Facts:

Samar Kumar Roy filed a suit against Jharna Bera seeking a declaratory decree and perpetual injunction regarding their alleged marriage.

The plaintiff passed away during the pendency of the suit, and his mother applied to be substituted as his legal representative.

The High Court set aside the substitution, stating that no right to sue survived after the plaintiff's death.

The appellant's counsel argued that the suit was maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act even after the plaintiff's death.

Issues:

Whether a suit filed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act by a legal representative of a deceased plaintiff is maintainable.

The jurisdiction of family courts in matters related to such suits.

Whether the suit is time-barred.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that A suit for declaration of a legal character, including the status of parties to a marriage, under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, could be filed by a third-party plaintiff or continued by the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff. This was affirmed by various judgments from different High Courts.

The exclusion of jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act, 1984 applied only to suits or proceedings specifically related to the Hindu Marriage Act or the Special Marriage Act, and not to suits filed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

The cause of action would begin to run from the date of the plaintiff's death, and in this case, the appellant's application to continue the suit was timely.

The appellant's counsel offered to settle the matter by sharing the deceased plaintiff's estate with the respondent, and the court directed the respondent to file an affidavit disclosing the amounts received due to her alleged marriage with the deceased plaintiff, with half of the total amount stated therein to be payable to the appellant.

Facts:

Siddalingayya filed a civil suit against Gurulingappa for recovery of damages.

Defendants failed to file their written statement despite granted time.

Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff.

Defendants appealed to higher courts, alleging insufficient opportunity to file written statement.

High Court remanded the case to Trial Court, imposing a cost on defendants.

Plaintiff appealed to Supreme Court against the remand order and the imposed cost.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's remand order was justified.

Whether the imposition of cost on defendants was appropriate.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court to remand the case and impose a cost on the defendants. The Court emphasized the principle of natural justice and fair opportunity for both parties. It concluded that the Trial Court should have granted the defendants some time to file their written statement, subject to payment of a reasonable cost to compensate the inconvenience caused to the plaintiff.

The Court dismissed the appeal and directed the Trial Court to proceed with the trial, issuing notice to the defendants and granting them time to deposit the cost and file their written statement. Failure to comply would result in the revival of the decree passed by the Trial Court against the defendants.

Facts:

The respondents, who were advocates by profession, were appointed by the State Government as Additional Government Pleaders/Assistant Government Pleaders/Additional Public Prosecutors for the Bench of the High Court at Aurangabad. However, the State Government later issued a cancellation order terminating their appointments, which was challenged by the respondents in a writ petition.

Issues:

The Court was to determine the legality and correctness of the cancellation order dated 28.08.2015 issued by the State Government.

Held:

The Court modified the cancellation order, treating it as having been passed under Rule 30(6) of the Maharashtra Law Officers (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Remuneration) Rules, 1984. It directed the State to pay one month's retainer in lieu of notice period to each respondent as fixed in their respective appointment letters.

The State was given three months to make the payments. Additionally, the Court stated that the State could consider the respondents' cases for future appointment if desired, and the cancellation order and any observations made by the High Court would not hinder such consideration.

FACTS:

Dharam Pal, the respondent, was initially appointed as a clerk in 1970 and later promoted to the post of Senior Assistant in 1980.

He was subsequently given officiating charges for higher positions, including Superintendent Grade II and Grade I.

Dharam Pal approached the High Court seeking the benefit of the pay scale for the higher positions he had officiated in, which had not been granted to him.

The High Court, relying on previous decisions, granted Dharam Pal's request for the pay scale benefit.

The State of Punjab appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether Dharam Pal was entitled to the pay scale benefit for the higher positions he had officiated in.

Whether the High Court's decision was legally sound in light of relevant statutes and precedents.

HELD:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that Dharam Pal was entitled to the pay scale benefit for the higher positions he had officiated in. The Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Contract Act, 1872, and the Punjab Civil Services Rules and found no prohibition against granting such benefits.

The Court also referred to previous judgments cited by both parties to support its decision. Therefore, the appeal by the State of Punjab was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

Introduction of the parties involved: The appellant is defendant No. 1, while the respondent is the plaintiff. Additional parties were also involved in the case.

Background of the dispute: The dispute revolves around land described in a sale deed dated 09.02.1978, referred to as the "suit land". The plaintiff alleges that they purchased the land for charitable activities, while the defendant contests this claim.

Legal proceedings: The plaintiff filed a suit seeking cancellation of the sale deed, which was initially dismissed by the Trial Court but later decreed by the High Court.

Appeals and remand: The case went through various appeals and was remanded to the Trial Court due to procedural irregularities.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff, as a society, could invoke Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC for a representative suit.

