Facts:

The dispute arose between the Appellant and the Respondent concerning development agreements for a property in Kolkata. The agreements included an arbitration clause, and an arbitrator was appointed. Despite objections raised by the Appellants regarding the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and jurisdictional issues, the arbitrator proceeded with the proceedings and rendered an award in favor of the Respondent. Subsequently, the Appellants filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to set aside the arbitral award on various grounds, including lack of reasoning.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench's directive to send the award back to the Arbitral Tribunal was within the scope of Section 34(4) of the Act?

Whether the Court can exercise its power under Section 34(4) suo moto, or it requires a written application from a party to the arbitration proceedings?

Whether the absence of a formal written application by the Respondent before the Division Bench rendered the directive erroneous?

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that the power under Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, can only be exercised upon a written application by a party to the arbitration proceedings.

The Court cannot exercise this power suo moto. Since no formal written application was made by the Respondent before the Division Bench for deferring the proceedings and sending the award back to the Arbitral Tribunal, the Division Bench's directive was deemed erroneous.

As a result, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Division Bench's directive, affirming the decision to set aside the award by the learned Single Judge. The parties were left free to pursue their remedies in accordance with law, without the need for further directions to the Arbitral Tribunal.

Facts:

The petitioner, Mahendra Singh Dhoni, sought the transfer of proceedings in a criminal case filed against him.

The case involved allegations under Section 295A of the IPC regarding deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings.

The petitioner contended that the allegations did not satisfy the essential ingredients of the offense under Section 295A.

Issues:

Whether the allegations in the complaint constitute an offense under Section 295A of the IPC.

Whether the trial should be transferred to another court or the complaint should be quashed.

Held:

The court held that the allegations in the complaint did not satisfy the essential ingredients of the offense under Section 295A of the IPC. Quoting previous judgments and the Constitution, the court emphasized that Section 295A penalizes only deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, and not every act of insult to religion. Therefore, the court quashed the complaint proceedings initiated against the petitioner.

Additionally, the court extended the benefit of quashing the complaint proceedings to the co-accused, the editor of the magazine in question. This decision was based on principles of fairness and justice, as established in previous judgments.

Furthermore, the court emphasized the importance of magistrates scrutinizing complaints before issuing summons, ensuring adherence to legal standards and territorial jurisdiction. The court cautioned against the abuse of legal processes and affirmed that such scrutiny is a primary judicial responsibility.

In conclusion, the transfer petition and the criminal miscellaneous petition were disposed of accordingly, with the complaint proceedings being quashed.

Facts:

The case involved the granting of conditional bail by the High Court to the respondent accused, Amit Kumar @ Bacha Rai, who was alleged to be the mastermind behind the Bihar Toppers Scam. The scam involved tampering with answer sheets and manipulating the examination system to secure top ranks for students, including the respondent's daughter.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent was justified given the gravity of the offences and the potential impact on the education system.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the granting of bail to the respondent at that stage was not advisable. The Court noted the seriousness of the offences, which included economic crimes of significant magnitude and tampering with the education system. The respondent was alleged to be the kingpin of the scam, and the allegations against him were serious enough to jeopardize the credibility of the education system in Bihar.

The Court emphasized that socio-economic offences require a different approach to bail considerations due to their impact on society and the need to prevent irreparable harm. It also considered the possibility of further investigation and the complexity of the case involving multiple accused and a sophisticated modus operandi.

The Court set aside the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent, ruling that his release at that stage was not advisable. It was held that while bail is the rule and jail is the exception, competing factors must be carefully considered in each case before deciding on bail.

Facts:

The respondent, along with another accused, faced trial in ST No. 01 of 2015 before the Sessions Court, Champawat, for offenses under Section 302 and 201 of IPC.

During the trial, the respondent sought permission to produce certain pages of the police diary, obtained under the Right to Information Act, for confrontation with the investigating officer.

The application was opposed by the appellant on the grounds that such documents could be produced later in the trial and that the accused's right to produce evidence was limited.

The application was rejected by the Sessions Court but allowed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the accused could produce pages of the police diary during the trial for confrontation with the investigating officer.

The extent of the accused's right to use entries from the police diary in trial proceedings.

Held:

The Court held that the accused's right to use entries from the police diary in trial proceedings is limited. The accused cannot demand access to the diary unless the entries are used by the police officer to refresh memory or by the court to contradict the officer, as provided in Section 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Sections 145 and 161 of the Evidence Act.

The Court emphasized that the police diary is not substantive or corroborative evidence and cannot be used against witnesses other than the police officer. Therefore, the accused cannot force the police officer to refer to the diary during examination in court.

The Court overturned the High Court's decision, holding that since neither the police officer nor the trial court had used the entries in the diary to contradict the officer (PW-15), the accused could not produce pages of the police diary obtained under the Right to Information Act to contradict the officer during cross-examination. Thus, the appeal was allowed.

Facts:

Disputes arose between Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited (Appellant) and Datawind Innovations Private Limited (Respondent) regarding an agreement dated 25.10.2014.

The agreement contained clauses regarding dispute resolution, stating that arbitration would be conducted in Mumbai, and all disputes would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts in Mumbai.

Issues:

Whether the courts in Mumbai have exclusive jurisdiction in the matter, despite no part of the cause of action arising there.

Interpretation of the term "seat" of arbitration and its implications on jurisdiction.

Applicability of Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 when the seat of arbitration is in India.

