Facts:

A Civil Suit (Title Suit No. 3 of 2005) was filed by the respondent against the appellant and others for a declaration of tenancy rights over a property and a permanent injunction against interference with possession.

During the suit, the respondent filed for a temporary injunction to protect their rights over the property.

The Trial Court, while disposing of the injunction application, made prima facie findings regarding possession.

Appeals were filed against the Trial Court's order, leading to the High Court modifying the order, appointing a special officer, and directing expedited hearing of the civil suit. The High Court also invoked Section 340 of the CrPC to inquire into alleged document fabrication.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the direction regarding the criminal complaint under Section 340 of the CrPC.

Issues:

Whether findings in interlocutory proceedings affect the disposal of the main suit?

Legality and correctness of the direction for a criminal complaint under Section 340 of the CrPC.

Held:

The Court emphasized that findings in interlocutory proceedings, such as injunction applications, are prima facie in nature and do not prejudice the disposal of the main suit based on evidence and pleadings.

It was reiterated that the civil suit must be decided on its merits, unaffected by any findings or observations made during interlocutory proceedings.

The Court directed the Trial Court to decide the civil suit within one year, strictly in accordance with the law, and maintained the interim orders and injunction granted by the High Court until the Trial Court's decision.

The parties were instructed to appear before the Trial Court on a specified date for further proceedings.

In the absence of representation for the appellant during the Supreme Court proceedings, the Trial Court was directed to issue notices to all parties for further proceedings.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly, emphasizing the need for the civil suit to be decided on its merits independently of any findings made during interlocutory proceedings.

Facts:

Respondent, Equinox Solution Pvt. Ltd., sold their entire running business, including all assets and liabilities, to Amtrex Appliances Ltd. for Rs. 58,53,682/-.

The respondent claimed deduction under Section 48(2) of the Income Tax Act, treating the sale as a "slump sale" of a long-term capital asset.

The Assessing Officer treated the sale as a short-term capital gain under Section 50(2) of the Act, resulting in a reworking of the deduction claimed.

Upon appeal, the Commissioner of Appeals allowed the respondent's appeal, holding that the sale did not fall under Section 50(2) of the Act.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's decision, and subsequently, the High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal under Section 260-A of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the sale of an entire running business, including all its assets and liabilities, qualifies as a short-term capital asset under Section 50(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the sale of the entire running business in one go does not fall under Section 50(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that Section 50(2) applies to cases where an assessee transfers one or more blocks of assets used in running a business. However, when the entire running business, along with all its assets and liabilities, is sold in one go, it cannot be considered a short-term capital asset. Therefore, the sale in this case constituted a "slump sale" of a long-term capital asset, which should be taxed accordingly.

The Court cited Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat v. Artex Manufacturing Co. and Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer & Anr. to support its conclusion. It noted that the decisions cited by the appellant's counsel did not take a contrary view or point out any errors in the decisions cited by the respondent's counsel.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court found no merit in the Revenue's appeal and dismissed it accordingly.

Facts:

The dispute involves agricultural land between Dagadabai's legal representatives (appellants) and the respondent, who claimed ownership through adverse possession and adoption.

Dagadabai inherited the land from her deceased father. The respondent claimed to be the adopted son of the deceased owner, asserting his right to the land.

Issues:

Whether the respondent's claim of adverse possession and adoption is valid.

Whether the lower courts' decisions were legally sound.

Held:

First, when the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court concurrently decreed the plaintiff's suit by recording all the findings of facts against the defendant enumerated above, then, in our opinion, such findings of facts were binding on the High Court.

In our considered opinion, these observations of the High Court are against the law of adverse possession... It is equally well-settled that such person must necessarily first admit the ownership of the true owner over the property to the knowledge of the true owner.

In the light of this settled legal position, the plea taken by the defendant about the adoption for proving his ownership over the suit land as an heir of Rustum was rightly held against him.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the decisions of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, thereby granting possession of the land to Dagadabai's legal representatives.

Facts:

The plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of property. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and did not have the required balance consideration. The trial court and the first appellate court found in favor of the defendants. However, the High Court decreed the suit in part, ordering specific performance for a portion of the consideration paid by the plaintiffs.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract.

Whether the High Court erred in decreeing the suit for specific performance in part.

Applicability of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract, as required by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

The High Court erred in decreeing the suit in part without reversing the findings of the trial court and the first appellate court on this issue. Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act does not allow for specific performance of a part of a contract except in specified circumstances, which were not present in this case.

Therefore, the High Court's decision to decree the suit for specific performance in part was set aside. The plaintiffs were ordered to refund the advance payment made by the defendants with interest, while the earnest money was rightly forfeited. The plaintiffs were also directed to bear the costs of the defendants in the lower courts and the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The case involved the kidnapping of a seven-year-old boy named Anurag from a marriage reception. Ransom calls were made demanding Rs. 10,00,000. The police investigation led to the recovery of the boy and the arrest of the appellant and another accused in Dausa, Rajasthan. During the trial, several witnesses testified, including the complainant, the child witness (Anurag), police personnel, and others.

