Facts:

The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the validity of his admission to the MBBS course at CM Medical College & Hospital (the College), based on an examination conducted by the College.

The admission process involved an examination called CGMAT-2016, supervised and monitored by the State of Chhattisgarh.

Changes in regulations regarding admissions to MBBS courses, particularly concerning the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET), were a point of contention.

Despite regulatory changes, the College proceeded with admissions based on its own examination rather than NEET.

Issues:

Whether the admission granted by the College to the petitioner was valid.

Whether the College and the State of Chhattisgarh adhered to the regulations established by the Medical Council of India and endorsed by the Court.

Held:

The Court held that the admission granted to the petitioner by the College was unjustified and therefore set it aside. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the rule of law, even if it meant adverse consequences for the petitioner and similarly situated students.

The Court stated that the College and the State of Chhattisgarh did not adhere to the regulations established by the Medical Council of India, resulting in the petitioner becoming a victim of circumstances. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed. However, the petitioner was given the liberty to proceed against the College and the State of Chhattisgarh in an appropriate manner.

Facts:

Appellants and private respondents appointed as SFOs in 1993 through direct recruitment.

Dispute arose over inter se seniority due to government's classification based on test clearance timing.

Private respondents successfully completed probation and cleared two tests; exempted from the third test by government order.

Government issued a memorandum for determining seniority, creating two classes among SFOs.

Appellants objected to the classification, leading to legal proceedings in the Tribunal, High Court, and eventually the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the government's classification for determining seniority among SFOs was justified.

Whether the classification was in conformity with relevant Rules.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the government's classification lacked justification and contravened relevant Rules. The Court emphasized that the respondents had fulfilled all requirements for seniority, including probation completion and test clearance.

The creation of two classes for determining seniority was deemed irrational and unreasonable. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court. This decision aligns with recent precedent, providing no grounds for interference.

FACTS:

Accused appellant convicted for offences under IPC Sections 302 read with Section 34 and Section 411.

Prosecution based on circumstantial evidence including presence of accused at crime scene, recovery of stolen goods, and witness testimonies.

Witness accounts inconsistent; recovery of stolen property insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUES:

Whether circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Admissibility and credibility of witness testimonies.

Application of presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

HELD:

The Supreme Court examined the evidence and found it insufficient to conclusively prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The recovery of stolen property, while suspicious, did not establish a direct link to the commission of the crime.

The witness testimonies were inconsistent and lacked credibility. Referring to the principle laid down in Sanwat Khan vs. State of Rajasthan, the Court emphasized that recovery of stolen property alone cannot establish guilt unless it is shown that the theft/robbery and the murder occurred in the same transaction.

The Court concluded that there was a significant gap in time between when the accused were last seen and the time of the incident, leaving room for the possibility that someone else could have committed the crime. Therefore, the appellant was acquitted of the murder charge under Section 302 IPC but the conviction for robbery under Section 392 IPC was upheld.

As the appellant had already served the sentence for the robbery offence, the Court ordered his immediate release.

Facts:

The appellant, S. Krishna Sradha, was denied admission to the MBBS course despite being more meritorious than the selected candidates. The High Court relied on the decision in Jasmine Kaur's case, denying admission benefits to the appellant due to the expiry of the cut-off date, but acknowledging lapses on the part of various authorities. The appellant approached the Court under Article 226 without delay, following the prescribed procedures for admission.

Issues:

Whether the previous decision in Jasmine Kaur's case restricting admission relief requires reconsideration by a larger bench.

Whether compensation alone is an adequate remedy for wrongful deprivation of admission, especially concerning the academic career of a student.

Held:

The decision in Jasmine Kaur's case, restricting admission relief based on the expiry of the time schedule, necessitates reconsideration by a larger bench, as it may not adequately address the grievances of meritorious students.

The Court emphasizes the importance of merit-based admissions and asserts that fundamental rights should not be denied to students due to institutional or administrative faults. The denial of admission based solely on the lapse of time may not serve the cause of justice.

Granting compensation may be an additional relief; however, it should not be the sole or adequate remedy for wrongful deprivation of admission, considering its impact on the academic career of the student. Restitution should be pursued where possible to restore the aggrieved party to their pre-wrongdoing condition.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of provisions under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, concerning the treatment of post-sale discounts granted through credit notes issued to customers.

Issues:

Whether discounts granted through credit notes can be deducted from the total turnover to determine the taxable turnover under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Held:

The Court analyzed Section 3(2)(c) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, and held that all amounts allowed as discounts qualify for deduction from the total turnover to ascertain the taxable turnover.It was further held that the requirement for discount to be eligible for deduction includes being allowed in accordance with the regular practice of the dealer or as per terms of any contract or agreement, and such discounts should be reflected in the tax invoice or bill of sale.( Para 11-13)

The Court emphasized the importance of contemporaneous records to prove transactions allowing discounts and mandated that the final sale price after deducting trade discounts must be reflected in the accounts as stipulated under Rule 3(2)(c) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 (Para 15).

Sections 29 and 30 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, along with Rule 3, were viewed as constituents of the same scheme to determine taxable turnover and were interpreted in a manner that ensures correct computation of tax liability (Para 26).

