Facts:

The case involved a dispute between a father-in-law and daughter-in-law regarding possession of a flat. The father-in-law claimed himself as the licensor and the daughter-in-law as a gratuitous licensee.

Issues:

The entertainability of the daughter-in-law's counter-claim seeking residence in the flat under Section 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, before the Small Causes Court.

Held:

The Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, establishes Small Causes Courts as civil courts, and proceedings before them are legal proceedings.

Section 26 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, allows for any relief under Sections 18 to 22 to be sought before a civil court, including the Small Causes Court.

Counter-claims by defendants are permissible under Order VIII, Rule 6A of the Code of Civil Procedure, and such claims can be filed before the Small Causes Court.

The Maharashtra Act 24 of 1984 amended the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to allow suits between licensors and licensees to be filed before the Small Causes Court.

The non-obstante clause in Section 26(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act overrides contrary provisions, enabling suits between licensors and licensees to be filed before the Small Causes Court.

The purpose of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is to secure a social purpose, and its provisions should be construed widely. Any claims under the Act should not be denied unless expressly barred.

Refusal to consider the daughter-in-law's counter-claim would amount to denying consideration of the claim as contemplated by Section 26 of the Act, leading to multiplicity of proceedings, which is against the object and purpose of the Act.

Decision: The Court allowed the daughter-in-law's appeal, emphasizing that her counter-claim seeking residence in the flat under the 2005 Act was fully entertainable, and the lower courts erred in refusing to consider it.

Facts:

The Maharashtra Value Added Tax (Levy, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2009, retrospectively amended Section 93(1) of the MVAT Act.

This retrospective amendment was challenged on constitutional grounds, alleging arbitrariness and violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the retrospective operation of the amended provisions of the MVAT Act is constitutionally valid.

Whether the retrospective amendment amounts to the imposition of a new levy with retrospective effect.

Held:

The legislative intent behind Section 41BB of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, and subsequently Section 93(1) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, was to grant proportionate incentives to eligible units (Para 22).

The retrospective amendment of Section 93(1) of the MVAT Act aimed to rectify the executive's error in implementing the legislative intent through administrative circulars instead of statutory rules (Para 29).

The retrospective amendment did not introduce a new levy but sought to make the statutory provision effective from its inception (Para 30).

Decision: The court upheld the retrospective operation of the amended provisions, emphasizing the legislative intent for proportionate incentives and the need to rectify earlier errors in implementation.

Facts:

The case revolves around a complaint filed by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) alleging anti-competitive behavior among certain companies, including the appellants, in relation to tenders for Aluminium Phosphide Tablets (APT) issued by FCI between 2007 and 2009. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) directed an investigation, resulting in a prima facie finding of anti-competitive conduct. The CCI concluded that the appellants violated provisions of Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002, and imposed penalties. The Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) upheld the findings but reduced the penalties.

Issues:

Whether Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 applied to tenders issued prior to its enactment.

Whether the CCI was authorized to investigate tenders not specifically mentioned in the complaint.

Whether the findings of collusive bidding were justified.

Whether penalties should be imposed on total turnover or relevant turnover of the offending company.

Held:

The Court held that Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 applied retroactively to tender processes initiated before its enactment, as long as the anti-competitive conduct persisted beyond the enactment date.

It was determined that the scope of investigation by the Director General (DG) under Section 26(1) was broad enough to cover additional evidence beyond what was specified in the initial complaint or order of investigation.

The Court affirmed the findings of collusive bidding based on evidence of identical pricing across multiple tenders, demonstrating a pattern of anti-competitive behavior.

Regarding penalties, it was clarified that Section 27(b) of the Act did not specify whether penalties should be based on total turnover or relevant turnover. However, adopting relevant turnover as the criteria for penalty imposition was deemed more equitable and in line with the Act's ethos.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, particularly regarding the deduction of expenses related to earning dividend income on which tax is payable under Section 115-O.

Issues:

Whether Section 14A applies to expenses incurred in earning dividend income subject to tax under Section 115-O.

Whether the Assessing Officer provided sufficient justification to disallow deductions for expenses related to dividend income in the specific case of Assessment Year 2002-2003.

Held:

The court held that Section 14A applies to expenses incurred in earning dividend income on which tax is payable under Section 115-O.

