Facts:

The case involves challenges by telecom service providers to the terms and conditions set by the Central Government for spectrum auction in 2015, particularly regarding minimum bidding criteria and capping. The Notice Inviting Application (NIA) outlined these conditions. Various aspects of the auction procedure, including spectrum allocation and eligibility criteria, were under scrutiny.

Issues:

The validity of the tender conditions imposed by the Central Government and whether they infringed upon the constitutional rights of the telecom service providers, particularly concerning Article 14.

Additionally, the role of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) recommendations in shaping government policy and the interpretation of the NIA's clauses were in contention.

Held:

The Court held that the challenge to the tender conditions was not tenable. The minimum spectrum requirement was deemed reasonable and aligned with the objective of ensuring efficient service provision.

The concept of legitimate expectation was deemed inapplicable in this case unless there was an abuse of power by the State.

The Court emphasized limited judicial review in complex auction procedures, intervening only in cases of obnoxious arbitrariness or extraneous considerations.

TRAI recommendations were considered non-binding but deserving of due weightage by the Central Government.

The interpretation of the NIA was subject to contractual principles, and the Court would not compel the State to interpret clauses in a particular way.

Spectrum allocation and capping were upheld as measures to prevent monopolies and promote healthy competition, benefiting consumers.

The auction structure and procedure were deemed within the discretion of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), considering factors like spectrum availability and market competition.

Changes in auction procedures were found not to violate legitimate expectations if they served the public interest and revenue maximization.

Facts:

The Armed Forces Tribunal allowed applications by doctors seeking DACP, relying on a previous decision.

However, the factual position regarding DACP's applicability to AMC cadre doctors wasn't adequately presented to the tribunal or the court.

Issues:

Whether the DACP scheme is applicable to medical doctors serving as Commissioned Officers in the AMC cadre of the Armed Forces.

Held:

The court recognized the importance of examining the applicability of DACP to Commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces due to significant financial and structural ramifications.

The AMC cadre officers' service conditions differ from other Commissioned Officers, and extending DACP to them might create an anomalous situation.

The previous tribunal decision didn't conclusively determine DACP's applicability to AMC cadre doctors but directed authorities to consider implementing DACP in accordance with the law.

The case is remanded to the tribunal for reconsideration, instructing both parties to present their arguments and relevant documents afresh.

The tribunal should reassess the matter without being influenced by previous observations or decisions.

Both parties are allowed to submit additional pleadings and documents to the tribunal.

The appellants are instructed to file a comprehensive affidavit explaining why DACP shouldn't be extended to AMC cadre doctors, and respondents are given the opportunity to respond.

A writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is disposed of, granting the petitioner the option to intervene in the remanded proceedings or file a fresh Original Application for the relief sought.

Facts:

The appellant owned agricultural land which the Government of Kerala sought to acquire for the development of Techno Park. The acquisition process was initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the appellant agreed to sell the land to Techno Park for a negotiated compensation amount.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was entitled to exemption under Section 10(37) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, considering the nature of the acquisition.

Held:

The Court determined that the acquisition of the land was compulsory as all procedures under the Land Acquisition Act were followed. It emphasized that the negotiations for compensation were solely regarding the quantum of compensation and did not alter the compulsory nature of the acquisition.( Para 9)

The Court overruled the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Info Park Kerala vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, stating that the mere execution of sale deeds does not change the compulsory nature of acquisition if statutory procedures are followed.( Para 10)

Consequently, the Court allowed the appellant's appeal and quashed the proceedings initiated by the Income Tax Department under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act.( Para 11)

Facts:

The petitioners filed interlocutory applications seeking the constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate alleged unlawful activities based on incriminating documents recovered during raids on the premises of Aditya Birla Group and Sahara Group.

The materials presented by the petitioners included documents indicating suspicious transactions and possible involvement of influential personalities and corporate entities in unlawful activities.

Issues:

Whether the materials presented by the petitioners are sufficient to warrant the constitution of an SIT and direction for investigation.

Whether the documents provided have legal admissibility and evidentiary value.

Held:

The court held that the materials presented lacked legal admissibility and evidentiary value as they did not conform to the requirements of Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act.

The documents provided were not maintained in the regular course of business and were deemed unreliable by the concerned authorities.

The Income Tax Settlement Commission had found the transactions noted in the documents to be doubtful and lacking evidentiary value.

Considering the principles laid down in previous cases such as C.B.I. v. V.C. Shukla and Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, the court emphasized the importance of reliable and admissible evidence in initiating investigations.

Therefore, the court dismissed the interlocutory applications, finding no merit in them.

Facts:

The appellant was charged with the murder of Anusha Sarkar and her mother Maya Sarkar under IPC Sections 302 and 34.

The prosecution alleged a motive based on a love affair between A1 and Anusha, leading to A1's desire to eliminate Anusha and her mother.

The appellant's involvement was based on circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of blood-stained clothes, a laptop, and fingerprints.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish the appellant's involvement in the crime.

Held:

The court concluded that there was no direct evidence linking the appellant to the crime and that the prosecution failed to establish a clear motive for his involvement (Paragraphs 6-8).

