Right to Education – Section 12(1)(c), RTE Act, 2009 – Admission of children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups – Neighbourhood schools under statutory obligation to admit at least 25% of entry-level class strength – Provision held to be transformative and central to achieving constitutional equality of status – Effective implementation declared a national mission [Paras 1, 7–10].

Fundamental Right – Article 21A – Nature and Scope – Right to free and compulsory elementary education recognised as a positive fundamental right – Identification of five duty bearers: appropriate government, local authority, neighbourhood school, parents/guardians and teachers – Co-relative duties essential for realisation of constitutional mandate [Paras 5–6.5].

Judicial Review – Denial of Admission – High Court dismissed writ petition blaming parent for failure to follow online procedure – Supreme Court held such approach unsustainable in face of administrative directions, RTI disclosures of vacant seats and poverty of petitioner – Courts duty-bound to provide effective relief in cases of denial of fundamental right to education [Paras 2–3].

Access to Justice – Procedural Barriers – Digital illiteracy, language barriers, lack of transparency, absence of help-desks and grievance redressal mechanisms found to obstruct access to Section 12 benefit – Online-only admission processes held exclusionary for vulnerable groups [Paras 3–4].

Constitutional Values – Equality, Dignity and Fraternity – Section 12(1)(c) designed to integrate children from diverse socio-economic backgrounds in common neighbourhood schools – Provision furthers substantive equality, social integration and fraternity – Common School System endorsed as constitutional strategy to dismantle class and caste segregation [Paras 7–12].

Duties of State and Local Authorities – Monitoring and Enforcement – Obligations under Sections 6 to 9 and Section 31 of RTE Act emphasised – National and State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights entrusted with monitoring, grievance redressal and enforcement of children’s right to education [Paras 6.1–6.3, 11–12].

Standard Operating Procedure – NCPCR – Non-binding Nature – SOPs and guidelines found insufficient in absence of enforceable statutory rules – Lack of uniformity across States and UTs undermining effective implementation of Section 12(1)(c) [Paras 12–15].

Subordinate Legislation – Necessity – Supreme Court held formulation of rules under Section 38 of RTE Act imperative – Without enforceable rules, mandate of Article 21A and Section 12(1)(c) would remain illusory – Directions issued to frame rules in consultation with NCPCR, SCPCRs and Advisory Councils [Paras 15–16].

Directions – Compliance and Monitoring – NCPCR directed to be impleaded as party respondent – Directed to collate information regarding framing of rules by States and UTs and file affidavit before Supreme Court – Matter kept pending for further monitoring [Paras 16–16.3].

Decision: Special Leave Petition retained for precedent and policy directions – Appropriate Governments directed to frame enforceable rules for implementation of Section 12(1)(c) – NCPCR tasked with monitoring compliance – Matter listed for further hearing.

Service Law - Public Employment – Persons with Disabilities – Denial of Appointment – Appellant applied under Visually Handicapped category pursuant to 2019 recruitment by Coal India Limited – Declared medically unfit on ground of multiple disabilities – Single Judge quashed medical unfitness and granted relief for subsequent recruitment – Division Bench reversed on ground of expiry of panel – Supreme Court set aside Division Bench order – Held: Expiry of panel cannot defeat substantive rights where initial denial was illegal and not attributable to candidate [Paras 1–3, 8].

Disability Law – Benchmark Disability – Medical Assessment by Expert Body – AIIMS Medical Board constituted pursuant to Supreme Court directions – Board assessed appellant at 57% disability, exceeding benchmark of 40% – Appellant held eligible for appointment under reserved quota for persons with disabilities [Paras 4–7, 9, 12].

Reasonable Accommodation – Concept and Scope – Reasonable accommodation recognised as a fundamental right and gateway right – Rooted in RPwD Act and Articles 14, 21 and 41 of the Constitution – Not limited to assistive devices but includes flexible, purposive interpretation of rules and conditions of employment – Denial amounts to discrimination and violates substantive equality [Paras 13–17].

