Facts:

The case involves a delay of 28 years in filing a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the claim petition is reasonable.

Held:

The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, provided a six-month limitation period for raising a claim for compensation. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, initially maintained a similar limitation period under Section 166(3) but later introduced a bar on entertaining claim petitions after twelve months from the date of the accident. However, this limitation provision was completely removed from the Act on November 14, 1994.

Despite the absence of an explicit limitation period in the 1988 Act, claims must be raised within a reasonable time. The reasonableness of the time period depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this instance, a delay of 28 years was deemed unreasonable, rendering the claim stale and dead.

A claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is considered genuine only if it is a live and surviving claim. Approaching the tribunal after such a significant delay cannot be deemed as a live and surviving claim.

Decision: The appeal is allowed. The claim petition filed after a delay of 28 years is dismissed.

Facts:

The case concerned the rehabilitation of 'project affected families' following the implementation of the Sardar Sarovar Project.

Various families were involved, some opting for cash compensation, while others sought land in lieu of compensation.

Issues:

Determination of compensation for families not fully compensated.

Addressing the situation of families duped by middlemen despite receiving compensation.

Held:

The Court held that Families not fully compensated were entitled to compensation at a rate of Rs. 60 lakhs per family.

Families duped by middlemen, despite receiving compensation, were further compensated with Rs. 15 lakhs per family.

The concerned authority was directed to ensure timely implementation of compensation payments.

All occupants were instructed to vacate the submergence area by a specified date, with potential forcible removal after.

Gujarat and Maharashtra were directed to conclude resettlement and rehabilitation activities within three months.

All pending litigations arising from the recommendations of the Jha Commission's report were ordered to come to an end.

Disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal brought before the Supreme Court challenging certain directions issued by a Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The High Court had directed the State Government to amend the provisions of Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, within a period of ninety days.

Issues:

The Supreme Court was whether the directions issued by the High Court for amending the legislation were constitutionally permissible, considering the limitations on the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the directions issued by the High Court for amending the legislation were unconstitutional and exceeded the limitations of judicial review under Article 226.

The Court emphasized the principle of separation of powers and reiterated that the judiciary cannot mandate the enactment or amendment of laws, as this power lies solely with the legislature. The Court referred to various precedents to support its decision and concluded by setting aside the directions issued by the High Court. No costs were awarded in the matter.

Facts:

Tarun Tyagi was accused of stealing the 'source code' of a software named 'Quick Recovery' and selling it under a different name.

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) seized certain documents and material, including hard disks, from Tyagi's premises during investigation.

Tyagi requested copies of the seized hard disks under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, asserting his need for them to prepare his defense effectively.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, Tyagi, is entitled to receive copies of the seized hard disks under Section 207 of the Code.

How to balance Tyagi's right to access evidence for his defense with the need to prevent potential misuse of the seized material.

Held:

The court recognized Tyagi's right to receive documents relied upon by the prosecution for a fair trial, as per Section 207 of the Code. However, concerns about potential misuse of the seized hard disks were also acknowledged. To address these concerns while ensuring fair trial rights, the court laid down specific conditions for supplying the hard disks to Tyagi. These conditions included recording the contents of the CDs in court in the presence of both parties, and Tyagi providing an affidavit undertaking not to use or misuse the source code contained in the CDs. The court referenced a similar case where the prosecution had accepted the court's directions to supply hard disks under similar circumstances, subject to similar undertakings from the accused.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal on the condition that the seized hard disks would be supplied to Tyagi under the specified conditions outlined in paragraphs 12 and 13.

Facts:

The respondent-landlord filed for eviction of the appellant, who was the brother of the deceased tenant, Lalita, from a property in Dehradun. Lalita had been the tenant after her father-in-law and husband.

Issues:

Whether the appellant qualified as a legal heir or representative of Lalita and whether he was entitled to continue as a tenant in the disputed property.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined relevant provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act and the Hindu Succession Act to determine the appellant's inheritance rights and tenancy status.

It concluded that the appellant did not meet the criteria to be considered a legal heir or representative of Lalita under the relevant laws. The Court upheld the eviction order, directing the appellant to vacate the premises within four weeks. Failure to comply would result in the appellant being liable for contempt of court.

Facts:

The appellants, along with four other individuals, were charged with offenses under Sections 148, 302, 302/149, and 307/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The case stemmed from an incident where the accused, armed with rifles and weapons, attacked the complainant's family, resulting in the death of one individual and injuries to others.

