Facts:

The petitioner, Krishna Mohan Medical College & Hospital, applied for establishment under the Indian Medical Council Act and the Regulations.

The Medical Council of India (MCI) recommended against granting permission due to detected deficiencies.

Despite MCI's recommendation, the Oversight Committee directed issuance of a conditional Letter of Permission (LOP) for the academic year 2016-17.

Subsequent inspections by MCI revealed alleged deficiencies in faculty and residents, leading to a recommendation for debarring the college from admissions for two academic years.

Issues:

Whether the Central Government's decision to debar the petitioner college from admitting students and to encash the bank guarantee was lawful.

Whether successive inspections by MCI and the decision based on such inspections were justified.

Held:

The Court held that the Central Government's decision was not in accordance with the principles of natural justice and fair hearing, as mandated by Section 10A(4) of the Indian Medical Council Act. The Court noted that the Hearing Committee did not adequately re-evaluate the materials on record or provide a reasoned decision.

The decision was based on flawed grounds, including the petitioner's alleged non-cooperation and unsubstantiated deficiencies. Therefore, the Court directed the confirmation of the conditional LOP for the academic year 2016-17. However, considering the importance of medical education standards, the Court ordered a fresh inspection for the academic year 2018-19.

The decision to debar the college from admitting students for the academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19 was overturned, and the Central Government was instructed not to encash the bank guarantee provided by the college.

Facts:

The petitioner, Saraswati Educational Charitable Trust, applied to the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India, for establishing a new medical college in Uttar Pradesh.

The application was forwarded to the Medical Council of India (MCI) for evaluation and recommendations.

The MCI conducted inspections and found deficiencies, leading to the Ministry debarring the petitioner college from admitting students for two academic sessions.

The petitioner challenged this decision through a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the decision to debar the petitioner college from admitting students was justified.

Whether the second inspection conducted by the MCI was necessary.

Whether the Competent Authority considered all relevant aspects before debarring the petitioner college.

Held:

The Court quashed the decision to debar the petitioner college and directed the authorities to allow admissions for the academic session 2017-18. It extended the cut-off date for admissions and directed admissions through central counseling.

The Court emphasized that the MCI or competent authority could inspect the college at any time and take action if deficiencies were found. However, considering the college's fulfillment of infrastructure and academic requirements, relief was granted to the petitioner. Costs were not awarded.

Facts:

Shri Venkateshwara University filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, challenging an order debarring them from admitting students in the MBBS course for the academic sessions 2017-2018 and 2018-2019.

The Medical Council of India (MCI) had conducted inspections and found deficiencies during the academic session 2016-2017.

The university argued that the inspection conducted on December 9, 2016, was invalid due to the religious holiday, and thus, the subsequent order debarring them from admitting students was unjustified.

Issues:

Whether the inspection conducted by the MCI on December 9, 2016, was valid despite falling within the timeframe of a religious holiday.

Whether the order debarring the university from admitting students for two academic years was justified.

Held:

The court held that the inspection conducted by the MCI on December 9, 2016, was valid as it did not fall within the specified moratorium period surrounding religious holidays. The order debarring the university from admitting students for two academic years was upheld.

However, the court allowed currently enrolled students to continue their studies for the academic session 2016-2017. The MCI was directed to conduct another inspection within two months to assess deficiencies for the academic session 2018-2019.

Facts:

The appellant challenged an order acquitting the respondent of a charge under Section 228 of the IPC. The charge stemmed from allegations of obstruction and interference in proceedings under Section 7A of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.

Issues:

Whether the complaint under Section 228 IPC was maintainable given the nature of the proceedings under Section 7A of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the complaint under Section 228 IPC was indeed maintainable, as the proceedings under Section 7A could be equated with a court for the purpose of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC. The Court cited Section 2(i) of the CrPC, which defines a judicial proceeding to include any proceedings in which evidence may be legally taken on oath. The Court reasoned that since such power is vested in the authority conducting proceedings under Section 7A of the Act, these proceedings could be deemed judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 IPC.

The Court also referenced the case of Lalji Haridas vs. State of Maharashtra (1964) 6 SCR 700, which supported the view that offenses committed during judicial proceedings should be treated as offenses committed in any proceeding in any court for the purpose of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC.

Additionally, the argument that the complaint should have been filed before the appellate tribunal under Section 7J of the Act was dismissed as frivolous.

Consequently, the Court held the order of the High Court to be unsustainable and allowed the appeal.

