Facts:

The prosecution alleged the appellant's involvement in the murder of Ramchandra Singh, based on the testimony of witnesses who claimed to have seen the deceased in the company of the appellant and others before his death. The identification parade was held more than two and a half months after the incident, and none of the witnesses provided specific identification marks or attributes of the accused. The confessional statement by another accused was discarded by the trial court.

Issues:

The sufficiency and reliability of identification evidence, considering the delay in holding the identification parade and the absence of specific identification marks provided by the witnesses.

Held:

The court held that the identification evidence alone was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It emphasized the importance of cautiousness in cases of delay, as witnesses' memories may fade. The absence of any incident or crime taking place in the presence of the witnesses further weakened the prosecution's case.

The suspicion expressed by one witness was not deemed enough to convict the appellant. Consequently, the court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant and acquitted him of all charges. The benefit of acquittal was also extended to the non-appealing accused.

Facts:

The appellant was accused of committing sexual intercourse on multiple occasions with the victim under the false promise of marriage.

The victim alleged that the appellant, his family treating her as their daughter-in-law, had sexually assaulted her. The trial court initially found the appellant to be a juvenile based on the victim's assertions regarding the last occurrence of intercourse. However, the High Court set aside this determination and remitted the matter back to the trial court.

Issues:

The determination of the appellant's juvenility at the time of the alleged offense and the validity of the trial court's decision in this regard. Additionally, the applicability of relevant legal provisions for age determination was in question.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the trial court's determination of the appellant's juvenility was valid and in accordance with established legal principles. The court emphasized that age determination should primarily rely on documentary evidence and resort to medical opinion only if such evidence is unavailable. Furthermore,

it was noted that if the offense occurred on multiple occasions, the appellant's status as a juvenile on the date of the last occurrence was sufficient for consideration.

The High Court's decision to remit the matter back to the trial court was deemed incorrect, and the trial court's findings were restored. Thus, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was disposed of in accordance with the trial court's directions.

Facts:

The High Court refused to quash the FIR and consequential investigation in the case of The State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani & Ors. However, it directed that if the accused person surrenders before the trial magistrate, they shall be admitted to bail. The Supreme Court considered the legality and propriety of this order.

Issues:

The appropriateness of the High Court's direction to grant bail without satisfying the conditions of Section 438 of the CrPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while declining to quash the FIR and investigation, the High Court could not extend the privilege to the accused person, which is in the nature of an anticipatory bail. The direction of the High Court amounted to an order under Section 438 of the CrPC, albeit without satisfying the conditions of the said provision. Such an order was deemed legally unsustainable.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the direction of the High Court was legally unacceptable as it amounted to granting anticipatory bail without satisfying the conditions prescribed by law. Such orders were deemed unsustainable and not within the purview of the relevant legal provisions.

Facts:

The case pertains to a show cause notice issued by the Revenue to the assessee, alleging the receipt of additional consideration in the form of royalty for supplying food flavors, essential ingredients of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) manufactured by franchisees. The Revenue sought to reassess the food flavors by including the royalty, leading to a demand for differential duty, penalty, and interest. The Adjudicating authority confirmed the demand, but the Appellate Tribunal held that there was no nexus between the royalty and the food flavors, and that the show cause notices were barred by limitation.

Issues:

Whether the royalty received by the assessee for supplying food flavors should be included in the assessable value for the purpose of imposing excise duty?

Whether the show cause notices issued by the Revenue were barred by limitation?

Held:

The concept of "manufacture" under the Central Excise Act implies change, but not every change constitutes manufacture. It involves treatment, labor, and manipulation.

The Tribunal's decision lacked detail and clarity regarding the process undertaken by the assessee in manufacturing and mixing the food flavors with IMFL.

The Tribunal's finding that certain show cause notices were barred by limitation was inadequate as it did not scrutinize the dates appropriately.

The matter was remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration based on the observations made by the Court and the applicable law.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the observations made hereinabove.

Facts:

The dispute arose over the revision of pay scales for teaching and non-teaching staff of educational institutions in Maharashtra, based on the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission. The Maharashtra government issued rules in 2009 revising the pay scales of non-teaching staff of only affiliated aided colleges. The appellants, who ran unaided colleges, contested this decision, arguing that they should not be compelled to pay salaries and allowances to their employees in accordance with the Sixth Pay Commission recommendations.

Issues:

Whether the classification between aided and unaided colleges for the purpose of pay scale revision violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India?

What is the legal authority for framing rules regarding the service conditions of employees of educational institutions in Maharashtra?

What are the financial obligations of the appellants regarding the payment of revised pay scales to their employees?

Held:

The court held that there was no justification for excluding non-teaching employees of unaided educational institutions from receiving the benefits of revised pay scales. The classification between aided and unaided colleges for this purpose was found to be arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

The authority of the State government to frame rules regarding the service conditions of employees of educational institutions was clarified under Section 8(3) of the Maharashtra Universities Act. The court affirmed the rights of teaching staff of affiliated colleges to receive revised pay scales.