Employment Rights – Right to Work – Constitutional Perspective – Right to livelihood integral to right to life with dignity – Directive Principles under Articles 39(a) and 41 to inform interpretation of fundamental rights – Public sector undertakings obligated to respect and promote disability rights [Paras 18–22].

Intersectionality – Disability and Gender – Appellant a single woman facing compounded discrimination – Technical objections such as expiry of panel cannot override need to do complete justice – Substantive equality requires recognition of multiple and intersecting axes of disadvantage [Paras 23–24].

Corporate Social Responsibility – Disability Inclusion – Public sector employer’s obligation to respect human rights of persons with disabilities – Disability inclusion integral to ESG framework and CSR obligations – Equality at workplace requires proactive accommodation and inclusion [Paras 25–28].

Relief – Creation of Supernumerary Post – Supreme Court directed creation of supernumerary post for appellant – Direction to provide suitable desk job with universal design accommodations – Posting directed at North Eastern Coalfields, Assam – Relief granted in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution [Paras 30–34].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order of Division Bench of Calcutta High Court set aside – Appellant directed to be appointed by creation of supernumerary post with reasonable accommodation – Appeal disposed of accordingly.

Hindu Law – Maintenance of Dependants – Widowed Daughter-in-Law – Section 21(vii), Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 – Respondent became widow after the death of her father-in-law – Family Court dismissed maintenance petition as not maintainable – High Court reversed and held petition maintainable – Supreme Court affirmed – Held: Expression “any widow of his son” includes every widow of a son irrespective of the time when widowhood occurs – Timing of son’s death is immaterial [Paras 7, 10–16, 22, 29].

Statutory Interpretation – Literal Rule – Clear and unambiguous language – Courts cannot add or subtract words from statute – Legislature deliberately used words “any widow of his son” and not “widow of predeceased son” – Judicial re-writing of statute impermissible even if hardship alleged [Paras 16–22].

Maintenance – Liability of Heirs – Section 22, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 – Obligation of all heirs inheriting estate of deceased Hindu to maintain dependants – Dependant who does not inherit any share entitled to maintenance from those taking the estate [Paras 12–13].

Constitution of India – Article 14 – Arbitrary Classification – Distinction between widowed daughters-in-law based on whether husband died before or after father-in-law held unreasonable – Such classification has no nexus with object of the Act and violates equality before law [Para 23].

Right to Life – Article 21 – Maintenance as component of right to live with dignity – Denial of maintenance to widowed daughter-in-law would lead to destitution and social marginalisation – Provisions of Act must be interpreted in harmony with constitutional values and social justice [Para 24].

Hindu Law Principles – Moral and Legal Obligation – Duty to maintain female dependants – Reference to Manu Smriti – Pious obligation of family head to support widowed daughter-in-law reaffirmed – Codified law does not negate fundamental Hindu law principles consistent with statute [Paras 25–26].

Sections 19 and 22 – Distinction – Section 19 governs maintenance during lifetime of father-in-law – Section 22 applies after death of father-in-law and enables claim against his estate – Widowed daughter-in-law entitled to maintenance as dependant after death of father-in-law [Paras 27–28].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Judgment of High Court upheld – Maintenance petition held maintainable – Family Court directed to decide claim on merits – No order as to costs.

Constitutional Law – Validity of Legislation – Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Upheld (with interpretation) – The Court examined the constitutional validity of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which mandates prior approval for inquiry or investigation into offences committed by public servants in discharge of official functions or duties – The provision aims to protect honest public servants from frivolous complaints and policy paralysis – The Court noted that Section 17A, unlike its predecessors (Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of DSPE Act), applies across the board to all public servants and includes time limits for approval decisions – It was contended that Section 17A is a salutary provision with checks and balances to prevent harassment of honest public servants – The Court held that the object behind Section 17A to provide previous approval for inquiry/investigation into offences relatable to recommendations or decisions taken by public servants in discharge of official duties cannot be faulted – The Court emphasized the need to balance protecting public servants from mala fide prosecution and upholding probity in public life – The Court also referred to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, which advocates for an appropriate balance between immunities for public officials and effective investigation – The Court concluded that Section 17A is constitutionally valid, subject to the condition that the grant or refusal of approval by the competent authority will depend on the recommendation of the Lokpal/Lokayukta – This interpretation ensures an independent screening mechanism, aligning Section 17A with the principles laid down in Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy – This mechanism addresses concerns about potential abuse and lack of objectivity if the government itself were the sole screening authority – The Court rejected the argument that judicial review alone is sufficient to check misuse of power, as judicial review primarily focuses on the decision-making process, not the merits of the decision itself – The Court also rejected the analogy with the judiciary's screening mechanism as not tenable due to the distinct nature of judicial functioning – The Court disposed of the writ petition with directions to ensure the involvement of Lokpal/Lokayukta in the approval process [Paras 45, 53, 58, 59, 81, 87, 88, 89, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 115, 116, 119, 120, 122, 124].