The literal interpretation of Section 14A aligns with the legislative intent to disallow deductions for expenses related to exempted income.

The provisions of Section 10(33) and Section 115-O indicate that dividend income subject to tax under Section 115-O is not included in the total income of the recipient assessee.

Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 14A, introduced in 2006, prescribe a formula for determining expenses related to income not forming part of the total income. The Assessing Officer must be satisfied with the validity of the assessee's claim regarding the absence of expenditure incurred in earning exempted income.

In the specific case of Assessment Year 2002-2003, the Assessing Officer failed to provide adequate reasons to reject the assessee's claim regarding the absence of expenditure incurred to earn dividend income. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to the full benefit of the claim of dividend income without deductions.

Decision: The court set aside the order of the High Court and ruled in favor of the assessee based on the interpretation of Section 14A and the lack of justification for disallowing deductions for expenses related to dividend income.

Facts:

Maharaji Educational Trust borrowed Rs. 75 crores from HUDCO and mortgaged Properties 1 to 6. Later, 21 acres of Property No. 6 were exchanged with Awas Parishad, and an agreement to sell Property No. 6 was made with a construction company. Dispute arose regarding whether these properties could be sold under SARFAESI Act for satisfying HUDCO's dues.

Issues:

The status of the exchanged 21 acres of Property No. 6 and HUDCO's right to sell these properties for recovering its dues.

Held:

The court discussed the doctrine of accession, stating that it applies when the security remains intact, and the mortgagor acquires new rights while keeping the security intact (Para 29).

It was held that the 21 acres exchanged with Awas Parishad could not be considered unencumbered as it remained subject to the mortgage with HUDCO. Thus, HUDCO did not have the first right to sell these 21 acres (Para 39).

The court emphasized that if the mortgagor acquires additional rights or interests in the mortgaged property, it constitutes an accession under the Transfer of Property Act (Para 38).

It directed Maharaji Educational Trust to settle a repayment scheme with HUDCO within one month and start payments from June 2017. Failure to comply would permit HUDCO to sell approximately 43 acres of mortgaged land to recover its dues (Para 42).

Facts:

The case pertains to the large-scale defalcation of public funds, fraudulent transactions, and fabrication of accounts in the Animal Husbandry Department of the State of Bihar, popularly known as the Fodder Scam. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) conducted an investigation into corruption in public administration, misconduct by bureaucracy, fabrication of official records, and misappropriation of public funds. Three individuals were convicted in one of the criminal cases arising from the Fodder Scam. The High Court quashed their conviction, invoking Article 20(2) and Section 300 of the CrPC, citing the involvement of similar ingredients in a previous conviction related to the Chaibasa treasury.

Issues:

Whether the quashing of the conviction by the High Court was justified based on the principles of double jeopardy.

Whether the delay in filing appeals by the CBI should be condoned.

Held:

The doctrine of double jeopardy, as enshrined in Article 20(2) of the Constitution, prohibits individuals from being prosecuted and punished for the same offense more than once. However, it does not bar subsequent trials and convictions for different offenses, even if some ingredients of the offenses are common.

Sections 219, 220, and 221 of the CrPC deal with the framing of charges and trials for multiple offenses committed within a year. Separate trials for distinct offenses must be conducted, and charges cannot be clubbed together for more than one year.

The delay in filing appeals by the CBI was sufficiently explained, considering the administrative procedures involved. The court should not dismiss petitions solely on grounds of delay, especially when it serves the ends of justice.

The conduct of the CBI in important legal matters, such as the Fodder Scam case, was criticized for its lack of vigilance and adherence to procedures. The Director of CBI was directed to investigate and address the issues leading to delays.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the quashing of convictions by the High Court. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to legal principles, conducting trials fairly, and addressing delays in legal proceedings to ensure justice.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation and application of the Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969, particularly regarding confiscation proceedings under Section 15 of the Act.

Issues:

Whether confiscation under the law is permissible even before the complete establishment of guilt by the accused.

Held:

The Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969 was enacted to regulate the trade of certain forest produce in Madhya Pradesh with the aim of preserving specific forest produce in the state.

The Act empowers authorized officers of the Forest Department to enforce its provisions effectively, including the power to seize, confiscate, and forfeit items related to forest offenses.

