Land Acquisition – Re-determination of Compensation – Section 28-A – Maintainability of second application based on High Court award – Doctrine of merger – Beneficial interpretation – Held: Second application under Section 28-A based on appellate court award is maintainable – “Court” includes High Court and Supreme Court – Earlier acceptance of compensation not a bar – Object is parity among similarly placed landowners – Ramsingbhai held per incuriam – Appeals allowed [Paras 14, 25–28]

Interpretation of “Court” – Section 3(d) read with Section 28-A – Whether confined to Reference Court – Held: Though Section 3(d) defines Court as principal civil court of original jurisdiction, for purposes of Section 28-A, appellate courts are included – Restrictive interpretation defeats object of Act – Award of appellate court replaces reference court award due to merger [Paras 13–15]

Doctrine of Merger – Applicability in land acquisition compensation – Held: Once appellate court passes award, earlier award merges and ceases to exist – Only one operative award survives – Re-determination must be based on final appellate decree [Paras 16, 26]

Beneficial Legislation – Equality in compensation – Section 28-A – Held: Provision intended to remove inequality among landowners who did not seek reference – Must be interpreted liberally to extend benefit of higher compensation awarded at any stage, including appellate stage [Paras 12, 26]

Second Application under Section 28-A – Bar of “one application” rule – Scope – Held: Restriction applies only to multiple awards of Reference Court – Does not bar application based on subsequent appellate award – Distinction clarified [Para 19, 25]

Collector’s Duty – Pendency of appeals – Held: Collector must await final outcome of appeals before deciding Section 28-A applications – Failure leads to incongruity and injustice [Paras 21, 27]

Precedents – Conflict of judgments – Held: Ramsingbhai Jerambhai (2018) 16 SCC 445 is per incuriam for not considering Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736 – Banwari (2024) followed – Correct position: appellate awards can form basis of Section 28-A claim [Paras 23–24]

Decision: Impugned judgment of Karnataka High Court set aside – Order rejecting second Section 28-A application quashed – Respondents directed to re-determine compensation based on High Court award dated 22.07.2013 within eight weeks – Appeals allowed.

Rent Control – Eviction – Finality of Judicial Orders – Abuse of Process – Restoration Application After Dismissal of SLP – Tenant directed to vacate tenanted premises on ground of non-payment of rent by orders of the Rent Authority, First Appellate Court, High Court, and finally by this Court upon dismissal of SLP, Review Petition, and Miscellaneous Application – Despite undertaking to vacate by 31.03.2025, tenant filed a restoration application before the Rent Authority, which was allowed – High Court set aside the restoration order and remitted the matter for fresh decision – Held: Filing of the SLP before this Court after furnishing an undertaking to vacate constitutes gross abuse of process and overreaching of orders of this Court – The restoration proceedings were an impermissible attempt to render a nullity of findings affirmed at every level of judicial review – Appeal disposed of accordingly [Paras 4, 11].

Jurisdiction – Rent Authority – Scope – Question of Title Beyond Jurisdiction – The UP Urban Premises Rent Control Act, 2021, Section 38(2), expressly limits the jurisdiction of the Rent Authority to the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and excludes questions of title or ownership – Tenant sought restoration on the ground that the landlord's sale deed was forged, a matter squarely within the domain of the Civil Court – Held: The Rent Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain a restoration application premised on a challenge to the landlord's title – Any such remedy lay before the Civil Court by way of a suit for declaration – Order of recall dated 15.05.2025 declared void as passed without jurisdiction [Paras 7–12].

Judicial Discipline – Conflict of Roles – Bias – The Rent Authority and the Additional District Magistrate who had submitted a report dated 31.12.2024 concluding that the sale deeds were obtained by concealing relevant facts were one and the same officer – The findings recorded in her administrative capacity as Additional District Magistrate pervaded her exercise of power as Rent Authority – Held: Such conflation of roles is impermissible – A special statute with clearly defined areas of action cannot be circumvented by an officer importing conclusions drawn in a different capacity – Show cause notice for contempt issued against the officer, whose unconditional apology was accepted – Proceedings not to impact the career progression of the concerned officer [Paras 11–15].

