Facts:

The case pertains to a dispute between TRFLTD. and ENERGO ENGINEERING PROJECTS LTD. (Civil Appeal No. 5306 of 2017) regarding the appointment of an arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether a person who becomes ineligible under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, can nominate another person as an arbitrator.

The validity of the procedure followed in appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act.

Held:

The court examined Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which renders a person ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator if they fall under any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule. It was clarified that a person who becomes ineligible under this provision cannot nominate another person as an arbitrator.

Additionally, the court addressed the procedure for appointing an arbitrator. It stated that if an agreement mandates the parties to nominate their respective arbitrators, their authority to nominate cannot be questioned. However, the eligibility of their arbitrator can be challenged based on the norms provided under the Act and its schedules. In this case, where the Managing Director was initially named the sole arbitrator and had the power to nominate another arbitrator, once the Managing Director became ineligible, they could not nominate another arbitrator. It was deemed legally inconceivable for a statutorily ineligible person to nominate an arbitrator.

The court further noted the incorrect procedure followed in appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act. The order appointing the arbitrator was set aside. However, since Clause (c) of the agreement was independent of Clause (d), the arbitration clause survived. Thus, the court retained the authority to appoint an arbitrator, considering all relevant aspects.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and the matters were remitted to the High Court for further consideration.

Facts:

Defendants 3 and 4 created an equitable mortgage of their property in favor of Defendant No. 1, a bank, for a loan.

The bank filed a suit for recovery of the loan by selling the mortgaged property, which was auctioned.

The plaintiffs, who claimed to have purchased the mortgaged property, filed a suit for redemption of the mortgage.

The trial court decreed the suit, but the decision was reversed on appeal.

Issues:

Whether the right to redeem the mortgage was extinguished due to the foreclosure decree and auction sale.

Whether the plaintiffs, as purchasers of the equity of redemption, had the right to redeem the mortgage.

Held:

The court held that the right to redeem the mortgage can be extinguished by the act of parties or by a court decree, as per the proviso to Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The plaintiffs lost the right to sue for redemption due to the foreclosure decree and auction sale, as there remained no property mortgaged to be redeemed.

The plaintiffs failed to challenge the auction sale or seek redemption before the sale was confirmed, and their right to redemption was extinguished by operation of law.

The court dismissed the appeals, upholding the decision of the High Court.

Facts:

The petitioners filed contempt petitions alleging non-payment of wages/allowances as per the award of the Wage Board by newspaper establishments. The recommendations of the Wage Board were accepted and notified by the Central Government. However, the petitioners challenged these recommendations and notification before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions challenging the recommendations, thereby affirming the Wage Board's award. Subsequently, the contempt petitions were filed due to alleged non-implementation/partial implementation of the Wage Board award by the newspaper establishments.

Issues: a. Whether the non-implementation/partial implementation of the Wage Board award by newspaper establishments constitutes civil contempt. b. Whether the undertakings given by employees agreeing to be governed by previous wage structures, despite being less favorable, are valid under the law. c. The maintainability of writ petitions under Article 32 seeking interference with transfer/termination.

Held:

The standard of proof required to establish contempt is the same as in criminal proceedings, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt (Para 1.1).

Non-implementation/partial implementation of the Wage Board award by newspaper establishments occurred due to a perceived understanding of the award, which was upheld by the Supreme Court. Such misunderstanding does not constitute willful default to attract civil contempt (Para 1.2).

None of the newspaper establishments are held guilty of contempt. Complaints regarding non-implementation of the Wage Board award should be addressed through mechanisms provided under the relevant act rather than through contempt proceedings (Para 1.3).

The Act is silent on the availability of an option to receive less than what is due to an employee under the Act. Such disputes should be resolved by the fact-finding authority under Section 17 of the Act (Para 2).

The purpose of the 1955 Act is to provide minimum, if not fair, wages to newspaper employees (Para 3).

Writ petitions seeking interference with transfer/termination should be addressed by appropriate authorities under the Act or cognate provisions of law rather than through Article 32 jurisdiction (Para 4).

