Facts:

The appellant, Power Machines India Limited, was directed by an arbitral award under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, to pay a certain sum to respondent No.3.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the validity of Rule 5 of the Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules, 2006, which allowed for the recovery of the awarded amount as arrears of land revenue.

The appellant contended that this rule was ultra vires and repugnant to Section 36(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The court acknowledged the inconsistency between Rule 5 and Section 36(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

However, it held that providing plural remedies is valid, and it's up to the award-holder to choose the preferred remedy.

Both Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and Rule 5 of the Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules intend to achieve the same objective of recovery, albeit through different procedures.

The court upheld the validity of Rule 5, noting its enactment to ensure speedy recovery and prevent small, micro, and medium industries from suffering due to delays in payment.

It also ruled that the procedure for recovery of land revenue under Rule 5 is reasonable and furthers the mandate of the Act.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the validity of Rule 5 of the Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules, 2006, allowing for the recovery of awarded amounts as arrears of land revenue under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.

Facts:

The dispute arose from the acquisition of land for the expansion of a marketing yard. The acquisition proceedings faced challenges due to non-compliance with statutory requirements such as publication in newspapers and consideration of objections.

Both the Appellant and the landowners appealed against the High Court's decision, which declined to quash the acquisition but adjusted the date of notification for determining compensation.

Issues:

Whether the acquisition proceedings could be sustained despite procedural irregularities, and whether the larger public interest justified upholding the acquisition.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after reviewing the submissions and considering the judgment in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory, upheld the acquisition proceedings. Despite the infirmities, the Court concluded that the acquisition should not be quashed, taking into account practical difficulties and the rising trend in land prices.

The Court dismissed all appeals, leaving open the option for aggrieved parties to pursue remedies under the 2013 Act before the appropriate forum.

Facts:

The appeal was filed by Steel Authority of India Ltd. against the imposition of anti-dumping duty on imports of graphite electrodes from China. The Designated Authority, Directorate General of Anti-Dumping and Allied Duties, recommended the imposition of the duty based on its findings that the domestic industry was suffering material injury due to dumping of graphite electrodes from exporters in China.

Issues:

The court was to determine the scope and applicability of the appellate jurisdiction under Section 130E(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Held:

The court outlined the history of the taxation regime under the Customs Act and discussed the evolution of appellate provisions. It clarified the conditions for admitting an appeal under Section 130E(b), emphasizing that the question raised must have a direct or proximate nexus to the determination of the applicable rate of duty or the value of goods for assessment purposes. Additionally, the question must involve a substantial question of law and the tribunal's decision must not be based on a gross violation of procedure or principles of natural justice.

The court found that the findings of the appellate tribunal were based on due consideration of relevant materials and were factual in nature. Therefore, the court declined to interfere with the tribunal's decision and dismissed the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant, who was elected as Chairman of District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. for a term of three years, continued to hold office beyond the prescribed period.

Issues:

The main issues included the validity of the actions taken by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Sections 76B and 81 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961.

The interpretation of the provisions regarding removal and disqualification of officers from cooperative societies.

Held:

The Court upheld the removal of the appellant from office as per the action initiated under Section 76B(1) of the Act. The removal was based on the Registrar's satisfaction regarding the appellant's misconduct and breach of duties.

The Court declined to act as an appellate court to examine the correctness of the conclusions drawn by the Registrar regarding the charges framed against the appellant. Such an exercise is generally not undertaken, neither by High Courts nor by the Supreme Court.

The Court clarified the distinction between Sections 76B and 81 of the Act, stating that action could be taken against individual officers or the entire committee of a cooperative society. The Registrar has discretionary power to decide which course of action to take.

The Court discussed the provisions of Section 76B(2) regarding the disqualification of officers from holding office. It emphasized that such disqualification can only be imposed after the removal of the officer under Section 76B(1) and that the factual basis for both actions must be the same.

