Facts:

The case involved the appeal of Bibi Parwana Khatoon and Md. Hasan against their conviction and sentence under Section 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The deceased, Tamkinat Ara @ Bulbul, was married to Md. Parwez Alam, and she died due to burn injuries. The prosecution alleged that she was killed by setting her on fire. The appellants, who are sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the deceased, were accused along with others.

Issues:

Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the present appellants in the commission of the crime.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the evidence presented by the defense, including testimonies and public documents, which indicated that the present appellants were residing in a different village at the time of the incident.

The Court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the present appellants had tortured the deceased for dowry or had any common intention with the husband of the deceased in the commission of the crime.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the present appellants, and acquitted them of the charge under Section 304B read with Section 34 IPC.

They were ordered to be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other crime. This decision was based on a careful consideration of the oral and documentary evidence presented, which created serious doubt in the prosecution's story regarding the involvement of the present appellants in the crime.

Additionally, the Court highlighted the failure of the trial court and the High Court to adequately address and consider the evidence presented by the defense, which further strengthened the case for acquittal.

Facts:

Dispute arose over ownership of a property, "Kauria Wali Masjid," registered as "Wakf" under the Wakf Act, 1995.

Respondent No. 6, Mutawali of the Masjid, filed a suit against respondents 1 to 5 and the appellant alleging the sold land adjacent to the Masjid was Wakf property and the sale was illegal.

The Tribunal decreed the suit in favor of respondent No. 6, but the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order, directing the matter to be handled by the civil court.

Issues:

Whether the Wakf Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the suit.

Whether the land in question was Wakf property.

Whether the sale of Wakf property without prior permission from the Wakf Board was void.

Whether matters concerning Sections 51 and 52 of the Wakf Act fall under the jurisdiction of the Wakf Tribunal.

Held:

The Court held that the Wakf Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the suit.

The main issue of whether the land is Wakf property falls under the purview of the Wakf Tribunal, not the civil court.

Any sale of Wakf property without prior permission from the Wakf Board is void under Section 51 of the Act.

Matters concerning Sections 51 and 52 of the Act are required to be decided by the Wakf Tribunal, and the jurisdiction of civil courts to decide such matters is barred.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case to the High Court for a fresh decision on the revision petition, focusing on the merits of the case.

Facts:

M/S Palam Gas Service, engaged in the purchase and sale of LPG cylinders, made payments to sub-contractors without deducting tax at source as required by Section 194C of the Act.

The Income Tax Department disallowed these payments as deductions under Section 40(a)(ia) since tax was not deducted at source.

The appellant challenged this disallowance, leading to a series of appeals before various authorities, including the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court.

Issues:

Whether Section 40(a)(ia) applies only when the amount is 'payable' or also when it has been 'paid'?

Interpretation of the term 'payable' in Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Section 40(a)(ia) applies to cases where the amount is both payable and paid. The court emphasized the mandatory nature of tax deduction at source provisions and the legislative intent to ensure tax compliance and revenue collection.

It rejected the argument that Section 40(a)(ia) only applies to assessees following the mercantile system of accounting, holding that it applies regardless of the accounting system followed.

The court referred to the Explanatory Note to Finance Bill-2004 to support its interpretation. The judgment upheld the view taken by the High Courts of Punjab & Haryana, Madras, and Calcutta, and overruled the judgment of the Allahabad High Court.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the disallowance of deductions under Section 40(a)(ia) for the payments made without deducting tax at source.

Facts:

The detenu had been charged with various offenses allegedly committed between 2002 and 2007.

Despite being granted bail in three out of four cases, the detenu was detained under the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986.

The detention order was based on incidents dating back nine to fourteen years, which were considered stale and irrelevant to the immediate need for detention without trial.

Issues:

Whether the detention order was justified based on stale incidents.

Whether the detention order violated the principles of preventive detention and the constitutional right to liberty.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the detention order, being founded on stale incidents, was tantamount to punishment without trial, violating the principles of preventive detention. The Court emphasized that preventive detention should only be exercised to prevent a person from engaging in activities prejudicial to public order and that incidents from such a distant past could not provide a reasonable basis for detention. Therefore, the Court set aside the detention order dated November 23, 2016, along with the judgment and order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition challenging the same.

This decision aligns with the principles established in previous cases such as G. Reddeiah v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and P.U. Iqbal v. Union of India, which emphasize the need for a reasonable prognosis of future behavior based on past conduct and the importance of judicial review to ensure that the exercise of discretionary powers is within the scope and purpose of the law.

Facts:

The review petition concerned the conviction and sentencing of the petitioners for the rape and murder of a minor girl aged four years.

Issues:

The consideration of mitigating factors in sentencing, the balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and procedural aspects concerning the sentencing process.

Held:

The Court upheld the death sentence imposed on the review petitioners, emphasizing the aggravating circumstances of the crime, including its brutality and the betrayal of trust. This decision was reached after considering the evidence and circumstances detailed in the judgment under review.

The plea regarding the consideration of mitigating factors, as per the Bachan Singh case, was addressed. The Court clarified that while the State has a burden to prove certain conditions regarding the accused's potential for rehabilitation, the failure to provide such evidence does not automatically favor the accused. Mitigating factors are weighed along with aggravating circumstances to determine the appropriate sentence.

