not find grounds to interfere with that discretion.

The High Court's directions were given in unique circumstances and would not form a precedent for future cases.

The Court upheld the High Court's decision considering the ground realities and balancing equities between landowners and authorities.

The claim regarding the acquisition of abadi land lacked merit as denied by the authorities, and the Court found no basis for the appellants' plea based on parity with other villages. The contempt petitions also stand disposed of.

Facts:

The respondent, Anil Kumar Sharma, was a clerk at ESI Hospital in Agra, Uttar Pradesh. He was transferred to KRB Hospital, Agra, where an FIR was lodged against him under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. Sharma filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking the quashing of the FIR.

Issues:

The appeal raises the question of the extent to which a High Court can exercise its powers in issuing directions on the procedural aspects of criminal trials.

Held:

The Court allows the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order. It criticizes the High Court for issuing sweeping directions not in conformity with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While acknowledging the concern regarding delay in criminal trials, the Court emphasizes the principle of judicial restraint and the separation of powers. The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing directions without sufficient data and material. The Court directs the state to ensure compliance with certain legal requirements but rejects the broader directions issued by the High Court.

Facts

The appellant, a Small Scale Industrial Unit, sought exemption from payment of excise duty for goods manufactured in its factory under various brand names, including 'Kalimark'. The Department denied the exemption, claiming that the brand name belonged to a third party. The dispute stemmed from a family settlement agreement, the Deed of Mutual Agreement dated 12.3.1993, which addressed the ownership of the 'Kalimark' trademark.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had legal ownership of the 'Kalimark' trademark within their marketing area.

Whether the appellant was entitled to exemption from excise duty.

Held:

The Court held in favor of the appellant, stating that they had legal ownership of the 'Kalimark' trademark within their marketing area, as per the Deed of Mutual Agreement. The agreement clearly vested the trademark in all the parties, including the appellant, and permitted its use without payment of royalty. The Court cited the Commissioner's acknowledgment that the appellant had exclusive ownership rights over the brand name 'Kalimark' within their marketing area, which predated the impugned notification. Consequently, the appellant was entitled to exemption from excise duty. All the appeals are disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The case revolves around the challenge to the constitutional validity of regulations imposed by the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (RERC). These regulations require captive power plants to purchase a minimum amount of energy from renewable sources.

Issues:

Whether the regulations framed by RERC are constitutionally valid.

Whether the regulatory jurisdiction extends to captive power plants.

Whether the penalties imposed for non-compliance with the regulations are justified.

Held:

The regulations are framed with the objective of protecting the environment and preventing pollution, aligning with the Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Duties enshrined in the Constitution.

The regulatory jurisdiction extends to captive power plants, as they are connected to the distribution network of distribution licensees.

Penalties for non-compliance are not considered taxes but surcharges aimed at ensuring compliance and achieving the objectives of the regulations.

Decision: The Court upheld the validity of the regulations, emphasizing their importance in promoting renewable energy and protecting the environment.