Regarding the disqualification period, the Court noted that while Section 76B(2) allowed for a maximum disqualification period of six years, in this case, the acts leading to the action occurred before the amendment extending the disqualification period. Therefore, the six-year disqualification was not applicable retroactively.

Facts:

The appellant owned agricultural land, including the suit land, subject to the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act.

Sale of suit land to respondents in 1975 was declared void by the Tribunal.

Civil suit filed by the appellant in 1998 seeking injunction against respondents.

Appeal filed by respondents to High Court, which reversed Trial Court's decision and dismissed the suit.

Appellant appealed to Supreme Court.

Issues:

Validity of sale of suit land.

Appellant's lawful possession of the suit land.

Applicability of State laws regarding agricultural land.

Held:

The Supreme Court revoked the certificate granted by the High Court under Article 134-A of the Constitution. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the suit.

The appellant was found to have no legal right to sell the land after the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act. Additionally, the Tribunal's order from 1976 had legal implications, and the suit land was considered surrendered to the state.

The Court directed further action by the Tribunal regarding the appellant's rights under the Act. The absence of the State as a party defendant was noted, which was necessary considering the agricultural land's status under state laws.

Facts:

The National Auto Fuel Policy, 2003, aimed to address the alarming rise in air pollution attributed significantly to vehicular emissions.

The government implemented Bharat Stage norms gradually, starting with specific regions and later expanding nationwide.

The policy mandated the transition to Bharat Stage IV compliant vehicles, with a clear cutoff date of April 1, 2017, for the sale and registration of non-compliant vehicles.

Issues:

The plea of manufacturers of non-compliant vehicles, seeking reasonable time to dispose of existing stock, despite having sufficient notice of the transition to Bharat Stage IV norms.

Held:

The Court, underscores the government's determination to introduce Bharat Stage IV emission norms for all vehicles manufactured on and after April 1, 2017. The implementation of this policy was gradual, with clear indications of transitioning from Bharat Stage III to Bharat Stage IV compliant vehicles.

The Court emphasizes that the government's notifications regarding the sale and registration of non-compliant vehicles should be interpreted purposively, considering their direct impact on public health. The Court rejects the manufacturers' plea for an extended disposal period, emphasizing the importance of public health over commercial interests.

Highlight the manufacturers' failure to adjust production strategies despite having ample notice of the transition. The Court dismisses the explanations provided by manufacturers and stresses the health implications of vehicular emissions on millions of citizens.

The Court, reiterates the need for a purposive interpretation of notifications concerning public health issues, emphasizing the importance of safeguarding the health of citizens.

Additionally, The Court underscores the significant health benefits of using Bharat Stage IV auto fuel compared to Bharat Stage III fuel, further justifying the transition.

The Court, elucidates that the government's phased approach towards emissions regulation aimed to benefit society as a whole rather than catering solely to commercial interests.

Decision: The Court dismisses the intervention applications filed by manufacturers, upholding the government's policy of prohibiting the sale and registration of non-compliant vehicles from April 1, 2017.

Facts:

The Respondent, M/S. Palakkad Heritage Hotels, applied for an FL-11 Licence under the Foreign Liquor Rules.

The application was rejected by the Excise Commissioner based on an amendment introducing a minimum distance requirement of 200 meters from objectionable institutions.

The Respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court of Kerala challenging the rejection and seeking various reliefs, including the issuance of the FL-11 licence.

The Single Judge allowed the writ petition, relying on precedents and directed issuance of the licence based on the law prevailing at the time of the Excise Commissioner's recommendation.

The State of Kerala appealed to a Division Bench of the High Court, which upheld the Single Judge's decision.

The State further appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the law applicable should be as of the date of the final decision by the competent authority.

The Supreme Court considered the interpretation of relevant laws and remanded the case to the Single Judge for fresh consideration.

Issues:

Whether the law applicable for considering the application for the FL-11 licence should be as of the date of the recommendation by the Excise Commissioner or the date of the final decision by the competent authority.

Whether the rejection of the application based on the amended provisions of the Foreign Liquor Rules was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the relevant date for considering the law applicable to the application for the FL-11 licence is the date of the final decision by the competent authority, not the date of the recommendation by the Excise Commissioner.

