FACTS:

Century Textiles & Industries Limited ("writ petitioner") holds a mining lease in Chhattisgarh for limestone required for cement manufacturing.

The Power Grid Corporation of India Limited ("Power Grid") sought to erect transmission towers on the leased land to facilitate electricity distribution, parallel to an existing transmission line.

The writ petitioner objected, citing concerns over operational disruptions and loss of mining area.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, affirming the Power Grid's authority to erect towers.

ISSUES:

Whether the Power Grid's action violated relevant provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rules, 2006.

Whether the High Court's direction for compensation determination by the District Collector was valid.

HELD AND DECISION:

The Court held that:

The Power Grid had obtained prior approval for the transmission line from the Central Government as required by Section 68 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The provision of Rule 3(1) of the Rules, 2006, requiring licensee consent, did not apply due to the powers conferred under Section 164 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The Court rejected claims of violation and upheld the Power Grid's actions. (Para 23)

The High Court's direction for compensation determination by the District Collector was improper. Section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, vests compensation determination authority with the District Judge, not the District Collector. Therefore, the direction was set aside, and the appropriate course for seeking compensation was through a suit before the District Judge, following Central Government guidelines. (Para 26)

Dismissed an appeal challenging the need for prior consent for laying transmission lines. (Para 28)

Facts:

The appellant, Sharat Babu Digumarti, was facing charges under Section 292 of the IPC for allegedly possessing obscene material in electronic form. However, proceedings under Section 67 of the IT Act were dropped against him.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, discharged under Section 67 of the IT Act, could still be proceeded against under Section 292 of the IPC.

Held:

The court observed that the material on record showed that the alleged possession of material constituted an electronic record under Section 2(l)(t) of the IT Act.( Para 18)

It was noted that the IT Act contains specific provisions related to obscenity in electronic form, such as Sections 67, 67A, and 67B, which provide for punishment for various forms of transmitting or publishing obscene materials electronically.( Para 24)

The court emphasized that the IT Act is a special law governing offenses related to electronic records and that Section 292 of the IPC must be interpreted in light of the provisions of the IT Act.( Para 25)

The court held that once special provisions covering a criminal act and the offender are provided for in the IT Act, the offender is exempted from the provisions of the IPC, including Section 292.( Para 28)

It was reiterated that special laws prevail over general laws, and the provisions of the IT Act regarding obscenity in electronic form override the provisions of Section 292 of the IPC.( Para 32)

The court concluded that the appellant, having been discharged under Section 67 of the IT Act, could not be proceeded against under Section 292 of the IPC.( Para 34)

Decision: The court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant.

Facts:

The incident involved the murder of Naurang, who was shot while riding his bicycle.

The accused individuals were Sube Singh, his brother Shama (the appellant), and another person identified as Jai Singh.

The dying declaration of the deceased implicated the accused persons, stating the circumstances of the incident.

Eyewitness testimony by Pyarelal (PW-3) also supported the prosecution's case.

Issues:

The admissibility and reliability of the dying declaration.

The credibility of the eyewitness testimony.

Held:

The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding the dying declaration and upheld the conviction based on it and the corroborating eyewitness testimony. The Court found no merit in the appellant's contentions regarding the procedural aspects of recording the dying declaration and held that it was admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872. Additionally, the Court found no evidence of false implication by the police and affirmed the findings of the trial court and the High Court.

Facts:

The Respondent, a Turkish company, was contracted for pipeline construction in Bangladesh and subcontracted the Petitioner, a US company, for Horizontal Directional Drilling works. Disputes arose regarding payment, leading the Petitioner to invoke arbitration. The Respondent failed to respond, prompting the Petitioner to file for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the arbitration agreement between the parties was valid.

Whether the court should appoint an arbitrator due to the failure of the Respondent to respond to the arbitration invocation.

Held:

In the circumstances, we hereby appoint Mr Justice FM Ibrahim Kalifulla, former judge of the Supreme Court of India to act as a sole Arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement. The learned arbitrator shall be at liberty to determine the fees payable to him for the arbitration. The Arbitration Petition is accordingly disposed of in the above terms.

Facts:

The petitioners, Lokesh Katara and another, were working as Systems Officers and Systems Assistants on a contractual basis since 2009. They sought absorption into regular positions following the sanctioning of posts and an amendment to recruitment rules by the High Court of Gujarat.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court can entertain a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in this matter, or if the appropriate remedy lies within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.

Held:

The Supreme Court declined to entertain the Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, as the petitioners had an alternative remedy available to them through the High Court under Article 226. The Court dismissed the petition, leaving it open for the petitioners to pursue their case before the High Court if they chose to do so.