Constitutional Law – Interpretation of Statutes – Reading Down – Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Applied – The Court applied the principle of "reading down" to Section 17A to save it from being rendered unconstitutional – The Court noted that where there are two possible interpretations, one invalidating the law and the other upholding it, the latter should be adopted – This approach aims to salvage legislation to achieve its objective without infringing the Constitution – The Court held that Section 17A can be aligned with the pronouncements in Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy by ensuring a screening mechanism by an independent agency before the grant or refusal of approval by the government, and that the recommendations of this independent agency are binding on the government – This ensures the salutary provision in preventing frivolous complaints against honest public servants is not set at naught – The Court emphasized that this interpretation does not amount to "substitution" or "judicial legislation" but rather ensures safeguards for its implementation and attracts talent to public service [Paras 97, 98, 99, 100, 111, 114, 122, 123, 124].

Criminal Law – Corruption – Investigation – Prior Approval – Role of Lokpal/Lokayukta – The Court directed that the Union of India or State Governments and the authorities competent to remove public servants, upon receiving information under Section 17A, shall immediately forward it to the Lokpal/Lokayukta (in case of States) – The Lokpal/Lokayukta shall then conduct an inquiry on the information in accordance with their respective statutes and forward a recommendation to the appropriate authority – This authority shall be bound by and act in accordance with the Lokpal/Lokayukta's recommendation regarding the grant or refusal of permission under Section 17A – For bodies/organizations/public servants not covered under the Lokpal's jurisdiction, the competent authority to remove the public servant shall commission an appropriate independent investigative agency to screen the information and act on its recommendation – The time-limit stipulated in the proviso to Section 17A (three months, extendable by one month) shall apply, and all authorities must adhere to it – The Lokpal/Lokayukta must provide reasons for their recommendations [Paras 124(i), 124(ii), 124(iii), 124(iv), 124(v)].

Dissenting Opinion – Constitutional Validity of Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Unconstitutional – Justice B.V. Nagarathna, in a separate opinion, held that Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is unconstitutional and ought to be struck down – The dissenting opinion argued that Section 17A is contrary to the objects of the Act and is an attempt to reintroduce provisions (Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of DSPE Act) previously struck down by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy – It was contended that the requirement of prior approval forestalls inquiry and protects the corrupt, rather than the honest – The dissenting opinion found the substitution of "Government" with "Lokpal" or "Lokayukta" impermissible by way of interpretation, as it amounts to judicial legislation – It highlighted that the provision is arbitrary due to "policy bias," potential conflict of interest within government departments, and the difficulty in identifying a single public servant responsible for decisions – The dissenting opinion emphasized that the classification of public servants based on their decision-making duties, effectively protecting higher-level officers, violates Article 14 of the Constitution – It concluded that Section 17A, in substance, is a resurrection of Section 6A and continues to suffer from the infirmities identified in Subramanian Swamy, including impeding independent investigation and forewarning potential culprits – The dissenting opinion stressed that the overarching object of the Act is to prevent corruption, and Section 17A undermines this purpose by creating a shield for dishonest public servants [Paras (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), 19.1, 20.1, 20.3, 20.5, 20.6, 20.7, 20.8, 20.9, 20.10, 20.11, 20.12, 20.13, 20.14, 20.15, 21, 21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4, 22(i), 22(ii), 22(iii), 22(iv), 22(v), 22(vi)].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The writ petition is disposed of with directions to ensure the involvement of Lokpal/Lokayukta in the approval process under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The matter is referred to the Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate Bench to consider the issues afresh due to divergent opinions.

