Civil Law - Negligence - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Sections 166 and 173 - Contributory Negligence - Accident occurred in the early hours at 3:00 am when a Wagon-R car collided with a truck parked in the middle of the road - Claimants alleged the truck lacked parking lights indicators or reflectors - Truck driver and owner failed to enter the witness box to rebut evidence or substantiate the plea of vehicle puncture - Tribunal and High Court concurrently held the truck driver solely negligent and rejected the plea of contributory negligence - Supreme Court observed that a stationary vehicle occupying the road in the dead of night without warning signs poses an evident hazard - Adverse inference was rightly drawn against the truck driver - Held - No reason to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the proximate cause of the accident - [Paras 3-18].

Civil Law - Compensation - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 166 - Loss of Dependency - Assessment of Income - Deceased was a 20-year-old bachelor pursuing CA Final and undergoing articleship - Tribunal assessed monthly income at Rs 55,500 based on the salary of an entry-level Group-A officer instead of the actual stipend - Insurer contended the award was excessive and based on hypothetical considerations - Supreme Court noted that the deceased was at the threshold of a professional career - The principle of just compensation provides a measure of solace and does not require exact mathematical equivalence - Assessment of future prospects must be viewed holistically given the human element involved - Held - Methodology adopted by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court was fair and reasonable - [Paras 9-23].

Civil Law - Filial Consortium - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 166 - Conventional Heads - Tribunal and High Court omitted awarding compensation under the head of consortium - Claimants sought enhancement on this ground - Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Act is beneficial legislation and the Court must ensure just compensation even if a conventional head is omitted by lower courts - Parents of an unmarried son are entitled to filial consortium as per established legal principles - Held - Award enhanced by Rs 40,000 each for the two parents totaling Rs 80,000 plus 10 percent increase as per the Pranay Sethi guidelines - [Paras 24-30].

Decision: Appeal by insurer dismissed - Appeal by claimants partly allowed - Total compensation enhanced from Rs 81,21,900 to Rs 82,01,900 with interest - Insurer directed to deposit the enhanced amount within four weeks.

Criminal Law - Sentencing - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 420 467 468 and 471 - Forgery and use of forged documents in judicial proceedings - Appellant convicted for producing forged revenue document for furnishing surety - Trial Court sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment affirmed by High Court - Supreme Court considered mitigating factors including long passage of time since 2014 - absence of criminal antecedents - detection of forgery at threshold stage without pecuniary loss - incarceration of over two years already undergone - Held - ends of justice met by modifying sentence to period already undergone while maintaining conviction - [Paras 1-28].

Criminal Law - Sentencing Policy - Proportionality - Principle of proportionality requires balancing nature of offence with attendant facts and mitigating circumstances - Sentencing should not be a purely retributive exercise divorced from the factual matrix and circumstances of the offender - Held - long lapse of time and absence of repeat conduct are relevant for moulding sentence - [Paras 18-21].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Substantive sentence reduced to the period already undergone while maintaining conviction and fine.

Civil Law - Specific Performance - Specific Relief Act 1963 - Section 16(c) - Readiness and Willingness - Appellants challenged High Court order setting aside decree for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 20-12-1990 - Trial Court had decreed the suit holding that time was not of essence and plaintiff was ready - High Court reversed finding that plaintiff failed to prove continuous readiness and willingness and noted laches of nearly three years in filing the suit - Supreme Court observed that readiness refers to financial capacity while willingness refers to conduct and intention - Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of funds at the time of agreement or suit filing - FDRs produced were dated between 1999 and 2001 while suit was filed in 1993 - Held - Continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent for specific performance - Passive conduct regarding statutory permissions and unexplained delay in approaching the court disentitles a party to equitable relief - Appeal dismissed - [Paras 1-44].

Civil Law - Financial Capacity - Specific Relief Act 1963 - Section 16(c) - Proof of Readiness - Plaintiff relied on four Fixed Deposit Receipts totaling Rs 280000 to show financial readiness - Court found FDRs were generated several years after institution of suit - Held - Availability of funds must be proved with reference to the relevant point of time and not by relying on financial documents created long after filing of the suit - [Paras 35-37].

Civil Law - Equitable Relief - Specific Relief Act 1963 - Section 20 - Impact of Delay - Suit for specific performance filed on 20-12-1993 at the very end of the limitation period following a 1991 refusal notice - Court examined impact of delay on discretionary relief - Held - Conduct of a party claiming equitable relief must be beyond reproach and involve promptitude - Filing suit at the fag end of limitation reflects lack of continuous readiness and willingness which is a sine qua non for grant of relief - [Paras 39-42].

