Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 CrPC – Scope of Inherent Jurisdiction – NRI plot purchasers alleged that accused persons created forged GPAs, executed fraudulent sale deeds and confirmation deeds in respect of Survey No. 12, Doddagubbi Village, Bengaluru, thereby depriving them of their lawfully owned plots through a premeditated conspiracy – Magistrate directed investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC – High Court quashed proceedings holding dispute to be civil in nature and that registered sale deeds must first be cancelled under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 before criminal proceedings could be sustained – Held: High Court transgressed well-settled boundaries governing exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC – Impugned judgment set aside – FIRs and proceedings revived and restored [Paras 4, 23–25, 51–58].

Section 156(3) CrPC – Magistrate's Order Directing Investigation – Scope and Standard – At the stage of directing investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, the Magistrate is required only to prima facie satisfy itself that the complaint discloses cognizable offences warranting investigation – The Magistrate is not expected to exhaustively evaluate evidence or adjudicate the merits of allegations – High Court's interference with such an order at the threshold, particularly when allegations of fraud, forgery and criminal conspiracy affecting a large group of NRI purchasers were made, was wholly unjustified [Para 52].

Section 482 CrPC – Mini-Trial Impermissible at Threshold Stage – High Court examined defence documents including sale deeds executed in favour of accused-respondents and treated them as determinative of the dispute – Such consideration of defence material involves adjudication of disputed questions of fact falling within the domain of investigation and trial – Any weighing of defence material at the threshold stage amounts to conducting a mini-trial and is wholly impermissible – Criminal investigation ought not to be scuttled except where the complaint ex facie discloses no cognizable offence or continuation would be an abuse of process [Paras 53–55].

Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings Permissible – Mere existence of a civil remedy does not bar criminal proceedings where allegations prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence – Initiation of civil proceedings for cancellation of sale deeds under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is not a sine qua non for launching criminal prosecution – Civil and criminal proceedings can run simultaneously even where allegations are identical [Para 56].

Parity of Reasoning – Coordinate Judgment Already Set Aside – High Court had passed a substantially identical judgment on 25th October, 2016 quashing proceedings against developer-Joseph Chacko on the same line of reasoning – That judgment was set aside by this Court on 28th November, 2024 – The impugned judgment in the present appeals rests on the same foundational premise – Existence of rival narratives attributing culpability to different sets of accused in respect of the same transactions underscores necessity of proper investigation rather than furnishing a ground to discard complaints at the threshold [Paras 47–51].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Common impugned judgment and order dated 28th September, 2016 of the High Court of Karnataka set aside – FIRs and proceedings arising therefrom revived and restored to the file of the concerned Police Station and/or Magistrate for being proceeded in accordance with law – All contentions of parties left open – Observations confined to present appeals and not to be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits [Paras 57–61].

Agricultural Income Tax – Amalgamation – Set-off of Accumulated Losses – Kerala Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1991 – Appellant-amalgamated company claimed set-off of accumulated losses of the amalgamating company (Pullangode Rubber & Produce Co. Ltd.) against its own profits, relying on Clause 14.2 of the scheme of amalgamation and Section 54 of the Kerala Act – High Court upheld denial of set-off at all levels – Held: The Kerala Act contains no provision analogous to Section 72A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which expressly deems accumulated losses of an amalgamating company to be losses of the amalgamated company – In the absence of such a provision, set-off cannot be claimed – Appeals dismissed [Paras 5–6, 14–16].

Section 12 – Kerala Act – Carry Forward of Losses – Personal to the Assessee – Section 12 of the Kerala Act permits carry forward of losses for a maximum period of eight years for set-off against income of subsequent years – Such benefit is personal to the assessee who suffered the losses – As the amalgamating company has ceased to exist upon dissolution without winding up, it is no longer an assessee capable of claiming set-off – The amalgamated company, not having itself suffered those losses, cannot claim the benefit – Moreover, the losses pertained to a period beyond eight years, independently disentitling the claim [Paras 6.1–6.4, 9, 15].

