Facts:

The appellant, Rajiv Dawar, appealed against his conviction and sentence under section 2(c) read with Section 10 & 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act and under Article 215 of the Constitution of India.

The conviction was based on allegations by the de facto complainant without giving the appellant a fair opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine the complainant.

The complainant accused Dawar of charging exorbitant fees without providing active assistance and subsequently withdrawing from the case. However, Dawar asserted that the fees were justified for the professional services rendered.

Issues:

Whether procedural formalities were followed in the contempt proceedings.

Whether the appellant was given a fair opportunity to defend himself.

Whether the allegations against the appellant were proven according to law.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that procedural safeguards were not followed, and the appellant was not granted a fair opportunity to defend himself. The court emphasized the importance of allowing the accused to establish their innocence in contempt proceedings and noted that the appellant was not given adequate opportunities to do so. Additionally, the Bar Council of Delhi had absolved the appellant of misconduct, further indicating that the conviction was not justified. Therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:

The appellants challenged the validity of a notification issued by the NCTE, dated 29th July 2011, making it mandatory for teachers in schools to have 50% marks in graduation. The appellants, possessing post-graduation and B.Ed. qualifications, argued that this requirement was not mandatory for those with 50% marks in post-graduation at the time of their B.Ed. admission.

Issues:

Whether candidates with post-graduation and B.Ed. qualifications, covered by the notification dated 23rd August 2010, could be excluded based solely on the graduation marks requirement introduced in the notification dated 29th July 2011.

Held:

The Supreme Court, in consideration of judgments from the Rajasthan and Uttarakhand High Courts, held that the requirement of a minimum percentage of marks in graduation was not going to be enforced by the NCTE. The Court declared this condition as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The appellants were directed to be treated similarly to those covered by the High Courts' judgments. The NCTE was instructed to issue a clarification within one month. The appellants and others similarly placed were given the liberty to claim further relief in accordance with the judgments of the Rajasthan and Uttarakhand High Courts.

Facts:

Parminder Singh, the appellant, and Gurpreet Singh, the respondent, are real brothers.

An agreement was made on 02.07.1995, wherein Parminder Singh agreed to sell his share of land to Gurpreet Singh.

Parminder Singh did not execute the sale deed as per the agreement, leading Gurpreet Singh to file a civil suit seeking specific performance.

Parminder Singh denied the validity of the agreement, alleging forgery and claiming he had only signed blank paper.

Issues:

Whether the agreement was genuine and enforceable.

Whether the lower courts erred in their decisions.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts. The findings of fact by all three courts were deemed concurrent and based on evidence. Parminder Singh's arguments had been previously considered and rejected by the lower courts. The discretion of the courts in granting specific performance, as per Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, was respected. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, a public Trust, leased out two shops to the respondents.

Disputes arose regarding non-payment of rent and termination of tenancy.

Appellant filed suits for eviction and recovery of rent against the respondents.

The Trial Court decreed the suits in favor of the appellant, but the Appellate Court dismissed them due to the appellant Trust not being registered under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959.

The issue revolved around the interpretation and applicability of Section 29 of the Act, which prohibits unregistered trusts from filing suits to enforce their rights.

Issues:

Whether the suits filed by the unregistered public Trust were competent under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959.

The jurisdiction of the Trial Court and the validity of its decree in light of the Trust's registration during the pendency of the appeal.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the suits filed by the unregistered public Trust were not competent under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959.

Once the Trust obtained registration during the pendency of the appeal, the bar under Section 29 no longer applied, and the Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the suits on merits.

The judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the suits were remanded to the Trial Court for hearing and deciding them on merits.

The parties were given the liberty to amend their pleadings and submit additional documents, including the certificate of registration of the Trust.

The Trial Court was directed to decide the suits within six months, and the parties were instructed to appear before the Trial Court on a specified date.

Facts:

Appellants were engaged as trade apprentices under the Apprentices Act, 1961 by M/S. Kanpur Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. (KESC).

Their services were terminated by the respondent, leading to a dispute regarding the legality of termination.

The matter was referred to the Labour Court, Kanpur, for adjudication.

The Labour Court ruled in favor of the appellants, directing their reinstatement and payment of 50% back wages.

The respondent challenged the Labour Court's decision before the High Court at Allahabad.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the appellants' services was legal.

Whether the Labour Court's decision was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the High Court, held that the termination of the appellants' services was legal. The Court relied on the precedent set by the case of U.P. State Electricity Board v. Shiv Mohan Singh, (2004) 8 SCC 402, which dealt with a similar situation involving the termination of apprentices.

The Court emphasized that upon completion of apprenticeship, the appellants could not be considered workers under relevant labor laws. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, concurring with the reasoning of the High Court and upholding its decision to set aside the awards of the Labour Court.

Facts:

The case arose from the quashing of the U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service (16th Amendment) Rules, 2012 by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

The High Court held that the amendment was in conflict with the Notification dated 11th February, 2011, issued by the National Council of Teachers Education (NCTE).

Conflicting views were taken in judgments of the Allahabad High Court, leading to the appeal in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether there exists a conflict between the notification issued by the Central Government and the amendment to the State Rules.

