Facts:

The case pertains to the appeal of Kameng Dolo against the High Court's declaration of his election to the State Legislative Assembly as void. The challenge was based on the alleged non-compliance with the provisions of section 37 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Issues:

• The compliance with section 37 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, concerning the withdrawal of candidature by the appellant.

Held:

Section 37 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, clearly outlines the procedure for withdrawal of candidature. It mandates that a candidate may withdraw their candidature by providing written notice containing prescribed particulars before the specified deadline.

The withdrawal notice must be delivered to the Returning Officer by the candidate personally, their proposer, or their election agent, authorized in writing. The Returning Officer must verify the genuineness of the withdrawal notice and the identity of the person delivering it.

In the present case, it was found that there was total non-compliance with section 37, as the withdrawal of candidature was not made by the candidate, their proposer, or their election agent, and there was no authorization for such withdrawal.

The legislature has provided safeguards in section 37 to ensure the integrity of the withdrawal process. Non-compliance with these safeguards could undermine the democratic process and the sanctity of elections.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, and the decision of the High Court to declare the election void is upheld due to the non-compliance with statutory provisions regarding withdrawal of candidature.

Facts:

Lisie Medical Institutions claimed exemption from paying building tax under the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975, for its hospital in Ernakulam, Kerala.

The institution was constituted under a Registered Trust Deed and claimed to be solely for philanthropic purposes, providing medical treatment regardless of caste, creed, or community.

The Commissioner of Income Tax treated the institution as a charitable trust under Section 12A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Despite income tax exemption, the institution faced resistance from authorities regarding building tax liability.

The institution's plea for exemption was rejected by the Assessing Officer and subsequently in appeals and representations.

Issues:

Whether the institution qualifies for exemption from building tax under the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975, as a charitable institution.

Interpretation of the term "charitable purpose" under the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the interpretation of "charitable purpose" under the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975, required reevaluation. It noted that the previous judgment misinterpreted Explanation I of Section 3(1) of the Act by equating "charitable purpose" with "relief of the poor and free medical relief" alone. The Court emphasized that the term "includes" in the explanation implies a broader understanding of charitable purposes, beyond the mentioned examples.

The Court referred to previous judgments emphasizing the predominant object test for determining charitable purposes and directed the matter to be reconsidered by a larger bench.

Facts:

The case involved the classification of the product 'Appy Fizz' under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, with the appellant asserting it should be categorized as a fruit juice-based drink (taxable at 12.5%), while the revenue authority argued for classification as an aerated branded soft drink (taxable at 20%). Various technical and scientific materials were presented to support each argument.

Issues:

The interpretation of statutory provisions, application of statutory interpretation principles, consideration of technical evidence, and the burden of proof in tax classification cases.

Held:

The court analyzed Section 6(1)(a) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, which indicates a higher tax rate for goods harmful to the environment and health.

Section 6(1)(d) empowers the state to notify goods taxable at 12.5%, applicable when goods do not fall under Section 6(1)(a) or (c).

The court applied the principle of 'noscitur a sociis' to interpret Entry 71, indicating that items listed therein should be understood contextually.

Technical evidence was deemed crucial in determining the classification of 'Appy Fizz,' as supported by certificates and opinions.

The appellant successfully proved through relevant scientific and technical materials that 'Appy Fizz' qualifies as a fruit juice-based drink under Entry 71.

Decision: The court upheld the appellant's argument, directing that 'Appy Fizz' should be classified under Entry 71, with a tax liability of 12.5% (later revised to 14.5%). The appeals filed by the revenue authority were dismissed, and further proceedings were directed accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant, a partnership firm, acquired leasehold rights in a market area and constructed shops and stalls on the premises, which were sub-licensed to various traders.

The Assessing Officer assessed the income as "Income from House Property," which the appellant contested, claiming it should be treated as business income.

Issues:

Whether the income earned by the appellant from the shopping centre should be taxed under the head "Income from House Property" or "Profits and Gains from the Business or Profession."

