Revenue Entry Calling Property ‘Ancestral’ Does Not Create Title: Gujarat High Court Upholds Registered Will in Second Appeal

“It Is Trite, Nay Axiomatic, That a Revenue Entry Neither Creates nor Extinguishes Title”, In a significant pronouncement on the scope of second appeals and proof of ancestral property, the Gujarat High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the First Appellate Court’s judgment validating a registered Will dated 15.04.1986.

The Court held that mere description of land as “ancestral” in revenue records does not confer coparcenary character, and in absence of foundational evidence of ancestral nucleus, the property must be treated as self-acquired. Consequently, the testator was fully competent under Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act to execute the Will.

The litigation revolved around agricultural lands claimed by the plaintiffs to be ancestral properties originally belonging to Agharabhai. The plaintiffs sought declaration that the Will executed by Reshiabhai—grandfather of some plaintiffs—was null and void, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, fraud, and undue influence. They also prayed for partition and 1/3rd share in the suit properties.

The Trial Court partly decreed the suit, holding the Will invalid. However, the First Appellate Court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. The present Second Appeal challenged that reversal under Section 100 CPC.

Substantial questions of law were framed concerning the genuineness of the Will and the ancestral nature of the properties.

Scope of Interference Under Section 100 CPC

At the outset, the High Court reiterated the narrow contours of Section 100 CPC, relying upon Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala, Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, and Jaichand v. Sahnulal.

The Court reminded that under Section 100 CPC, interference is permissible only on substantial questions of law and not on reappreciation of facts unless findings are perverse or based on no evidence.

“Under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law.”

Having set this legal threshold, the Court proceeded to examine whether the plaintiffs had established ancestral character.

Ancestral Property: Burden Lies on the Claimant

The plaintiffs heavily relied on Entry No. 47 dated 19.06.1957 (Exh. 42), which described the properties as “ancestral.”

The Court, however, dismantled this reliance with a clear legal declaration:

“Though the entry employs the nomenclature ‘ancestral property,’ such description, in the absence of antecedent revenue records demonstrating title in the name of their father Agharabhai, cannot ipso facto be treated as conclusive proof of ancestral character.”

The revenue record initially showed Ranchhodbhai as a tenant. Subsequent mutations reflected joint names and later a family arrangement under Entry No. 533 (Exh. 45). The Court observed that the conduct of the brothers—executing registered sale deeds from their own funds and later partitioning the properties—was inconsistent with coparcenary inheritance by birth.

The Court emphatically observed:

“It is trite, nay axiomatic, that a revenue entry neither creates nor extinguishes title; its utility is primarily fiscal and administrative.”

In absence of proof that the properties descended from Agharabhai as ancestral nucleus, the plaintiffs failed to discharge the burden of proof.

Relying on Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar (2025) and Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel v. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai, the Court reiterated that unless the ancestral source is proved, no right by birth accrues.

Coparcenary Argument Rejected

The appellants argued that even if partition had occurred, the share received by Reshiabhai retained ancestral character qua his male issue.

The Court rejected this submission, holding that such principle applies only where original property is proved to be ancestral. In the present case, no such foundational evidence existed.

Therefore, the plaintiffs could not claim coparcenary rights by birth.

“Once Property Is Self-Acquired, Testator Is Fully Competent to Execute a Will”

Having held the properties to be self-acquired, the Court addressed the challenge under Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act.

The Court categorically held: “Ergo, the embargo contemplated under Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act would not operate as a fetter upon his testamentary competence.”

Reshiabhai, being absolute owner, had unfettered right to dispose of his property by testamentary instrument.

Registered Will: Presumption of Genuineness and Proof of Execution

The Will dated 15.04.1986 (Exh. 49) was registered before the Sub-Registrar on 17.04.1986.

The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthiah (2025), observing:

“The Will is a registered document and thus there is a presumption regarding genuineness thereof… the burden would lie on the party who disputed its existence… to establish suspicious circumstances.”

Significantly, the plaintiff herself admitted that the Will was executed and registered, though she later disputed the signature without producing expert evidence. The Court termed such assertion a mere “ipsi dixit devoid of probative worth.”

An attesting witness was examined and confirmed execution in sound disposing state of mind. The Trial Court had discarded his testimony merely because he was a clerk to the advocate appearing for defendants. The High Court found this reasoning untenable.

“Merely because a witness is employed as a clerk by an advocate appearing in the matter cannot, in vacuo, render his testimony suspect.”

The statutory requirements under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act were satisfied. The Sub-Registrar’s endorsement further strengthened the evidentiary value, consistent with Pentakota Satyanarayana v. Pentakota Seetharatnam.

No suspicious circumstances were established.

No Substantial Question of Law Survived

Upon cumulative appreciation, the Court concluded that:

• Plaintiffs failed to prove ancestral character.

• Reshiabhai had full testamentary competence.

• Execution of Will was duly proved.

• Findings of the First Appellate Court were neither perverse nor illegal.

“The appeal is utterly devoid of substance, bereft of any sustainable ground warranting interference within the limited scope of Section 100 CPC.”

The Second Appeal was dismissed. Interim relief was continued for four weeks to enable the appellants to avail further remedies, after which it would stand vacated automatically.

The judgment reinforces critical civil law principles. A revenue entry describing land as “ancestral” does not, by itself, establish coparcenary title. The burden of proving ancestral property lies squarely on the claimant. Where such proof fails, property is treated as self-acquired, and the owner enjoys full testamentary autonomy under Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act.

Equally, a registered Will supported by attesting witness testimony and admissions carries a presumption of genuineness that cannot be displaced by bald allegations.

By declining to convert a second appeal into a factual re-trial, the Gujarat High Court reaffirmed both the sanctity of testamentary freedom and the disciplined limits of Section 100 CPC jurisdiction.

Date of Decision: 06 February 2026