It was held that the recovery of blood-stained clothes and a laptop from the appellant's house was not sufficient to establish his guilt, as the evidence did not directly pertain to the commission of the crime (Paragraphs 6-8).

The court found the fingerprint evidence unreliable, as one crucial print was missing and others were inconclusive (Paragraph 10).

Based on the above factors, the court held that the appellant should be given the benefit of the doubt, and his conviction was set aside (Paragraph 11).

Facts:

The appellant, United Finance Corporation, purchased property through a court auction sale as a decree-holder.

The sale was made absolute on June 1, 2002, and a sale certificate was issued on March 17, 2003.

The respondent, M.S.M. Haneefa, the judgment-debtor, filed applications to set aside the auction sale, which were dismissed by the executing court.

The respondent also filed a revision before the High Court, which was dismissed on July 9, 2003.

The appellant filed an application under Order 21, Rule 95 CPC for delivery of possession on August 30, 2003.

Issues:

Whether the application filed under Order 21, Rule 95 CPC for delivery of possession was barred by limitation.

Determination of the date from which the limitation period should be reckoned for filing such an application.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the application for delivery of possession was not barred by limitation. It concluded that the sale became absolute only when the revision filed by the judgment-debtor was disposed of on July 9, 2003.

Therefore, since the application for delivery of possession was filed on August 30, 2003, which was well within one year from the date the sale became absolute, the Court ruled that it was not barred by limitation.

The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Executing Court to restore the application and dispose of it in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The appeals arose from criminal proceedings pending in the Court of Additional Session Judge, Delhi, involving various offences under IPC based on an FIR.

The prosecuting agency sought to prosecute the appellant under Section 182 IPC without following the procedure prescribed in Section 195 CrPC.

The appellant challenged this action, leading to dismissal by the Trial Court and subsequent dismissal by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution's action against the appellant under Section 182 IPC without following the procedure under Section 195 CrPC renders it void ab initio.

Held:

The Court, referring to the precedent set in Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR 1962 SC 1206), held that the prosecution's action under Section 182 IPC is void ab initio if not in accordance with the procedure outlined in Section 195 CrPC.

The Court emphasized that the procedural requirements of Section 195 CrPC are mandatory for prosecuting an offence under Section 182 IPC.

The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned orders of the lower courts, as the action taken by the prosecution against the appellant under Section 182 IPC was found to be void ab initio due to non-compliance with the procedural requirements.

The Court expressed no opinion on any subsequent application filed by the State in this regard, leaving it to be considered by the Trial Court on its own merits and in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The trial court, after the conclusion of the criminal trial, recorded in the order sheet that the accused persons had been acquitted as per a judgment separately typed, signed, and dated. However, the judgment was not dictated in open court, and there was only an incomplete judgment with no page signed by the presiding officer. On inquiry, it was found that the judgment was not available on record, leading to administrative action by the High Court. The High Court, in exercise of its administrative power, treated the trial as pending and transferred the case to another court for rehearing and disposal.

Issues:

Whether the recorded order by the trial court can be treated as a judgment of acquittal.

The competence of the High Court to transfer the case in exercise of its administrative power.

Held:

The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) mandate that the judgment must be pronounced in open court either by delivering the whole judgment, reading out the whole judgment, or reading out the operative part of the judgment. In this case, the judgment was not dictated in open court, and there was only an incomplete judgment with no signature by the presiding officer.

The absence of a complete and signed judgment renders it invalid as per Section 353 CrPC, and the trial cannot be concluded based on an incomplete document.

Article 227 of the Constitution confers powers of superintendence on the High Court over courts and tribunals within its territory, including the authority to exercise suo motu power.

The High Court, upon finding the absence of a valid judgment, was under a legal obligation to rectify the error.

Therefore, the transfer of the case by the High Court to another court for rehearing and disposal was within its jurisdiction and served the cause of justice.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the importance of properly pronouncing judgment in open court and upholding the High Court's authority to rectify errors in legal proceedings to ensure the sanctity of justice.

Facts:

The respondent filed a suit seeking permanent and temporary injunctions against the defendants, claiming possession of the property known as Tej Kunj.

The property was owned by the deceased father of the respondent's mother.

The respondent and his maternal grandmother were residing in the property.

The defendants argued that the respondent and his grandmother were permitted to stay there out of love and affection and had no legal right to claim possession.

The property had been bequeathed to the defendants by the deceased father's will.

Issues:

Whether the respondent and his grandmother had any legal right to claim possession of the property.

Whether an interim injunction should be granted in favor of the respondent.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that a person holding property gratuitously, as a caretaker or servant, does not acquire any legal right or interest in the property, regardless of how long they have possessed it.

Therefore, the respondent, being a relative staying with his grandmother who was a gratuitous licensee, had no legal basis to claim possession.

The Court cited precedents to support its decision, emphasizing that protection of possession could only be granted to those with valid agreements, such as lease or license agreements.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and reinstating the trial court's order.

The Court clarified that its observations should not be considered as conclusive, as the main suit was still pending and the merits would be decided at the appropriate stage.