Civil Law – Abatement of Appeal – Non-substitution of one legal heir – Estate sufficiently represented – No abatement – Vendor Kishorilal died during pendency of first appeal – All four legal heirs initially substituted – One heir (Murarilal) subsequently died – Remaining three legal heirs and transferees lis pendens continued on record – Held: Where estate of deceased party is substantially and sufficiently represented by other legal heirs already on record, appeal does not abate merely due to non-substitution of one heir – High Court erred in holding appeal abated [Paras 25, 26, 38–40, 43].

Specific Performance – Vendor as necessary party – Distinction between total non-representation and partial non-substitution – Vendor is a necessary party in suit for specific performance notwithstanding transfer of property – However, where vendor’s estate is represented by some legal heirs, absence of substitution of one heir does not render appeal incompetent – Decision in Dwarka Prasad distinguished on facts [Paras 32–36, 39–40].

Civil Procedure – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Status of transferee pendente lite – Transfer during pendency of suit not void but subservient to decree – Transferee lis pendens can represent estate of vendor as intermeddler and maintain appeal – Such transferee not a substitute for vendor where vendor’s presence is totally absent – But can supplement representation where vendor’s heirs are on record [Paras 10, 36–38].

Civil Procedure – Res Judicata – Applicability at different stages of same proceedings – High Court earlier held that appeal had not abated and permitted impleadment of heirs – Subsequent contrary finding by same court impermissible – Principle of res judicata applies between different stages of same litigation – Earlier determination binding unless set aside in appeal [Paras 30, 41–42].

Civil Procedure – Clerical / Typographical Error – Power of correction – Order deleting name of Kishorilal passed despite his prior death and substitution of LRs – Error apparent on face of record – Such clerical mistake correctable at any stage under Sections 151 and 152 CPC – Party cannot take advantage of court’s inadvertent error [Para 44].

Order I Rule 10 CPC – Impleadment of legal heirs – Effect on abatement – Impleadment of heirs of deceased legal heir as pro forma respondents permissible where appeal had not abated – No necessity of formal order setting aside abatement when abatement itself had not occurred [Paras 45–46].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of High Court dismissing First Appeal Nos. 213 of 2000 and 217 of 2000 as abated set aside – Both appeals restored to file of High Court for decision on merits in accordance with law [Paras 47–48].

Service Law – Government Employment – Suppression of Criminal Antecedents – Cancellation of Appointment – Respondent selected as Sahayak Samiksha Adhikari – Required to disclose pendency of criminal cases in attestation and verification forms – Respondent answered in the negative despite two criminal cases pending against him – Held: Proper and complete disclosure of criminal antecedents is a fundamental requirement rooted in fairness, integrity and public trust – Repeated non-disclosure amounts to deliberate concealment and is a serious lapse justifying cancellation of appointment [Paras 3–6, 8–9].

Service Law – Attestation / Verification Forms – Effect of Disclaimer – Forms contained clear stipulation that furnishing false information or suppressing material facts would render candidate unfit and ineligible for government service – Respondent submitted incorrect information twice in clear violation of disclaimer – Held: What is decisive is the status of criminal cases at the time of filling the forms – Subsequent acquittal or later disclosure does not efface the misconduct of suppression [Paras 7–9].

Service Law – Criminal Cases – Pending Investigation – Relevance at Time of Disclosure – At the time of filling forms, investigations in criminal cases were pending – Acquittal or dropping of proceedings occurred later – Held: Subsequent developments cannot accrue to benefit of candidate who furnished false information at the relevant time [Paras 8–9].

Service Law – Equity and Sympathy – Limits – High Court interfered on grounds of triviality of offences, absence of charge-sheet, subsequent disclosure and opinion of District Magistrate – Supreme Court held that sympathy cannot supplant law – Maxim “juda lex sed lex” applied – Loss of employment cannot justify overlooking deliberate concealment of material facts [Paras 9–10].