The rejection of the application based on the amended provisions of the Foreign Liquor Rules was justified, and the case was remanded to the Single Judge for fresh consideration in light of the amended rules.

The decision of the Division Bench of the High Court and the Single Judge's judgment were set aside, and the writ petition was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration.

Facts:

The case involved the murder of two individuals, with charges against 19 accused persons. Initially, the trial court acquitted all accused, giving them the benefit of the doubt due to a purported lack of evidence. Subsequently, the State and the complainant filed appeals and revisions challenging the acquittal.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's acquittal of all accused was based on a perverse and incorrect appreciation of evidence.

Whether the testimonies of eyewitnesses, including an injured witness, were reliable and corroborated by medical evidence.

Whether the High Court's decision to convict the accused was justified based on the evidence presented.

Held:

The trial court's reasoning for disbelieving the evidence of the injured witness (PW.5) was found to be perverse and incorrect. The Supreme Court observed that there was evidence indicating PW.5 was unconscious when admitted to the hospital, which the trial court had overlooked. (Para 22)

The absence of a certificate from the doctor regarding PW.5's state of consciousness was deemed inconsequential, as it was well established that such lapses do not undermine the prosecution's case. The High Court's reliance on PW.5's testimony and medical evidence was therefore justified. (Para 23)

The High Court appropriately considered the evidence of PW.5 and noted that his injuries were not disputed. The court found that the trial court's disregard of PW.5's testimony was unsustainable, as it was corroborated by medical evidence. (Para 24-25)

The testimonies of other eyewitnesses, such as PW.1 and PW.2, were also found reliable and consistent with the prosecution's case. The trial court's dismissal of their testimonies was unwarranted, and the High Court's reliance on them was deemed appropriate. (Para 26-27)

The trial court's criticism of certain witnesses' presence at the court on the day of the incident was rejected, as it did not undermine their credibility. The High Court's decision to convict the accused based on the eyewitness testimonies and medical evidence was upheld. (Para 28)

Despite the non-presentation of weapons to the doctors, the Supreme Court emphasized that this did not weaken the prosecution's case, given the clear medical evidence indicating homicidal injuries. (Para 30-31)

The Supreme Court affirmed that when evidence supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, acquittal should not be upheld. It reiterated that while it typically refrains from interfering with acquittals, it would do so if the acquittal appears perverse, illegal, or unjust. (Para 35-37)

Decision: In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court's decision to convict the accused based on the reliable eyewitness testimonies and medical evidence presented.

Facts:

Simplex Infrastructures Ltd., the Respondent, was awarded a construction contract by the Union of India, the Appellant.

Disputes arose, leading to arbitration proceedings, where the Arbitrator ruled in favor of Simplex Infrastructures Ltd.

The Union of India filed a petition to set aside the arbitral award before the District Court at Port Blair, which was held not maintainable.

Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. filed an execution proceeding in the High Court at Calcutta related to the arbitral award.

The District Court held that the petition filed by the Union of India under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not maintainable due to lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The Union of India filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act before the High Court at Calcutta, seeking to set aside the arbitral award, and also filed an application for condonation of delay.

The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the application for condonation of delay.

Issues:

Whether an intra-Court Letters Patent Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court at Calcutta can be maintained against an order passed by a Single Judge regarding condonation of delay in filing a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The Court held that the remedy of appeal against the order of the Single Judge condoning the delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not available under Section 37 of the Act. The Act provides for a remedy of appeal only against orders setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34(1)(c). The decision of the Division Bench to entertain the Letters Patent Appeal was erroneous, as the order of the Single Judge fell within the ambit of the Act.

The Union of India was permitted to challenge the judgment of the Single Judge through appropriate legal recourse, but not through a Letters Patent Appeal. The appeals were allowed, and the Division Bench's judgment was set aside.

The Court granted liberty to Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. to challenge the judgment of the Single Judge separately.