Judicial Discipline – Precedent – Binding Effect of Superior Court Orders – Subordinate authorities must follow orders of higher appellate authorities unreservedly – Deliberate non-compliance with the law laid down by superior courts undermines constitutional authority, subverts rule of law, and engenders uncertainty in the administration of justice – Judicial office is a public trust requiring highest standards of integrity and propriety – Jurisdiction of Trial Courts, being a creature of specific statutes, must always be kept clearly in mind [Paras 12–16].

Decision: Appeal disposed of – Restoration order dated 15.05.2025 of the Rent Authority declared void – Show cause notice discharged upon acceptance of unconditional apology – Career progression of concerned officer not to be affected – Pending applications closed.

Taxation – Electricity Duty – Exemption – Withdrawal – Section 5A of Bombay Electricity Duty Act, 1958 – Captive Power Generators – State Government granted exemption from electricity duty to industries generating power through captive plants by notifications from 1994, which was modified and substantially withdrawn by notifications dated 01.04.2000 and 04.04.2001, citing budgetary constraints and augmentation of revenue – Exemption was restored from 01.05.2005 by notification dated 16.06.2005 – Respondents challenged the intervening withdrawal and the High Court quashed the notifications as arbitrary, discriminatory, and unsupported by reasons – Held: High Court orders quashed – Notifications upheld subject to one year transitional notice period [Paras 1–24].

Exemption – Nature – Defeasible Right – Power to Withdraw – An exemption granted under a fiscal statute is a concession by the State relieving the beneficiary from an obligation otherwise payable – The recipient has no legally enforceable right to insist upon continuation of exemption indefinitely – The right to enjoy exemption is a defeasible right in the sense that it may be taken away in exercise of the very power under which it was granted – The exemption from payment of electricity duty was neither prematurely withdrawn nor withdrawn with retrospective effect [Paras 13, 16–17].

Article 14 – Judicial Review – Fiscal Policy – Courts must defer to legislative and executive judgment in matters of social and economic policy and must not interfere unless the exercise of power appears to be palpably arbitrary, discriminatory, or actuated by extraneous considerations – Courts do not evaluate the wisdom, sufficiency, or effectiveness of economic policy – Augmentation of public revenue and addressing budgetary constraints constitute valid public interest grounds for withdrawal of exemption and cannot be regarded as extraneous or unreasonable – Respondents failed to demonstrate manifest arbitrariness or irrelevant consideration [Paras 13, 18–20].

Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation – Inapplicable – Where the government makes a representation through a notification, the beneficiary must know that such notification is liable to be amended or rescinded in public interest – Doctrine of promissory estoppel does not prevent the State from changing its stand where supervening public equity exists, provided the Court is satisfied that such public interest exists – Decision to withdraw and modify the exemption having been taken in public interest, doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation have no application [Paras 14–15, 20].

Reasonable Notice Period – Transitional Protection – While the State possesses the power to withdraw or modify a statutory exemption, the manner of exercise of such power must satisfy reasonableness and fairness – Persons who have structured their commercial and industrial activities on the basis of a concession should not be subjected to abrupt policy reversals leaving them without reasonable time to adjust – Government should resile from its stand by giving reasonable notice where such course is feasible – Captive power generators had enjoyed exemption since 1994 and would have organised their financial and operational arrangements accordingly – Sudden withdrawal without transitional period imposes immediate additional fiscal burden – Held: A period of one year from the respective dates of the notifications constitutes reasonable notice, and the impugned notifications shall operate only after expiry of such period [Paras 21–23].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court judgments dated 05.10.2009 and 07.11.2009 quashed and set aside – State Government's power to withdraw or modify exemption under Section 5A upheld – Notifications dated 01.04.2000 and 04.04.2001 held operative only after expiry of one year from their respective dates – No order as to costs.

