Facts:

Mohit Chaudhary, an Advocate-on-Record since 2009, made mentioning before the Court in an aggressive manner, alleging collusion between the Supreme Court Registry and the opposite litigant to hastily list the matter with the aim of "Bench hunting."

Issues:

Whether his allegations were true,

Whether his behavior amounted to contempt of court.

Held:

The Court found that Chaudhary, being an experienced Advocate-on-Record, should have been aware that benches are constituted by the Chief Justice, not the Registry. Thus, his allegations indirectly impugned the Chief Justice himself, though masked as an attack on the Registry.

The allegations made by Chaudhary were found to be false. The matter had been listed based on judicial direction, not determined by the Registry. This led to a prima facie satisfaction of contempt in the face of the Court.

Chaudhary's conduct was considered unbecoming of an advocate, especially one practicing in the Supreme Court. He was accused of assisting the petitioner in scandalizing the Court and the Registry under the pretext of representing the petitioner's interests.

Despite the responsibilities of advocating for a client, Chaudhary's actions were deemed an abuse of the privilege of being an Advocate-on-Record. His behavior was calculated and aimed at bench shifting, which failed. Consequently, he was barred from practicing as an Advocate-on-Record for one month.

Facts:

The appellant, a mentally retarded destitute woman suffering from HIV, alleged rape and sought termination of her 18-week-old pregnancy. Hospital authorities initially denied the termination, prompting the appellant to file a writ petition seeking direction for termination of pregnancy.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, being a rape victim suffering from mild mental retardation, was competent to consent to termination under the law?

Whether there was negligence on the part of the hospital authorities in denying the termination?

What relief is the appellant entitled to under the law?

Held:

The Court held that the appellant, despite suffering from mild mental retardation, was competent to consent to termination under the law.

The medical board's report did not establish that termination was risky to the appellant's life, and there was negligence on the part of the authorities.

Consequently, the Court ordered compensation for the appellant and directed the State to ensure proper treatment and nutrition for the child to be born.

The Court emphasized the need for sensitivity in handling matters of termination of pregnancy, respecting women's rights, bodily integrity, and personal autonomy.

The Court highlighted India's international obligations under conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

The Court underscored the importance of timely decisions in pregnancy-related cases and criticized the delay caused by the hospital authorities.

The Court rejected the State's argument invoking the principle of "actus curiae neminem gravabit," stating that compensation was warranted due to hospital negligence.

Facts:

Various electric supply and generation companies in Telangana issued advertisements inviting applications for the posts of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) and Assistant Engineer (Civil).

The selection process was based solely on a written examination, and candidates who performed well found themselves in the select list of more than one corporation.

The government issued a clarification allowing the corporations to fill up the leftover vacancies by operating the merit list downwards for each category.

Issues:

Interpretation of G.O.Ms. No. 81 dated 22.02.1997, which prohibited waiting lists for vacancies.

Validity of the government's clarification allowing the corporations to fill up leftover vacancies by operating the merit list downwards.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the purpose of G.O.Ms. No. 81 was to ensure that vacancies arising from selected candidates not joining would be filled through subsequent selection processes, not through waiting lists.

The Court interpreted the G.O.Ms. to apply only after the issuance of appointment letters. The Court acknowledged the government's decision as justified in the larger public interest, considering the large number of vacancies that would remain unfilled otherwise.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the Division Bench and learned Single Judge of the High Court, and dismissed the writ petitions. It directed the corporations to fill up the posts as per the government's clarification and the interpretation of G.O.Ms. No. 81 provided by the Court.

Facts:

Smt. Bharati Reddy was elected as a member of Zilla Panchayat, Bellary, from a constituency reserved for General (Women) category.

The State Government subsequently reserved the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Bellary, for Backward Class-B (Woman).

The election of Smt. Bharati Reddy as Adhyaksha was challenged by respondents alleging her caste and use of a false caste certificate.

The writ petition challenging her election was initially dismissed by a learned Single Judge on grounds of maintainability due to a constitutional bar.

Issues:

Whether the writ petition filed by the respondents challenging the election was maintainable under Article 226/227 of the Constitution despite the bar under Article 243-O.

Whether voters, even if not members of the Zilla Panchayat, have the right to challenge the election through judicial review.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while the Constitution provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of election petitions, the power of judicial review under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution cannot be excluded.

The Court emphasized that the power of judicial review is an integral part of the Constitution's basic structure and cannot be eroded.

Therefore, the writ petition filed by the respondents challenging the election was deemed maintainable under Articles 226/227.

The Court directed the learned Single Judge to expedite the disposal of the writ petition and allowed the appellant to continue functioning as Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Bellary, pending the outcome of the writ petition.

Facts:

The dispute concerns the ownership of land in Survey No. 129/45/D in Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. The appellant claims ownership based on a compromise decree and subsequent sale deed. The respondent, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, contests this claim.

Issues:

The rightful ownership of the land in Survey No. 129/45/D and clarifying any association between the appellant and a separate land dispute in Survey No. 403.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after careful examination of the arguments presented by both parties and the relevant legal provisions, concludes that the appellant's title to Survey No. 129/45/D is valid.