Scheme of Amalgamation – Binding Effect – Clause 14.2 – Distinction from Dalmia Power Ltd. – Appellant's reliance on Clause 14.2 of the scheme of amalgamation and the judgment in Dalmia Power Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax rejected – In Dalmia Power Ltd., the Income Tax Department received notice and failed to raise objections within the stipulated time, rendering all terms of the scheme binding – In the present case, no statutory requirement existed to issue notice to the State of Kerala under the Companies Act, 1956, and no such notice was issued – The State of Kerala was not a party to amalgamation proceedings and thus cannot be bound by terms of the scheme – Held: The ratio of Dalmia Power Ltd. is inapplicable and distinguishable on facts [Paras 11–13].

Section 54 – Kerala Act – Succession to Business – Scope – Section 54 of the Kerala Act deals with succession to business and provides that a successor can be called upon to pay tax dues of the predecessor – The proviso enables recovery of existing tax demands from the successor but does not extend any benefit of set-off of losses suffered by the predecessor to the successor – Section 54 cannot be read to confer upon the amalgamated company the right to set off losses of the amalgamating company [Paras 6.2, 9.1].

Decision: All five civil appeals dismissed – No order as to costs – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 15–17].

Arbitration – Enforcement of Consent Award – Indemnity Obligation – Trigger Point – Appellant-companies enforcing a Consent Award dated 01.03.2019 passed by SIAC, incorporating a Deed of Compromise whereby Respondent-Promoters undertook to defend specified litigation and ensure no liability was recovered from Appellants – High Court deferred enforcement holding obligation arose only upon confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal – Held: High Court committed error in restricting operative effect to the fifth limb of Paragraph 32(a) alone while rendering the fourth limb otiose – Liability crystallised upon court-directed deposit of Rs. 15,86,17,808/- by Appellants – Enforcement Petition allowed – Promoters directed to pay/deposit the said amount within 30 days [Paras 8–29].

Contract of Indemnity – Absolute vs. Contingent Obligation – Construction of Paragraph 32(a) – Fourth limb of the Consent Award imposed an unconditional obligation on Promoters to "ensure that no liability in regard to the said litigation is recovered from VPS/Medeor by the Forum" – Word "ensure" combined with the broad contractual definition of "Forum" pointed to an absolute obligation – Fifth limb providing for discharge within 30 days after confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal was a backstop guarantee for extreme scenarios, not the primary trigger – Treating fifth limb as the sole operative obligation converts a performance timeline into the indemnity trigger, contrary to established principles of contractual construction – Held: Where liability incurred is absolute, indemnity holder is entitled to call upon indemnifier without awaiting confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal [Paras 19–26].

Contractual Construction – Consent Award – Rules of Interpretation – Consent Award is equivalent to a Consent Decree, being a contract between parties with the court's seal super-added – Courts must give effect to every limb of the contract and cannot render any part otiose – Literal rule of construction to be applied first; purposive construction permissible only where literal reading produces absurdity – High Court's purposive construction ignored the clear and immediate obligation in the fourth limb and produced a paradox whereby Promoters could escape liability entirely by choosing not to appeal to the Supreme Court – Held: Plain reading of all five limbs together yields an immediate enforceable obligation; purposive construction unavailable where literal reading is clear [Paras 17, 20–28].

Internal Self-Contradiction in Impugned Judgment – High Court rejected Promoters' argument that "Forum" meant only the Highest Court of Appeal, yet adopted the same conclusion that liability was payable only after confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal – Such self-contradiction within the same paragraph rendered the impugned judgment erroneous – Further, High Court ignored the already-crystallised liability arising from its own direction to Medeor to deposit the full award amount for a conditional stay [Paras 16.1–16.5].

Reliance on Precedents – Commercial Contracts – Strict Construction – Promoters' reliance on Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. v. Garg Sons International and Suraj Mal Ram Niwas Oil Mills (P) Ltd. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. held misplaced – Both decisions support VPS/Medeor, as they mandate that in commercial contracts courts must give paramount importance to the exact words used and are prohibited from adding, deleting, or substituting words under the guise of interpretation – High Court's departure from the plain terms of the Consent Award was contrary to the ratio of these very decisions [Para 27].

