Facts:

The case involves a custody dispute over a minor daughter. The mother filed an application seeking custody and the appointment of a guardian for the child. The Family Court dismissed the application, but the High Court granted it. The child expressed a desire to continue living with her father, who had been caring for her since she was 21 months old. However, the mother had nursed the child during her early years before being forcibly deprived of custody. The court considered the welfare of the child as paramount and weighed various factors before reaching a decision.

Issues:

Whether the principle of the welfare of the minor child, as provided under Section 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, should prevail in this custody dispute.

Whether the child's best interests are served by granting custody to the mother or the father.

Whether the child's preference to continue living with the father should be given primary consideration.

Held:

The principle of the welfare of the minor child, as enumerated in Section 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, aims to ensure the optimal growth and development of the child.

The welfare principle serves two objectives: ensuring the child's growth in the best environment and serving the public interest by fostering the child's development as a future asset of the nation.

While the child expressed a preference to continue living with the father, the court considered the mother's role during the child's early years and the potential negative impact of the father's feelings towards the mother on the child's psyche.

It is crucial for the child to have regular contact with both parents and to be shielded from parental hostility for her personality development.

The mother, being a teacher in a prestigious school, can provide the child with better care, protection, education, and guidance. Therefore, custody is granted to the mother for one year, with provisions for further review and variation if necessary.

The court directs the father to cooperate in the child's admission to the school where the mother teaches, and custody shall be handed over to the mother one week before the next academic session starts.

Facts:

The case involved two Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) arising from the ongoing elections to the Municipal Corporation of Pune. The petitioners challenged actions taken by the respondents, including the rejection of Reena Suresh Alhat's nomination and a dispute over the allotment of a symbol to another candidate.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court should entertain the petitions considering the importance of grassroots level elections in the civic administration of Pune.

Whether the High Court's decisions deprived the petitioners of their electoral rights and if the Supreme Court should examine the cases on merits.

Held:

The Supreme Court declined to entertain the petitions for several reasons:

The elections pertained to a local body under state law, with minimal impact beyond Pune City (Para 10, point i).

The High Court, being a constitutional court, was competent to adjudicate such matters, subject to appellate jurisdiction (Para 10, point ii).

The petitioners still had recourse to a forum for adjudication of their rights (Para 10, point iii).

The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 was discretionary (Para 10, point iv).

Considering the substantial number of pending cases and the relatively minor nature of the grievances compared to national issues, the Court deemed it inappropriate to entertain the applications (Para 10, point v).

The Court cited the cautionary words of Justice Frankfurter, emphasizing the importance of adhering to criteria for granting case reviews to avoid accumulation of arrears or hasty disposals of essential business (Para 11).

The Court expressed regret for its inability to examine the issues raised in the petitions and dismissed the Special Leave Petitions. (Para 12)

Facts:

The case involves allegations of manipulation and fraud in the entrance examination for admissions into medical colleges conducted by the Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board under the Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board Act, 2007.

The appellants were found to have obtained admission to the MBBS course through deceitful means, which included breaching the computer system, procuring assistance from others to answer exam questions, and manipulating seating arrangements and exam centers.

Issues:

The fraudulent practices employed by the appellants to secure admission to the MBBS course and the invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution to determine the appropriate course of action.

Held:

The court observed that the appellants' admission was based on a well-orchestrated plan of fraud and deception, commonly referred to as a scam. Despite the appellants' arguments that they were young and immature and should not be held accountable for their actions, the court rejected this defense, emphasizing that even juveniles face consequences for wrongdoing.

Furthermore, the court highlighted that the invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution must consider the larger interest of the administration of justice and prevent manifest injustice. In this case, the court found that upholding the cancellation of the appellants' admissions was not unjust, as their admissions were improper due to fraud.

The court emphasized that nothing obtained by fraud can be sustained, and it cannot allow fraudulent acts to prevail over the principles of fairness and legitimacy. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeals and upheld the cancellation of the appellants' admissions to the MBBS course, emphasizing the importance of truth, honesty, and fairness in the administration of justice.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, and the cancellation of the appellants' admissions to the MBBS course was upheld.

Facts:

The case involved an arbitration petition between MIS. Voestalpine Schienen GmbH and Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC) concerning the appointment of arbitrators.

The arbitration clause provided for the appointment of arbitrators from a panel prepared by DMRC.

The petitioner challenged this panel, alleging that it violated Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which was amended to ensure the neutrality, independence, and impartiality of arbitrators.

Issues:

Whether the panel of arbitrators prepared by DMRC complies with the requirements of Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Whether the appointment of arbitrators from the said panel would ensure impartiality and independence in the arbitration proceedings.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of the independence and impartiality of arbitrators in any arbitration proceeding, highlighting these as fundamental principles of natural justice.

Independence and impartiality are distinct concepts, with independence being an objective concept and impartiality being more subjective.

The amended provisions of Section 12 aim to identify circumstances that could raise doubts about the independence or impartiality of arbitrators, with the goal of preventing bias and ensuring fairness in arbitration proceedings.

The court noted that the individuals empaneled by DMRC were not covered by any of the disqualifying criteria listed in the Fifth and Seventh Schedules of the Act.

The court rejected the petitioner's argument that individuals retired from government or public sector undertakings would be ineligible to act as arbitrators solely based on their previous employment, as these individuals could possess relevant expertise and impartiality.

DMRC provided a wide choice of arbitrators to the petitioner, and the ultimate arbitrators would have to disclose any interests in accordance with the amended provisions of Section 12.

However, the court found fault with the limited choice given to the opposite party in selecting an arbitrator and directed that the panel of arbitrators should be broad-based to instill confidence in the arbitration process.