Precedents – Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P. – Applicability – Principles relating to consideration of surrounding circumstances in cases of non-disclosure reiterated – Held: Facts of present case show demonstrated mal-intent due to repeated false declarations – Hence benefit of said precedents not available to respondent [Para 9].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgments of Single Judge and Division Bench of Allahabad High Court set aside – Cancellation of respondent’s appointment upheld – Pending applications disposed of [Para 10].

Consumer Law – Execution Proceedings – Liability of Directors and Promoters – Consumer complaints admitted only against company – Directors/promoters not proceeded against at adjudicatory stage – No notice issued, no pleadings, no findings recorded against them – Held: Execution must strictly conform to the decree – Persons against whom no adjudication of liability exists cannot be proceeded against in execution merely because they are directors/promoters of judgment-debtor company [Paras 9–13, 17, 23].

Execution of Decree – Scope and Limitations – Executing forum cannot go behind or enlarge decree – Liability cannot be shifted or expanded at execution stage – Decree binding exclusively on company cannot be enforced against non-judgment debtors – Settled principle reiterated – Executing court may construe decree but cannot travel beyond it [Paras 12–13].

Consumer Protection Act – Adjudicatory Safeguards – Necessity of pleadings, notice and findings – Personal liability cannot be fastened without foundational adjudication – Execution proceedings cannot operate as substitute for trial or adjudication – Absence of pleadings and findings fatal to execution against individuals [Paras 11, 17].

Insolvency Law – Moratorium under Section 14 IBC – Effect on execution proceedings – Moratorium shields only corporate debtor – Does not automatically extend to directors/promoters – However, execution against directors permissible only if independent liability is established – Moratorium cannot be indirectly bypassed by proceeding against non-liable directors [Paras 7, 15, 20–22].

Company Law – Separate Legal Entity – Company distinct from shareholders and directors – Liability of directors limited unless personal guarantees, undertakings or statutory exceptions shown – Doctrine of corporate personality reaffirmed – No material to show guarantees or statutory basis for fastening personal liability [Paras 13–16].

Corporate Veil – Piercing of – Exceptional doctrine – Requires specific pleadings and findings of fraud or misuse of corporate form – Invocation impermissible at execution stage without prior adjudication – Directors/promoters cannot be exposed to personal liability in absence of established grounds [Paras 18–19].

Effect of Prior Supreme Court Order – Scope clarified – Earlier order permitting continuation of execution against directors removed only moratorium-related bar – Did not adjudicate or declare personal liability – National Commission rightly examined executability on merits and declined execution against directors – No inconsistency with prior order [Paras 19–22].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Order of NCDRC declining execution against directors/promoters upheld – Decree executable only against corporate debtor – Liberty reserved to appellants to pursue other remedies available in law against directors/promoters in appropriate proceedings – No order as to costs [Paras 24–27].

Criminal Law – Bail Jurisdiction – Section 439 CrPC – Scope and Limits – High Court while deciding bail application under Section 439 CrPC issued sweeping directions mandating medical age determination of victims in all POCSO cases and laid down procedural norms for investigation – Held: Jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC is confined to consideration of grant or refusal of bail – High Court cannot issue general or policy directions unrelated to adjudication of bail – Exercise of statutory jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by invoking constitutional status of High Court – Directions issued beyond jurisdiction and liable to be set aside [Paras 10–11.5].

POCSO Act – Determination of Age of Victim – Statutory Scheme – High Court held medical age determination under Section 164-A CrPC read with Section 27 POCSO Act to be mandatory at commencement of investigation – Supreme Court held that statutory framework does not mandate compulsory medical age determination in every case – Section 94 JJ Act provides a clear hierarchy for age determination, giving primacy to documentary evidence – Medical tests are permissible only in absence of primary documents and by competent authority at appropriate stage – High Court erred in holding otherwise [Paras 12–14.5].

Bail Proceedings – Mini Trial Impermissible – High Court undertook detailed evaluation of victim’s age, documentary records and medical opinion at bail stage – Held: Bail court is required to form only a prima facie view – Detailed examination of evidence, determination of disputed facts and issuance of binding findings amounts to conducting a mini trial – Such exercise is impermissible while deciding bail [Paras 11.1.2, 14].