Decision: Civil Appeal allowed – Impugned Judgment set aside – Enforcement Petition allowed – Promoters granted 30 days to pay or deposit Rs. 15,86,17,808/- for the benefit of VPS/Medeor – Amount subject to outcome of pending proceedings between EY and Promoters – No order as to costs [Paras 29–30].

Criminal Law – Bail – Suspension of Sentence – Split Chargesheet – Overlapping Allegations – Appellant, a former Minister convicted in R.C. Case No. 04(A)/2010-AHD-R(C) under Sections 120B read with 13(1)(d) and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988 and Section 120B read with Section 193 IPC, sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of seven years, sought bail during pendency of appeal before the High Court – High Court rejected application – Two split chargesheets arising from the same Vigilance P.S. Case No. 26 of 2008 contained substantially overlapping allegations pertaining to the same check period and same transactions – Appellant had undergone more than four years' incarceration in the earlier case, sentence whereof had been suspended by this Court, and more than ten months in the present case – Held: Bail granted by suspending substantive sentence – Impugned order set aside [Paras 3–23].

Double Jeopardy – Article 20(3) – Split Chargesheets – Permissibility – Appellant contended that filing of two separate prosecutions arising from the same set of overlapping allegations amounted to dual punishment for the same offence, violating the right against double jeopardy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution – Held: This aspect would have to be gone into by the High Court while deciding the pending appeal – Fact of overlapping allegations in the two cases noted as a relevant consideration for grant of bail – No final determination on merits [Para 20].

Bail – Parity – Sentence Already Suspended in Connected Case – Where sentence in an earlier case involving substantially similar and overlapping allegations had been suspended by this Court and the appellant enlarged on bail, and the appellant had undergone more than ten months of incarceration in the present case as well, the Court found it appropriate to extend similar indulgence – Held: Bail granted subject to condition that appellant file an undertaking to assist in restoration of tribal land to its original status and such other conditions as the trial Court deems fit [Paras 19–21].

Tribal Land – Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 – Confiscation – Restoration – Tribal lands illegally acquired in the name of the appellant's wife by furnishing false residential addresses and submitting false affidavits, in connivance with public officials including the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, were confiscated by the Special Court under PMLA vide judgment dated 21.03.2020 – Assets worth approximately Rs. 18 crores attached and confirmed by the adjudicating authority – State Government yet to take steps for cancellation of sale deeds and reversion of tribal land under CNT Act provisions – Appellant and family members undertook to cooperate in restoration [Paras 6, 15, 17, 21].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order of the High Court set aside – Appellant directed to be released on bail upon suspension of substantive sentence – Appellant to file undertaking before trial Court within seven days of release to assist in restoration of tribal land – Bail subject to such terms and conditions as the trial Court may deem fit and upon furnishing bail bonds and sureties to its satisfaction [Paras 21–23].

Family Law – Mediated Settlement Agreement – Resilement – DV Proceedings Quashed – Parties married in 2000 entered into a Settlement Agreement dated 16.05.2024 through mediation, agreeing to dissolve marriage by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Appellant-Husband performed his obligations including payment of ₹75,00,000/-, ₹14,00,000/- for car, and return of jewellery – First Motion allowed by Family Court on 14.08.2024 – Respondent-Wife withdrew consent before Second Motion and filed DV Complaint No. 3186/2025 – Held: DV proceedings constitute abuse of process, liable to be quashed – Impugned interim order set aside [Paras 3–9, 37–41, 55(i)].

Mediated Settlement Agreement – Binding Nature – Resilement – A party cannot be permitted to resile from a mediated settlement agreement duly authenticated by a mediator and ratified by the Court, without demonstrating that the settlement was procured by force, fraud or undue influence, or that the opposite party failed to comply with conditions stipulated therein – Resilement from such agreements strikes at the foundational basis of the entire mediation process – Resiling party must be encumbered with heavy costs – Settlement agreement subsumes the original complaint and disputes – Held: Respondent-Wife's conduct in accepting benefits under the Settlement Agreement and thereafter withdrawing consent amounts to abuse of process [Paras 29–35].

