Facts:

The appellant, Khokan Giri, along with three other accused persons, was convicted under Sections 302, 34, 120B, and 394 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the murder of Girish Navalkha and Bina Navalkha.

The prosecution's case relied heavily on the confessional statement of one of the co-accused, Raju Rao, who became an approver.

The trial court and the High Court found sufficient corroborative evidence to support the prosecution's case.

Issues:

Whether the conviction based on accomplice testimony without independent corroboration is safe.

Whether there was sufficient corroborative evidence connecting the appellant with the crime.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while accomplice testimony can be admissible, it should be corroborated in material particulars, and such corroboration must connect the accused with the crime from an independent source.

There cannot be any dispute about the aforesaid principle of law. We have, therefore, examined the present case keeping in view the aforesaid legal principle, viz., whether there is corroborative evidence in material particulars substantiating the aforesaid confessional statement of Raju Rao and other material connecting the appellant with the crime.( Paragraph 16)

We, thus, do not find any error in the impugned judgment of the High Court affirming the conviction of the appellant herein. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.( Paragraph 18)

Facts:

The appellants were involved in various criminal cases, with the instant incident occurring in 1994. They were convicted under sections 302, 149, and 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellants raised a claim of juvenility for the first time before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The admissibility and reliability of medical opinion in determining the appellants' age.

The significance of age determination in applying the Juvenile Justice Act.

Whether the appellants provided sufficient evidence to support their claim of juvenility.

Held:

The court noted that age determination is crucial for applying the Juvenile Justice Act, especially in cases where there is a lack of documentary evidence. However, the reliability of ossification tests diminishes after the age of 30, as observed in this case.

Section 49 of the Juvenile Justice Act mandates the competent authority to ascertain the age of the person brought before it. While medical examination is a useful tool, it is not conclusive and must be considered alongside other circumstances.

Despite the medical opinion indicating an age range of 35-40 years for the appellants, the court found inconsistencies and lack of other cogent evidence to support their claim of juvenility.

The appellants' involvement in previous cases dating back to their childhood suggested they were treated as adults at that time, undermining their claim of juvenility.

Considering the circumstances and lack of compelling evidence, the court rejected the appellants' plea of juvenility.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals, emphasizing that the appellants failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim of juvenility, and thus, they were not entitled to the benefits under the Juvenile Justice Act.

Facts:

The appeal concerned allegations of medical negligence leading to the death of the respondent's wife. The appellant, along with other members of the West Bengal Medical Council, was accused of deliberately concealing evidence to protect the accused doctors.

Issues:

Whether the actions of the appellants constituted offenses under Sections 201, 120B, or 219 of the IPC.

Whether the departmental proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Committee constituted judicial proceedings.

Held:

The court examined the allegations and legal provisions, concluding that the actions of the appellants did not constitute offenses under the specified sections of the IPC. Paragraphs 12-22 were crucial in the court's analysis:

The court found that the evidence allegedly concealed by the appellants did not relate to the commission of the offense as required by Section 201.

The alleged conspiracy was not aimed at committing any offenses punishable under Section 120B.

The departmental proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Committee did not constitute judicial proceedings under Section 219. As a result, the court allowed the appeal and quashed the complaint filed by the respondent against the appellants.

Facts:

Multiple civil appeals arising from Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were before the Supreme Court. The appellants challenged the compensation awarded to them for land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Issues:

The adequacy of compensation awarded to the appellants and the delay involved in filing the appeals.

Held:

In a concise manner, the court condoned the delay in filing the appeals. It awarded compensation to the appellants based on previous judgments addressing similar issues. The compensation amounts were determined based on the location of the land and previous rulings. Additionally, the appellants were granted all statutory benefits under the Act, including interest.

In the case of Suresh Prasad @ Hari Kishan & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., the court granted Rs. 24 lakhs per acre as compensation.

In the case of Charan Singh & Ors. Etc. v. Union of India & Anr., the court awarded Rs. 25 lakhs per acre for land in Block 'A' and Rs. 22 lakhs per acre for land in Block 'B'.

In the case of Impulse India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., the court granted Rs. 21 lakhs per acre for land in Block 'A' and Rs. 19 lakhs per acre for land in Block 'B'.

The appeals were disposed of accordingly, and the costs were to be borne by the parties.

Facts:

The suit involved a dispute between the appellant (landlord) and the respondent (tenant) concerning the ownership and tenancy of a property known as the suit house.

The appellant claimed ownership over the suit house and served a quit notice to the respondent, seeking eviction on various grounds including arrears of rent and unauthorized construction.

The respondent contested the appellant's claim to ownership and denied the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship.

Issues:

Whether the appellant proved their title to the suit house and established a landlord-tenant relationship with the respondent?

Whether the appellant's quit notice to the respondent was valid?

Whether the case should be remanded to the Trial Court for deciding other grounds for eviction under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961?