FACTS:

The petitioners, who were advocates, filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking guidelines to curb acts of discrimination against individuals from the north-eastern states. They highlighted instances of discrimination reported in the media since 2009, emphasizing the need for systemic measures to address the issue.

ISSUES:

Whether guidelines are needed to address discrimination against individuals from the north-eastern states.

What steps should be taken by the government to address racial discrimination and promote equality.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that guidelines were necessary to address discrimination against individuals from the north-eastern states. It emphasized the obligations of the government under Article 15 of the Constitution and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The court ordered the formation of a Committee under the Ministry of Home Affairs to monitor and redress issues related to racial discrimination faced by citizens from the north-eastern states. This Committee would meet regularly to review the implementation of measures to address racial discrimination and would be accessible to grievances, suggestions, and complaints.

The court also directed the Committee to monitor the implementation of recommendations from the Bezbaruah Committee and take necessary action against incidents of racial discrimination or violence. Sensitivity and inclusion in society were emphasized as crucial to addressing the underlying issues of racial discrimination. The judgment underscored the government's non-negotiable obligation to promote racial equality through constitutional rights, fundamental duties, statutory provisions, and international obligations. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of.

REFERRED CASES:

C Masilamani Mudaliar Vs. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami Thirukoil, (1996) 8 SCC 525

Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241

Facts:

The appellant filed an Original Application (OA) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), challenging the decision of the Departmental Promotional Committee (DPC) to keep the result of his promotion in a sealed cover.

The appellant was facing criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The High Court set aside the CAT's order, prompting the appellant to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the adoption of the sealed cover procedure by the DPC was justified.

Whether the case of the appellant should be reconsidered for promotion in light of subsequent developments.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the adoption of the sealed cover procedure by the DPC was justified as the chargesheet had been filed before a criminal court before the DPC meeting. However, it emphasized the necessity of timely review of such cases, which had not been conducted in the appellant's case. Therefore, the Court directed the respondents to reconsider the appellant's case for ad-hoc promotion within one month, taking into account the developments after the judgment of the High Court. The Court also closed the contempt petitions and did not impose any costs.

This decision is based on the principles laid down in Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109 and other relevant cases cited in the judgment.

Facts:

Harshita Bhasin and Mukul Bhasin, married on July 11, 2007, have two children.

Living separately since July 2013 due to a matrimonial dispute.

Mukul Bhasin filed for dissolution of marriage and custody of children under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.

Harshita Bhasin filed a habeas corpus petition before the Calcutta High Court seeking interim custody of the children.

Calcutta High Court directed Mukul Bhasin to bring children to Kolkata fortnightly for Harshita Bhasin's visitation.

Issues:

Stressful travel schedule for the children due to visitation arrangements.

Request for modification of visitation orders by Mukul Bhasin.

Held:

The Court, after considering the stressful travel schedule for the children and the request for modification of visitation orders, made the following directives:

Mukul Bhasin shall travel with the children to Kolkata on a Sunday in the first fortnight of every month to facilitate Harshita Bhasin's visitation rights.

Harshita Bhasin shall have visitation rights in New Delhi in the second fortnight of every month.

Mukul Bhasin shall deposit Rs. 40,000 per month into a nominated bank account of Harshita Bhasin by the seventh day of every month to cover her travel and hotel expenses.

Harshita Bhasin shall make her own travel arrangements to and from New Delhi and for her stay. She shall collect the children from the chambers of Ms. Udita Seth, Advocate, in New Delhi and return them to Mukul Bhasin at the same place.

The Interlocutory Application is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

Greaves Cotton Limited (the appellant) and United Machinery and Appliances (the respondent) were parties to an agreement containing an arbitration clause.

The respondent filed a civil suit seeking damages, while the appellant invoked the arbitration clause and filed an application under Section 5 read with Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, requesting reference of the dispute to arbitration.

The High Court rejected the application, stating that by seeking an extension of time to file the written statement, the appellant waived its right to seek arbitration.

Issues:

Whether filing an application for an extension of time to file a written statement constitutes the submission of the first statement on the substance of the dispute under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that filing an application for an extension of time to file a written statement does not constitute the submission of the first statement on the substance of the dispute. The court emphasized that the intention of the legislature was not to include such procedural steps as constituting the first statement on the substance of the dispute. Therefore, the appellant had not waived its right to object to the jurisdiction of the judicial authority by seeking an extension of time.

The court highlighted that before deciding on the application under Section 8, the High Court should have considered factors such as the existence of an arbitration agreement, whether the disputes fell within the scope of arbitration, and whether the reliefs sought in the suit could be granted in arbitration.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court, and requested the High Court to reconsider the application in light of the observations made by the Supreme Court, except for the points already addressed in the judgment.