Facts:

The State of U.P. issued notifications between 1976 and 2010 to acquire land for planned industrial development in Noida and Greater Noida.

Some landowners challenged the acquisition in the High Court of Allahabad, arguing that it was illegal, lacked urgency, and deprived them of the opportunity to object.

The High Court disposed of several writ petitions, upholding the acquisition in most cases but directing the State to pay enhanced compensation and allot developed abadi plots to certain landowners, based on the extent of development on the acquired land.

The appellants, who were also landowners in the acquisition proceedings, appealed to the Supreme Court seeking similar relief as granted by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellants are entitled to claim the same relief as granted by the High Court to certain landowners in the acquisition proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellants lacked both legal right and factual foundation to claim the relief of allotment of additional developed abadi plot.

The Land Acquisition Act does not provide for such reliefs to landowners.

The State had already paid statutory and additional compensation to all landowners, including the appellants.

Granting the relief sought by the appellants would contradict the Court's previous directions and set a precedent against its decision in a similar case.

The appeals were dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision to deny the appellants the relief of allotment of additional developed abadi plot.

Facts:

The appellants (plaintiffs) filed a civil suit against the respondents (defendants) for specific performance of an agreement.

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the appellants.

The respondents appealed to the Single Judge of the High Court, who allowed their appeal and dismissed the appellants' suit.

The appellants then filed a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) before the Division Bench of the High Court, which was summarily dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellants' LPA.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the Division Bench's dismissal of the LPA lacked proper reasoning and did not comply with the requirements of the Civil Procedure Code. The lack of a reasoned order deprived the parties of understanding the basis for the decision, causing prejudice. Thus, the Supreme Court decided to set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the Division Bench of the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the Division Bench of the High Court for fresh consideration on merits, emphasizing the importance of reasoned orders and expeditious disposal of the appeal.

Facts:

The case involved workers seeking regularization of their services in Chennai Port Trust, governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The High Court had given directions regarding cargo distribution between Chennai and Ennore Ports. Chennai Port Trust terminated the MOU after certain activities were shifted to Ennore Port Trust. Workers filed a writ petition, initially dismissed by a Single Judge but partially allowed by a Division Bench.

Issues:

The employment status of the workers, their association membership, and entitlement to relief.

Held:

The Supreme Court directed that the case should have been referred to arbitration instead of being entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution. Various questions regarding employment status and entitlement to relief need to be decided by an Arbitral Tribunal.

The Court set aside the impugned judgments and dismissed the writ petition, granting liberty to the parties to approach the court for the appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal as per the MOU.

The Tribunal is instructed to consider all issues raised, ensure a fair resolution within six months, and may frame additional questions if necessary.

Facts:

Plaintiff filed a civil suit against the defendants for recovery of a sum.

Summons initially sent to defendants' place of business, later sought substituted service by publication.

Summons published in newspapers but lacked specific details like day, date, year, and time for defendants' appearance.

Defendants did not appear, leading to the passing of an ex-parte decree.

Defendants filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC to set aside the decree, citing improper summons service.

Issues:

Whether the summons served on the defendants complied with statutory requirements.

Whether the lack of specific details in the summons invalidated the ex-parte decree.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the summons did not comply with statutory requirements, as they lacked specific details for the defendants' appearance. This non-compliance invalidated the ex-parte decree, and the defendants were entitled to have it set aside under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC.

The Court emphasized the importance of adherence to statutory provisions and set aside the judgments of the lower courts. The civil suit was restored to its original file, and the parties were directed to appear before the concerned court for further proceedings.

Any deposits made by the appellant would be subject to the final result of the suit.

Facts:

Swaraj Abhiyan and other petitioners filed writ petitions seeking investigation into the purchase of a helicopter by the State of Chhattisgarh.

Allegations included irregularities in the procurement process and possible links to offshore accounts of the Chief Minister's son.

Issues:

Whether there were irregularities in the procurement process of the helicopter.

Whether there were grounds to suspect kickbacks or undue benefits to the Chief Minister's son.

Whether the writ petitions had a sufficient element of public interest.

Held:

The court examines the documents and finds no evidence to substantiate the allegations of irregularities or kickbacks in the procurement process. It notes that the state government's decision was based on recommendations and comparisons of helicopter models, and there was no indication of undue benefits to any individual.

Emphasizes that a petition under Article 32 should have a clear element of public interest and cannot be entertained solely based on alleged procedural irregularities. The court dismisses the writ petitions, highlighting the importance of genuine public interest in such cases.

Facts:

The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) denied exemption under excise notifications for jute bags manufactured and supplied for packing food grains, based on the assertion that affixing buyer-specific information amounted to using a brand name.