Decision: The Court dismissed the contempt petitions and directed that complaints regarding non-implementation of the Wage Board award or other grievances should be dealt with in accordance with the mechanisms provided under the relevant act. It also emphasized that disputes regarding undertakings by employees should be resolved through the fact-finding authority under Section 17 of the Act.

Facts:

The appellant, Kanchan Udyog Limited, entered into an agreement with the respondent, United Spirits Limited, for the establishment of a non-alcoholic beverages bottling plant. Under the agreement, the respondent was to supply the concentrate (essence) required for beverage preparation.

Subsequently, the respondent terminated the bottlers agreement, prompting the appellant to file a suit seeking damages for wrongful termination of the contract.

Issues:

Whether the breach by the respondent was the primary cause for the loss of anticipated profits.

Whether the appellant failed to mitigate its losses and take reasonable steps to continue its business.

Held:

The Appellate Court adequately discussed the appellant's letter thanking the respondent for its advertising support and found that the breach alone was not the primary cause for the loss of anticipated profits (Para 25).

The appellant failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate its losses, including stopping the procurement of concentrates from another company without explanation and delaying the sale of the unit after its closure (Para 27).

Regarding reliance loss and expectation loss, both could be claimed simultaneously, but in this case, the appellant failed to establish that the breach by the respondent was the primary cause for the loss of anticipated profits (Para 28).

The appellant was not entitled to expectation loss towards anticipated profits due to its own lapses, lack of infrastructure, finances, and failure to mitigate losses. Granting reliance loss would essentially benefit the appellant for its own shortcomings (Para 30).

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the decision of the Appellate Court, which found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the breach by the respondent was the primary cause for the loss of anticipated profits and that the appellant had not taken reasonable steps to mitigate its losses.

Facts:

The appellant-companies, engaged in steel ingot manufacturing, drew heavy loads of electrical power from 11 KV High Tension Supply Lines.

A circular issued by the Punjab State Electricity Board in 1995 mandated consumers drawing power above 1500 KVA to shift to 66 KV voltage supply or pay a surcharge of 17.5%.

The Electricity Act, 2003 came into force on June 10, 2003, mandating tariff determination by the Appropriate Commission.

Issues:

Whether the regulatory commission's imposition of surcharges on industrial consumers was lawful under the Electricity Act, 2003.

Whether the rate/quantum of the surcharge determined by the regulatory commission was justified.

Held:

The Court held that the regulatory commission's authority to determine tariffs, including surcharges, was lawful under the Electricity Act, 2003. The court emphasized the limited scope for judicial intervention in tariff fixation matters, citing the principle that such matters fall within the domain of legislative activity and should not be interfered with by the courts unless they are illegal, arbitrary, or ultra vires the law.

The court affirmed the decisions of the High Court and the Appellate Tribunal, dismissing the appeals filed by the industrial establishments.

Facts:

The case revolved around Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. (hereafter referred to as "the assessee-company") entering into a joint venture with Honda Motor Co. Ltd. (HMCL), Japan, and the subsequent Technical Collaboration Agreement (TCA) between HMCL and the assessee-company for the transfer of technical know-how and information. The question at hand was whether the technical fees paid by the assessee should be categorized as capital expenditure or revenue expenditure.

Issues:

The nature of the technical fees paid by the assessee-company: whether they constituted capital expenditure or revenue expenditure for tax purposes.

Held:

The enduring nature test is pivotal in differentiating between capital and revenue expenditure. Expenditure providing an enduring benefit is deemed capital, while that of a concurrent, recurring nature falls under revenue expenditure .

Technical information and know-how possess unique characteristics distinct from tangible assets. While the transfer of ownership in intellectual property rights or licenses constitutes capital expenditure, arrangements facilitating limited use of such rights for a specific period may qualify as revenue expenditure .

The High Court correctly determined that the expenditure incurred by the assessee-company was of capital nature. The purpose of the Technical Collaboration Agreement was integral to establishing a joint venture for manufacturing automobiles. The agreement involved not only the transfer of technical information but also comprehensive assistance for setting up the manufacturing unit .

The expenditure in question was crucial for establishing the manufacturing plant and the continuation of product manufacture. Thus, it constituted capital expenditure rather than revenue expenditure, given its enduring benefit and integral role in setting up the manufacturing unit .