Civil Law - Statutory Permissions - Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 - Permission for Transfer - Agreement required clearance under ULCRA - Plaintiff failed to furnish necessary affidavits for obtaining clearance and remained passive - Held - Failure to cooperate in completing formalities for effectuating title establishes lack of willingness to perform the contract - [Paras 38-42].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Judgment of the High Court setting aside the decree for specific performance affirmed – No costs.

Civil Law - Motor Accident Compensation - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 166 - Enhancement of Award - Appellant a 30-year-old mason sustained grievous injuries resulting in amputation of right leg above the knee due to a collision with a rashly driven lorry - Tribunal awarded Rs. 10,84,330 by assessing monthly income at Rs. 6,000 and permanent disability at 70% - High Court enhanced income to Rs. 12,000 and total compensation to Rs. 23,86,320 but inadvertently calculated 40% future prospects on the Tribunal's income assessment rather than the enhanced income and omitted certain heads like nutrition and medical expenses - Supreme Court observed that the High Court and Tribunal failed to distinguish between physical and functional disability - Held - The work of a mason is a manual avocation requiring continuous use of both legs and amputation above the knee effectively results in total loss of earning capacity for such work - Functional disability assessed at 100% - Future prospects recalculated at 40% of the enhanced income - Future medical expenses for artificial limb increased to Rs. 2,00,000 - Total compensation enhanced to Rs. 40,29,730 with 7.5% interest - [Paras 1-31].

Civil Law - Functional Disability - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 166 - Loss of Earning Capacity - Distinction between physical disability and functional disability - Assessment of compensation for permanent disability must not mechanically apply the physical disability percentage as the economic loss percentage - Tribunal must ascertain the activities the claimant could carry on despite disability versus their previous avocation - Appellant was a mason whose work required physical agility - Held - Amputation of a leg for a manual laborer renders him incapable of pursuing his sole source of livelihood - Functional disability must be treated as 100% even if physical disability is certified at 70% - Ratio in Raj Kumar vs Ajay Kumar followed - [Paras 19-26].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Compensation enhanced to Rs. 40,29,730 – Insurance Company directed to deposit enhanced amount within six weeks.

Civil Law - Land Reform - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950 - Sections 154 and 163 - Appellants claimed title via 1957 sale deed - Consolidation authorities and High Court held deed void for violating land ceiling limits and failing to prove execution - Supreme Court observed that under unamended Section 163 transfers in violation of Section 154 were not void but voidable at the instance of Gaon Sabha via ejectment suit within limitation - No such suit was filed - Held - the sale deed dated 04.06.1957 governed by unamended provisions could not be treated as void ipso facto - [Paras 1-34].

Civil Law - Statutory Interpretation - Retrospective Operation - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950 - Sections 166 and 167 - 1982 Amendment omitted Section 163 and expanded Section 166 to render all violating transfers void with automatic vesting in State - Respondents argued law at time of consolidation should apply - Supreme Court held that amendments affecting substantive rights and accrued liabilities are prospective unless express intention suggests otherwise - Held - 1982 amendment cannot retrospectively alter legal consequences of a 1957 transaction - [Paras 35-42].

Civil Law - Jurisdiction - U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 - Sections 5(2)(a) and 49 - Competence of consolidation authorities to disregard registered instruments - Authorities rejected appellants claim by treating the registered deed as void - Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between void and voidable documents - Held - while authorities can ignore void documents they lack jurisdiction to cancel voidable ones which remain binding until set aside by a competent Civil Court - [Paras 43-49].

Evidence Law - Registered Documents - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 79 - Presumption of validity - Authorities doubted execution based on minor discrepancies in attesting witness description recorded 38 years after execution - Supreme Court held that a registered sale deed carries a formidable presumption of validity and solemnity - Held - minor variations in witness testimony after decades do not dislodge statutory presumption and burden to prove fraud or fabrication lies heavily on the challenger - [Paras 50-59].

Decision: Civil Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and orders set aside – Authorities directed to record names of appellants in revenue records – No order as to costs.

