Facts:

Agreement to sell property entered into between P. Savitri (Respondent) and B. Vijaya Bharathi (Appellant).

Partial payment made, but respondent backed out of executing General Power of Attorney (GPA).

Property subsequently sold to other parties, leading to Defendant No. 3 acquiring it.

Appellant filed suit for specific performance after being unable to obtain the property.

Issues:

Whether the appellant demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform their part of the agreement.

Whether the subsequent sale deeds executed by the respondent needed to be canceled for specific performance.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss the suit for specific performance due to the appellant's failure to demonstrate readiness and willingness and the absence of steps to cancel subsequent sale deeds. The court held that:

The appellant's inaction for nearly two years after the respondent's repudiation of the agreement indicated a lack of readiness and willingness .

The appellant's failure to seek cancellation of subsequent sale deeds executed by the respondent was necessary for specific performance .

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

The original plaintiff initiated a suit alleging the nullity of various sale deeds pertaining to a property and sought a permanent injunction against the defendants.

Issues:

The determination of the applicable court fees in the suit.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that when the plaintiff, who is a party to the transaction, seeks to invalidate sale deeds, it effectively amounts to seeking cancellation of the deeds, regardless of how the relief is framed (Para 24).

Consequently, the proper court fee payable was under Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955, and not under Section 25(d) as held by the High Court (Para 24).

The orders of both the trial court and the High Court were set aside, and the trial court was directed to grant three months' time to the plaintiff to pay the requisite court fee (Para 28).

Facts:

The appellant received a show cause notice in August 2007 for non-payment of service tax on commission paid to overseas agents.

The Joint Commissioner confirmed the demand for service tax in August 2008.

The appellant did not challenge this decision promptly and filed a writ petition in the High Court in March 2012, four years later.

The appellant cited organizational changes and a belief that service tax was not applicable during the relevant period as reasons for the delay.

Issues:

Whether the delay in approaching the court was justified.

Applicability of the circular issued by the Ministry of Finance regarding service tax.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the appellant's delay in challenging the demand for service tax was not adequately justified. The court emphasized that delay and laches in seeking legal remedies can bar relief. The court clarified that the circular issued by the Ministry of Finance applied only to pending disputes and would not cover cases like the appellant's, where the demand had already been confirmed.

However, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the court decided to balance the equities by setting aside the demand for interest and penalty. While the appellant may not be entitled to a refund of the service tax already paid, they should not be required to pay interest and penalty on a tax that was not payable according to law.

Therefore, the court partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the demand for interest and penalty, and directed that no costs be imposed.

Facts:

The respondent, an airman in the Indian Air Force, was charged with overstaying his casual leave period without sufficient cause. He was found guilty and initially sentenced to four months' rigorous imprisonment, dismissal from service, and reduction in rank. The period of rigorous imprisonment was later reduced to three months. The respondent sought reinstatement, which was rejected, leading him to approach the Armed Forces Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was disproportionate.

Whether the Tribunal's decision to reinstate the respondent was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's decision to reinstate the respondent was unjustified. Despite being his first offence, the respondent's action of overstaying leave for nearly a year without informing superiors constituted serious misconduct, impacting discipline within the armed forces. The Court noted that the Tribunal had misapplied Regulation 754(C), which suggests lighter punishment for first offences, as the offence in question was not trivial. Therefore, the Court set aside the Tribunal's decision to reinstate the respondent.

However, considering the respondent had already undergone the sentence period and to provide some relief, the Court modified the order of dismissal to one of discharge from service simpliciter. This would allow the respondent to seek employment elsewhere without being disqualified.

The appeal partly succeeded, with the dismissal from service modified to discharge from service, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The deceased, Shri Ravi Shekhar Joshi, was employed as an engineer by Dynemech Systems Pvt. Ltd.

He and a co-worker were deputed to test a filter at Hero Honda Factory in Haryana.

While returning from the factory, they met with a road accident, resulting in the death of Shri Ravi Shekhar Joshi.

The appellant filed for compensation under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923, which was dismissed by the Commissioner and upheld by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the accident of the deceased occurred during the course of and out of employment?

Whether the deceased falls under the definition of workman under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923?

If so, whether the claimant is entitled to compensation as per the claim application?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the accident did arise out of and in the course of employment, emphasizing the need for a causal connection between the accident and the employment. The deceased was on the road as part of his duties as a sales engineer, which made it necessary for him to be there. The Court cited various judgments, both from English and Indian courts, to support its conclusion.

The Court disposed of the appeal, directing the matter back to the Commissioner to decide the remaining issues framed in the case. The Court clarified that the accident fell within the ambit of Section 3(1) of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923.

Facts:

The state acquired land, including the suit land (survey no. 50), and transferred it to the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA).

The landowners contested the acquisition through multiple legal proceedings, initially unsuccessful at the High Court level.

Subsequently, the landowners made a representation to the State Government, leading to the issuance of a notification dated April 12, 2001, withdrawing the suit land from acquisition.

