Facts:

The appellants, who were the legal heirs of the deceased, filed a claim for compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) following the death of the deceased in a road accident allegedly caused by the negligent driving of a goods carriage vehicle. However, MACT dismissed the claim citing lack of territorial jurisdiction. Subsequently, the appellants' review petition against this order was also dismissed. They then filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution in the High Court of Calcutta, which was dismissed on grounds of delay.

Issues:

The delay in filing the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain the compensation claim.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while there's no prescribed limitation for filing an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, the petition should be filed without unreasonable delay, and any delay should be satisfactorily explained. The High Court's approach of applying the limitation period prescribed for applications under Sections 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was deemed incorrect. The Court emphasized that if a petition under Article 227 is filed with some delay but with a satisfactory explanation, it should be entertained on merits.

The Court further held that the High Court should have considered the petition on its merits, especially considering the circumstances of the appellants as the widow and minor daughter of the deceased, who was the sole earning member. Therefore, the High Court's order dismissing the petition on the ground of delay was set aside.

In determining the compensation, the Court considered the deceased's income, age, and loss of consortium to the appellants. A compensation of Rs. 8 lakhs was awarded along with interest and costs.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The landlord sought eviction of the tenant for alleged sub-letting without obtaining written consent.

A partnership deed was executed between the tenant and his son-in-law for business purposes.

Dispute arose whether the son-in-law was a genuine partner or a sub-tenant.

The tenant did not obtain written consent from the landlord before allowing the son-in-law to occupy the premises.

Issues:

Whether the arrangement between the tenant and his son-in-law constituted sub-letting under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958?

Whether the absence of written consent from the landlord invalidates the partnership agreement?

Held:

The Court held that the absence of written consent from the landlord invalidated the partnership agreement and constituted sub-letting.

The son-in-law's exclusive occupation of the shop premises, lack of proper accounts, and control over the business supported the finding of sub-letting.

The Court emphasized the requirement of obtaining written consent from the landlord before allowing any person to occupy the premises, as mandated by Section 14(1)(b) read with Section 14(4) of the Act.

The eviction of the respondents was ordered, granting them time till 31st October, 2017, to vacate the premises and directing them to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month to the appellant.

The decision was based on the interpretation of relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Facts:

On 24-03-1998, an incident occurred near the house of the Appellant involving the Appellant and the Respondents.

Accused Nos. 1 to 14 were convicted by the Trial Court for various offences including Section 302 read with Sections 149/34 IPC.

The High Court acquitted some of the Accused under Section 302 read with 149 IPC, partially allowing their appeal.

The Appeal was filed by the Complainant against the High Court's judgment.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's acquittal of the accused under Section 302 read with 149 IPC was justified?

Whether the judgment of the High Court suffered from miscarriage of justice due to failure in reappreciation of evidence?

Held and Decision:The court concluded: "The background in which the attack was made by the Accused does not show that there was a common object of a murder amongst the accused. Common object to commit a murder cannot be inferred only on the basis that the weapons carried by the accused were dangerous.

The above facts would indicate that no knowledge about the likelihood of an offence of murder being committed can be attributed to the members of the unlawful assembly, barring Lakshmanbhai Bhikabhai Vagh (A-10) who has been convicted under Section 302 IPC."

The Appeal was partly allowed and the Accused were convicted under Section 326 read with 149 IPC and sentenced to the period undergone.

Facts:

Bhulabhai Bhikhabhai, owner of landed property, died intestate in 1947, leaving behind his widow Harkhiben, two sons, Narsinbhai and Balubhai, and two daughters, Gangaben and Maliben.

Balubhai filed a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, claiming ownership of the land.

Competent Authority declared a portion of the land as surplus, which was accepted by Balubhai.

After the deaths of Balubhai and his siblings, Maliben and the children of Gangaben filed a suit for partition of the property and challenged the legality of the proceedings related to the surplus land.

The plaintiffs filed an appeal before the Urban Land Tribunal eight years after the original decision, which was entertained and allowed.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a share in the property of Bhulabhai Bhikhabhai under Hindu Law.

Whether the plaintiffs could maintain an appeal before the Tribunal after a lapse of about eight years.

Whether the plaintiffs, by not filing a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act, could claim any right in the property.

Held:

The Court held that Neither Harkhiben nor her daughters had any claim in the property under Hindu Law.

The Tribunal erred in entertaining the appeal after the original order had merged with the Tribunal's decision, which attained finality.

The plaintiffs could not claim any right in the property by not filing a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court.