Land Acquisition – National Highways Act, 1956 – Solatium and Interest – Review – Escalation of Financial Burden Not a Valid Ground – Section 3-J of the NH Act, inserted in 1997, excluded the application of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in toto to acquisitions under the NH Act, thereby denying solatium and interest to land-losers during the period 1997 to 2015 – This Court in Tarsem Singh-I declared Section 3-J unconstitutional to the extent it denied solatium and interest, and held landowners entitled to benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and proviso to Section 28 of the 1894 Act – In Tarsem Singh-II, NHAI's application for prospective operation was dismissed – In the present Review Petition, NHAI contended that the financial liability was not Rs. 100 crores as recorded but approximately Rs. 29,000 crores due to a clerical error – Held: A mere escalation in projected liability, howsoever significant, does not constitute a valid ground for review – The constitutional guarantee of just compensation cannot be rendered contingent upon the magnitude of financial burden – Review Petition dismissed on merits [Paras 6–8].

Land Acquisition – NH Act – Cut-Off Date – Entitlement to Solatium and Interest – Balancing Equities of Delay – While landowners are entitled to solatium, interest, and interest on solatium as part of compensation for lands acquired under the NH Act during the period 1997 to 2015, not all claims can be treated uniformly – Where claims regarding quantum or components of compensation were alive on or after 28.03.2008 (the date of the Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment in Golden Iron and Steel), landowners are entitled to claim such benefits – However, where such claims are raised after inordinate delay post 28.03.2008, no interest on either component shall be payable for the period of delay, and entitlement to interest and interest on solatium shall run only from the date such claims were actually raised – Where claims stood conclusively decided prior to 28.03.2008 with no further appeal or proceedings pending, such landowners cannot seek reopening or review for the purpose of claiming solatium or interest – Held: A balance must be struck between the substantive entitlement of landowners and the equities operating against their delay, in a manner analogous to denial of interest for the period of delay in belated land acquisition enhancement appeals [Paras 10–14].

Finality of Judgments – Stale Claims – Subsequent Change in Law – No Entitlement to Reopen – Once a judgment or order has attained finality and is not subject to further challenge before a prescribed forum, a subsequent change in judicial interpretation does not entail reversal of such decision inter se the parties – Overturning of a principle of law cannot sustain even a formal review of an original decision once it has attained finality – Landowners whose claims stood concluded prior to 28.03.2008 are not entitled to seek reopening on the basis of Tarsem Singh-I or Tarsem Singh-II – Clarified that NHAI and Union of India are not entitled to seek refund or recovery of solatium or interest already paid [Paras 12, 17].

Decision: Review Petition disposed of – Review on ground of enhanced financial liability rejected – Limited clarification issued on cut-off date and conditions for entitlement to solatium, interest, and interest on solatium under the NH Act – Tagged Special Leave Petitions allowed – Impugned orders of High Courts of Bombay and Chhattisgarh set aside – Matters remanded to respective High Courts for recomputation strictly in accordance with directions issued.

Criminal Law – Matrimonial Dispute – Section 498A IPC – Dowry Prohibition Act – Quashing – Vague and Omnibus Allegations – FIR lodged after a delay of more than six years and seven months from the date of marriage alleging dowry demand, harassment, instigation by sister-in-law, miscarriage caused by husband's assault, sexual misconduct by father-in-law, and forcible eviction from matrimonial home – Investigating officer dropped Section 313 IPC charges in chargesheet – No medical evidence to support miscarriage – No documentary evidence regarding jewellery taken – High Court declined to quash – Held: Appeals allowed – FIR, Chargesheet, and Criminal Case quashed qua the appellant sister-in-law and parents-in-law [Paras 2–29].

Section 498A IPC – Misuse – Vague Allegations Against Relatives – A mere reference to names of family members in a matrimonial dispute case without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud – There is a well-recognised tendency to implicate all members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise – Generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution – Courts must exercise caution to prevent misuse of Section 498A and unnecessary harassment of innocent family members [Para 22].

Delay in FIR – Fatal in Matrimonial Cases – Due to the personal nature of the relationship between the parties in matrimonial cases, there is already an insufficiency of evidence to support or rebut claims – A delay of nearly seven years in lodging the FIR can be fatal to the prosecution's case when not properly explained – Citizens who allege commission of an offence should not delay in pursuing their rights – Law protects those who are vigilant (vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt) – The reason ascribed for delay, namely the father-in-law's reputation as an advocate, was not substantiated by any specific instance of threat or restraint over six years [Paras 21, 24].

