Facts:

Dispute over irrigating fields led to a violent incident.

Accused, including Darshan Singh, faced charges under IPC sections.

Injured eye witnesses provided specific details about Darshan Singh's role.

Defense raised a plea of alibi, claiming Darshan Singh was not present.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal.

Validity of Darshan Singh's alibi plea.

Held:

The High Court's judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court. Darshan Singh's plea of alibi was rejected. The Court found the prosecution's evidence, including the testimony of injured eye witnesses and medical reports, to be credible and upheld the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC. The appeal was dismissed, and Darshan Singh was directed to be taken into custody to serve the remaining part of the sentence.

Facts:

In connection with the investigation of F.I.R. No. 287 of 1999 (Jessica Lal Murder Case), the police sought an expert opinion from the State Forensic Science Laboratory. The appellant, a Deputy Director of the Laboratory, provided a report with the opinion that a definite conclusion could only be given with the examination of the suspected firearm. The High Court initiated proceedings under Section 340 of CrPC against the appellant, alleging a shift in the expert's stand during the trial.

Issues:

Whether the expert's opinion and subsequent court questioning warranted perjury charges under Section 340 of CrPC.

The admissibility and reliability of the expert's opinion in the criminal proceeding.

Held:

The court quashed the proceedings initiated under Section 340 of CrPC. The judgment emphasized that the expert had consistently maintained that a definite opinion required examination of the suspected firearm. The court noted that rejection of expert evidence alone does not warrant perjury charges. The expert's opinion was based on the court's insistence to provide an opinion without examining the firearm, and there was no somersault or shift in the stand taken by the appellant. The appeal was allowed.

Referred Cases:

"Abdul Majeed Vs. State, PLD 1976 Kar. 762

Ali Nawaz Gardezi Vs. Muhammad Yousuf PLD 1963 SC 51

Har Gobind Vs. State of Haryana, (1979) 4 SCC 482

National Justice Compania Naviera SA Vs. Prudential Assurance Co Ltd The ""Ikarian Reefer"", (1995) 1 Lloyd's Rep 455

Pritish Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 1 SCC 253

Ramesh Chandra Aggrawala Vs. Regency Hospitals, (2009) 9 SCC 709

Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma Vs. State NCT of Delhi, (2010) 6 SCC 1

Sqn. Ldr. R Umeed Ali Khan Vs. Dr. Mrs. Sultana Ibrahim, LEX/SCPK/0483/2006

State Delhi Vs. Pali Ram, (1979) 2 SCC 158

Yaqoob Shah Vs. The State, PLD 1976 SC 53"

Facts:

The case involves charges against the appellants for offenses including murder and causing grievous hurt.

The incident occurred on April 3, 1996, where the appellants allegedly obstructed and assaulted the victims with deadly weapons.

Issues:

Whether the participation of each member of an unlawful assembly, as required by Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, was established.

Implication of all five accused based on evidence, despite certain names not being mentioned in the First Information Report (F.I.R.).

Held:

The court emphasized the need to establish the common object of an unlawful assembly under Section 149, requiring proof of the participation of each member. It was noted that specific overt acts by each member are not necessary for invoking Section 149.

The court dismissed the appeals and upheld the conviction and sentences imposed by the trial court and subsequently confirmed by the High Court. The judgment highlighted the significance of eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and corroboration in establishing the guilt of the accused.

Referred Cases:

Ajit Savant Majagvai Vs. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 110

Bishna alias Bhiswadeb Mahato Vs. State of W.B., (2005) 12 SCC 657

Mritunjoy Biswas Vs. Pranab alias Kuti Biswas, (2013) 12 SCC 796

Rajendran Vs. State of T.N., (2004) 10 SCC 689

Rotash Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 12 SCC 64

Facts:

The appellant, Damodar Lal, sought eviction of the respondents based on unauthorized construction or material alteration in the tenanted premises. The trial court and the first appellate court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the High Court, in second appeal, overturned the decision, questioning the reliability of evidence and the non-appearance of the appellant as a witness.