The Court finds no connection between the disputed land in Survey No. 129/45/D and the land dispute in Survey No. 403. Consequently, the Court sets aside the Division Bench's order and reinstates the directions given by the single Judge in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

The case involves a civil appeal against a judgment related to the execution of a decree concerning agricultural land.

The decree was based on a judgment and decree passed in 1965 in favor of the respondents.

The appellants raised objections to the execution of the decree, including issues related to time bar, subsequent events, lack of notice, and failure to deposit money as per the decree.

During the appeal, the appellants primarily raised a legal point regarding the effect of a 1973 amendment to the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920, on the validity of the decree.

Issues:

Whether the 1973 amendment rendered the decree null and void.

Whether the objection regarding the amendment was raised in a timely manner.

Whether the decree remained valid despite subsequent changes in law.

Held:

The objection regarding the 1973 amendment was raised for the first time during the appeal and had not been raised at any previous stage of the proceedings.

The suit and appeal had been decided before the 1973 amendment came into force, and therefore, the amendment did not affect the validity of the decree.

The retroactive nature of the amendment applied only to pending proceedings or cases initiated after the amendment came into force.

Since the suit and appeal had been finalized before the amendment, it did not affect their outcome.

Additionally, the 1973 amendment applied only to the State of Punjab, whereas the case arose from the State of Haryana, and there was no evidence to suggest that the amendment had been extended to Haryana.

Therefore, the submission questioning the decree as being nullity was devoid of merit and was rejected.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, emphasizing that executing courts cannot go behind a decree and that factual objections should have been raised during the trial rather than in execution proceedings.

The appeal, which fails and is hereby dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Misra and Co., filed an appeal against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, which dismissed their application under Article 227 challenging the order and judgment of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Durgapur, dated 06.07.2015.

Issues:

The execution of a decree awarded to the appellant and whether the execution application was barred by limitation.

Held:

The court held that despite the delay caused by objections raised by the respondent, the execution application filed on 30.06.2006 was beyond the twelve-year limitation period.

The court expressed concern over the respondent's prolonged litigation tactics, emphasizing the need for conciliatory approaches to resolve disputes. The respondent was called upon to propose a conciliatory solution to compensate the appellant. The case was adjourned for six weeks to allow the respondent to file an affidavit addressing the court's observations.

REFERENCED CASES:

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Rasal Singh, (1976) 2 SCC 179

West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation Vs. Swadesh Agro Farming and Storage Pvt. Ltd., (1999) 8 SCC 315

Facts:

The petitioners, Om Sai Punya Educational and Social Welfare Society, sought a writ of mandamus directing the respondent, All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), to issue a Letter of Approval for their college, Anant Institute of Business Studies (AIBS), for the academic year 2017-2018. However, their application was rejected by AICTE.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners were entitled to approval for the academic year 2017-18 and if AICTE was at fault for any delay.

Held:

The Court held that AICTE's adherence to statutory timelines and regulations was mandatory, and it could not grant approval beyond the specified deadline. The academic year had already commenced, and any indulgence to the petitioners would affect larger public interests.( Para 5)

The Court rejected the argument that deficiencies noted in the inspection reports contradicted earlier findings, stating that the later report, based on site inspection, was final. The petitioners' conduct, including obstruction during previous inspections, was considered.( Para 8)

The Court clarified that the Supreme Court's direction did not mandate AICTE to grant approval for the academic year 2017-18. Approval for AIBS for the academic year 2018-19 was appropriate, given the removal of deficiencies after the deadline.( Para 9)

The Court emphasized that the petitioners' awareness of shared facilities and land, coupled with their delayed withdrawal of the AIM proposal, contributed to the situation. The Court concluded that no relief could be granted to the petitioners, considering their conduct and the statutory timelines.( Para 11)

Accordingly, this petition being devoid of merits is dismissed.( Para 12)

Facts:

The appellant, a constable in the Maharashtra Police Department, was detained under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons Engaged in Black Marketing of Essential Commodities Act, 1981 by an order dated 10.10.2016 passed by the Commissioner of Police.

The detention order did not specify the period of detention.

The appellant challenged the detention order before the High Court of Bombay, bench at Aurangabad, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 132 of 2017, which was dismissed.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the detention order was flawed because it did not specify the period of detention, citing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary.

The respondent-State's counsel supported the High Court's reasoning.

Issues:

Whether the detention order, which did not specify the period of detention, is valid under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981.

Interpretation of the prescribed procedure for detention orders under the Act.

Comparison with the judgment in Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary regarding detention orders.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the detention order without specifying the period of detention was unsustainable and violated the prescribed procedure under the Act.

Referring to the Cherukuri Mani case, the Court emphasized the need for strict interpretation and compliance with the prescribed procedure.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the detention order dated 10.10.2016, and ordered the detenu to be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in any other case.

Decided on : 17-07-2017

Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 - Section 3(1)

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Devadatt Kamat, Rajesh Inamdar, Javedur Rahman, Mehtaab Singh Sandhu, Ms. Devina Sharma, Gautam Talukdar, Advocates, for the Appellant; Mahaling Pandarge, Nishant Katneshwarkar, Advocates, for the Respondents