DV Act – Section 12 – Complaint Without Specific Allegations – Quashing Justified – A careful perusal of the DV complaint revealed absence of any specific allegations of domestic violence by the Appellant-Husband or his mother – Filing of DV complaint immediately after Contempt Petition was issued against Respondent-Wife, after eight months of the Second Motion deadline, and for the first time in 23 years of marriage, pointed to it being a premeditated afterthought designed to sustain litigation after resilement from the Settlement Agreement – Criminal prosecution without specific averments of violence cannot be permitted and is liable to be quashed [Paras 37–41].

Article 142(1) – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Divorce Granted – Parties living separately since 2022-23 – Both children of the parties are majors – Multiple rounds of litigation initiated by both parties – Settlement Agreement entered through court-directed mediation rendered unworkable by Respondent-Wife's conduct – No possibility of reconciliation – Held: Marriage has irretrievably broken down; present is a fit case for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142(1) – Decree of divorce granted subject to compliance with specified terms including payment of remaining alimony of ₹70,22,871/-, handover of PPF passbook, and execution of relinquishment deeds [Paras 42–55].

Conditions for Exercise of Power Under Article 142(1) – Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is to be determined factually by weighing several factors including period of cohabitation, nature of allegations, number of attempts at settlement, economic and social status of parties, age and dependency of children, and provision for fair alimony – Power is discretionary and not a matter of right, to be exercised only when the Court is fully convinced that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, and beyond salvation – Court is not required to adjudicate on fault but must take a holistic view on the relationship [Paras 44–49].

Decision: Criminal appeal allowed – DV proceedings quashed – Impugned order of the High Court set aside – Divorce granted under Article 142(1) – Appellant-Husband directed to pay ₹70,22,871/- (after deducting ₹4,77,129/- towards PPF Account) and hand over PPF passbook within two weeks – Parties to execute relinquishment deeds before jurisdictional Registrar within four weeks – Amount of ₹89,00,000/- deposited by Respondent-Wife before High Court to be returned with accrued interest – All pending civil and criminal proceedings between the parties, their family members and relatives, arising out of or in relation to the marriage, stand closed and quashed – Bar on future proceedings [Paras 55–56].

EWS Reservation – Validity of Income and Asset Certificate – Financial Year Requirement – Appellants applied under EWS category for 9212 posts of Health Worker (Female) advertised on 15.12.2021 with last date of application 05.01.2022 – EWS certificates submitted were either issued prior to closure of the relevant financial year 2020-21 or related to a different financial year altogether – Commission rejected candidatures as certificates did not conform to the prescribed format and financial year – Single Judge directed issuance of fresh certificates and reconsideration – Division Bench reversed, holding certificates invalid – Held: EWS certificate must relate to the financial year prior to the year of application; certificates issued before closure of the relevant financial year or relating to a wrong financial year are invalid on the face and rejection of candidatures was justified – Appeals dismissed [Paras 18–27].

Prescribed Form – Compliance – Mandatory Nature – Clause 8.3 of advertisement required submission of EWS certificate in prescribed Form-I prior to the last date of application – Form-I mandates disclosure of the financial year for which the certificate is valid and a statement that family income is below Rs. 8 lacs for that financial year – Office Memorandum dated 18.02.2019 and Section 7 of the 2020 Act require that income be assessed for the financial year prior to the year of application – Certificates of several appellants were dated January–February 2021, i.e., before the advertisement dated 15.12.2021, and were thus obtained prior to the relevant financial year closing – Appellants could have obtained fresh certificates after publication of the advertisement but failed to do so [Paras 20–26].

Individual Certificates – Defects Examined – Poonam Dwivedi's certificate dated 12.01.2021 purportedly valid for FY 2020-21 when that year had not closed – Shanu Tiwari's certificate dated 21.01.2021 valid for FY 2019-20 instead of 2020-21 – Komal's certificate dated 06.01.2021 relating to FY 2019 – Archana Saxena's certificate dated 05.02.2021 valid for FY 2019-20 – Anuradha Srivastava's certificate dated 05.01.2021 for FY 2020-21 issued before year-end – Sunita Kumari's certificate dated 10.01.2022 relating to FY 2021-22 instead of FY 2020-21 – All certificates found defective; certificate of a different financial year goes to the root of eligibility [Paras 8, 16, 26].