Confiscation proceedings under Section 15 of the Adhiniyam are characterized as quasi-judicial and not criminal proceedings. Confiscation is based on the satisfaction of the authorized officer regarding the commission of a forest offense.

Initially, the Act did not provide for separate confiscatory proceedings. However, later amendments introduced Sections 15-A to 15-D to establish a distinct confiscatory mechanism in line with the Indian Forest Act.

The purpose behind separating confiscation proceedings from criminal prosecution is to allow for a deterrent mechanism and to prevent further misuse of vehicles or articles involved in forest offenses.

Section 15 grants independent power to the concerned authority to confiscate articles even before the guilt is fully established if they were used during the commission of a forest offense. Owners of such articles can defend themselves by proving they took all reasonable care and precautions and were not aware of or involved in the offense.

Confiscation proceedings and criminal prosecution serve different purposes. Confiscation aims for speedy and effective adjudication regarding the confiscation of produce and means used for the offense, while prosecution aims to punish the offender.

Both the High Court and the Revisional Court erred in concluding that confiscation under the law was impermissible unless the guilt of the accused was fully established.

Facts:The case involved the question of whether compensation ordered under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act remains recoverable even after the default sentence has been served. The appellant sought clarification on the applicability of legal fiction under Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this context.

Issues:

Whether compensation ordered for offenses under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is still recoverable after the completion of the default sentence.

Held:

The judgment clarified the application of legal fiction under Section 431 of the Cr.P.C. regarding the recoverability of compensation ordered for offenses under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

It was observed that the legal fiction should not be extended beyond its intended purpose or the language of the section by which it is created. However, once the purpose of the legal fiction is identified, it must be given full effect and carried to its logical conclusion.

The judgment explained the provisions of the Cr.P.C., particularly Sections 431, 357(3), and 421(1), in relation to the recovery of fines and compensation.

Emphasizing the distinction between punishment and compensation, the court examined relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code, including Sections 64 to 70, which deal with penalties for offenses.

Changes in the law, particularly through amendments in the Cr.P.C., were highlighted, including the addition of Section 357(3) and alterations to the proviso of Section 421(1).

Decision: The court held that compensation ordered under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, even after the default sentence has been served, remains recoverable under the provisions of the Cr.P.C., specifically Section 421(1), through the application of the legal fiction established by Section 431. The appeals are dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

The case involves addressing the exploitation of children in orphanages in Tamil Nadu, focusing on the interpretation and enforcement of various legal provisions aimed at protecting the rights of children, including the Juvenile Justice Act, POCSO Act, and other relevant laws and international conventions.

Issues:

The definition of a "child in need of care and protection,"

The registration and regulation of child care institutions, adherence to minimum standards of care, utilization of grants,

Establishment and functioning of commissions for child rights protection,

Rehabilitation and social re-integration of children, interpretation of statutes,

The constitutional obligation of the state to enforce laws protecting children's rights.

Held:

The definition of a "child in need of care and protection" under the Juvenile Justice Act should be broadly interpreted to include victims of sexual abuse, assault, harassment, and child trafficking.

All child care institutions must be registered under the Juvenile Justice Act within a specified time frame, and a comprehensive database of children in need of care and protection should be maintained.

Child care institutions must adhere to minimum standards of care and protection as prescribed by law, including provisions for safety, health, education, and rehabilitation.

Adequate funds must be allocated and utilized for safeguarding children's rights, and proper plans for utilizing grants should be formulated.

National and State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights must be established and functional to ensure effective implementation of child protection laws.

Provisions for rehabilitation and social re-integration of children in need of care and protection must be enforced, including training programs and alternative care options like adoption and foster care. (Referenced from Para 6 of the judgment)

High Courts should establish Juvenile Justice Committees to ensure the effective implementation of child protection laws, and these committees may require support through a Secretariat.

Regular social audits should be conducted to ensure transparency and accountability in the implementation of child protection laws.

Technology should be utilized for maintaining records of child care institutions and children in need of care and protection.

Beneficial legislation like the Juvenile Justice Act should be interpreted broadly to further the objectives of social justice and child welfare.

The state has a constitutional obligation to enforce laws and policies aimed at protecting children's rights, as outlined in the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Decision: The court directs comprehensive measures to address the exploitation of children in orphanages in Tamil Nadu, emphasizing the importance of broad interpretation and effective enforcement of laws aimed at protecting children's rights.