Emphasizing the importance of balancing both aggravating and mitigating circumstances in sentencing, the Court weighed the evidence presented by the petitioner regarding potential rehabilitation against the extreme depravity of the crime and the vulnerability of the victim. The latter factors were deemed to outweigh the former.

The Court addressed a procedural issue raised by the petitioner regarding the sentencing process. It clarified that while there is an obligation to hear the accused on the question of sentence, the absence of a separate date for sentencing does not invalidate the process if relevant material is considered.

Decision: The Court found no grounds to alter the death sentence imposed on the review petitioners, considering the gravity of the crime and the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors. Review petitions is dismissed.

Facts:The respondent No.2, State Bank of India, obtained a money decree against respondent No.1 in O.S. No.192 of 1987. Subsequently, the property owned by respondent No.1 was brought to auction sale for the realization of the decretal dues. The appellant emerged as the highest bidder in the auction. The judgment debtor filed objections under Order 21 Rule 90 seeking to set aside the sale, alleging various irregularities in its conduct.

Issues:

Whether the objections raised by the judgment debtor justify setting aside the auction sale under Order 21 Rule 90 of the CPC?

Whether the executing Court and the High Court have correctly applied the law in determining the validity of the auction sale?

Held:

The Supreme Court, after a thorough examination of the objections raised and the procedures followed during the auction sale, concluded as follows:

Mere material irregularity or fraud is not sufficient to set aside an auction sale. The judgment debtor must demonstrate substantial injury resulting from such irregularity or fraud.

Specific particulars must be provided to sustain allegations of fraud or irregularity; bald allegations are insufficient.

The executing Court had properly conducted the sale in accordance with the relevant provisions of the CPC.

None of the objections raised by the judgment debtor constituted material irregularities warranting the setting aside of the sale.

The objections were devoid of merit, and the executing Court's order dismissing them was justified.

The judgment of the High Court, setting aside the sale, was not in conformity with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in previous cases.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the order of the executing Court was restored.

Facts:

Appellant, Essar Steel India Ltd., sought exemption from electricity duty under sections 3(2)(vii)(a) and 3(3) of the Bombay Electricity Duty Act, 1958.

The appellant company, holding 42% equity shares of another entity, claimed joint generation of energy with it.

A significant portion of the energy generated was allocated to the Gujarat Electricity Board.

The appellant also claimed exemption under a notification issued on 27.02.1992.

Issues:

Whether the appellant qualifies for exemption under section 3(2)(vii)(a) of the Bombay Electricity Duty Act, 1958.

Whether the appellant is entitled to exemption under the notification dated 27.02.1992.

Held:

The appellant claimed exemption under Section 3(2)(vii)(a) of the Bombay Electricity Duty Act, 1958, which provides exemptions from duty on units of energy consumed.

The court interpreted the statute's requirement of joint generation of energy with another industrial undertaking. The appellant, while holding shares in another company generating energy, was found not to be jointly generating energy with the Gujarat Electricity Board.

The court emphasized strict construction of taxing statutes and exemptions. As the conditions stipulated under Section 3(2)(vii)(a) were not fulfilled, the appellant's claim for exemption under this section was rejected.

Regarding the claim under the notification dated 27.02.1992, the court found that the conditions specified in the notification were not met. The generating sets were commissioned after the specified period, and no application was made within the prescribed time frame.

The court upheld the High Court's decision to reject the appellant's claim under both Section 3(2)(vii)(a) and the notification dated 27.02.1992.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision that the appellant was not entitled to exemption under either Section 3(2)(vii)(a) or the notification dated 27.02.1992.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against the acquittal of the accused-respondent who was initially convicted by the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Issues:

Applicability of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India regarding self-incrimination.

Evaluation of circumstantial evidence and its sufficiency for conviction.

Failure of the prosecution to establish a connection between the accused and the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court held that compelling an accused to provide fingerprints or footprints does not violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution. However, non-compliance with such directions may lead to adverse inference but cannot be the sole basis for conviction.

In cases based on circumstantial evidence, conviction can only be sustained if the chain of circumstances is complete beyond all reasonable doubt.

Upon reviewing the evidence, the Court found that the prosecution had failed to establish a connection between the accused and the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it upheld the High Court's decision to acquit the accused-respondent.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh and the complainant, thereby affirming the acquittal of the accused-respondent by the High Court.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal filed by Arun Kumar, the son of the deceased, against the acquittal of several accused persons.

The incident occurred on 24th July 1991, where the accused allegedly attacked the informant and his family members, resulting in the death of Sheo Kumar Pati Tiwari.

The High Court, in its impugned order, dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant against the acquittal of the accused.

Issues:

Whether the High Court properly exercised its appellate powers in hearing the appeal against acquittal.

Whether the principles laid down by the Supreme Court regarding appellate review of evidence in cases of acquittal were adhered to.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's dismissal of the appeal was cursory and cryptic, failing to appreciate the evidence properly. The Court emphasized the extensive powers of the appellate court in reviewing evidence in appeals against acquittals, as established in previous judgments. As a result, the Court allowed the appeal in part and remanded the case to the High Court for a fresh hearing on merits.

The High Court was instructed to decide the appeal strictly in accordance with the law and without being influenced by the Supreme Court's observations. It was clarified that no findings on the merits were recorded, and the case was restored to its original file for expeditious reconsideration by the High Court.