Facts:

Uniworth Apparel Limited defaulted on its dues to ICICI Bank, which were later assigned to Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited (ARCIL).

ARCIL took possession of Uniworth's assets under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act).

ARCIL allegedly entered into an agreement with Excel Dealcomm Pvt. Ltd. for the sale of the assets, subject to approval by ARCIL's Board of Directors. However, the approval was not obtained.

Excel filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement in the Calcutta High Court.

Issues:

Whether the suit filed by Excel qualifies as a "suit for land" under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Calcutta.

Whether the agreement between Excel and ARCIL confers exclusive jurisdiction on Mumbai courts.

Whether the jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal is applicable in this case under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

Held:

The Court held that the suit filed by Excel qualifies as a "suit for land" as it seeks specific performance of an agreement implicitly requiring the delivery of possession of immovable property.

The agreement between Excel and ARCIL grants exclusive jurisdiction to Mumbai courts, as per the clauses in the agreement.

Given the above findings, the Calcutta High Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. The appeal is dismissed, and the parties are directed to pursue their claims in the appropriate forum, as per the agreement.

Facts:

The appellant, Jeyar Consultant & Investment Pvt. Ltd., appealed against the denial of deduction by the Revenue and lower courts, arguing that despite losses in export business, they should be eligible for deduction under Section 80HHC.

Issues:

Whether the appellant could claim deduction under Section 80HHC despite incurring losses in export business.

Held:

The court emphasized that the pre-requisite for deduction under Section 80HHC is the existence of profits from export business. This condition must be satisfied before considering the computation of deduction under subsection (3).

Even if profits from domestic business exceed export losses, the benefit under Section 80HHC won't apply if there are losses in export business. Thus, the deduction cannot be claimed in such a scenario.

The domestic income sought for deduction, such as dividend income, interest income, profit or sale of shares, and fees received from arranging finance, does not fall under the purview of "total turnover" for computation purposes.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that since there were losses in the export business, deduction under Section 80HHC was not applicable. Additionally, the nature of domestic income sought for deduction did not align with the criteria specified in the law.

Facts:

The appellants, residents in a slum on private plots owned by a developer/landowner, contested the treatment of consent for redevelopment and the declaration of a common slum area over different kinds of lands. They asserted that they should be permitted to carry out redevelopment exclusively through a cooperative of occupants of private plots.

Issues:

Whether there was an illegality in clubbing private land and municipal corporation land for declaring a contiguous area as a slum area for approving a slum rehabilitation scheme.

Whether the verification and approval process of slum rehabilitation schemes adhered to statutory provisions and guidelines.

Whether the alleged procedural shortcomings caused legal injury to the appellants.

Held:

The court found no illegality in clubbing private land and municipal corporation land for declaring a contiguous area as a slum area for approving a slum rehabilitation scheme. The authorities were entitled to treat the entire slum area as one, given that consent of 70% or more of the slum dwellers was available.

The procedure for submission, processing, and approval of slum rehabilitation schemes was outlined, emphasizing adherence to guidelines and circulars issued by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA). The court noted that the appellants failed to provide material showing non-submission of Annexure II or verification by the competent authority. The purpose of the verification process is to identify genuine slum dwellers eligible for benefits under the rehabilitation scheme.

Non-statutory provisions, such as guidelines and circulars, were considered discretionary unless their non-observance caused legal injury. The court found no legal injury to the appellants due to alleged procedural shortcomings.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed. The High Court judgment, which recorded that a majority of slum dwellers had consented to redevelopment and that redevelopment activities were ongoing, was upheld.

Facts:

Chellammal borrowed a sum of Rs. 2,20,000 from S. Krishnamoorthy and issued a post-dated cheque for repayment. However, when the cheque was presented, it bounced due to insufficient funds. Krishnamoorthy sent a notice demanding payment, but Chellammal responded by falsely alleging that her father and son-in-law were the borrowers. Krishnamoorthy filed a criminal complaint against Chellammal. Chellammal challenged these proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to quash the criminal proceedings against Chellammal was justified under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held:

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for delving into disputed factual matters that should have been addressed at the trial stage. It emphasized that Section 482 should only be invoked if the complaint is frivolous or does not disclose any offense, which was not the case here.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, revoked the quashing of criminal proceedings against Chellammal, and directed the trial court to proceed with the criminal complaint. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal regarding the quashing of criminal proceedings initiated by a Judicial Magistrate First Class, Srinagar, against the appellants based on a complaint filed by the first respondent under Section 500 of the Ranbir Penal Code, 1932. The appellants contended that the complaint did not constitute an offence, and therefore, they should not be called to defend the criminal proceedings.