Juvenile Justice Act vs. POCSO Act – Distinct Fields of Operation – JJ Act primarily deals with children in conflict with law or children in need of care and protection – Victims under POCSO Act do not automatically fall within jurisdiction of JJ Board or Committee – Age determination mechanism under Section 94 JJ Act cannot be mechanically imported into bail proceedings under POCSO Act – Conflation of statutory regimes by High Court held erroneous [Paras 14.5.1–14.5.4].

Constitutional Law – Statutory Power vs. Constitutional Power – High Court justified directions on ground of being a constitutional court – Supreme Court clarified distinction between constitutional powers and statutory powers – When exercising statutory jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, High Court must act within limits of statute – Constitutional status cannot be used to expand statutory jurisdiction [Paras 11.3–11.4].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment of High Court set aside to extent it issued general and mandatory directions regarding age determination in POCSO cases – Bail order interfered with accordingly – Law clarified that such directions cannot be issued in exercise of bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC.

Income Tax – Amalgamation – Shares held as Stock-in-Trade vs Capital Asset – Taxability under Section 28 – Assessees, promoter investment companies, received shares of amalgamated company in lieu of shares of amalgamating company under a court-sanctioned scheme – Assessing Officer treated shares as stock-in-trade and taxed notional gains as business income – Tribunal held no income accrued in absence of sale or transfer – High Court remanded matter holding that if shares were stock-in-trade, gains would be taxable under Section 28 – Supreme Court examined whether substitution of shares itself constitutes taxable business income – Held: Mere substitution of shares on amalgamation does not automatically give rise to taxable business income – What is relevant is real commercial realisation and not notional appreciation – Taxability depends on whether shares received are immediately realisable, freely tradable, and of ascertainable market value – Matter remitted for factual determination by Tribunal [Paras 8–11, 15–18, 39–40].

Income Tax – Section 28 – Scope and Interpretation – Real Income Doctrine – Section 28 is a wide charging provision taxing real profits and gains of business whether received in cash or kind – However, income must be real, accrued or received, and commercially realisable – Hypothetical or notional gains cannot be taxed unless expressly deemed by statute – In amalgamation, unless assessee receives a real, immediately disposable commercial benefit, no income accrues at the stage of substitution – Principle of real income reiterated [Paras 13–15, 18–19].

Amalgamation – Legal Nature – Not a Sale or Exchange per se – Amalgamation results in statutory substitution of one corporate holding by another – Amalgamating company ceases to exist and shareholders receive shares by operation of law – Not a bilateral exchange in strict legal sense – However, amalgamation constitutes “transfer” for purposes of capital gains as held in Grace Collis – Distinction maintained between capital gains taxation and business income taxation [Paras 16–18].

Capital Gains – Section 47(vii) – Limited to Capital Assets – Exemption under Section 47(vii) applies only where shares are held as capital assets – If shares are stock-in-trade, exemption under Section 47(vii) is unavailable – Determination of nature of holding is foundational to deciding taxability – Tribunal directed to decide nature of holding afresh [Paras 12–13, 26].

Section 260A – High Court Jurisdiction – Incidental Questions of Law – Contention that High Court exceeded jurisdiction by addressing Section 28 rejected – Issue of business income taxability was incidental and arose directly from Tribunal’s findings – Parties were fully heard and no prejudice caused – High Court empowered to consider such incidental questions even if not formally framed – Distinguished Shiv Raj Gupta [Paras 9–9.6].

Preliminary Inquiry vs Final Tax Liability – Role of Tribunal – Tribunal erred in declining to decide whether shares were capital assets or stock-in-trade – Such determination is mandatory before applying charging provisions – High Court justified in remanding matter for fresh adjudication – Tribunal to examine commercial realisability, marketability, and nature of shares received [Paras 8.3, 11, 18.4–18.6].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – High Court judgment upheld – Matters remanded to Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to determine whether shares were held as stock-in-trade or capital assets and whether substitution on amalgamation resulted in real, taxable business income under Section 28 – No automatic taxability on mere substitution of shares.