Facts:

MGR Industries Association, represented by its members, filed a writ petition seeking exemption from taxation by the Zila Panchayat under Section 12-A of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976.

The area in question had been declared as an industrial development area, but no notification had been issued designating it as an industrial township under Article 243-Q(1) of the Constitution.

The State Government rejected the representation of the appellants, stating that without the area being notified as an industrial township, the Zila Panchayat was entitled to realize tax.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to exemption from taxation by the Zila Panchayat under Section 12-A of the 1976 Act.

Whether the area's declaration as an industrial development area was sufficient for claiming exemption, or if specific notification as an industrial township was required.

Held:

The Court held that the appellants were not entitled to the claimed exemption from taxation by the Zila Panchayat under Section 12-A of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. This was because the area in question had not been specifically notified as an industrial township under the proviso to Article 243-Q(1) of the Constitution.

The Court relied on the statutory provisions and precedent cases, including Rishipal vs. State of U.P. and Saij Gram Panchayat vs. State of Gujarat, to establish that the exclusion of an industrial development area from the Panchayat's jurisdiction is dependent upon such notification. Since no such notification was issued, the appellants' claim for exemption was dismissed, and the appeal was consequently dismissed.

Facts:

The dispute involves a Town Planning Scheme in the Mehrun area within the Jalgaon Municipal Council's jurisdiction.

The municipal council reserved certain lands, including those owned by the appellants, for public purposes in a draft development plan published in 1971.

The final development plan was sanctioned in 1974. Subsequently, a Town Planning Scheme (Scheme III) was prepared in 1976, and compensation for the affected lands was determined by an arbitrator in 1980.

Issues:

Whether the reservation of land under a Town Planning Scheme lapses if not acquired within ten years as per Section 127 of the MRTP Act.

The applicability of Section 127 to lands reserved under a Town Planning Scheme.

Held:

In the present case the prayer is made by the appellants in the Writ Petitions specifically in respect of Town Planning Scheme No. III, which was finally sanctioned, as such, we find no error in the impugned judgment passed by the High Court dismissing the Writ Petitions. From the copy of special notice dated 25.04.1980 in form No. 4 issued under Town Planning Scheme Rules (filed as Annexure-B with the additional documents) and copy of order dated 16.05.1980 passed by the Arbitrator in the aforesaid rules, it is clear that the compensation was determined in respect of land in question under Town Planning Scheme. The decision of the Arbitrator appears to have been published in the Official Gazette dated 20th August, 1980, and appeal was dismissed. In the circumstances, we find no error in the order passed by the High Court.

Facts:

The respondent was alleged to have facilitated illegal mining by granting quarry licenses beyond permissible limits, resulting in illegal benefits to the detriment of the State.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's exercise of revisionary powers in quashing the charges framed against the respondent was justified.

What is the scope of interference at the stage when a charge has been framed?

Held:

The Court emphasized that the stage of framing a charge is not where the final test of guilt is applied. Instead, it is to determine whether there is a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offense, which, if put to trial, could prove his guilt (Para 4).

The High Court erred in quashing the charges framed without properly considering the substance of the allegations against the respondent. It failed to address the discrepancy between the granted quarry license and the technical map issued, indicating a larger area for mining than permitted (Para 5).

Both the chargesheet and the order of the Special Judge had specifically noted the allegations, which clearly made out offenses under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 120B IPC (Para 6).

The power of the court under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) is to examine the legality and regularity of proceedings or orders made in a case, aiming to correct patent defects, errors of jurisdiction, or law. Quashing the charges framed in this case was an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court (Para 7).

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and the charges framed against the respondent were reinstated.

Facts:

The statutory provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), particularly Section 173(8), in light of its historical development from the CrPC 1898 and the recommendations of the Law Commission of India.

Issues:

Whether a Magistrate has the authority to direct further investigation suo motu or upon the request of the complainant/informant after certain stages of the proceedings.

Clarification regarding the powers of the Magistrate in directing investigation at different stages of the legal process.

Analysis of relevant sections of the CrPC to determine the scope of the Magistrate's authority in directing further investigation.

Held:

The court clarifies that neither the Magistrate on their own nor upon the request of the complainant/informant has the authority to direct further investigation after cognizance has been taken and the accused person has appeared.

Legislative intent behind the amendment to Section 173(8) of the CrPC empowers the investigating agency to conduct further investigation at any stage of the proceedings.

The court delineates the powers of the Magistrate regarding directing investigation, taking cognizance, framing charges, etc., and highlights limitations on the Magistrate's authority after certain stages of the proceedings.

Analysis of relevant sections of the CrPC demonstrates that while the Magistrate can direct investigation at the pre-cognizance stage, they lose the authority to do so after certain milestones in the legal process have been reached.

The judgment interprets the statutory provisions in light of the legislative intent and the framework of the CrPC to conclude that the Magistrate cannot initiate further investigation suo motu or upon the request of the complainant/informant after certain stages of the proceedings.

Decision: The court reaffirms the role of the investigating agency in conducting further investigation and underscores the limitations on the Magistrate's authority in this regard after certain milestones in the legal process have been reached.