Issues:

The trustworthiness of evidence regarding structural alteration, the non-appearance of the landlord as a witness, and the validity of the High Court's interference in findings of fact.

Held:

The court emphasized that material alteration is not confined to the exclusive knowledge of the owner but can be proven by any admissible and reliable evidence. The burden of proof was successfully discharged by the plaintiff, and the finding on structural alteration was reasonable.( Paragraph 12)

Even if the finding of fact is wrong, it does not constitute a question of law unless it stems from a complete misreading of evidence or is based on conjectures and surmises. The High Court's interference on a pure question of fact was unwarranted.( Paragraph 13)

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and restoring the decision of the trial court as confirmed by the first appellate court.( Paragraph 16)

The respondents were given time until March 31, 2017, to vacate the premises, and they were directed to file an undertaking and continue to pay use and occupation charges.( Paragraph 17)

Referred Cases:

Babu Vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189

Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao Vs. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636

Gurvachan Kaur Vs. Salikram Dead, (2010) 15 SCC 530

Krishnan Vs. Backiam, (2007) 12 SCC 190

Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10

Kulwant Kaur Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann Dead, (2001) 4 SCC 262

Rajinder Kumar Kindra Vs. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635

S.R. Tiwari Vs. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 602

Facts:

The case involves the death of Diganta Sardar in a road accident in Hoogly, West Bengal.

Appellant (Malati Sardar) filed a compensation claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in Kolkata.

Tribunal awarded compensation, but the insurance company (Respondent) appealed, claiming lack of territorial jurisdiction.

Issues:

Whether the Kolkata Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the compensation claim.

Whether lack of territorial jurisdiction was a valid ground to set aside the Tribunal's award.

Held:

The Supreme Court, relying on the precedent set in Mantoo Sarkar, emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is wider than that of a civil court. It stated that objections to territorial jurisdiction cannot be entertained unless there is prejudice, as per Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court held that a hyper-technical approach in such matters is not appreciated. The judgment clarified that the provision for territorial jurisdiction should be interpreted in line with the objective of facilitating remedies for victims of accidents.

The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Tribunal's award was restored.

Referred Cases:

Jagmittar Sain Bhagat Vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana, (2013) 10 SCC 136

Kiran Singh Vs. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340

Mantoo Sarkar Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2009) 2 SCC 244

New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. Kustiswar Pramanik, (2010) 1 TAC 405 Cal

Nirmala Devi Agarwal, (2013) 3 CLJ Cal

Union of India Vs. G.S. Grewal, (2014) 7 SCC 303

Facts:

The suit was filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by individuals associated with the Aurobindo Ashram Trust. The plaintiffs sought the removal of trustees, alleging their failure to support the philosophy of Shri Aurobindo. The trustees were accused of not taking action against an objectionable book and assisting its author.

Issues:

Whether the suit fell within the ambit of Section 92 CPC. The focus was on the purpose for which the suit was filed—specifically,

Whether the failure to take action against the objectionable book constituted maladministration.

Held:

The Court clarified that the allegations in the plaint should be examined to determine if the suit falls within Section 92 CPC. If the purpose is to remedy a private right, the suit would not be within the section. [Para 31]

Analyzing the purpose of the suit, it was evident that it aimed to highlight the trustees' failure to act against the objectionable book and its author. The Court noted that a determination by the Orissa High Court regarding the objectionable nature of the book was pending. [Para 32]

The Court acknowledged that the trustees had expressed displeasure with the objectionable book, clarified their non-sponsorship, and stated it was not published under the Ashram's aegis. The failure to take precipitate action pending a determination by the Orissa High Court was reasonable. [Para 33]

The Court emphasized that the failure to ban the objectionable book did not constitute a cause of action for removing trustees. Trustees are entitled to wide discretion, and a mere disagreement with their exercise of discretion does not necessarily indicate maladministration. [Para 34]

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, holding that the suit did not fall within the ambit of Section 92 CPC. The application for revocation of leave should have been allowed, as the failure to ban the objectionable book did not warrant the removal of trustees. [Para 34]

Referred Cases:

Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust Vs. S. Ramanathan, (2013) 4 CTC 566

Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati Vs. Ramji Tripathi, (1974) 2 SCC 695

Vidyodaya Trust Vs. Mohan Prasad, (2008) 4 SCC 115

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the management of Narendra and Company Private Limited (Appellant) and the workmen of Narendra and Company (Respondent).