Issues:

The court was to determine the scope of the Magistrate's opinion on sufficient grounds for proceeding to issue process to the accused based on a complaint.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering various precedents and legal principles, held that while no formal or speaking orders are required at the stage of taking cognizance, there must be sufficient indication of the Magistrate's application of mind to the facts constituting the offence and the statements recorded under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The court emphasized that the Magistrate must apply their mind to the allegations on commission of the offence and ensure that there is prima facie evidence to proceed against the accused. In this case, the court found that there was no indication of the Magistrate's application of mind in taking cognizance and issuing process to the appellants. Therefore, the orders of the Magistrate and the High Court were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrate for fresh consideration and further action if required.

Facts:

The respondent, Saurabh Bakshi, was convicted for causing the death of two individuals due to his rash and negligent driving. The trial court sentenced him to undergo one year of rigorous imprisonment. Upon appeal, the High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to the period already served, considering compensation awarded to the legal representatives (LRs) of the deceased.

Issues:

Whether the reduction of sentence by the High Court was appropriate, given the circumstances of the case.

The necessity for reevaluation of sentencing policies in Section 304A of the IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's decision appeared to be influenced by misplaced sympathy and a misapplication of the principle that compensation payment should lead to a reduction in sentence.

Emphasizing the seriousness of road accidents and the need for deterrence, the Court reduced the sentence from one year to six months, calling for a reevaluation of sentencing policies in Section 304A of the IPC to address the rising number of road accidents and the nonchalant attitude of drivers.

Facts:

Oswal Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. (Appellant) sought refund of duty paid to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) for the purchase of Naphtha for a specific period.

Refund application was rejected by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise on grounds of locus standi and time limitation.

Appeals were made to higher authorities including Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) and Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), all of which were dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the Appellant had locus standi to claim the refund.

Whether the refund application was filed within the prescribed time limit.

Whether the jurisdiction of Central Excise authorities was valid for the refund claim.

Held:

The Court held that the Appellant, as the purchaser bearing the burden of excise duty, had the right to claim the refund under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

The Court clarified that the jurisdiction of the Central Excise authorities at Durgapur was valid for the Appellant's refund claim.

However, the Court found the refund application to be time-barred, as it was filed beyond the six-month period from the date of purchase. The Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds of time limitation.

Facts:

Holostick India Ltd. manufactures security holograms using coated metallised film, embossing, adhesive coating, and release coating processes. The Department classified the holograms under Tariff entry 39.19, while the appellant argued for classification under Tariff entry 49.01.

Issues:

The proper classification of security holograms under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. Specifically,

Whether they should be classified under Tariff entry 39.19 (self-adhesive plastic products) or Tariff entry 49.01 (printed products of the printing industry).

Held:

The court ruled in favor of the appellant, holding that security holograms should be classified under Tariff entry 49.01. The primary use of the holograms was for security purposes, with printing being incidental. This interpretation was supported by the HSN Explanatory Notes. The court set aside the decision of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal and allowed the appeals. The appellant was entitled to a refund of the excise duty paid during the appeal process.

Facts:

Vir Rubber Products P. Ltd. (the appellant) manufactures goods under its own brand name "VIR" and also undertakes job orders from automobile companies like Hindustan Motors, Kinetic Honda, etc.

Goods supplied to automobile companies bear their respective brand names, while the appellant claims exemption under Notification No. 1/93 for its own branded goods.

The Department includes the value of goods supplied to automobile companies under their brand names in calculating the total turnover, exceeding the threshold for availing the exemption.

The appellant contends that only goods manufactured under its own brand name "VIR" should be considered for turnover calculation for exemption purposes.

Issues:

Whether goods supplied to automobile companies under their brand names should be included in calculating the turnover for availing exemption under Notification No. 1/93.

Interpretation of the term "brand name" or "trade name" as mentioned in the notification.

Held:

The court examines the definition of "brand name" or "trade name" as provided in the notification and concludes that goods bearing another person's brand name are not eligible for exemption, regardless of whether the brand owner is also an SSI unit.

The court overturns the decision of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) and other authorities, ruling in favor of the appellant.

The court directs that only goods manufactured under the appellant's own brand name "VIR" should be considered for turnover calculation, entitling the appellant to the exemption under Notification No. 1/93 for the relevant year.