Facts:

The case involved a complaint against an advocate, wherein the issue arose regarding the transfer of disciplinary proceedings from the State Bar Council to the Bar Council of India (BCI) as per Section 36B(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961. The question was whether the BCI, upon receiving such transferred complaints, could remand them back to the State Bar Council for adjudication.

Issues:

Whether the BCI has the authority to remand transferred complaints back to the State Bar Council for adjudication.

The responsibilities of State Bar Councils in dealing with disciplinary proceedings against advocates within the stipulated time frame.

Held:

The Court held that Section 36B(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 clearly indicates that once the original jurisdiction to deal with a complaint is transferred to the BCI, it cannot be remanded back to the State Bar Council. The legislative intention was to ensure expeditious resolution of disciplinary matters, and remanding complaints would defeat this purpose.

It was further held that the BCI exercises original jurisdiction under Section 36B(1) and cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction as it does under Section 37. Therefore, once a complaint is transferred to the BCI, it cannot be sent back to the State Bar Council.

Regarding the responsibilities of State Bar Councils, the Court emphasized that they are obligated to conclude disciplinary proceedings within the stipulated time frame. Failure to do so would result in the transfer of proceedings to the BCI. State Bar Councils were directed to periodically review the progress of disciplinary proceedings, identify causes of delay, and ensure expeditious resolution.

Facts:

Deepa E.V., the appellant, applied for the post of Laboratory Assistant Grade II in the Export Inspection Council of India under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

Deepa E.V. belongs to the Dheevara community, classified as Other Backward Class (OBC), and received age relaxation as per rules.

Despite applying under the OBC category and attending the interview as an OBC candidate, Deepa E.V. was not selected for the position.

Deepa E.V. filed a Writ Petition before the High Court, seeking accommodation in the general category, which was dismissed by both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court.

Issues:

Whether Deepa E.V., who applied under the OBC category and received age relaxation, can claim the right to be appointed under the General Category.

The interpretation and application of Rule 9 of the Export Inspection Agency (Recruitment) Rules, 1980, and government proceedings dated July 1, 1998, regarding reservation and relaxation in age limits for recruitment.

Held:

The Court held that the appellant, who applied under the OBC category and received age relaxation, cannot claim the right to be appointed under the General Category.

Rule 9 of the Export Inspection Agency (Recruitment) Rules, 1980, along with the government proceedings dated July 1, 1998, expressly bar SC/ST/OBC candidates who availed relaxation from being considered for the general category.

The principles laid down in the case of Jitendra Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh cannot be applied to the present case, as they were specific to the interpretation of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services Act and government orders related to it.

The appellant had not challenged the constitutional validity of the relevant proceedings and rules.

The appellant's plea for a declaration that the proceedings were not binding on her without challenging their constitutional validity was not sustainable.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and there were no costs awarded.

Facts:

Devendra Nath Srivastava was convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC for the culpable homicide of his wife, Madhu Srivastava, on 12.05.2005.

The medical evidence confirmed that Madhu Srivastava died a homicidal death due to strangulation and ante mortem injuries.

Witnesses testified to seeing the appellant assault his wife, and forensic reports supported the prosecution's case.

The defense presented an alibi, claiming the appellant was in his native village at the time of the incident, but failed to substantiate it with evidence.

Issues:

Whether the appellant caused the death of his wife, as suggested by the prosecution?

Whether the offense constitutes culpable homicide under Section 304 Part I IPC or murder under Section 302 IPC?

Held:

The Supreme Court, after thorough examination of the evidence and legal arguments, upheld the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court under Section 304 Part I IPC. The court found:

The incident was not premeditated but occurred after a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased, likely due to the appellant's intoxicated state and anger.

The medical evidence clearly established the homicidal death of Madhu Srivastava.

Witness testimonies, although some turned hostile, were found credible upon careful scrutiny.

The defense's alibi was not substantiated with concrete evidence.

The act of the appellant constituted culpable homicide under Section 304 Part I IPC rather than murder under Section 302 IPC.

Therefore, the appeals filed by the appellant were dismissed, and the judgment of the High Court was affirmed.

Facts:

Dr. Sou Jayshree Ujwal Ingole, a surgeon, appealed against the order of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, which dismissed her petition to quash criminal proceedings initiated against her under Section 304A IPC. The case involved the death of a patient suffering from Haemophilia at Irvin Hospital, Amravati, where Dr. Ingole was on call.

Issues:

Whether Dr. Ingole's actions constituted criminal negligence under Section 304A IPC, given her decision to leave the hospital after noting that a Physician should be summoned for the patient.

Held:

The court held that Dr. Ingole's actions did not amount to gross negligence or a rash and negligent act under Section 304A IPC. The judgment emphasized the distinction between civil and criminal liability in cases of medical negligence and highlighted the need for caution before instituting criminal proceedings against medical professionals.

The court concluded that Dr. Ingole's decision to leave the hospital before the Physician arrived may have been an error in judgment, but it did not meet the high threshold required for criminal liability.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, the judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the criminal proceedings against Dr. Ingole were quashed.

Facts:

The case involved a partition suit filed by the respondents, claiming to be the sons and daughter of Mithu Sao and Bilaso Devi (2nd wife). The appellants were the sons and daughter of Mithu Sao and Temni (1st wife), who was deceased at the time of the suit. The dispute arose over the joint family properties owned by a joint Hindu Mitakshra family.

Issues:

The entitlements of the parties regarding the partition of the joint family properties.

Held:

The court analyzed the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It was held that before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the joint family continued with Mithu Sao as the sole coparcener after the death of the common ancestor. Following the provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a notional partition was presumed just before the death of Mithu Sao.