However, this withdrawal notification was later revoked by another notification dated March 22, 2005.

Issues:

Whether the judgments of the High Court dismissing earlier writ petitions operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings?

Whether the Single Judge and Division Bench erred in their interpretation and application of the law regarding the withdrawal of land acquisition?

Held:

The Court held that the Single Judge erred in quashing the notification dated March 22, 2005, as it contradicted previous findings regarding possession and the finality of acquisition proceedings. The dismissal of earlier writ petitions, as found in the judgment dated March 16, 1998, operates as res judicata in subsequent proceedings. [Para 54-61]

The Court criticized the Single Judge for disregarding earlier findings that possession was taken in 1984 and that acquisition proceedings had become final. The validity of the judgment dated March 16, 1998, based on Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, was affirmed. [Para 57]

The Court emphasized that the withdrawal notification issued on April 12, 2001, came after 16 years of possession by the state, during which development activities had been carried out by the BDA. [Para 60]

The Court ruled that the landowners' actions in seeking withdrawal from acquisition after the dismissal of their previous writ petitions were unjustified and impermissible. The failure to disclose relevant facts to the State Government further undermined their case. [Para 62-70]

Decision: The Court ultimately ruled in favor of the Bangalore Development Authority, holding that the High Court's judgments were unsustainable due to errors in judgment and the principle of res judicata. The landowners' actions in seeking withdrawal from acquisition were deemed unjustified and impermissible given the prior rejections of similar petitions.

Facts:

The petitioner sought the transfer of two cases, one for dissolution of marriage and another for custody of a minor child, from the Family Court in Alappuzha, Kerala, to the Family Court in Chennai, Tamil Nadu. The respondent's counsel referred to a decision by a coordinate Bench of the Supreme Court in Krishna Veni Nagam vs. Harish Nagam, proposing the use of video conferencing instead of transferring the cases.

Issues:

The Court had to consider whether the directions issued in the Krishna Veni Nagam case, advocating the use of video conferencing in matrimonial and custody matters, adequately considered the mandatory procedures outlined in relevant statutes such as the Family Courts Act, 1984, and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

It also needed to address concerns regarding confidentiality and effectiveness of reconciliation efforts through video conferencing in family disputes.

Held:

The Court recognized the importance of reconciliation efforts in family matters and raised concerns about the adequacy of video conferencing in maintaining confidentiality and ensuring effective reconciliation. It emphasized the significance of physical presence in reconciliatory efforts and suggested that the issue of using video conferencing in matrimonial disputes required reconsideration.

Accordingly, the Court decided that the matter needed to be reviewed by a larger bench. It directed the Registry to place the case before the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate bench to reconsider the use of video conferencing in matrimonial disputes, taking into account the urgency of the matter.

Facts:

The appellant, Vasant Rao Guhe, was a Sub-Engineer in the Irrigation Department, accused of acquiring assets disproportionate to his known sources of income.

The prosecution alleged that between 1970 to 1992, the appellant acquired assets valued at Rs. 7,94,033/- which were disproportionate to his known sources of income.

The trial court convicted the appellant based on its own calculations of the appellant's income and expenditure, deviating from the figures presented by the prosecution.

Issues:

Whether the charge against the appellant underwent a metamorphosis during the trial, violating the appellant's right to prior notice of the accusations against him?

Whether the trial court's speculative calculations of the appellant's income and expenditure, without concrete evidence, violated the principles of criminal jurisprudence?

Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was in possession of disproportionate assets as per Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988?

Held:

The charge against the appellant underwent a metamorphosis during the trial, as the final conviction was based on different figures than those originally framed in the charge sheet. This violated the appellant's right to prior notice of the accusations against him (Para. 17).

The trial court's speculative calculations of the appellant's income and expenditure, without concrete evidence, violated the principles of criminal jurisprudence (Para. 18).

The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was in possession of disproportionate assets. As per Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the burden of proof lay with the prosecution, and the appellant was not required to offer an explanation in the absence of such proof (Para. 20).

Consequently, the appellant's conviction and sentence were set aside, granting him the benefit of doubt. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges (Para. 22).

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit for redemption of mortgage, which was initially decreed by two lower courts but reversed in second appeal by the High Court.

The main issue revolved around determining the nature of the deed dated 21.04.1953 (Exhibit 62) – whether it was a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale with an option to repurchase.

Issues:

Whether the deed in question constituted a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale with an option to repurchase.

Held:

The agreement, despite being styled as a sale deed, was deemed to be a mortgage by conditional sale due to the presence of a clause for reconveyance and other relevant factors.( Paragraph 15)

The High Court's finding that there was no debtor and creditor relationship between the parties and that the agreement was a sale deed with an option to repurchase was deemed unsustainable.( Paragraph 17)

The Supreme Court held that the agreement in question was a mortgage by conditional sale and set aside the High Court's decision. The appeals were allowed in favor of the appellant.( Paragraph 18)