The appellants were reminded of their legal obligation to meet the financial liability arising from the obligation to pay revised pay scales to their employees, regardless of financial aid from the State.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the rights of teaching staff of affiliated colleges to receive revised pay scales and ruling that non-teaching staff of unaided colleges should also receive similar benefits.

Facts:

The appellant challenged a detention order issued against them under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, contending that certain documents related to one particular allegation in the detention order were not supplied to them.

Issues:

Whether the detention order was based on multiple grounds or a single composite ground.

Whether the principle of segregation of grounds under Section 5A of the Act applies in this case.

Held:

The Court held that if a detention order is based on more than one ground, independent of each other, it will survive even if one of the grounds found is non-existing or legally unsustainable.

"Grounds" in the context of Section 5A of the Act refer to the basic facts on which conclusions are founded, distinct from subsidiary facts or further particulars.

The detention order in this case was based on multiple grounds, as various different acts were mentioned as separate grounds for the detention, thus invoking the principle of segregation contained in Section 5A.

Decision: The Court dismissed the criminal appeal and the tagged writ petition, upholding the detention order based on the principle of segregation of grounds under Section 5A of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974.

Facts:

The appellant, Gopal and Sons (HUF), filed a return for Assessment Year 2006-07 declaring its income.

The Assessing Officer (AO) made various additions to the declared income, including an addition under Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, pertaining to deemed dividends.

The appellant contested this addition, arguing that as an HUF, it couldn't be the beneficial or registered shareholder of the company.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) ruled in favor of the appellant, holding that HUF couldn't be a registered or beneficial shareholder, thus the provisions of Section 2(22)(e) wouldn't apply.

The High Court reversed the ITAT's decision, reinstating the addition made by the AO, emphasizing the involvement of the HUF's Karta in the transaction.

Issues:

Whether advances received by an HUF could be deemed as dividends under Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, stating:

The provisions of Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, create a fiction, deeming certain payments as dividends under specific circumstances.

Even though the HUF was not the registered shareholder, once the payment was received by the HUF and the Karta had substantial interest in the HUF, the payment constituted deemed dividends under Section 2(22)(e) of the Act.

The judgment in CIT, Andhra Pradesh v. C.P. Sarathy Mudaliar, 1972, relied upon by the appellant, was inapplicable in this context due to the presence of Explanation 3 in Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the addition of the deemed dividends to the appellant's income.

Facts:The appellant, Patel Brothers, ran a business of purchasing tea and was a registered dealer under various tax acts. The appellant submitted declarations reflecting the value of sales, based on which the Superintendent of Tax granted exemption of sales tax. However, the information provided by the appellant was found to be false, leading to reassessment orders and imposition of penalties. The appellant filed appeals and review applications, which were dismissed, following which revision petitions were filed in the High Court. There was a delay of 335 days in filing these revision petitions.

Issues:

The applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the revision petitions filed under Section 81 of the VAT Act, considering the delay in filing.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 81 of the VAT Act in conjunction with Section 84 thereof. The Court observed that Section 84 of the VAT Act expressly made only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings under the VAT Act, implying the exclusion of other provisions, including Section 5. The Court emphasized that the Legislature's intention was clear in this regard.

The judgment referred to previous cases, including Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited & Anr, to establish that where a special law provides a specific limitation period without any provision for condonation of delay, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be excluded. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the decision of the High Court.

Facts:

The case involved the murder of the nephew of PW1 at a tube well. Witnesses (PW2, NS, and PW3) heard gunshots and saw the accused, armed with weapons, leaving the scene.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supported the conviction of the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

Whether the juvenile defendant was entitled to release from custody due to being a minor at the time of the offense.

Held:

The accused were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC based on evidence establishing their presence at the scene, their carrying of weapons, and their association with others armed with guns .

Common intention can be conceived immediately or at the time of the offense and is determined based on the facts of the case. The applicability of Section 34 IPC is a question of fact to be ascertained from the evidence brought on record .

Despite the absence of injuries caused by certain weapons mentioned, the accused's actions, including carrying weapons, arriving at the scene together, and the timing of the offense, attracted constructive liability under Section 34 IPC.

Eyewitness testimony provided by PWs 1 to 3 was deemed credible, as it detailed the previous enmity between the parties, the weapons carried by the accused, and the circumstances of the incident. Non-examination of certain witnesses did not discredit the prosecution's case.

The testimony of PW3 was found reliable, and there was no reason to doubt his presence at the scene. The court upheld the testimony of PWs 1 to 3 as trustworthy and admissible.

Reliance was placed on the eyewitness testimony by the trial court and the High Court, and their version was accepted. The witnesses' relationship with the deceased did not undermine their credibility, and no adverse inference could be drawn against the prosecution.

The accused-appellants' intention to visit the shed where the deceased was present, accompanied by others carrying weapons, established their common intention to commit the offense.

The juvenile defendant, being found to be a minor at the time of the offense, was entitled to release from custody in accordance with juvenile justice laws.

Decision: The court affirmed the convictions of the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, upheld the credibility of eyewitness testimony, and ordered the release of the juvenile defendant from custody. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of 2010 is dismissed and Criminal Appeal No. 1448 of 2010 is disposed of.