The court calculated the shares of each party based on this notional partition and the devolution of shares after the deaths of Mithu Sao and Bilaso Devi. Consequently, the appellants were entitled to a higher percentage share in the joint family property.

The appeal was allowed to the extent of modifying the decree to grant the appellants a higher share in the joint family property.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over land between the appellant, Hari Shankar Shukla, and the deceased, Umesh Shukla.

The altercation between the parties escalated, leading to a scuffle during which the appellant fired a shot that resulted in the death of Umesh Shukla.

The trial court acquitted all accused due to discrepancies in witness testimonies, but the High Court overturned this decision and convicted Hari Shankar Shukla under various sections of the Indian Penal Code.

Issues:

Whether the conviction of Hari Shankar Shukla was justified based on the evidence presented.

Additionally, there was a procedural issue regarding the right of certain witnesses to appeal against the trial court's judgment.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to convict Hari Shankar Shukla based on consistent testimonies from eyewitnesses regarding his involvement in the shooting.

Despite discrepancies highlighted by the trial court, the crucial fact of the appellant firing the fatal shot remained consistent among witnesses.

The court also considered the injuries sustained by the appellant during the altercation, further confirming the occurrence of a scuffle.

Consequently, the conviction was upheld, but the sentence was reduced to six years of rigorous imprisonment, with a fine of Rs. 7,000.

The appellant, who was out on bail, was ordered to be taken into custody to serve the remaining sentence.

The appeals are allowed.

Facts:The case involved a petition (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 558 of 2012) filed by Kalpana Mehta and others against the Union of India and others. The petition raised questions regarding the reliance on Parliamentary Standing Committee reports by the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court can refer to and place reliance upon Parliamentary Standing Committee reports in litigation filed under Arts. 32 or 136 of the Constitution.

If such a report can be considered, are there any restrictions on its reference, considering parliamentary privilege and the delicate balance between constitutional institutions as envisaged under Arts. 105, 121, and 122 of the Constitution.

Held:

The procedure of the Parliamentary Standing Committee is sui generis, neither inquisitorial nor adjudicative. It serves as a means for Parliament to examine the conduct of the executive, but individuals do not have a right to be heard, and principles of natural justice are not applicable.

While Constituent Assembly debates and parliamentary proceedings can be referenced for understanding constitutional provisions and legislative intent, Parliamentary Standing Committee reports cannot be used as evidence to establish facts.

Article 105(2) of the Constitution protects members of Parliament from liability for statements made in committee meetings, and their freedom of speech within committees is subject to constitutional provisions and parliamentary rules.

Article 118 empowers Parliament to regulate its procedure apart from what is stated directly in the Constitution.

Articles 121 and 122 impose limitations on parliamentary discussions and court inquiries into parliamentary proceedings to maintain a delicate balance between constitutional institutions.

Judicial review primarily focuses on the propriety of executive decisions, and reliance on Parliamentary Standing Committee reports should be cautious to avoid undermining parliamentary privilege.

Due to the substantial questions of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution, the matter was referred to a Constitution Bench for further consideration. The questions framed included the permissibility and restrictions on relying on Parliamentary Standing Committee reports by the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The Orissa Olympic Association was granted a lease of land for the construction of a stadium. However, a dispute arose regarding a portion of the plot where 23 shops and part of a Kalyan Mandap were built by the association.

The State contended that this portion of land was outside the leased area, while the association claimed it was erroneously excluded from the leasehold area in state records.

Issues:

Whether the constructed shops and Kalyan Mandap were within the leasehold land granted to the association.

Whether there were discrepancies in the income derived from the disputed land and if there was any conflict of interest in the association's dealings.

Held:

The Committee of Judicial Officers concluded that the association encroached upon government land by constructing the shops and part of the Kalyan Mandap. Thus, the properties built on government land must be returned to the government's possession.

The court observed significant discrepancies in the income reported by the association and the actual revenue calculated by the Accountant General, indicating potential revenue manipulation. Consequently, a CBI investigation was ordered to probe the matter.

The court found a conflict of interest in the association's dealings, as the son and son-in-law of the association's secretary were partners in a firm that had a contract with the association. This agreement was declared null and void, and the secretary was barred from contesting any post in the association.

Decision: The court issued various directions, including the takeover of the disputed properties by the Collector, continuation of tenancy by the Department of Revenue, prohibition of any litigation regarding the property, nullification of the agreement with the firm, and debarring the association's secretary from contesting any post. Additionally, a CBI investigation was ordered to investigate revenue discrepancies and related matters.

Facts:

The case originated from concerns regarding the presence of liquor vends on national and state highways contributing to road accidents.

Official statistics on road accidents and fatalities provided the backdrop for the Court's intervention.

The judgment addressed the issue based on the consistent policy of the Union Government to curb drunken driving.

Issues:

Whether the presence of liquor vends on highways contributes significantly to road accidents.

Whether the Court's directions to prohibit liquor vends on highways are justified and in the public interest.

Held:

The Court held that there is no justification for allowing liquor vends on state highways while prohibiting them on national highways due to the significant role of drunken driving in causing road accidents.

The Court issued directions to stop granting licenses for the sale of liquor along national and state highways and within a specified distance from the highways' outer edge.

The Court clarified that its judgment was based on established policies of the Union Government and statutory provisions related to road safety.

Modifications were made to the original directions to accommodate varying excise years in different states and to address concerns related to unique geographical conditions.

The Court rejected requests to narrow down the scope of the judgment, emphasizing the importance of preventing drunken driving as the primary objective.

The judgment was affirmed, and the batch of applications was disposed of accordingly.