Issues:

Whether the markings on jute bags constitute a brand name, thus disqualifying them from excise duty exemption.

Held:

The Court, after examining the definition of "brand name" and considering precedents, held that the compulsory markings on jute bags, mandated by the Jute Commissioner and government requisition orders, did not serve the purpose of indicating a connection in the course of trade between the product and any person. Thus, they did not qualify as a brand name as defined under the law. The Court referred to the judgment in CCE v. Stangen Immuno Diagnostics (2015) 11 SCC 761, where it was held that a brand name must establish a connection between the product and the manufacturer. Similarly, in CCE v. Sanghi Threads (2015) 14 SCC 701, it was emphasized that a mark used for identification within a group did not constitute a brand name.

The Court distinguished the present case from Kohinoor Elastics P Ltd. v. CCE (2005) 7 SCC 528, where the brand name was affixed to indicate a connection between the product and the customer, unlike the compulsory markings here. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals and set aside the CESTAT's judgment.

Facts:

In 1999, the Rourkela Steel Plant (RSP) introduced a Voluntary Retirement Scheme.

In 2002, SAIL introduced the "Sail Scheme for Leasing of Houses to Employees," excluding ex-employees.

Ex-employees, who were allotted quarters under the VRS, sought long-term leases, which were denied by SAIL.

The matter was taken to court, where the High Court directed SAIL to consider allotting quarters on a long-term sub-lease basis to the ex-employees.

SAIL appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether ex-employees under the VRS scheme have a right to long-term leases for the quarters.

Whether subsequent developments and changed circumstances affect the applicability of the 2002 lease scheme.

Held:

The Court held that the changed circumstances, including significant infrastructural developments and future expansion plans of RSP, rendered the 2002 lease scheme inapplicable to ex-employees.

The Court noted that no legal right vested in ex-employees under the 2002 scheme and found it unreasonable to compel SAIL to grant long-term leases in light of the current shortage of accommodation and future expansion plans.

Therefore, the Court allowed SAIL's appeal, setting aside the High Court's order. However, the Court directed the ex-employees to remain in occupation of the quarters for 33 months from the date of the judgment, after which they were instructed to vacate the quarters peacefully and hand them over to the competent authority of RSP.

Facts:

The case of MAXOPP INVESTMENT LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI (Civil Appeal Nos. 104-109 of 2015) involved the interpretation and application of Section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 14A and whether the disallowance of expenditure related to exempted income applies to investments made to gain control of investee companies or those made as stock-in-trade.

Held:

The deduction of expenditure under Section 14A is not allowed if it has been incurred in relation to income that is not part of the total income under the Income Tax Act.

The dominant purpose for which an investment into shares is made by an assessee may not be relevant for interpreting Section 14A. Even if the investment is made to gain control of the investee company, if dividend income is earned, the expenditure attributable to earning that dividend income has to be disallowed.

The principle of apportionment of expenses comes into play for interpreting Section 14A, regardless of whether the shares are held to gain control or as stock-in-trade.

When shares are held as stock-in-trade, the main purpose is to trade and earn profits. Even if dividend income is earned incidentally, it is exempt from tax. Thus, the expenditure incurred in acquiring such shares needs to be apportioned.

Before applying the theory of apportionment under Section 14A, the Assessing Officer (AO) needs to record satisfaction that the suo moto disallowance under Section 14A by the assessee was not correct. This is particularly relevant when the assessee has apportioned the expenditure in the return, but the AO disagrees.

Decision: The decision of the court emphasizes that Section 14A applies to dividend income irrespective of the purpose of investment, and the principle of apportionment of expenses is to be applied. The judgment clarifies the obligations of the Assessing Officer and provides guidance on the treatment of expenditure related to exempted income.

Facts:

The Maharashtra Housing Development Authority (MHADA) issued an e-Tender notice for a redevelopment project.

The respondent, Shapoorji Pallonji & Company Private Limited, claimed to have submitted their bid within the specified timeframe but did not receive an acknowledgment.

The High Court directed the National Informatics Centre (NIC) to retrieve and consider the bid documents of the respondent.

Issues:

Whether the bid documents uploaded by the respondent could be retrieved.

If the bid documents could be retrieved, whether the respondent's bid should be considered.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the bid documents uploaded by the respondent could not be retrieved under any circumstances, as affirmed by the NIC.

The Court accepted the NIC's assertion that the bid was invalid due to the failure of the respondent to complete the bid process by pressing the 'freeze button'. Therefore, the High Court's directions to consider the respondent's bid were incorrect as it effectively provided the respondent with a second opportunity, which was unwarranted.

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the directions issued by the High Court.