Section 313 IPC – Charges Dropped by Investigating Officer – Allegations of miscarriage caused by physical assault were not supported by the medical examination report which failed to ascribe any particular injury supporting the claim – Investigating officer dropped charges under Section 313 in the chargesheet – High Court, not having the benefit of the chargesheet, erroneously treated these allegations as supporting a cognizable offence – Only offences with lesser punishment survive the investigation [Para 23].

Section 354 IPC – Outrage of Modesty – No Substantive Material – Allegation that the father-in-law held the complainant's hands and engaged in inappropriate conduct was not elaborated upon either in the FIR or in the chargesheet – The nature of the alleged 'obscene acts' was not specified – Prosecution could not substantiate any material in support during proceedings – State counsel unable to discern substantive material from the chargesheet for Section 354 – Mere bald allegations without evidentiary backing cannot sustain prosecution [Para 25].

Non-Appearance of Complainant – Adverse Inference – Complainant failed to enter appearance despite service of notice, indicating indifference and lack of interest in contesting the appeals – This draws an adverse inference against the prosecution case [Para 25].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned order of the Allahabad High Court dated 18.12.2023 set aside – FIR No. 758/2023, Chargesheet No. 01/2024, and Criminal Case No. 634/2025 quashed qua the appellant sister-in-law and parents-in-law – Observations not to affect any matrimonial or other proceedings pending between the parties.

Tender Law – Judicial Review – Scope and Limits – Quality and Cost Based System (QCBS) – High Court's Interference with LOA and Executed Contract Set Aside – GPPC floated a public tender in January 2025 for operation and maintenance of a 702.86 MW gas-based combined cycle power plant for five years on a QCBS basis, assigning 70% weightage to technical evaluation and 30% to price – Appellant was declared the successful bidder with a higher combined score – Writ petitioner challenged the process before the High Court – During pendency, the consultant re-evaluated the marks and reduced the appellant's technical score by 2 marks, resulting in a tie in technical scores at 93 each – High Court, solely on the basis of a minuscule difference in the combined score (95.09989831 vs. 95.0978453), quashed the LOA and the formal contract and directed award to the writ petitioner – Held: High Court exceeded the first principle of judicial restraint in contractual matters – When the difference is marginal and no mala fide or arbitrariness is found, a constitutional court should not substitute its decision for that of the owner – LOA and contract upheld [Paras 17–18, 26–30].

Judicial Review – Contractual Matters – Principle of Restraint – "Fair Play in the Joints" – The decision-making process of an owner in accepting or rejecting a bid should not be interfered with unless it is mala fide, intended to favour someone, or is so arbitrary or irrational that no responsible authority acting reasonably could have reached it – The threshold of mala fides, intention to favour, or perversity must be met before a constitutional court interferes – Courts must not use a magnifying glass to make every small mistake appear a big blunder – Technical evaluation or comparison by the court is impermissible – Tender document itself reserved with GPPC the right to accept any bid or reject all bids, underscoring that the final choice vests in the owner and not the court – Constitutional courts do not exercise ex-ante jurisdiction to pre-empt executive actions [Paras 19–22, 25–26].

Tendering Process – Owner's Needs – Delay Caused by Litigation – Court's Responsibility – It is not uncommon that when judicial review proceedings are invoked, the entire focus of the court shifts to choosing the most eligible party, losing sight of the needs and requirements of the owner – GPPC floated the tender in January 2025 and the LOA was granted on 09.06.2025, after which more than a year had elapsed – Judicial review must balance justice with flexibility and exercise nuanced discretion between multiple outcomes and binary choices, keeping in mind the larger public interest and avoiding unnecessary loss to the public exchequer [Paras 24, 22].

Sea Water System Experience – Clause 4 of 20.02(B) – Findings of High Court Upheld – As regards the appellant's claim for additional 5 marks under clause 4 of 20.02(B) towards operation and maintenance of sea water system experience, the findings of the High Court are based on true and correct facts and reasonable interpretation of the tender document – No justification to interfere – Civil Appeal arising out of Special Civil Application No. 12328 of 2025 dismissed [Para 28].