The Court stressed the practicality of allowing trade discounts, recognizing that they may not always be reflected at the time of the original sale but should be evidenced by contemporaneous documents and reflected in relevant accounts (Para 27).

It was reiterated that while statutes should generally be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning, if a literal interpretation leads to absurd results, courts may seek the underlying legislative intent and interpret accordingly (Para 34).

The interpretation of the first proviso to Rule 3(2)(c) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, was aligned with the legislative intent to sustain the benefit of trade discounts and ensure the correct determination of taxable turnover (Para 36).

The Court concluded that the requirement of referencing discounts in tax invoices or bills of sale should be construed in relation to the transaction resulting in the final sale/purchase price, but discounts must be proven through contemporaneous records (Para 37).

Decision: The appeals were allowed, affirming the deduction of post-sale discounts from the total turnover to determine the taxable turnover under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Facts:

Safety Retreading Company (P) Ltd. was engaged in the retreading of tires.

The dispute arose regarding the levy of service tax on the total amount charged for retreading, including the value of materials/goods used and sold in the execution of the contract.

The appellant had paid taxes under the local Act as a Works Contractor.

Issues:

Whether service tax is leviable on the total amount charged for retreading, including the value of materials/goods used and sold in the execution of the contract.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that service tax should be levied only on the service component and not on the entire gross value. The court emphasized the provisions of Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, which exclude the cost of parts or materials sold to the customer from the taxable value. The court rejected arguments regarding insufficient evidence of the value of goods or parts used in the contract, noting the undisputed assessment of the appellant under the local Act and the details provided in the show cause notice issued by the Department.

The court set aside the majority order of the appellate Tribunal and held that the view taken by the Vice President of the appellate Tribunal was correct. The appellant was entitled to all reliefs due, and any amounts deposited were to be returned without interest. Bank guarantees related to penalties were discharged. The appeals are disposed of on the same terms.

Facts:

Anil Kumar was convicted under Section 22 of the NDPS Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and fine.

He was later convicted under Section 27(b)(ii) and Section 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and sentenced to imprisonment and fine.

An appeal was filed seeking concurrent running of sentences.

Issues:

Whether concurrent sentences should be ordered under Section 427 of the CrPC.

Held:

The power conferred on the Court under Section 427 Cr.P.C. to order concurrent sentence is discretionary.

Whether or not the discretion is to be exercised in directing sentences to run concurrently would depend upon the nature of the offence/offences and the facts and circumstances of each case.

In the present case, the appellant was earlier convicted under Section 22 NDPS Act and subsequently convicted under Section 27(b)(ii) and Section 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

Considering the nature of the offences for which the appellant was convicted and the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct that the sentences imposed on the appellant in FIR No.37 and Complaint No.638 shall run concurrently.

The substantive sentences imposed on the appellant are ordered to run concurrently and the appeal is thus allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, S. Muthu Kumaran, was inducted into the Indian Army in 1994.

He was alleged to be involved in a fraudulent recruitment racket and obtaining illegal gratification during his posting in Jammu and Kashmir in 2006.

Despite denial and subsequent reply, the appellant's services were terminated under Section 20(3) of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules.

The appellant approached the Armed Forces Tribunal challenging his dismissal, but his application was dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal of the appellant from service was justified.

Whether the punishment could be modified considering the appellant's long and unblemished service.

Held:

The dismissal of the appellant from service was within the powers of the authorities under Section 20(3) of the Army Act coupled with Rule 17 of the Army Rules.

However, considering the appellant's long and unblemished service of more than 17 years, the extreme punishment of dismissal could be modified.

The modification of the punishment from dismissal to discharge from service would allow the appellant to receive benefits such as gratuity and other attendant benefits for his service rendered, while not affecting his ability to seek employment outside the army.

Therefore, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal and directed the respondents to release benefits available to the appellant for his service in the army. No costs were ordered.

Facts:

Meera Santosh Pal, a 22-year-old appellant, approached the Court seeking permission to undergo medical termination of her pregnancy due to fetal anencephaly, a condition incompatible with extra-uterine life.

A Medical Board was constituted to evaluate the petitioner's medical condition.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner should be permitted to terminate her pregnancy due to the fetal condition and potential risks to her life.

Held:

The Court considered the petitioner's plea for medical termination of her pregnancy in light of the fetal condition and potential risks to her life. The Medical Board confirmed that continuation of the pregnancy posed grave risks to the physical and mental health of the petitioner. [Para 4]

Referring to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 and the Supreme Court's precedent in Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1, which recognizes a woman's right to make reproductive choices as part of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court emphasized the importance of a woman's consent in matters of termination of pregnancy. [Para 9]

The Court, therefore, deemed it appropriate to allow the petitioner to terminate her pregnancy. The Solicitor General did not oppose this decision. [Para 12]

The termination of pregnancy was to be conducted by the hospital's doctors under the supervision of the Medical Board, maintaining complete records of the procedure. [Para 13]

The writ petition was allowed, permitting the petitioner to undergo medical termination of her pregnancy. The petitioners did not press other prayers mentioned in the petition. [Para 14-16]