Public Recruitment – Online Processing – Caution Against Routine Interference – In public recruitments involving large numbers of candidates where applications are submitted online with scanned documents processed by software, errors in applications necessarily result in rejection – Courts should not ordinarily entertain challenges to such rejections as they stall expeditious completion of recruitment, frustrating thousands of aspirants [Para 28].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – No order as to costs – Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law – Suspension of Sentence – Section 389 CrPC – Murder Conviction – Respondent No. 2 convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27(3) of the Arms Act and sentenced to life imprisonment after full trial, based on consistent ocular evidence of three eyewitnesses – High Court suspended sentence during pendency of appeal relying on specific role attributed to respondent being limited to holding the deceased, period of incarceration of about six years nine months, and pendency of appeal for seven years – Held: Upon conviction, presumption of innocence stands displaced; suspension of sentence in cases of conviction under Section 302 IPC can be granted only in rare and exceptional circumstances; High Court erred in selectively reappreciating evidence and granting suspension without any apparent or palpable infirmity in the judgment of conviction; impugned order set aside; respondents directed to surrender within two weeks [Paras 14–25].

Suspension of Sentence – Scope and Parameters – Section 389 CrPC – Distinction from Pre-trial Bail – Post-conviction suspension of sentence is qualitatively distinct from pre-trial bail; appellate court must record reasons in writing reflecting careful consideration of the nature of offence, manner of commission, gravity of findings of the trial court, and desirability of release – Appellate court should not reappreciate evidence or pick out lacunae at this stage; only where something palpable and apparent on the face of the record indicates the conviction may not be sustainable can suspension be considered – Long period of incarceration and pendency of appeal, while relevant, cannot be the sole or decisive ground for suspension in cases of serious offences [Paras 14–21].

Common Intention – Section 34 IPC – Constructive Liability – Absence of a specific overt act attributed to an accused does not dilute his culpability where common intention is established; each participant is equally liable for the act done in furtherance of common intention – High Court's reliance on the fact that the fatal shot was fired by a co-accused while respondent's role was limited to holding the deceased is misconceived at the stage of Section 389 [Para 19].

Criminal Antecedents – Threats to Complainant – Relevance at Bail Stage – Multiple prior cases registered against the convict including offences involving violence and use of arms constitute relevant factors in assessing propriety of suspension of sentence – Allegations of intimidation of the informant and his family by the convict, though denied, cannot be discountenanced at the interlocutory stage [Paras 22–23].

Decision: Both Criminal Appeals allowed – Impugned orders suspending sentences of Respondent No. 2 in Criminal Appeal (DB) Nos. 1180 and 1182 of 2018 set aside – Bail bonds cancelled – Respondents directed to surrender before the trial Court within two weeks.

Family Law – Divorce – Cruelty and Desertion – Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Respondent-husband filed divorce petition alleging persistent mental and physical harassment, use of abusive language towards his parents, and irretrievable breakdown of matrimonial relationship – Family Court granted divorce upon finding cruelty and desertion established – High Court affirmed, relying on undertaking given by appellant acknowledging misconduct, testimony of the parties' son supporting cruelty allegations, and appellant's own statement expressing disinterest in custody of children – Parties living separately since 2018; prolonged separation indicating matrimonial bond broken beyond repair – Held: Findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence; no perversity warranting interference; decree of divorce affirmed [Paras 5–10].

Maintenance – Quantum – Modification in Interest of Complete Justice – Family Court awarded lump sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- as maintenance to the appellant-wife – Held: Having regard to the need to ensure continued financial support, respondent directed to pay Rs. 10,000/- per month to the appellant from the date of this order in substitution of the lump sum awarded [Para 11].

Decision: Appeal disposed of – Decree of divorce affirmed – Maintenance modified to Rs. 10,000/- per month payable from the date of the order.