Whether the appellant's main business activity was sub-letting premises, thereby making the income business income.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the income earned by the appellant from the shopping centre should be taxed under the head "Income from House Property" rather than "Profits and Gains from the Business or Profession." The Court emphasized that the determination depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case, the Court noted that the primary activity of the appellant was not the systematic provision of services to the occupants but rather letting out of the shops and stalls and collecting rents.

Therefore, the income was rightfully categorized as income from house property. The Court referred to relevant legal provisions and precedents to support its decision, stating that income from letting out premises is generally treated as income from house property unless the activity amounts to a systematic or organized business.

The judgment cited the case of East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd., which held that income derived from letting out of property remained income from house property even if received by a company formed with the object of developing and setting up properties. Based on the facts and legal principles, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the decision to tax the income as "Income from House Property."

Facts:

The appellant-husband and respondent-wife, after over two decades of marriage, were embroiled in a bitter matrimonial dispute.

The couple jointly owned a flat where they resided with their daughters.

The respondent-wife filed for divorce on grounds of cruelty and sought various reliefs, including the appellant's eviction from the shared household under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Issues:

Whether the order directing the appellant-husband to vacate the matrimonial home warrants interference.

Whether the appellant's rights as a co-owner of the property can outweigh the respondent-wife's allegations of domestic violence.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments presented and the relevant legal provisions, held as follows:

The court affirmed the Family Court's interim order directing the appellant-husband to vacate the shared household, citing Section 19(1)(b) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which empowers the court to take such action upon satisfaction of domestic violence (Paragraph 12).

The court dismissed the appeal and directed the Family Court to expedite the divorce proceedings while emphasizing that no opinion on the merits of the case was expressed. The Family Court shall try and dispose of the case uninfluenced by any observations or findings either in the impugned order or this order. (Paragraph 13).

Facts:

The appellant, Shivashakti Sugars Limited, sought permission to establish a sugar factory.

The High Court held that the respondent, Shree Renuka Sugar Limited (RS), qualified as an existing sugar factory under Clause 6A.

The distance between the appellant's factory and RS was less than 15 kilometers, violating Clause 6A.

The appellant's factory had been operational since 2011.

Various economic factors such as loans, employment, and public purpose were considered.

Issues:

Whether RS qualifies as an existing sugar factory under Clause 6A.

Whether the distance requirement between the appellant's factory and RS was violated.

The economic impact and public interest served by the appellant's factory.

Held:

The court accepted the submission that RS is not an existing sugar factory if it is not in operation at the time of the new sugar mill's application for establishment.

The requirement for an existing sugar mill under Explanation 1 to Clause 6A is to crush for five consecutive years, not just for one season.

The State Government's liquidation order for RS indicates it was not operational, making the distance requirement inapplicable.

The appellant's factory took effective steps for establishment, including obtaining necessary permissions and commencing production within the stipulated time.

RS waived the distance requirement by giving a "no objection" certificate to the appellant, indicating no adverse impact on sugarcane availability.

Economic factors such as investment, loans, employment generation, and public purpose served by the appellant's factory favored its continued operation.

The court emphasized the need for an economic analysis of law, considering the economic impact of decisions alongside statutory provisions.

Article 142 of the Constitution was invoked to uphold the operation of the appellant's factory, considering equitable considerations.

The High Court's directions were set aside, allowing the appellant's factory to continue operations, with certain villages being reallocated.

Facts:

The case involves multiple interlocutory applications and contempt petitions filed by a consortium of banks against debtors and guarantors, seeking recovery of substantial sums of money owed to them. The respondent No. 3, a guarantor, was supposed to receive a sum of US$ 75 million, out of which US $ 40 million was to be paid to the Banks immediately. However, respondent No. 3 failed to disclose his assets as directed by the Supreme Court and violated restraint orders passed by the High Court by transferring US $ 40 million to his children.

Issues:

Whether respondent No. 3 is guilty of contempt of court on two counts.

Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to exercise contempt jurisdiction in the case of contempt of the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court found respondent No. 3 guilty of contempt on two counts. First, for disobeying the Supreme Court's orders by not disclosing full particulars of his assets (Para 28). Second, for violating the express orders of restraint passed by the High Court.

The orders passed by the Supreme Court were clear and unambiguous, and respondent No. 3 was obligated to make complete disclosure of his assets (Para 28). The funds received by respondent No. 3 were subject to restraint orders passed by the High Court, and his actions to transfer the funds to trusts beyond the reach of the court process reflected an intent to evade legal scrutiny.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to exercise contempt jurisdiction even with regard to contempt of the High Court, especially when the orders of the High Court pertain to the same cause. Respondent No. 3 was adequately put on notice, and no prejudice would be caused by the Supreme Court assuming jurisdiction in this matter.

Respondent No. 3 was found to be duty-bound to appear in person in response to the contempt petition, but instead, he sought the recall of the orders issuing notice, which was dismissed by the Court. Consequently, he was directed to appear in person for the contempt proceedings.

As respondent No. 3 failed to file any reply or appear in person, the Court decided to grant him one more opportunity to be heard on the proposed punishment for contempt. Therefore, the matter was adjourned for further hearing.

Decision: The Supreme Court held respondent No. 3 guilty of contempt on two counts and directed him to appear in person for further proceedings on the proposed punishment for contempt.

Facts:

The respondents operated a financial establishment, Global Capital Trading Services, in Madurai, offering high returns on investments.

Numerous depositors lodged complaints alleging that the respondents failed to return deposits after maturity.

A complaint (FIR No. 06/2010) was filed against the respondents under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, along with Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997.

The State Government issued an order (G.O.) on 24.12.2012, attaching the immovable properties of the respondents under Section 3 of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the State Government's order attaching properties under Section 3 of the Act is valid.

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the said order.

Held:

The Court examined the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997, and determined the validity of the State Government's order.

The Court's interpretation of Section 3 of the Act, affirming the government's power to issue ad-interim attachment orders to protect depositors' interests. The Court found no ambiguity in the Act's language and upheld the validity of the government's action.

The Court criticized the High Court's interference with the ad-interim order, stating in paragraph 15 that such interference defeats the purpose of the provision meant to safeguard investors' interests.

In conclusion the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and affirmed the validity of the State Government's order to attach the respondents' properties under Section 3 of the Act.

The appeal was allowed, providing clarity on the State's authority to take action against financial establishments that fail to fulfill their obligations to depositors.

Facts:

The land in question was taken over by the government in 1935 for non-payment of land tax and converted into "bought in" land. Subsequently, it was further converted into "Punjai Tharisu" (Government-owned fallow land) and assigned to third parties in 1958. The respondent claimed to be the sole legal heir to the land and offered to pay the arrears of land tax for its restoration to him. The respondent relied on RSO 45(4) for preferential reassignment.

Issues:

Whether the respondent met the prerequisites for preferential reassignment under RSO 45(4).

Whether the High Court's decree based on the absence of notice issued to the respondent before the 1958 assignment was correct.

Held:

The Revenue Standing Orders outline the general procedure under the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, for realization of arrears of land revenue. RSO 45, a pivotal provision, mandates specific steps for the government's acquisition of "bought in" land.

The prerequisite for preferential reassignment under RSO 45(4) includes absence of willful default in tax payment, default due to uncontrollable circumstances, and unobjectionable assignment. Non-compliance with these preconditions disqualifies the original owner or their heirs from preference.

The respondent failed to provide evidence satisfying the prerequisites for preferential reassignment under RSO 45(4). His delay in clearing arrears and initiating legal action worked against him.

Compliance with statutory requirements is crucial. Failure to meet these requirements precludes preferential treatment.

The High Court's decree solely based on the absence of notice issued to the respondent before the 1958 assignment was incorrect.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the respondent is not entitled to the restoration of the land. The preference under RSO 45(4) was not applicable due to the respondent's failure to meet the necessary conditions.