Decision: Civil Appeal arising out of Special Civil Application No. 7289 of 2025 allowed – Judgment and order of the High Court set aside – LOA dated 09.06.2025 and the formal contract dated 01.07.2025 in favour of the appellant upheld – GPPC permitted to have the contract performed without hindrance – Civil Appeal arising out of Special Civil Application No. 12328 of 2025 dismissed – No order as to costs.

Criminal Trial – Defect in Charge – Substantial Compliance – Purpose of charge is to inform accused of case against him – Charges framed though unsigned initially and later recorded in presence of accused – Accused participated in trial and cross-examined witnesses extensively – Held: Substantial compliance satisfied – accused had full knowledge of accusations – trial not vitiated [Paras 14.1–14.8]

Charge – Procedural Irregularity vs Illegality – Sections 215 & 464 CrPC – Absence of signature on charge – Whether fatal – Held: Defect is curable irregularity and not illegality – omission does not vitiate trial unless failure of justice shown – no prejudice demonstrated [Paras 15.1–15.12]

Prejudice Test – Failure of Justice – Requirement – Mere technical defect insufficient – accused must show they were misled in defence – Active participation and detailed cross-examination indicate no prejudice – belated objection after 14 years reinforces absence of prejudice [Paras 15.8–15.10]

De Novo Trial – When warranted – Scope – Fresh trial can be ordered only in exceptional cases where trial is fundamentally vitiated or miscarriage of justice occurs – cannot be ordered for curable procedural defects or to fill lacunae [Paras 16.1–16.5]

Delay and Stage of Trial – Advanced stage proceedings – Trial continued for over a decade with evidence recorded – key witnesses died – Held: Ordering retrial would seriously prejudice prosecution and defeat justice [Paras 16.8–16.9]

Inherent Powers – Section 482 CrPC – Exercise by High Court – Held: High Court erred in directing fresh trial without finding failure of justice – improper interference with substantially concluded trial [Paras 16.10–16.11]

Criminal Justice – Balance of rights – Courts must avoid allowing technical objections to defeat substantive justice and prolong proceedings unnecessarily [Para 16.12]

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court order directing de novo trial set aside – Trial Court order restored – Trial to proceed from existing stage and be concluded expeditiously.

Service Law – Defence Security Corps – Second Service Pension – Condonation of Shortfall – Pension Regulations 1961 and 2008 – Appeals Dismissed – Whether DSC personnel already drawing Regular Army pension are entitled to the benefit of rounding off under Paragraphs 9 and 18 of the Pension Regulations and condonation of shortfall under Paragraphs 125 and 44 thereof – DSC constitutes a Corps of the Indian Army under Section 3(vi) of the Army Act, 1950, and DSC personnel are "Armed Forces personnel" – Pensionary provisions applicable to PBOR of the Regular Army extend equally to DSC personnel by virtue of Paragraphs 266 and 173 of the 1961 and 2008 Regulations, save where inconsistent with DSC-specific provisions – Held: DSC personnel are entitled to rounding off of qualifying service and condonation of shortfall up to 12 months – Appeals dismissed [Paras 26–51].

Qualifying Service – Rounding Off – Paragraphs 9 and 18 – Note 5 of Letter dated 30.10.1987 – Fraction of a year equal to three months and above but less than six months to be treated as a completed half-year for reckoning qualifying service – Appellants directed to first determine the actual length of qualifying service of each respondent by giving effect to this beneficial stipulation before computing any shortfall – Such rounding off is mandatory and governs all Army and DSC personnel alike [Paras 31–32].

Condonation of Deficiency – Paragraph 125/Paragraph 44 – Incorporation by Reference – Paragraphs 266 and 173 of the Pension Regulations, 1961 and 2008 expressly apply all Regular Army pensionary provisions to DSC personnel – No express prohibition against condonation exists in the DSC-specific chapter – Appellants' argument that existence of Paragraph 175 creates inconsistency so as to exclude condonation is untenable – Paragraph 175 prescribes computation of DSC pension but contains no embargo against condonation of shortfall – Held: No inconsistency between Paragraphs 175, 44, and 47 – Condonation of up to one year's shortfall available to DSC personnel [Paras 34–41].