Co-operative Societies – Bye-laws – Eligibility to Contest Elections – Validity – District Milk Unions framed Bye-law Nos. 20.1(2), 20.1(4), 20.2(7) and 20.2(9) prescribing conditions for the President of a Primary Milk Producers' Co-operative Society to contest elections to the Board of Directors of District Milk Unions, including audit classification, continuity of operations for more than 90 days, minimum 270 days of milk supply, and minimum quantity of milk supplied – Single Judge declared the bye-laws ultra vires the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001; Division Bench affirmed – Held: Writ petitions not maintainable; statutory remedies not exhausted; on merits, bye-laws are intra vires, being traceable to Section 8 read with Schedule B, Clauses (da) and (v); impugned judgment set aside [Paras 14–23].

Writ Jurisdiction – Article 226 – Co-operative Societies – Amenability – District Milk Unions are autonomous, member-driven bodies neither owned, financially controlled nor administratively dominated by the State so as to qualify as instrumentalities of the State under Article 12 – Supervisory or regulatory control by the Registrar or State Co-operative Election Authority does not confer the character of a public body discharging public duties – Disputes relating to internal governance and electoral processes of co-operative societies do not, as a matter of course, attract writ jurisdiction merely because such societies owe their incorporation to a statute – Writ petitions ought not to have been entertained [Paras 14.1–14.9].

Alternative Remedy – Exhaustion – Sections 58, 60, 100, 104–107, Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 – Act provides a self-contained, multi-tiered adjudicatory mechanism for election disputes – Section 58(2)(c) expressly deems disputes arising in connection with elections to be disputes touching the constitution and management of a co-operative society, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Registrar – Writ petitioners having failed to invoke statutory remedies and demonstrating no exceptional circumstances to bypass them, the High Court ought to have rejected the writ petitions at the threshold [Paras 15.1–15.12].

Right to Vote v. Right to Contest – Statutory Rights – Distinct Fields – Neither the right to vote nor the right to contest an election is a fundamental right; both are purely statutory rights subject to regulation – The right to contest election is a distinct and additional right, inherently subject to stricter regulation including qualifications and eligibility conditions – Impugned bye-laws regulate eligibility for candidature and continuation in office and do not restrict the right to exercise franchise – High Court erred in conflating the two rights and applying an erroneous standard of scrutiny [Paras 18.1–18.7].

Eligibility v. Disqualification – Conceptual Distinction – Disqualifications under Section 28 operate as statutory disabilities upon the occurrence of specified negative circumstances and presuppose eligibility, whereas eligibility conditions are threshold, positive and performance-oriented criteria designed to ensure minimum functional connection with the society – Impugned bye-laws prescribe conditions of audit classification, operational continuity, minimum milk supply and minimum supply days, which are uniform, objective, non-stigmatic and capable of being satisfied in subsequent cycles – They do not add to or trench upon disqualifications under Section 28; High Court's premise that any condition affecting participation must be a disqualification is legally unsustainable [Paras 19.1–19.7].

Subordinate Legislation – Validity – Source of Power – Section 8 read with Schedule B, Clauses (da) and (v) – Power to frame bye-laws on minimum utilisation of services and entitlement to send a representative to another society is expressly conferred – Impugned bye-laws supplement and do not supplant the statutory framework; they advance the legislative object of ensuring functional, accountable and democratic governance – Presumption of validity of subordinate legislation not dislodged; no manifest arbitrariness, inconsistency with the parent Act or lack of legislative competence demonstrated [Paras 20.1–20.15].

Natural Justice – Non-joinder of Necessary Parties – Judgment in Rem – High Court struck down bye-laws of all District Milk Unions in the State including those not impleaded and not heard in the writ proceedings – Such adjudication operating in rem and affecting the internal governance of absent societies without affording them a hearing violates audi alteram partem – High Court transgressed the limits of its writ jurisdiction [Paras 21.1–21.6].

Locus Standi – Persons Not Party to Writ Proceedings – Present appellants, though not impleaded in the writ proceedings, are directly and adversely affected by the impugned judgment which operates to alter the legal regime applicable to them – Persons aggrieved by a judgment even without formal party status are entitled to maintain an appeal with leave of the Court [Para 13].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and order of the High Court set aside – Bye-laws 20.1(2), 20.1(4), 20.2(7) and 20.2(9) upheld as valid – No order as to costs