Held:

The Court found that the appellant had sufficiently proven their title to the suit house and established a landlord-tenant relationship with the respondent. This was based on various pieces of evidence presented, including admissions made by the respondent.

The Court affirmed the validity of the appellant's quit notice, concluding that the respondent had failed to rebut the appellant's claim of ownership and tenancy.

The Court decided to remand the case to the Trial Court for a fresh decision on other grounds for eviction under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, allowing parties to amend pleadings and present additional evidence.

Facts:

The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) appealed against the High Court of Delhi's declaration that the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed due to the operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

The dispute centered around the transfer of land and the restrictions imposed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972.

Issues:

Whether the respondents had locus standi to challenge the land acquisition proceedings.

Interpretation of the transfer restrictions under the relevant Acts in relation to land acquisition proceedings.

Application of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act in the present case.

Held:

The court held that the writ petitioner did have locus standi to challenge the land acquisition proceedings, despite the transfer of the land prior to the declaration under Section 6(1) but after Section 4(1).

The court held that since the compensation had not been paid, the writ petitioner was entitled to the declaration under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

The court dismissed the appeal, as stated, and granted the appellant a period of one year to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. If no fresh proceedings were initiated within this period, and if the appellant was in possession of the land, they were ordered to return the physical possession to the owner.

Facts:

The appellant claimed to be a cultivating tenant of the land before the notification under Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948. He sought an injunction to restrain the former landlord (respondent No. 1 - Deity) from interfering with his possession. The Estate Officer, Devasthanam, also filed a suit asserting the deity's ownership of the land and the appellant's cultivation as its tenant.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was entitled to Ryotwari Patta under the 1948 Act.

Applicability of Section 82 of the 1987 Act to the present case.

Whether the appellant's suit was barred by limitations.

Held:

The appellant's suit was decreed, and respondent No. 1's suit was dismissed. The appellant's continuous possession of the land before the notified date entitled him to a "Ryotwari Patta" under Section 11 of the 1948 Act. (Para 14)

Section 82 of the 1987 Act was deemed inapplicable as the appellant couldn't be considered a leaseholder of agricultural land belonging to any institution or endowment. (Para 15)

The claim raised by the appellant was not barred by limitations. The relevant date for determining limitations was when the appellant's possession was allegedly threatened. (Para 17)

The instant appeal is allowed. (Para 18)

Facts:

The landlords leased a property to a firm, "M/s Biyani Textile," which later defaulted on rent payments.

The landlords filed a civil suit for eviction against the Firm and its partners, including defendant no. 1, an employee of the Firm.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit against defendant no. 1 but decreed it against the Firm and its partners.

Plaintiff no. 2 appealed, and the District Judge reversed the Trial Court's decision, decreeing the suit against all defendants.

The defendants filed a revision application before the High Court, which was allowed, reinstating the Trial Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether defendant no. 1, as an employee of the Firm, is bound by the eviction decree against the Firm and its partners.

Whether the High Court erred in allowing the revision application and reinstating the Trial Court's decision.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that:

Defendant no. 1, being an employee of the Firm, is bound by the eviction decree against the Firm and its partners. (Para. 23)

The High Court erred in allowing the revision application without considering settled legal principles and factual findings. (Para. 14)

The legal effect of the eviction decree extended to all persons connected with the Firm, including its partners and employees. (Para. 24)

There was no need for the landlords to file a separate suit against defendant no. 1, as he was bound by the eviction decree obtained against the Firm. (Para. 26)

In rent proceedings, only the lessee/tenant is a necessary party, and persons claiming through the tenant are not necessary parties. (Para. 30)

The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the judgment of the District Judge decreeing the suit against all defendants was restored. (Para. 32)

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the action taken by the Municipal Corporation under Section 305 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, for the removal of buildings projecting beyond the regular line of public streets. The landowners contested the propriety of the action taken by the Corporation.

Issues:

The interpretation and application of Section 305 of the Act, particularly concerning the removal of buildings or parts thereof projecting into the periphery of the regular line of public streets.

Held:

The Court clarified that Section 305(1) empowers the Corporation to remove any building or part thereof that projects beyond the regular line of a public street. The provision mandates the Corporation to take action for removal, and no adjudicatory process or discretion is provided (Para 30).

Vesting of property occurs as soon as the building or projecting part is removed, or when the Corporation issues a notice for rebuilding to set back the projecting part. The area, upon such action, is deemed to be part of the public street and vests in the Corporation (Para 36).

The Court emphasized that the special provision in Section 305 prevails over the general provisions of acquisition of land under Sections 78 and 79 of the Act. Recourse to Sections 78 and 79 is ousted by the special provision of Section 305 (Para 49).

The principles of reasonable compensation under Sections 305, 306, and 387 are deemed to be applicable. The Court clarified that reasonable compensation must be paid, and the mechanism for determining compensation follows the provisions laid down in Section 387 (Para 70).

Decision: The appeals were dismissed by the Court, affirming the validity and applicability of the action taken by the Municipal Corporation under Section 305 of the Act.