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the expenditure incurred by the assessee on technical fees constituted capital expenditure rather than revenue expenditure.

Facts:

The appellants purchased agricultural produce and brought it to the market area, raising the question of their liability to pay market fees.

Issues:

The title in the goods passed from the seller to the appellant-buyer and whether the agricultural produce was subject to market fees.

Held:

The applicability of market fees depended on when the title in the goods passed, which required an examination of the terms and conditions of the contract and the relevant provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.( Para 14)

The intention regarding the transfer of title was to be gathered from the terms and conditions of the contract, indicating that ownership remained with the seller until delivery. This condition established that the sale was fructified only after the goods were brought to the market area.( Para 21, 22, and 28)

The argument that agricultural produce bought for further processing in the appellant's factory was not subject to market fees was rejected. The court held that if the goods initially qualified as agricultural produce subject to market fees, then the fees were payable regardless of their subsequent use.( Para 25, 27)

Decision: The court affirmed that market fees were payable if the agricultural produce was bought and sold within the market area, with liability dependent on the transfer of ownership as per the terms of the contract and relevant provisions of the Sale of Goods Act. The purpose for which the produce was bought (e.g., for further processing) did not exempt it from market fees if it initially qualified as agricultural produce subject to such fees.

Facts:

The appellant and a girl were in love, but her family opposed their relationship due to caste differences.

Both consumed copper sulphate; the girl hanged herself, while the appellant survived.

Items indicative of a marriage ceremony were found at the scene.

A suicide note purportedly written by the girl was discovered.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the death was homicidal.

The plausibility of suicide versus murder in the circumstances presented.

The sufficiency and reliability of circumstantial evidence.

The flaws in the investigation and the appellant's conduct.

Held:

The Court observed that the prosecution failed to prove conclusively that the cause of death was homicidal. Medical evidence did not support this assertion. (Para 21)

The appellant's account of the girl's suicide due to familial opposition was deemed plausible, supported by items found at the scene indicating a marriage ceremony. (Para 22)

The Court emphasized the requirement for a complete chain of circumstances to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt in cases relying on circumstantial evidence. (Para 24)

It was noted that suspicion, no matter how grave, cannot replace legal proof, and the prosecution must establish guilt to a moral certainty. (Para 24)

Flaws in the investigation, including the failure to authenticate the suicide note's handwriting, were highlighted. (Para 30)

The appellant's conduct, such as efforts to save the girl and subsequent hospitalization, was inconsistent with the prosecution's narrative of premeditated murder. (Para 32)

The Court reasoned that the circumstances did not support the prosecution's contention of murder, as the appellant made efforts to save the girl and sought help. (Para 35)

The Court criticized the High Court's reasoning for assuming the appellant's guilt without positive evidence. (Para 40)

Concluding that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court acquitted the appellant. (Para 41)

This appeal is allowed. (Para 44)

Facts:

The case involves the import of Acrylonitrile Butadiene Rubber from abroad and the imposition of anti-dumping duty under Section 9A(5) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

The government had initiated a sunset review investigation regarding the anti-dumping duty previously imposed.

Notifications extending the period of anti-dumping duty were issued, with one extending it for another five years effective till January 01, 2014, and another extending it by one year pending investigation, until January 01, 2015.

Issues:

Whether the continuation of anti-dumping duty beyond the original period requires a proper notification.

Whether the amendment of notifications extending anti-dumping duty can occur after their expiration.

Held:

The requirement under Section 9A(5) is that the sunset review must be initiated before the expiry of the original period for which the anti-dumping duty prevails.

There's no additional requirement of making the initiation public before the expiry date.

The extension of anti-dumping duty cannot be automatic and requires a proper notification.

The second proviso to Section 9A(5) provides enabling power to the Central Government to continue the duty for a further period not exceeding one year pending the outcome of a review.

The anti-dumping duty may continue, pending the review outcome, for a maximum period of one year, implying that the period can be shorter.

The High Court's interpretation that notifications for anti-dumping duty are temporary legislation and cannot be amended after expiration is upheld.

Notifications extending anti-dumping duty must be amended during their validity period (para 40).

Decision: The appeals are dismissed.