Facts:

The application filed on behalf of Shri R.R. Nair sought the recall of an order dated October 21, 2016, citing incomplete hearing and the filing of another writ petition challenging the same sections of the Advocates Act in the High Court of Delhi.

Issues:

The adequacy of hearing, the challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 16 and 23(5) of the Advocates Act, and the related writ petition filed in the High Court of Delhi.

Held:

The Court recalls the earlier order and decides to set down the matter for fuller arguments afresh, along with the transferred Writ Petition (C) No. 6331 of 2016. This decision is based on the need for a comprehensive hearing, considering the dissatisfaction among certain sections of the bar and the challenges to the designation process of lawyers as senior advocates.

Facts:

The appellant, a member of GREF in Border Roads Engineering Services, raised the issue of refusal to grant financial upgradation before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). The Government objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the AFT or CAT has jurisdiction over the grievances of GREF personnel.

The appropriate remedy for the appellant's grievance.

Held:

The Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, clearly outlines the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) to adjudicate complaints and disputes regarding service matters and appeals arising from court-martial verdicts of members of the services. GREF personnel belong to the Armed Forces, but AFT's jurisdiction is limited to appeals arising from courts martial verdicts.

Certain provisions of the Army Act 1950 are exempted in their application to civilian members of GREF. These personnel are subject to disciplinary control under the 1950 Act for the purpose of discipline.

GREF personnel are subject to dual disciplinary control, allowing action under the 1950 Act or the Central Civil Services (Control, Classification and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965) depending on the nature of the offense.

The AFT has jurisdiction over appeals arising from courts martial verdicts involving GREF personnel. However, it does not have jurisdiction over grievances related to terms and conditions of service or other service matters.

The previous tribunal's decision regarding the upgradation issue was deemed null and void due to lack of inherent jurisdiction. The appellant was granted liberty to approach the High Court for redressal of grievances.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the limited jurisdiction of the tribunals involved and granting the appellant the opportunity to seek redressal through the High Court.

Facts:

Sivanandi, an officer, was considered for promotion to the Indian Police Service (IPS) in 1994-95.

Some ACRs necessary for his promotion were missing or delayed.

A Review Select Committee reconsidered his case in 1999, taking into account the missing ACRs, and he was promoted to the IPS with the year of allotment being 1991.

Respondents challenged his selection, leading to a legal battle.

Issues:

Whether delayed or missing ACRs should be considered in the promotion process.

Whether the High Court's decision to exclude certain ACRs from consideration was correct.

Held:

The Court held that ACRs are integral to an officer's service record and should not be ignored due to delays caused by superior officers. The delay in writing and reviewing the ACRs should not disadvantage the officer.

The High Court's decision to exclude certain ACRs from consideration was deemed incorrect. Therefore, the Court upheld the decision of the Review Select Committee and allowed Sivanandi's appeals, entitling him to all consequential benefits of promotion.

Facts:

The case involves an eviction petition filed by the respondents against the appellant before the Rent Controller, Delhi. The appellant applied for impleadment as a necessary party, claiming that the disputed property was leased to a partnership firm, in which he was a partner. The respondents argued against the existence of a tenancy in favor of the firm.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be impleaded as a proper party in the eviction petition.

The validity of the tenancy claimed by the appellant and the partnership firm.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that for proper adjudication of the issue, both the firm K.K. Lee and all its partners should be parties to the case. The Court invoked its power under Order I, Rule 10 to implead the firm and its partners as additional respondents. The Rent Controller was directed to ensure expeditious disposal of the eviction petition.

The interim order regarding the deposit of a specified amount per month was to continue until duly varied by an appropriate forum. The Rent Controller was directed to pass appropriate orders regarding the release of the deposited amount upon final disposal of the petition.

The Rent Controller was further instructed to dispose of the case within six months from the date of the first appearance. Pending applications were disposed of with no orders as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Suresh Singhal, was prosecuted for the murder of Shyam Sunder and Kishan Lal, which occurred on 04-03-1991 at the office of Lala Harkishan Dass. There were conflicting witness testimonies regarding the sequence of events leading to the shooting.

Issues:

Whether the appellant acted in the exercise of his right of private defence.

Whether the shooting amounted to murder or fell under any exceptions under IPC.

Held:

The court found that the appellant reasonably apprehended danger to his life during a scuffle where he was being strangulated by the deceased. It was held that a mere reasonable apprehension is sufficient to invoke the right of self-defence.

The shooting was deemed to have occurred in a sudden fight in the heat of passion, falling under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, and not premeditated murder.

Therefore, the appellant's actions were considered to be in the exercise of the right of private defence.

The appellant was convicted under Section 304 IPC for causing the death of Shyam Sunder and Kishan Lal. Considering he had already undergone a sentence of 13 years, he was sentenced to the period already served.

Regarding the conviction under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Kishan Lal, it was set aside due to insufficient evidence.

The court noted the difficulty in ascertaining whether the shots that hit Kishan Lal were fired by the appellant.

In conclusion, the appeal was partially allowed, and the conviction was modified under Section 304 IPC. The appellant was ordered to be released from custody forthwith.