Facts:

The case involves Sasan Power Ltd., a special purpose vehicle incorporated by Power Finance Corporation for procuring power. A Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) was executed between Sasan Power Ltd. and procurers for the generation and sale of electricity. The PPA specified preconditions for declaring COD, including successful performance tests certified by an independent engineer.

Issues:

The determination of COD under the PPA and whether there was a valid waiver of contractual provisions regarding COD by the procurers.

Held:

Waiver Interpretation (Para 20): Waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Without a clear intention to give up a known right, a party cannot be said to waive it. Additionally, any waiver involving public interest will not be recognized if it contradicts public interest.

Effect on Tariffs (Para 25, 29, 30, 31): Variations in electricity tariffs affect public interest, and any waiver of contractual provisions impacting tariffs must pass muster with the appropriate commission under the Electricity Act, 2003.

Interpretation of Contracts (Para 35): The interpretation of contracts must adhere to the explicit provisions and intentions of the parties, particularly in cases involving public interest.

Performance Tests and Certifications (Para 36, 38, 39): The COD is contingent upon the successful completion of performance tests as per the agreed standards and certification by an independent engineer. Deviation from specified parameters invalidates certification and delays COD.

Email Exchanges and Intentions (Para 42, 43, 46): Email communications between the parties did not demonstrate a clear intention to waive contractual rights regarding COD. The urgency expressed by the lead procurer did not constitute a valid waiver of agreed-upon performance standards.

Decision: The Court, after careful consideration, held that there was no valid waiver of contractual provisions regarding COD. Therefore, the appellate tribunal's decision regarding waiver was deemed erroneous.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over a Technical Services Agreement between EIH Limited and BHEL, wherein EIH was contracted to provide technical expertise for a hotel constructed by BHEL. EIH made a substantial payment to BHEL as a financial accommodation, but the agreement was terminated, and BHEL was required to refund the amount. Legal proceedings ensued, with EIH seeking a declaration of the agreement's validity and injunctions against BHEL from selling the hotel project. Temporary injunctions were granted by the High Court in favor of EIH and OB Hotels.

Issues:

The validity and subsistence of the Technical Services Agreement.

The legality of the sale of the hotel project by BHEL.

Compliance with court orders regarding the disclosure of EIH's rights in the property.

Held:

The Division Bench's order dated July 26, 2011, which required BHEL to refund a specified amount to EIH, was deemed to have done complete justice between the parties. The Supreme Court saw no reason to interfere with this decision under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The essence of the interim injunction issued by the Court was to ensure that any party dealing with the hotel unit was made aware of EIH's rights under the Technical Services Agreement. However, despite this injunction, financial institutions transferred ownership of the hotel unit to RB Hotels without disclosing EIH's rights.

While the Court did not express an opinion on whether EIH's suits were barred by Section 34, it emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must align with certain conditions. The Court noted that the interim injunction applied to subsequent purchasers, including RB Hotels, who were bound by the terms of the agreement.

The Court reiterated that parties or third parties cannot unilaterally determine the validity of court orders. If an order is deemed voidable, the appropriate course of action is to approach the competent court for resolution.

The Division Bench correctly acknowledged EIH's entitlement to a specified amount and directed the former owner and another party to deposit the sum. However, the Court noted that the High Court's presumption of non-compliance with the deposit conditions was unnecessary, as courts have the power to ensure compliance.

The Court affirmed the directions issued by the Division Bench and extended the deadline for depositing the amount. It emphasized the importance of compliance with court orders, especially considering the ongoing operation of the hotel and pending legal issues.

Acknowledging the operational status of the hotel and the pending legal issues, the Court upheld the decisions of both the Single Judge and the Division Bench to refuse interim injunctions.

Facts:

The appellant challenged his termination from service, leading to an industrial dispute.

The Labour Court set aside the dismissal order but granted only 50% of the back wages due to the appellant's crossing the age of superannuation.

The High Court modified the award, granting a one-time compensation equivalent to 50% of the back wages instead of reinstatement, citing procedural irregularities.

Issues:

Whether the Labour Court followed the correct procedure in deciding the fairness of the inquiry and other issues.

Whether the appellant's termination was justified based on the findings of the inquiry officer.

Whether the appellant was entitled to gratuity despite the allegations of misconduct constituting an offense involving moral turpitude.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Labour Court, finding that the management failed to provide evidence despite the opportunity granted after the Labour Court held the inquiry officer's findings as perverse.

The Court held that denial of gratuity requires termination on account of misconduct constituting an offense involving moral turpitude. Since the termination was not justified, the appellant was entitled to gratuity.

Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Labour Court's award was restored, granting the appellant gratuity for his continuous service till the date of his superannuation.

Facts:

The appellant, Maharao Bhim Singh of Kota, owned extensive properties including two residential palaces, one of which, "Umed Bhawan Palace," was in dispute.

The Central Government, under Section 60A of the Income Tax Act, issued "The Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950," granting exemptions, including for the bona fide annual value of the residential palace of a Ruler.

The Ministry of Defence requisitioned a portion of Umed Bhawan Palace for its use in 1976, while the appellant continued to occupy another part.

The dispute arose regarding the taxability of the rental income derived from the portion requisitioned by the Defence Ministry.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to claim full exemption for his residential palace under Section 10(19A) of the Income Tax Act, despite a portion being let out to the Defence Ministry.

Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950.