Facts:

The case involves allegations of dowry harassment leading to the death of Bandhavi @ Bani Ghoshal. Asim Kumar Chatarjee, the brother of the deceased, filed a complaint stating that his sister was tortured for dowry by her husband and in-laws, resulting in her death under suspicious circumstances. The trial court convicted the accused based on evidence presented during the trial.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's judgment and directing a retrial based on alleged lapses in investigation and trial proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in directing a retrial without adequately demonstrating how the alleged lapses resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The court emphasized that a retrial should only be ordered in exceptional cases where there is a serious illegality, irregularity, or miscarriage of justice. It clarified that the power to order a retrial should be exercised sparingly, considering the demands of justice.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the matter back to the High Court for reconsideration. It directed the High Court to afford sufficient opportunity to all parties involved and proceed with the matter afresh in accordance with the law. The court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.

Facts:

The landlords filed a suit seeking recovery of possession of their property from the tenants on various grounds, including bona fide requirement. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the landlords, which was upheld by the appellate court. However, the High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction, set aside the lower courts' judgments.

Issues:

The validity of the High Court's interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, and whether the landlords' claim for recovery of possession was bona fide.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interference was unjustified and beyond its jurisdiction. It emphasized that the High Court's revisional jurisdiction is limited to cases of illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction by subordinate courts. Since the lower courts had passed reasoned orders within their jurisdiction, the High Court had no grounds to overturn their decisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the landlords' appeal.

However, considering the tenants' long occupation of the premises, the Supreme Court granted them six months to vacate the premises.

Facts:

The Central Bank of India appealed against a judgment by the High Court directing them to release deposits made by Respondents 1 to 4.

The CBI had previously requested the bank not to release the deposits until they received any reference from the CBI or the Special Court, Akola.

Respondents 1 to 4 challenged this request in a Criminal Writ Petition No. 496 of 2006, which was allowed by the High Court in a judgment dated 23.07.2010, directing the bank to release the amounts.

During the appeal, the CBI informed the court that they have withdrawn their request to the bank, and they have no objection to the release of the amounts.

Issues:

Whether the Central Bank of India should release the deposits made by Respondents 1 to 4, as directed by the High Court, despite the earlier request by the CBI not to release them.

Whether any other reasons exist to withhold the release of the deposits.

Held:

The Court held that since the CBI has withdrawn its request, there is no need to address the various contentions raised by the appellant's senior counsel. Therefore, all questions of law are left open.

The main objection to the release of the deposits was the request made by the CBI. Since the CBI has withdrawn its objection, the appeal is disposed of with a direction to the appellant-bank to release the deposits made by Respondents 1 to 4, provided there are no other reasons to withhold them. This release should be done within a week from the date of receipt of the judgment. No costs were awarded in this matter.

Facts:

Jagdamba Devi, the appellant, sought dependent family pension under the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980, on behalf of her deceased husband, Late Hari Kant Jha, who was involved in the freedom struggle. However, the Central Government rejected her claim, citing non-compliance with the eligibility criteria of serving a minimum of six months in detention.

Issues:

Whether Jagdamba Devi's claim for dependent family pension meets the eligibility criteria under the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980.

Whether the authorities should adopt a lenient approach considering the sacrifices made by freedom fighters and their families.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Central Government was justified in rejecting Jagdamba Devi's claim for dependent family pension under the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980.

The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the eligibility criteria outlined in the scheme. The appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that Hari Kant Jha remained underground for more than six months, as required by the scheme. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

FACTS:

Mrs. Ivy C. D. Conceicao, the appellant, was a Grade-I teacher at Rosary Higher Secondary School in Goa, run by the Diocesan Society, respondent No.3. She had been teaching for 21 years and was eligible for the position of principal. However, despite her qualifications and seniority, she was passed over for promotion to the position of principal, which was filled by promoting other junior candidates in violation of certain rules.

ISSUES:

Whether the process of appointment of a principal in a minority institution is subject to judicial review?

If subject to review, on what grounds can such review be conducted?

HELD:

The Court held that while a minority institution has the autonomy to select a principal, it must do so fairly and reasonably, and its actions are subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The autonomy of minority institutions does not exempt them from the requirement to act fairly and transparently.

The Court emphasized that the right to administer does not include the right to maladminister, and decisions of the management of such institutions must be tested on the grounds of breach of principles of natural justice and fair play.

The Court referred to the decisions in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 and M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212, which reaffirmed the principle that the autonomy of minority institutions is not absolute and must be exercised within the framework of constitutional principles, including equality and fairness.

Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

REFERED CASES:

Belsi M. Vs. Corporate Management of Latin Catholic Schools, Diocese of Neyyattinkara, (2010) 2 KHC 220

Delhi Science Forum Vs. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 405

M. Nagaraj Vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212

Roberts Vs. Hopwood, (1925) AC 578

Secy. Malankara Syrian Catholic College Vs. T. Jose, (2007) 1 SCC 386

T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481