Issues:

The interpretation and application of Section 149 of the IPC, which holds every member of an unlawful assembly accountable for offenses committed by any member in furtherance of the common object.

Held:

After analyzing the evidence, including witness testimonies and medical reports, the court upheld the convictions of the appellants and other accused. The court emphasized the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC, stating that once an individual's case falls within the scope of this provision, their personal involvement in the offense becomes immaterial. The court noted the consistent and credible testimonies of eyewitnesses, corroborating the prosecution's case, and highlighted the presence of the accused at the scene armed with weapons, indicating a common objective to commit violence.

The court referred to the precedent set in Lalji v. State of U.P., reiterating the principles governing Section 149 IPC and emphasizing that mere presence in an unlawful assembly can lead to vicarious criminal liability. Therefore, finding no merit in the appeal, the court dismissed it accordingly.

Facts:

Mrs. X, a 22-year-old petitioner, approached the court seeking permission for the medical termination of her pregnancy due to fetal abnormalities, diagnosed as bilateral renal agenesis and anhydramnios.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner had sufficient grounds to justify the termination of her pregnancy under the law, considering both her health and the condition of the fetus.

Held:

The court upheld the petitioner's right to preserve her life, citing the case of Suchita Srivastava vs. Chandigarh Administration, which established a woman's right to make reproductive choices as a dimension of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.( Paragraph 8)

Despite the advanced stage of pregnancy (24 weeks) and the inevitability of the fetus's death outside the womb, the court deemed it appropriate to permit the termination under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, given the risk to the petitioner's life and her mental and physical health.( Paragraph 9)

The court ordered the termination to be performed by the doctors of the hospital where the petitioner underwent medical check-up, supervised by the Medical Board appointed by the court, and with complete records maintained by the hospital.( Paragraph 10)

Concerns regarding the validity of the petitioner's consent were addressed by confirming her mental soundness through psychiatric evaluation, ensuring that the decision to terminate the pregnancy was made voluntarily and without coercion.( Paragraph 11)

The court allowed the writ petition, granting the petitioner's request for medical termination of her pregnancy, emphasizing the importance of obtaining affidavits directly from the concerned individual in such cases.( Paragraph 12)

Facts:

Nidhi, the appellant, sought possession of a non-residential accommodation under Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Act, alleging bona fide personal requirement.

The Prescribed Authority granted the release order in Nidhi's favor, but the decision was challenged and overturned by the Additional District Judge and subsequently by the High Court.

The High Court, considering subsequent events like Nidhi's marriage and relocation, denied relief to Nidhi.

Issues:

Whether subsequent events, such as Nidhi's marriage and relocation, extinguished her bona fide requirement for the premises.

Whether the High Court erred in not considering the comparative hardship to Nidhi.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Nidhi's marriage and subsequent relocation did not extinguish her bona fide requirement for the premises, particularly as she sought accommodation not only for herself but also for her parents and grandparents. The court emphasized the legislative intent to favor landlords in such disputes and stressed the need to assess the impact of subsequent events on the landlord's bona fide requirement and comparative hardship.

As the tenant could relocate their business without significant loss, while Nidhi's family would face hardship without the premises, the High Court's failure to consider the comparative hardship to Nidhi led to the reversal of its decision.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed Nidhi's appeal, setting aside the High Court's order, and restored the release order passed by the Prescribed Authority. The tenant was directed to hand over possession, and Nidhi was instructed to deposit compensation for the tenant within a specified period.

Facts:

The case involves an eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by the respondent against the appellants. The appellants contested the eviction on various grounds, including disputing the ownership of the respondent over the property, the relationship of landlord and tenant, and the availability of alternative accommodation.

Issues:

Whether the appellants should be granted leave to contest the eviction proceedings on merits based on the grounds raised by them.

Held:

The court held that the appellants were entitled to contest the eviction proceedings on merits as they had raised prima facie grounds which, if accepted, could result in dismissing the eviction application.

The court set aside the orders of the lower authorities and granted leave to contest the eviction application. The eviction case was restored to its original file before the Rent Controlling Authority for disposal on merits.

The appellants were directed to deposit arrears of rent and continue to deposit monthly rent until final orders were passed. The Rent Controlling Authority was directed to decide the case expeditiously.