Held:

The court held that once the seat of arbitration is designated, it acts as an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Mumbai courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings arising from the agreement between the parties, even if no part of the cause of action arose in Mumbai. The concept of "seat" of arbitration is analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause.

The court clarified that the "juridical seat" refers to the legal place of arbitration. Therefore, Mumbai courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the injunction confirmed by it continued for four weeks to allow the respondents to take necessary steps under Section 9 in the Mumbai Court.

Facts:

The appellant and respondent were married in 1995 and had a son.

There were several rounds of litigation between the parties, including applications for restitution of conjugal rights, dowry harassment cases, and a divorce petition.

The appellant remarried post-divorce and had a child from the second marriage.

The respondent filed for enhancement of maintenance from Rs. 16,000/- to Rs. 23,000/- per month, citing the appellant's increased income.

Issues:

Whether the maintenance amount should be enhanced considering the change in circumstances.

Whether the appellant's remarriage and the child from the second marriage should affect the maintenance amount.

Held:

The court held that maintenance is dependent on the factual situation of the case and can be molded based on various factors, including changes in circumstances. The court found the enhancement of maintenance justified due to the increase in the appellant's income.

However, considering the appellant's remarriage and the child from the second marriage, the court decided to reduce the maintenance amount to Rs. 20,000/- per month from the enhanced Rs. 23,000/- per month.

Therefore, the maintenance amount awarded to the respondent-wife was reduced to Rs. 20,000/- per month, payable on or before the 10th of every succeeding English calendar month.

Facts:

Machindra accused Sajjan and his son of murdering Machindra's younger son, Dattatreya, following a dispute over land ownership.

The trial court convicted Sajjan and his son based on witness testimonies and medical evidence.

On appeal, the High Court acquitted the respondents, citing contradictions in witness testimonies and deficiencies in medical evidence.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to acquit the respondents was justified based on the evidence presented.

Whether there were substantial doubts regarding the guilt of the respondents.

Held:

The court emphasized the principle that the burden of proof lies with the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It noted contradictions in witness testimonies, the absence of key witnesses, and inadequacies in medical evidence.

The conduct of an alleged eye-witness who fled the scene further cast doubt on the reliability of testimonies. Despite the gravity of the offense, the lack of clarity in medical reports and witness testimonies led to substantial doubts regarding the guilt of the respondents.

Therefore, the High Court's decision to acquit them was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking the cancellation of a sale deed, claiming that the property in question was wakf property. The defendants purchased the property through a private person.

The plaintiff relied on a Gazette Notification dated 28.06.1962, alleging that the property was notified as wakf property under the Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board.

The Tribunal and the High Court both concluded that the property in question was not notified as wakf property in the Official Gazette. However, the High Court raised doubts about the inclusion/non-inclusion of the property in the Survey Commissioner's Report.

Issues:

Whether the plaint discloses a cause of action or is barred by law.

Whether the property in question was properly notified as wakf property in the Official Gazette.

Whether the plaintiff's suit is manifestly meritless and vexatious.

Held:

The power to reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised by the court at any stage of the suit. The decision to reject the plaint should be based solely on the averments of the plaint.

Averments in the defendant's written statement or contentions are irrelevant when considering the defendant's prayer for rejecting the plaint. Even if the plaintiff's allegations are taken as true on their face, if they demonstrate that the suit is barred by law or does not disclose a cause of action, the plaint can be rejected.

The property in question was not notified as wakf property in the Gazette, as alleged by the plaintiff. The Tribunal and the High Court both concluded this fact. Thus, the plaint fails to establish the property's wakf status.

The provisions of the Wakf Act, both the 1954 Act and the 1995 Act, were discussed, emphasizing the role of Survey Commissioners in identifying wakf properties and the process of gazette notification.

The Court upheld the rejection of the plaint, deeming the plaintiff's suit manifestly meritless and vexatious. The plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action, and the suit was barred by law.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and upheld the rejection of the plaint by the Wakf Tribunal under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff's suit lacked merit and was barred by law.

Facts:

The case involves the demolition of the Babri Masjid and subsequent legal proceedings against various accused individuals. Multiple FIRs were lodged, and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a consolidated charge sheet. The State Government issued a notification for the trial of cases, but it was amended and struck down for non-compliance. Additionally, a supplementary charge sheet was filed against eight accused separately.

Issues:

Whether a joint trial is warranted despite multiple FIRs.

The correctness of dropping proceedings against certain accused.

The validity of transferring proceedings from Rae Bareilly to Lucknow.

Compliance with Article 142 of the Constitution.

Held:

The court observed that despite the existence of multiple FIRs, the evidence for all offenses was essentially the same. Therefore, a joint trial was justified.

The dropping of proceedings against certain accused was deemed erroneous, as they were implicated in the charge of criminal conspiracy. Their discharge was not warranted.

The court directed the transfer of proceedings from Rae Bareilly to the Sessions Court at Lucknow to facilitate a joint trial. This was deemed necessary for the efficient and fair conduct of the legal process.

In invoking Article 142 of the Constitution, the court clarified that while equity is prioritized, it cannot override mandatory legal provisions. However, Article 142 empowers the court to ensure complete justice in cases of exceptional circumstances.

Decision: The court directed the consolidation of legal proceedings related to the Babri Masjid demolition case into a joint trial at Lucknow. Additional charges were to be framed against certain accused, and the trial was to be completed within two years. The court emphasized the importance of avoiding unnecessary adjournments and ensuring the presence of prosecution witnesses.