Administrative Letters Cannot Override Regulations – Government letters dated 20.06.2017 and 22.03.2022 purporting to bar condonation of shortfall for DSC second pension are without statutory authority – Government may issue beneficial circulars or clarifications in cases of ambiguity but cannot by administrative fiat amend or override clear statutory provisions of the Pension Regulations – A regulation on the statute book cannot be deemed amended by executive letters – Such letters have been repeatedly struck down by High Courts and the AFT and cannot be revived by re-issuance [Paras 42, 19–21].

Second Service Pension – No Dual Benefit Bar – DSC second service is separate and independent from prior Regular Army service when the personnel opts not to count former service – Condonation of shortfall in DSC service does not amount to dual benefit on the same service – No bar exists under the Regulations against earning a second service pension from DSC service independent of the first – Rounding off and condonation together may render a respondent eligible for the second pension without creating any anomaly in the scheme of the Regulations [Paras 44–46].

Pension – Vested Right – Consistent Judicial View – Settled position affirmed by High Courts and larger Bench of AFT Principal Bench in Smt. Shama Kaur v. Union of India – Pension is a deferred portion of compensation for past service and, upon fulfilment of conditions, constitutes a vested and enforceable right partaking the character of property – Cannot be withheld or curtailed save by authority of law – Union of India's repeated re-issuance of struck-down prohibitory letters deprecated [Paras 40, 43, 50].

Decision: Appeals dismissed with no order as to costs – Union of India directed to determine qualifying service of each respondent giving effect to Paragraphs 9 and 18 and Note 5 of letter dated 30.10.1987, and thereafter to condone shortfall up to 12 months where applicable under Paragraphs 125 and 44 of the Pension Regulations, 1961 and 2008.

Criminal Law – Rape and SC/ST Act – Conviction under Section 376 IPC and Section 3(xii) of SC/ST Act – Reliability of Child Witness – Conviction Restored – Respondent accused of sexually assaulting a nine-year-old girl in a cowshed – Trial Court convicted the accused; High Court acquitted him citing contradictions and the improbability of the victim traveling 16 km within two hours – Held: High Court's approach of picking holes in a case that withstood cross-examination is flawed; testimony of the child witness (PW-1) was positive, unequivocal, and corroborated by medical evidence (PW-7) – Acquittal set aside and conviction restored [Paras 1–14].

Evidence – Appreciation of Testimony – Child Witness – Guidelines – Competency and Corroboration – Held: There is no hard and fast rule for testing child competency; it depends on the Trial Judge’s satisfaction regarding the witness's ability to distinguish truth from falsehood – Non-administration of oath does not render testimony unusable – If a child witness withstands cross-examination, conviction can be based solely on such testimony, though seeking corroboration is a matter of prudence – Solitary testimony of a prosecutrix is sufficient if it inspires confidence [Paras 7–10, 13].

Criminal Procedure – Appreciation of Evidence – Minor Inconsistencies vs. Material Contradictions – Mathematical Precision – Held: Human perception and memory are imperfect; trivial discrepancies do not make evidence unreliable – Courts should not attach undue importance to variations that do not affect the core of the case – The High Court’s reliance on the "improbability" of traveling 16 km in two hours was misplaced as the factum of sexual assault remained undisturbed – Courts do not look for mathematical precision in proving the timeframe of an offence [Paras 8, 11–12].

Legal Procedure – Victim Anonymity – Protection of Identity – Section 228-A IPC – Disclosure of Survivor’s Name – Held: Disclosure of a sexual assault survivor’s identity causes social stigma and reputational harm – The mandate of Section 228-A IPC and the victim-centered orientation of the 1983 amendments must be followed strictly – Use of the victim's name in court records deprecated – Directions issued to all Registrars General of High Courts to ensure compliance with the proscription in Section 228-A IPC as per Nipun Saxena v. Union of India [Paras 5, 15].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of acquittal set aside – Respondent-accused directed to surrender forthwith to serve the remainder of the sentence – Directions issued regarding victim anonymity.