Facts:

Consignments were shipped to Bombay Port on a cash-against-documents basis. The consignees failed to lift the consignments, resulting in storage at the Port. The exporter sold the goods to the petitioner. The petitioner applied to Customs Authorities to file bills of entry and substitute bills of entry for the consignments. The Customs authority issued a detention certificate, mentioning detention for "bonafide operation of ITC formalities". The Port Trust issued demurrage charges for the storage of the goods.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was liable to pay demurrage charges for the period before acquiring title to the goods.

Whether the appellant was entitled to complete remission of demurrage charges due to delayed clearance by the Customs Department.

Held:

The Court held that the Port Trust's authority to recover dues was derived from various legal provisions, including the Contract Act, Bills of Lading Act, and Major Port Trusts Act.

The Court clarified that possession, not title, is crucial in bailment, and bailment can exist without a contractual relationship.

The petitioner, claiming through the consignor, was held liable for demurrage charges, as the Port Trust incurred expenses in connection with the bailment.

The Port Trust's decision to decline total remission of demurrage charges lacked rational consideration and sound policy. The Court set aside the decision and allowed the Port Trust to reconsider, ensuring proper reasons are recorded.

Decision: Partly allowing the appeal, the Court affirmed the Port Trust's authority to recover dues, clarified liability for demurrage charges, and emphasized the need for rational decision-making regarding remission.

Facts:

The appellant-accused was convicted of murdering his daughter allegedly due to her marriage to a person of a lower caste. The trial court acquitted him, but the High Court convicted him under Section 304 Part I IPC, sentencing him to 10 years of imprisonment. The Supreme Court issued a show cause notice for enhancement of sentence, despite the accused's request to withdraw the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented, especially that of PW18, was reliable enough to convict the accused of murder under Section 302 IPC, and whether the appellant could withdraw his appeal.

Held:

The Supreme Court decided against permitting the accused to withdraw the appeal, given the issuance of a show cause notice for enhancement of sentence. The Court must proceed with the substantive proceedings under the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code and its plenary jurisdiction.

The evidence of PW18 was found to be reliable and truthful, corroborated by other circumstances and evidence. This included the recovery of a blood-stained sickle matching the blood group on the deceased's clothes, indicating the accused's responsibility for the murder.

None of the exceptions in Section 300 IPC were found to apply to the case, leading to the conclusion that the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of his daughter.

Considering the circumstances, including the advanced pregnancy of the deceased, the Court ruled out the death penalty, sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment.

Accordingly, appeal filed by the accused is dismissed.

Facts:

Ravada Sasikala, the appellant, was subjected to an acid attack by the accused after her family refused his proposal for marriage.

The accused was convicted under Sections 326 and 448 of the IPC, but the High Court reduced the sentence.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's reduction of the sentence was justified considering the gravity of the offense, the impact on the victim, and the societal interest.

Held:

The Court reinstated the trial court's sentence and emphasized the importance of proportionate punishment and victim compensation. Justice Misra stated: "When there is medical evidence that there was an acid attack on the young girl and the circumstances having brought home by cogent evidence and the conviction is given the stamp of approval, there was no justification to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone.

The Court further directed the accused to pay a compensation of Rs. 50,000 and the State to pay Rs. 3 lakhs to the victim, with additional imprisonment in case of non-compliance. This decision was based on the principle that justice must be served not only to the accused but also to the victim and society at large.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding property transferred to Respondent No.2, Prachaarini Sabha, through a registered deed in 1940, with specified conditions and purposes.

Appellants sought permission under Section 92 of the CPC to file a suit against the respondents, alleging that the Sabha was acting as a trust.

Issues:

Whether leave of the court is a prerequisite for the institution of a suit against a public trust under Section 92 of the CPC.

Held:

The Court held that the purpose of the transfer indicated the nature of Prachaarini Sabha as a trust.

A suit under Section 92 presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character.

Granting leave under Section 92 does not entail deciding the rights of the parties or adjudicating upon the merits of the case, but only considering whether there is a prima facie case for granting leave.

The requirement of giving notice to proposed defendants before granting leave under Section 92 is a rule of caution but not mandatory.

The examination of the plaint annexed with the application under Section 92 is crucial to determine the maintainability of the suit.

Facts:

The respondent-company was accused of fraudulently obtaining higher credit limits from the bank based on forged and false stock statements.

During the proceedings, a compromise was reached between the bank and the respondent-company under a One Time Settlement scheme.

The trial court dismissed an application for compounding of offenses, citing certain sections of IPC as non-compoundable offenses.

The respondents approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR and the proceedings, which was granted based on the settlement.

Issues:

Whether the FIR and the consequential proceedings alleging non-compoundable offenses could be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC on the basis of a settlement.

The applicability of Section 320(9) of CrPC in such cases.

Held:

The Supreme Court, upholding the decision of the High Court to quash the proceedings, emphasized the doctrine of judicial restraint and the separation of powers among the organs of the state. It noted that encroaching into the domain of the legislature or the executive would violate the rule of law, which is a basic structure of the Constitution of India.

Furthermore, the Court referred to various precedents and observed that depending on the facts of the case, the continuation of criminal proceedings after a compromise between the parties might amount to abuse of the court's process and be futile.

In conclusion, while keeping the point of law open, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the principle of judicial restraint.