The extent to which the Notification dated 11th February, 2011, suggesting weightage to Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) marks, is binding on the State Rules.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the notification suggesting weightage to TET marks can be construed as a guideline rather than a mandatory requirement. The jurisdiction of the NCTE was limited to laying down qualifications as a condition for appointment and did not extend to regulating the selection process. (Para 11)

There was no conflict between the notification issued by the Central Government and the amendment to the State Rules. The State rules, not being in conflict with the norms laid down by the NCTE, could not be held void on the grounds of repugnancy. (Para 12)

The appeals were allowed, setting aside the impugned judgment, and the State was granted liberty to proceed with the matter in accordance with the law. (Para 13)

Facts:

The appellant, SGT Chaman Lal, challenged the denial of his promotion on the grounds of alleged discrimination in consideration due to his disability status. He claimed that officers with higher disability percentages were promoted while he was not.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's disability status was improperly considered in his promotion evaluation.

Whether the exemption of the establishment under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, affected the appellant's promotion claim.

Whether the appellant's listing as a candidate for promotion conferred a vested right to promotion.

Whether the appellant's eleven years of service alone warranted promotion despite lacking medical fitness for the selective promotion to JWO.

Held:

The Tribunal justly rejected the appellant's plea of discrimination, as it was based on a thorough analysis of relevant facts. The appellant's argument that officers with higher disability percentages received preferential treatment was unfounded.(Para 9, 11)

The medical category assessment of the appellant was conducted objectively, in accordance with established parameters. The categorization was not solely based on the percentage of disability but also considered other factors. Thus, the appellant's lower disability percentage did not automatically warrant a higher medical category.( Para 12, 13)

Section 47(2) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, allows for exemptions of establishments from its provisions. The establishment where the appellant was employed was exempted from this Act, thereby affecting the applicability of certain benefits to the appellant's promotion claim.( Para 16, 17)

Mere listing as a candidate for promotion did not grant the appellant a vested right to promotion. The appellant's lack of medical fitness for selective promotion to JWO rendered him ineligible, despite his years of service. The promotion policy clearly stipulated eligibility criteria, including medical fitness, for selective promotion.( Para 18, 19)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The appellant's promotion claim was rejected due to his failure to meet the requisite eligibility criteria, including medical fitness for selective promotion.

Facts:

The case concerns the implementation of Rule 16-A, inserted by the Uttar Pradesh Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (First Amendment) Rules, 2014, which deals with the absorption of 'Shiksha Mitras' as Assistant Teachers in junior basic schools. The issue revolves around the relaxation of minimum educational qualifications for this position, as provided under Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.

Issues:

Whether the absorption of 'Shiksha Mitras' as Assistant Teachers in junior basic schools, through relaxation of minimum educational qualifications, is constitutionally valid.

Whether the State has the authority to relax qualifications for teacher appointments under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.

Whether 'Shiksha Mitras' are entitled to be appointed or absorbed as teachers despite not meeting the prescribed qualifications.

Held:

The fundamental right to free and compulsory education encompasses the right to quality education, which necessitates the presence of qualified teachers. The appointment of unqualified teachers undermines this mandate and cannot be justified. (Para 16, 17, 19)

The statutory requirement for minimum qualifications for teacher appointments after a specified date must be adhered to. The relaxation of qualifications can only apply for a limited period or for individuals already appointed in accordance with existing rules. (Para 20, 21)

'Shiksha Mitras' were not appointed as teachers in compliance with the prescribed qualifications and were not covered by relaxation orders. Therefore, their appointment as teachers contravened the law, and the State lacked the authority to relax qualifications. (Para 22, 23)

'Shiksha Mitras' should be given the opportunity to be considered for recruitment if they acquire the requisite qualifications. Until then, they may continue working under their existing terms if the State so decides. (Para 26)

Decision: The appeals and writ petitions are disposed of in accordance with the above findings.

Facts:

The National Council for Teachers Education (NCTE) issued qualifications and guidelines for the recruitment of elementary education teachers.

The State of Uttar Pradesh amended its rules to align with the NCTE notifications but later amended them again, stating that weightage to TET marks was not mandatory.

Challenges were raised against the cancellation of an earlier advertisement and the issuance of a fresh one, alleging inconsistency with NCTE guidelines.

Issues:

Whether the State Government's actions were consistent with NCTE guidelines.

Whether weightage to TET marks was mandatory.

What relief should be granted considering the interim developments.

Held:

The NCTE, acting under relevant statutes, was competent to issue the notifications regarding teacher qualifications and guidelines.While qualifications prescribed by the NCTE were binding, the requirement of weightage to TET marks was not mandatory, as clarified by the NCTE (Para 16).

The State's advertisement dated December 7, 2012, could not proceed due to interim developments. However, appointments already made (66,655 posts) based on interim orders could not be disturbed, but the State could fill remaining vacancies through a fresh advertisement (Para 17).

Decision: The Court upheld the qualifications prescribed by the NCTE but ruled that weightage to TET marks was not mandatory. It allowed the State to fill remaining vacancies through a fresh advertisement while respecting previously made appointments.