Held:The court held that the appellant is entitled to claim full exemption for his residential palace under Section 10(19A) of the Income Tax Act, even if a portion is let out. The judgment cited the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bharatchandra Banjdeo, and held that the entire palace, being declared the official residence, should enjoy the exemption. The court rejected the contention of splitting the exemption or taxing the portion occupied by the tenant. The language of the relevant provisions and the absence of a provision allowing such splitting supported this interpretation. The court also emphasized the principle of finality in tax matters, especially when a consistent view had been taken by higher courts previously.

This decision aligns with the view taken in earlier cases such as Maharao Bhim Singhji v. CIT and Bharatchandra Banjdeo v. CIT, providing clarity on the interpretation of tax exemption provisions concerning residential palaces of Rulers.

Facts:

Burren Energy India Ltd. acquired shares of Hindustan Oil Exploration Co. Ltd., exceeding 15% of the equity share capital.

SEBI alleged violation of Regulation 22(7) by Burren for appointing directors to the target company's board during the offer period.

The interpretation of the offer period under Regulation 2(1)(f) was crucial, with SEBI contending it should start from the date of the share purchase agreement.

Issues:

Whether Burren violated Regulation 22(7) by appointing directors during the offer period.

The interpretation of the offer period under Regulation 2(1)(f) of the Regulations.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that:

The Regulations encompassed both the acquirer and persons acting in concert, including corporate entities. Thus, the argument that corporate entities were exempt from Regulation 22(7) was rejected. (Para. 11)

The offer period should commence from the date of a concluded agreement, such as the share purchase agreement. The Court reasoned that if an offer period could be triggered by an understanding that had not yet become a binding contract, it should also commence from the date of a concluded agreement. (Para. 12)

Consequently, the Tribunal's decision was deemed incorrect, and the Adjudicating Officer's order was reinstated. The penalty imposed by the Adjudicating Officer was directed to be deposited within two months. (Para. 13)

Facts:

The respondent, Kamruddin, filed a suit for possession of a property against the appellants, claiming to be a tenant under the Punjab Wakf Board since April 1, 1990, at a monthly rent of Rs. 50.

The appellants contested the suit, claiming possession of the property through an agreement with one Shivlal, who allegedly had possession of the property on lease from the Punjab Wakf Board.

Issues:

Whether the appellants have legal possession of the suit property as tenants under the Punjab Wakf Board.

Whether the agreement with Shivlal establishes the appellants' right to possession.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, upheld the decisions of the lower courts and dismissed the Civil Appeal. However, the Court granted the appellants six months' time to vacate the property, provided they file an undertaking in the Registry of the Court within four weeks from the judgment date. The undertaking includes conditions such as not creating any third-party rights, clearing all rent/dues/occupational charges to the Wakf Board, and vacating the property peacefully within the stipulated time frame. The Civil Appeal stands dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Gurpal Singh, was convicted under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC for a shooting incident arising from a land dispute.

His co-accused, Harpartap Singh, was acquitted due to lack of evidence against him.

The incident resulted in the death of one individual and injuries to others.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the conviction under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC was appropriate.

Held:

The Court examined the evidence presented, including witness testimonies and medical reports, and found it consistent and convincing. Additionally, the recovery of the firearm and other evidence corroborated the prosecution's case.

The Court considered the circumstances of the case, including the passage of twelve years since the incident and the appellant's state of mind at the time of the offense. It concluded that while the appellant was guilty of causing harm, his actions did not demonstrate an intention to commit murder.

Therefore, the Court modified the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part 1, which deals with culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The sentence was reduced to the period already served.

Consequently, the appellant was ordered to be released unless detained for other reasons.

This decision was based on a comprehensive examination of the facts and legal principles involved, ensuring justice was served while considering the specific circumstances of the case.

Facts:

The case involved the suicide of Surjit Kaur and her two daughters. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, along with others, had subjected them to harassment and deprivation, leading to their suicides.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution established the elements of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court carefully examined the evidence presented. It noted discrepancies in the prosecution's case, particularly regarding the alleged deprivation of property and harassment. The court found that there was no concrete evidence linking the appellant or his family members to the suicides. The court emphasized the elements of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, highlighting the need for clear intent and active involvement on the part of the accused. It cited previous judgments to underscore the requirement for a direct causal link between the accused's actions and the suicide.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the essential elements of abetment of suicide against the appellant. It found no evidence of cruelty, oppression, or inducement by the appellant or his family members. Therefore, the court acquitted the appellant and set him at liberty. The appeal is thus allowed.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, concerning a Sale Deed executed between the appellants-defendants and the respondent-plaintiff. The Sale Deed was challenged on the grounds that it constituted a mortgage as security for a loan taken by the respondent-plaintiff.

Issues:

The court was to determine whether the Sale Deed executed by the appellants-defendants was indeed a sale or whether it constituted a mortgage as security for the loan.

Held:

The court, after examining the Sale Deed and accompanying agreements, found that the Sale Deed did not incorporate any conditions typical of a mortgage by conditional sale as stipulated in Section 58(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Additionally, the court noted the inadequacy of the sale consideration, further supporting the conclusion that the transaction was not intended as a sale by the respondent-plaintiff. The court upheld the findings of the lower courts, affirming that the Sale Deed was executed merely as security for a loan and that the respondent-plaintiff had fulfilled their repayment obligations. Thus, the appeal was dismissed.