Issues:

The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 364(A) read with Section 114 IPC, raising various arguments, including discrepancies in witness testimonies, acquittal in related cases, and lack of evidence regarding the SIM card used for ransom calls.

Held:

The Supreme Court carefully analyzed the evidence presented and rejected the appellant's arguments. It found that the testimony of the child witness was natural and credible, corroborated by other evidence.

The court also addressed discrepancies in statements and highlighted the minor nature of these inconsistencies, emphasizing that they did not undermine the prosecution's case. Additionally, the court noted that acquittals in related cases did not affect the appellant's conviction in the present case. It found that the prosecution had successfully proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the appellant's conviction under Section 364(A) read with Section 114 IPC. The court commended the assistance provided by the senior advocate and amicus curiae in the case.

Facts:

Unichem Laboratories Ltd., the appellant, owned industrial quarters allotted under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Housing Act, 1955.

Rani Devi, the respondent, occupied one such quarter initially allotted to her husband, Dharam Dev Yadav, who was an employee of the appellant.

Appellant filed a civil suit seeking eviction of the respondent from the quarter after Dharam Dev Yadav's retirement.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of Civil Court to try eviction suits concerning quarters allotted under the Act.

Interpretation of Section 13 of the Act regarding the bar on civil suits.

Existence of a tenancy agreement between the employer and the employee regarding the quarter.

Effect of retirement on the employee's occupancy rights and the right of the respondent to occupy post-retirement.

Held:

The Supreme Court held the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try eviction suits concerning quarters allotted under the Act, as Section 21 was deleted in 1972.

Section 13 of the Act does not bar civil suits filed by employers for eviction; it only restricts workers from challenging orders passed under the Act in civil courts.

A contractual relationship akin to a tenancy existed between the employer and the employee regarding the quarter.

Upon retirement, the employee's tenancy ended, and he was obligated to vacate the quarter. The respondent, not being an employee or an allottee, had no independent right to occupy the quarter post-retirement.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the trial court's decree for eviction. The respondents were given three months to vacate the quarter and were required to deposit the decreetal amount and three months' rent as damages for use and occupation.

Facts:

The respondents filed a civil suit against the appellants concerning a piece of land, seeking relief through a permanent injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, but this decision was reversed by the first appellate court. The respondents then appealed to the High Court, which ruled in their favor. Dissatisfied with this decision, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the issue of title to the property was relevant to the grant of permanent injunction.

Whether the High Court erred in framing substantial questions of law and in its subsequent examination of the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the issue of title to the property was relevant to the grant of permanent injunction, as indicated by the prayers for relief made by the plaintiffs in the suit.

The Court found that the High Court had erred in framing the substantial questions of law and in its examination of the case. Therefore, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case back to the High Court for reconsideration.

The High Court was directed to reframe the substantial questions of law and to consider the case afresh in light of the pleadings and the findings of the lower courts. Additionally, the Supreme Court urged the High Court to expedite the proceedings due to the age of the appeal.

Facts:

Cooperative Housing Societies 'B' and 'S' were placed under liquidation for non-compliance with the Registrar of Cooperative Societies (RCS) directives.

Revival applications for both societies were submitted by individuals not originally associated with them.

Delhi Development Authority (DDA) provisionally allotted land to society 'B' but failed to hand over possession.

Subsequent writ petitions by societies 'B' and 'S' sought direction for possession of allotted plots.

DDA contended that the revival of societies was fraudulent and memberships were not genuine.

Issues:

Whether the revival of Cooperative Housing Societies 'B' and 'S' was legal and memberships genuine.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the builder mafia played a role in reviving the societies. Investigations by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) revealed triable cases against office bearers and officials of RCS.

The revival of societies was initiated by individuals not affiliated with the original societies and funded by builders. The Court deemed this revival illegal as there was no evidence of RCS satisfaction or genuine reasons for liquidation cessation.

The Court concluded that the revival was illegal and memberships not genuine, but acknowledged the possibility of some members being deceived. DDA was directed to refund deposited money to societies with interest, and societies instructed to return this to members to alleviate hardships.

Facts:

The appellants, who were Social Security Assistants (SSAs) transferred from Karnataka/Tamil Nadu regions to Kerala, were challenged by private party respondents regarding their inclusion in the promotion list for the post of EO/AO in the EPFO Kerala region. The dispute revolved around the interpretation of the eligibility rule, which required candidates seeking promotion through departmental competitive examination to have served for five years "in the respective regions."

Issues:

The interpretation of the eligibility rule: whether candidates needed to have served specifically five years in the region where they sought promotion or whether total experience in various regions would suffice.

Held:

The Supreme Court interpreted the rule to mean that candidates must have served a total of five years, inclusive of service in both their earlier and present place of postings. It emphasized that in All India Services, officers are routinely transferred across regions, and the purpose of the rule was to ensure that such officers are not deprived of their experience in the feeder cadre due to transfers. Referring to previous judgments, the Court held:

"In All India Service, the officers are posted from one region to the other in a routine manner. The purpose of the rule is that such officers are not deprived of their experience in the feeder cadre merely because they have been transferred from one place to another."

The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the Tribunal, and held that the appellants were indeed eligible and qualified for promotion to the post of EO/AO in the Kerala region of the EPFO.