Civil Law - Mandatory Injunction - Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - Section 100 and Order XXI - Legal heirs of original plaintiff challenged the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which reversed concurrent decrees for mandatory injunction for removal of illegal encroachment - Original plaintiff filed suits for removal of a wall and a lintel constructed by defendants on common open space and plaintiff's wall respectively - Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently decreed the suits directing removal of illegal constructions - In the first round of second appeals the High Court modified the decrees to monetary compensation without framing substantial questions of law - Supreme Court previously set aside those orders and remanded the matter for fresh consideration - On remand the High Court again set aside the removal decrees and directed the Executing Court to assess the value of the constructions for monetary compensation to do justice - Supreme Court observed that the plaintiff never sought damages or compensation and did not consent to monetary relief - Held - High Court committed a grave error by compelling legal heirs to accept compensation for which no prayer was made - such exercise of seeking to compensate one party at the cost of the other without any prayer or consent results in miscarriage of justice - without an available question of law for consideration and by making out a new prayer the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC - Impugned common judgment set aside and appeals remanded to High Court for adjudication on merits - [Paras 1-7].

Civil Law - Execution of Decrees - Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - Order XXI - Direction to Executing Court - High Court set aside the decrees for removal of encroachment but directed the Executing Court to assess the valuation of the offending wall to compensate the plaintiff - Held - once a decree is set aside there is no occasion for the Executing Court to proceed with execution proceedings as no decree remains in the field - directing an assessment of value without a supporting decree is an exercise not supported by Order XXI CPC - [Para 5b].

Civil Law - Second Appeal - Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - Section 100 - Scope of interference - High Court reversed concurrent findings on a factually wrong premise that the Trial Court found the wall to be a common wall - High Court failed to indicate whether the urged questions were treated as substantial questions of law - Held - High Court ought to have adjudicated the appeals on their own merits strictly in accordance with Section 100 CPC - [Paras 5d-6].

Decision: Civil Appeals allowed – Common judgment dated 02.05.2016 passed by the High Court set aside – Matter remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits – No order as to costs.

Writ Law - Fundamental Rights - Constitution of India - Articles 13, 19 and 21 - Right to Walk - Appellant's five-year-old son was crushed by a tanker while walking to school in an area without footpaths or pedestrian crossings - Claim for compensation filed under the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - High Court reduced the MACT award leading to an appeal - Supreme Court observed that the Right to Walk is inextricably connected to the right to life and is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) - Court noted that the right to move freely has been eclipsed by motorised transport and the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 remains vehicle-centric rather than human-centric - Declared that the primary right of movement is the Fundamental Right to Walk which precedes movement on wheels - Held - The Right to Walk is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution and includes the right to safe demarcated footpaths - These rights are primary and shall have priority over motorised vehicles - Duty bearers including Urban Development Authorities and Municipalities have an enforceable duty to provide and maintain footpaths - Violation entitles citizens to restitutionary and constitutional remedies - [Paras 1-16 and 20].

Civil Law - Motor Accident Claims - Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Section 166 - Compensation for Death of Minor - MACT awarded Rs. 7,82,000 for the death of a five-year-old child which the High Court reduced to Rs. 4,70,000 - Supreme Court found the High Court in error - Applied the ratio from Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha - Determined income based on skilled worker notifications under the Minimum Wages Act 1948 - Calculated monthly income at Rs. 6,690 with 40 percent addition for future prospects and 50 percent deduction for personal expenses - Multiplier of 18 applied - Held - High Court order set aside - Compensation enhanced to Rs. 11,44,628 including loss of dependency consortium estate and funeral expenses - [Paras 17-19].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Compensation enhanced to Rs. 11,44,628 to be paid within two months – Right to Walk declared a Fundamental Right – Registry directed to send judgment to relevant Ministries and Law Commission to initiate statutory framework for pedestrian rights – Case re-titled as Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath.

Writ Law - Disciplinary Authority - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 - Sections 59(d) and 92 - Competence of Commissioner to dismiss Group A officer - Appellant serving as Executive Engineer (Civil) was convicted under the P.C. Act and IPC in 2011 - Consequent to conviction the Commissioner dismissed the appellant from service - Appellant challenged the dismissal before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) on the ground that as a Group A officer only the 'Corporation' was the competent disciplinary authority under the 1959 Regulations - CAT set aside the dismissal - High Court reversed the CAT order holding that post-1993 amendment the Commissioner was empowered - Supreme Court analyzed the 1993 amendment (Act 67 of 1993) which substituted Section 59(d) and amended Section 92 to vest both appointing and disciplinary powers in the Commissioner - Held - The Commissioner was the competent disciplinary authority for all municipal officers on the date of the dismissal order - the legislative intent of the 1993 amendment was to streamline administration by vesting executive control in the Commissioner - appeal dismissed - [Paras 1-84].