Facts:

The incident occurred on January 19, 1991, involving an attack on Askari resulting in his death, and injuries to Mohd. Asad and Md. Vasir.

The appellants were convicted by the trial court based on evidence provided by eyewitnesses and post-mortem reports of the deceased.

The High Court upheld the conviction, finding the witnesses reliable despite some personal enmity and contradictions in their statements.

Issues:

Whether the conviction based on eyewitness testimony and other evidence is valid.

Whether there are sufficient grounds to interfere with the decision of the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellants based on the evidence presented, including eyewitness testimony and post-mortem reports. The witnesses were found to be reliable, and the prosecution's case was deemed acceptable.

The Court rejected the submissions made by the appellants' counsel, emphasizing the principles established in previous judgments. Consequently, the appeals lacked merit and were dismissed.

Facts:

The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents (including the Union Government, State Governments, and Union Territories) to ensure that industrial units requiring "consent to operate" have functional effluent treatment plants meeting prescribed norms.

Issues:

Whether industrial units requiring "consent to operate" must have functional effluent treatment plants.

Whether the directives issued by the court would effectively address industrial pollution concerns.

Held:

The court held that industrial units must have functional primary effluent treatment plants to operate. It directed State Pollution Control Boards to issue notices for compliance within three months, with inspections to follow. Non-compliant units would face restrictions, including disconnection of electricity supply.

The court also mandated the setting up of common effluent treatment plants and sewage treatment plants within specified timelines. Municipalities were tasked with operating existing plants and evolving norms for fund recovery. Implementation responsibility rested with Member Secretaries of Pollution Control Boards, with oversight by Environment Department Secretaries. The National Green Tribunal would supervise complaints and initiate actions against defaulters.

The court also directed the implementation of online monitoring systems for emission levels. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (CSEB) filed a petition under Sections 45, 46, and 64 of the Electricity Act, 2003, seeking determination of Retail Supply Tariff for the financial year 2005-2006.

The Commission fixed minimum charges for power consumption initially at 30% of the load factor, later reducing it to 10% after considering consumption patterns.

The appellant challenged this order before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity.

During the appeal, the appellant approached the Commission with additional prayers, including the issue of minimum charges.

The Commission, in its order, stated that consumers availing power from captive power plants (CPPs) need not pay monthly minimum charges on consumption if they draw more than 50% of their power requirement from the CPP.

Issues:

Whether the concept of minimum charges for power consumption was abolished for the appellant for the year 2005-2006.

Whether the Tribunal adequately addressed the Commission's order of abolishing minimum charges when affirming the decision.

Held:

The Court noted that while the Commission had acknowledged the possibility of abolishing minimum charges for cases like the appellant's, it was subject to factual analysis and conditions precedent.

The Tribunal failed to adequately address this aspect.

Therefore, the Court remitted the matter back to the Commission for fresh determination based on factual analysis.

The Commission was directed to complete the determination within four months and consider all relevant aspects.

The Court's decision was limited to the issue of contract demand, as argued by the counsels. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, GNR. Laxmanram Poonia, was enrolled in the Indian Army in 2005. Two years later, he was diagnosed with acute schizophrenia-like psychotic disorder. Despite this, the Medical Board determined that the disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by Military Service. Subsequently, the appellant was discharged from service. Upon applying for disability pension, his claim was rejected by the tribunal, asserting that the disability was not connected with Military Service.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's disability was attributable to or aggravated by Military Service.

Whether the Medical Board's opinion adequately considered the relevant regulations and rules governing disability pensions.

Whether the tribunal appropriately applied the relevant regulations and rules in its decision.

Held:

The Court noted that Regulation 173 of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961, outlines the conditions for granting disability pension. The regulation specifies that disability pension is granted to individuals who are invalided out of service due to a disability attributable to or aggravated by Military Service, with an assessed disability of 20% or more, unless otherwise provided. This determination is made according to the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982. [Para 11]

The appellant's disability, as assessed by the Medical Board, was acute schizophrenia-like psychotic disorder, with a 60% assessed disability for life. However, the Medical Board concluded that the disability was not attributable to or aggravated by Military Service. The Court observed that the Medical Board's opinion lacked reasoning, particularly regarding the absence of any record of the disease or disability at the time of the appellant's enrollment in Military Service. [Para 18]

While the Court acknowledged the weight of the Medical Board's opinion, it emphasized that such opinions must align with the relevant regulations and rules. According to the General Rules of Guide to Medical Officers (Military Pensions), 2002, the Medical Board should consider the etiology of the disease and provide reasoned conclusions to facilitate the examination of entitlement to pension by the Pension Sanctioning Authority. [Para 20]

Since there was no evidence to suggest that the appellant was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of enrollment, the Court presumed that he was in sound mental condition then. Consequently, any deterioration in health was presumed to be due to Military Service, unless proven otherwise. [Para 22]

The tribunal failed to examine the case in light of the relevant regulations and rules. Applying precedent cases, it was presumed that the appellant's disability was casually connected to his service conditions. The Court set aside the tribunal's order and directed the respondents to pay disability pension to the appellant's wife and other legal heirs in accordance with the rules. [Para 23, 24]

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, directing the respondents to pay disability pension to the appellant's wife and other legal heirs in accordance with the relevant regulations and rules.