The primary issue revolves around the entitlement of the workmen to back wages and the determination of the period for which they should be paid—whether until the beginning of January 1995 or until January 1999.

Issues:

The central question is the entitlement and duration of back wages for the workmen.

The management contends that the industry was virtually closed by the beginning of January 1995.

Held:

The learned Single Judge of the High Court limited the back wages to January 1995, citing the lack of evidence proving the industry's functioning beyond that point.

The Division Bench, in an appeal, extended the benefit of 50% back wages until the end of January 1999, considering the closure of the industry.

The Supreme Court criticized the Division Bench for reaching a different conclusion without additional material and emphasized that findings of fact should not be disturbed unless proven to be perverse.

The Court directed the Appellant to file an affidavit specifying the actual year of closure of the industry, and the affidavit, filed on July 11, 2013, stated that the industry became non-functional by the beginning of January 1995.

The Supreme Court vacated the order for payment of back wages beyond January 1995 but retained the Division Bench's order in all other aspects.

Workmen are directed to be paid the entitled benefits within three months, and if not, they will be entitled to interest at the rate of 10% per annum.

Facts:

The appeal is against the interim order of the High Court granting a stay on the excavation of minor minerals by the Appellant, who held a lease executed on October 17, 2013.

The High Court found that the lease was granted in violation of its earlier judgments, particularly those dated January 29, 2013, and September 12, 2014.

Issues:

Whether the lease granted to the Appellant is in violation of the High Court judgments.

The impact of the Government Order dated May 31, 2012, and its subsequent withdrawal on the validity of the lease.

Held:

The High Court had issued directions in its previous judgments, debaring the grant of leases under Chapter II after May 31, 2012.

The renewal claimed by the Appellant was found to be in pursuance of a Government Order dated February 26, 2013, conflicting with the High Court orders.

The withdrawal of the Government Order dated May 31, 2012, could not benefit the Appellant as it was operative at the time of the lease grant.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's interim order and leaving the final decision on merits to be decided by the High Court.

Referred Cases:

Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1

Deepak Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 4 SCC 629

Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590

Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 9 SCC 516

Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1

Nar Narain Mishra Vs. The State of U.P., (2013) 2 ADJ 166

State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205

Sukhan Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2014) 11 ADJ 89

Sukkhan Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2014) 11 ADJ 89

Facts:

The case involves the grant of mining leases and the application of the G.O. dated 31st May 2012 in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

The G.O. mandated e-tendering for mining leases to ensure transparency and safeguard government revenue.

The appellants claimed a vested right prior to the G.O., arguing that they had already applied in accordance with Chapter II of the Rules.

The High Court rejected the appellants' claim, upholding the validity of the G.O.

Issues:

Validity of the G.O. dated 31st May 2012 and its application to pending lease applications.

Appellants' claim of a vested right prior to the G.O.

Held:

The High Court upheld the validity of the G.O. dated 31st May 2012, emphasizing transparency and consistency with Article 14 of the Constitution. All applications pending as of 31st May 2012, including the appellants', were rejected. The High Court held that the mere filing of an application did not confer a vested right for the grant or renewal of a lease. The G.O. dated 31st May 2012 covered "Building Stone," and the subsequent G.O. dated 22nd October 2014 could not be applied retroactively. The appeals were dismissed, and the interim order granted by the Court was vacated. The State was directed to assess the extent of pecuniary advantage taken by the appellants under the interim order and recover the same from the appellants.

Referred Cases:

Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1

Deepak Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 4 SCC 629

Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590

In Re : Natural Resources Allocation, (2012) 10 SCC 1

Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 9 SCC 516

Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1

Nar Narain Mishra Vs. The State of U.P., (2013) 2 ADJ 166

State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205

Sukhan Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2014) 11 ADJ 89

Final Result : Dismissed