Civil Law - Statutory Interpretation - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 - Section 59(d) - Phrase 'subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf' - Interpretation of futurity - Appellant contended that the Commissioner's power under Section 59(d) remained subject to the existing 1959 Regulations which designated the 'Corporation' as the disciplinary authority - Court examined the grammatical construction of 'may be made' - Referred to Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary and the 'pen and ink theory' - Held - The phrase 'may be made' is words of futurity - it refers to regulations to be framed after the 1993 amendment and not to pre-existing regulations - any other interpretation would render the amendment redundant and the words superfluous - [Paras 64-74].

Civil Law - Amendment by Substitution - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 - Section 59(d) - Retrospective effect - Court considered whether the substituted clause (d) of Section 59 related back to the inception of the 1957 Act - Reviewed the principles of construction for substituted provisions - Held - Substitution involves the simultaneous repeal of the old provision and insertion of the new one - in the absence of express or implied retrospective intent an amendment by substitution operates prospectively from the date it is placed in the statute - the 1993 amendment came into force on 01.10.1993 and does not relate back to 1957 - [Paras 35-52].

Writ Law - Subordinate Legislation - General Clauses Act 1897 - Section 24 - Conflict between Statute and Regulations - Appellant argued that the 1959 Regulations were saved by Section 24 despite the 1993 amendment - Court found the 1959 Regulations to be inconsistent with the amended Sections 59(d) and 92 - Held - Section 24 of the General Clauses Act does not apply where regulations are inconsistent with the re-enacted or amended statutory provision - the statute overrides subordinate legislation - the 1959 Regulations ceased to operate to the extent they named the 'Corporation' as the authority instead of the 'Commissioner' - [Paras 75-77].

Civil Law - Harmonious Construction - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 - Sections 59(d) and 95(1) - Conflict of provisions - Appellant argued that Section 95(1) makes the authority subject to regulations and thus the 1959 Regulations must prevail - Court applied the rule of harmonious construction - Held - Section 59(d) and Section 95(1) operate in different fields - Section 59(d) specifies who the disciplinary authority is while Section 95(1) specifies the punishments - so long as new regulations are not framed the authority specified in the Act i.e. the Commissioner remains competent to inflict punishments - [Paras 78-81].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Judgment of the High Court affirmed – Commissioner held as the competent disciplinary authority – No interference warranted.

Writ Law - Right to Information - Right to Information Act 2005 - Section 24 - Exemption of Organizations - Appellant-Special Police Establishment (SPE) challenged High Court order directing supply of information to respondent-accused regarding details of sanction for his prosecution - Appellant relied on Madhya Pradesh State Notification dated 25.08.2011 issued under Section 24(4) exempting SPE from the RTI Act - Respondent sought information on the decision-making process of grant of sanction - State Information Commission had denied information under Section 8(1)(h) - High Court found investigation complete and directed supply of information - Supreme Court examined whether SPE qualifies as an 'intelligence and security' organization - Found that SPE is a specialized investigative body for corruption and economic offences assisting the Lokayukt - Held - Notification dated 25.08.2011 to the extent it excludes SPE from the purview of the RTI Act is bad in law and excessive - SPE is not an 'intelligence and security' organization for the purposes of Section 24(4) - Notification struck down to the extent of SPE - Appeal dismissed - [Paras 1-22].

Constitutional Law - Judicial Review of Subordinate Legislation - Right to Information Act 2005 - Section 24(4) - Suo Motu Power - Validity of State Notification dated 25.08.2011 not specifically challenged in the writ petition before the High Court - State argued that validity cannot be examined for the first time by the Supreme Court in absence of specific pleadings - Court observed that Constitutional Courts possess plenary power to suo motu declare subordinate legislation invalid if it is manifestly contrary to fundamental rights or parent statute - State was granted full opportunity and heard through Advocate General to justify the notification - Held - Absence of a prayer seeking declaration of invalidity does not deter the Court from testing validity of subordinate legislation when it exceeds limits of authority conferred by enabling statute - [Paras 8-11].

Writ Law - Exemption Clause Interpretation - Right to Information Act 2005 - Section 24(4) - Intelligence and Security Organization - Scope - Expression not defined in the Act - Court analyzed nature of organizations mentioned in the Second Schedule such as ED, CRPF, BSF and NIA - Found SPE is limited to investigating corruption and specific IPC offences - Jurisdiction of SPE guided by matters enquired by Lokayukt under Section 7 of the Act of 1981 - Held - Sphere of operation of SPE does not relate to intelligence or security - Principle of institutional parity with central security organizations not applicable to corruption-investigating bodies - [Paras 13-21].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Notification dated 25.08.2011 issued by GAD Madhya Pradesh seeking to exclude SPE from the applicability of the RTI Act is struck down – Notification continues to operate for the State Bureau of Investigation of Economic Offences – High Court order maintained.