Whether the lower courts adequately addressed the jurisdictional issue regarding the trial of the suit.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had not properly addressed the issue of jurisdiction to try the suit. Despite the plaintiff seeking permission to prosecute the suit as a representative suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC, the Trial Court did not sufficiently examine whether a society could be considered a "person" under the said rule. Additionally, the Trial Court failed to determine if the suit met the requirements of a representative suit. Therefore, the Supreme Court decided to remand the case to the Trial Court to address these issues and decide the suit accordingly.

The appeal was allowed, the judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the case was remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The Trial Court was directed to answer the relevant issues and decide the suit within one year from the specified date.

Facts:

The petitioner, World College of Medical Sciences & Research and Hospital, applied to establish a medical college in Jhajjar, Haryana.

After an assessment by the MCI, deficiencies were noted, and the MCI recommended debarring the petitioner college from admitting students for two academic sessions and encashing the bank guarantee.

Despite the Oversight Committee's opinion that there were no deficiencies, the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare passed an order debarring the college based on the MCI's recommendation.

The petitioners challenged this order via a writ petition.

Issues:

Whether the Competent Authority adequately considered the explanations provided by the petitioners for the deficiencies noted by the MCI.

Whether the decision of the Competent Authority was reasoned and in compliance with the Court's earlier directions.

Whether the deficiencies noted during inspection warranted debarring the college from admitting students.

Held:

The Court found that the Competent Authority failed to consider relevant matters and mechanically followed the MCI's recommendation without adequately assessing the explanations provided by the petitioners. Despite the Court's earlier direction to reconsider the matter afresh and record reasons, the Competent Authority's decision lacked analysis and reasoning. While significant deficiencies were noted during inspection, the Competent Authority failed to adequately address these deficiencies and ignored the explanations provided by the petitioners.

Therefore, the Court directed that the students already admitted in the petitioner college for the academic session 2016-2017 should be permitted to continue their studies. The Court declined to issue directions for the renewal of LOP for the academic session 2017-2018 but directed the MCI to conduct a fresh inspection within two months to consider renewal for the academic session 2018-2019. The bank guarantee provided by the petitioners was not to be encashed pending further orders.

Facts:

The couple, married since November 1997, had two children.

Allegations of mental and physical torture by the respondent led to the appellant leaving the matrimonial home in February 2013.

Legal proceedings, including domestic violence cases and custody applications, ensued.

The respondent voluntarily handed over custody of the children to the appellant at one point due to the son's academic struggles, leading to improved academic performance under the appellant's care.

Issues:

Determination of custody of the children in the matrimonial dispute.

Assessment of the welfare principle in deciding custody matters.

Consideration of the children's preferences and best interests.

Held:

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, restoring custody to the appellant based on the welfare principle and the children's preference. Noting the improved academic performance and positive environment provided by the appellant, the court emphasized the need for a holistic approach to custody matters.

The appellant was granted custody, with the respondent given weekend access and custody during vacations, ensuring the children's studies were not affected. Additionally, the appellant was awarded the children's domicile certificates and passports.

Facts:

Shalu Ojha and Prashant Ojha got married in Delhi on April 20, 2007, but their marriage lasted only four months.

Shalu Ojha filed an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeking maintenance among other reliefs.

The Metropolitan Magistrate granted interim maintenance to Shalu Ojha, which was later challenged by Prashant Ojha in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ).

Various legal proceedings ensued, including appeals and petitions filed by both parties.

Issues:

The dispute regarding the rate of maintenance and whether the learned ASJ rightly reduced the amount of maintenance.

Held:

The Supreme Court entertained the petition despite the matter being pending before the High Court.

The Court directed both parties to file necessary documents in the domestic violence proceedings before the Family Court within four weeks.

The Family Court was directed to decide the case within eight months based on the evidence presented and determine the final rate of maintenance.

The High Court was instructed to expedite the hearing of the pending case and decide whether the ASJ's order needed modification regarding interim maintenance.

Facts:

Apparaju Malhar Rao (the Appellant) contested a judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad.

The High Court had allowed a second appeal filed by the plaintiff (respondent No.1), setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower court, and confirming the decree in favor of the plaintiff.

The Appellant argued that the High Court failed to properly frame any substantial question of law as required under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, before allowing the second appeal.

Issues:

Whether the High Court properly framed substantial questions of law before admitting the second appeal.

Whether the failure to frame substantial questions of law renders the High Court's decision legally sustainable.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the impugned order of the High Court was not legally sustainable due to the failure to properly frame substantial questions of law. The Court emphasized the necessity of formulating such questions before admitting a second appeal.

In the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs. (2001) 3 SCC 179, it was established that the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating substantial questions of law. This requirement is essential for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The absence of substantial questions of law warrants dismissal of the appeal.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case for fresh consideration, directing the High Court to properly frame substantial questions of law as required by law.