The court suggested that the panel should include individuals from various backgrounds, including engineers from the private sector, legal professionals, and experts in other fields relevant to potential disputes.

It emphasized the importance of creating a healthy arbitration environment and directed DMRC to prepare a broader panel within a stipulated period.

Decision: The arbitration petition was dismissed by the court.

Facts:

M/S Chakreshwari Construction Pvt. Ltd. (the appellant) filed an eviction petition against Manohar Lal (the respondent), alleging subletting of a shop owned by the appellant.

After the close of evidence, the appellant filed two applications:

One under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code seeking to amend their eviction petition.

Another under Order 7, Rule 14(3) of the Civil Procedure Code seeking permission to file additional documents in support of the proposed amendment.

The respondent opposed the applications on grounds of delay and irrelevance.

Issues:

Whether the applications for amendment and for filing additional documents should be allowed?

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the appellant and set aside the impugned orders. The Court held that:

The proposed amendment did not change the nature of the case or introduce a fresh cause of action.

The amendment was relevant for deciding the question of subletting and the availability of alternative accommodation.

The facts proposed in the amendment were obtained recently and were not in the appellant's personal knowledge.

Granting the applications would not cause prejudice to the respondent, as they would have an opportunity to make consequential amendments and file additional documents in rebuttal.

The Court directed the appellant to pay costs to the respondent and granted the respondent an opportunity to make consequential amendments in the written statement and to file additional documentary evidence.

The Tribunal was directed to conclude the proceedings within three months.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction, claiming ownership of a piece of land, which was contested by the defendant, a temple trust. The trial court dismissed the suit, stating that the plaintiff failed to prove ownership and possession and that the suit was not maintainable as it only sought declaratory relief without seeking recovery of possession. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision. However, the High Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff had established ownership and possession of the property.

Whether the suit was maintainable considering it only sought declaratory relief without seeking recovery of possession.

Whether the High Court's decree was legally sustainable.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in reversing the lower courts' judgments. It found that the plaintiff failed to prove ownership and possession of the property. Moreover, the suit was not maintainable as it only sought declaratory relief without seeking recovery of possession, which was a necessary relief given the plaintiff's lack of possession.

The High Court's decree was contradictory as it affirmed the temple trust's ownership of part of the property while ordering the correction of records in favor of the plaintiff. The High Court's reasoning was legally unsustainable, as it did not address the trial court's findings on the lack of plaintiff's ownership and possession or the issue of non-joinder of a necessary party.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the judgments of the trial court and the appellate court.

Facts:

The case involved the double murder of two individuals, one being a 12-year-old girl and the other a 50-year-old man, along with attempted murders of two other individuals. The accused was also charged with theft. The prosecution presented evidence including eyewitness testimonies, medical reports, and forensic evidence to establish the guilt of the accused.

Issues:

The correctness of the High Court's decision to acquit the accused despite evidence presented by the prosecution.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after careful examination of the evidence and reasoning provided by both the trial court and the High Court, held that the High Court's decision to acquit the accused was erroneous.

The Court identified various discrepancies and errors in the High Court's analysis, including its misinterpretation of medical evidence, disregard of crucial forensic evidence, and failure to consider dying declarations made by the injured parties.

Additionally, the High Court's reasoning was found to be internally inconsistent. Therefore, the Supreme Court declared the High Court's judgment as "perverse" and reinstated the conviction of the accused. The Court directed the concerned authorities to take the accused into custody to serve the remainder of the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Facts:

The case involves a delay of 28 years in filing a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the claim petition is reasonable.

Held:

The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, provided a six-month limitation period for raising a claim for compensation. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, initially maintained a similar limitation period under Section 166(3) but later introduced a bar on entertaining claim petitions after twelve months from the date of the accident. However, this limitation provision was completely removed from the Act on November 14, 1994.

Despite the absence of an explicit limitation period in the 1988 Act, claims must be raised within a reasonable time. The reasonableness of the time period depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this instance, a delay of 28 years was deemed unreasonable, rendering the claim stale and dead.

A claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is considered genuine only if it is a live and surviving claim. Approaching the tribunal after such a significant delay cannot be deemed as a live and surviving claim.

Decision: The appeal is allowed. The claim petition filed after a delay of 28 years is dismissed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the Karnataka Determination of Seniority Act, 2002, which provides for consequential seniority to government servants belonging to SC and ST categories promoted under reservation. The petitioners challenged the validity of this Act on the grounds that it violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Issues:

The case include the validity of the Karnataka Act of 2002, the necessity of determining factors such as 'backwardness,' 'inadequacy of representation,' and 'overall efficiency' before granting consequential seniority, and the interpretation of Article 16(4A) of the Constitution.

Held:

The court held that while enabling the State to do away with the 'catch up' rule was valid, the exercise of this power was subject to certain limitations, including the determination of factors such as 'backwardness,' 'inadequacy of representation,' and 'overall efficiency' (Para 15).

It was emphasized that the exercise of power under Article 16(4A) required the state to demonstrate the 'backwardness,' 'inadequacy of representation,' and 'overall efficiency' before granting consequential seniority (Para 20).

The court highlighted that the state must justify its decision with compelling reasons based on material, including studies ensuring that overall efficiency is not compromised. In the case at hand, the absence of such an exercise was noted (Para 26).

The provisions of the 2002 Act, which did away with the 'catch up' rule and provided for consequential seniority, were declared ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This decision would affect those who have already retired, while financial benefits already availed would not be affected. Consequential promotions granted based on seniority benefit were deemed ad hoc and liable to be reviewed, and seniority lists were to be revised accordingly (Para 27).