Facts:

The petitioners applied to establish a medical college, which was evaluated by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and forwarded to the Medical Council of India (MCI) for recommendations.

Despite initial negative recommendations and subsequent assessments, the Oversight Committee approved the scheme for the academic session 2016-17 with conditions.

The Ministry issued a Letter of Permission for the session 2016-17, but subsequent deficiencies led to a negative recommendation by the MCI and a decision by the Ministry to debar the college from admitting students for two years.

The petitioners challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the decision to debar the petitioner college from admitting students for the academic session 2017-18 was justified.

Whether the authorities provided tangible reasons for barring admissions.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the decision to debar the petitioner college from admitting students for the academic session 2017-18 was unjustified. The Court criticized the authorities for disregarding the fact situation and failing to provide tangible reasons for barring admissions.

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner college, allowing it to admit students for the academic session 2017-18 and directing authorities to facilitate the admissions process in the interest of justice and the larger public interest.

The Court emphasized that the Medical Council of India (MCI) or the Central Government could inspect the college and proceed against it if any deficiencies were found.

Facts:

Canara Bank (appellant) received an application from C.S. Shyam (respondent) seeking information about the transfer and posting of clerical staff from 2002 to 2006.

The information sought included personal details of individual employees such as joining date, designation, promotions, and transfer orders.

The bank's Public Information Officer declined to provide the information citing Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, and stating it had no nexus with public interest.

Issues:

Whether the information sought by the respondent falls within the ambit of personal information exempted from disclosure under Section 8(j) of the Act.

Whether there is a requirement to establish a public interest, especially a larger public interest, for the disclosure of such personal information.

Held:

The Supreme Court held in favor of Canara Bank and against C.S. Shyam. The Court concluded that the information sought was indeed personal in nature and exempted from disclosure under Section 8(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Moreover, the respondent failed to establish any public interest, let alone a larger public interest, justifying the disclosure of this information.

Therefore, the application made by the respondent under Section 6 of the Act was deemed misconceived. The Court set aside the orders of the High Court and Central Information Commission and restored the original decision of rejecting the respondent's application for information. The appeal is allowed,

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the appointment of arbitrators under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the appointed arbitrators met the requirements of independence and impartiality as per the Act and relevant schedules.

Whether the challenges raised against the appointment of the arbitrators are sustainable under the provided grounds.

Held:

Under Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a person approached for possible appointment as an arbitrator must make a written disclosure regarding any past or present relationship or interest in the parties or dispute that could raise doubts about their independence or impartiality.

The 2016 Amendment Act introduced a distinction between persons who become "ineligible" to be appointed as arbitrators and those about whom doubts exist regarding their independence or impartiality. If an arbitrator falls into any category specified in the Seventh Schedule, they become "ineligible" to act as an arbitrator.

Challenges based on grounds listed in the Fifth Schedule should be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13. If unsuccessful, the party challenging the appointment may seek to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34. However, challenges based on the Seventh Schedule render the arbitrator "ineligible" and can be addressed directly by the Court under Section 14(2).

Items listed in the Schedules should be interpreted broadly to ensure arbitrators' impartiality and independence.

Previous involvement in an arbitration between the parties does not necessarily render an arbitrator ineligible due to bias, as long as there is no indication of a pronounced anti-claimant view.

Arbitrators should make timely written disclosures to parties, but failure to do so due to administrative oversight may not necessarily invalidate the appointment.

Explanation 3 to the Seventh Schedule, regarding maritime or commodities arbitration, does not affect the applicability of other items in the Schedule.

Decision:

The Court upheld the appointment of the arbitrators, finding the challenges to their appointments unsustainable based on the disclosed grounds.

Facts:

The appellant company, MIS. INNOVENTIVE INDUSTRIES LTD., defaulted on payments owed to ICICI BANK under credit facilities. ICICI BANK filed an insolvency petition against the appellant to initiate the insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the Code). The appellant argued that its liability was suspended temporarily under the Maharashtra Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions Act), 1958 (the Maharashtra Act), and it was unable to pay debts due to non-release of funds under a master restructuring agreement (MRA).

Issues:

Whether the Maharashtra Act conflicts with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Whether the appellant's arguments regarding suspension of liability under the Maharashtra Act and non-payment due to the MRA are valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), affirming that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prevails over the Maharashtra Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions Act), 1958. The Court emphasized the objective of the Code to speed up the insolvency process and prevent entrenched managements from continuing if they cannot pay debts.

The Court clarified the principles of repugnancy between central and state laws under Article 254 of the Constitution, stating that the later central enactment prevails over earlier state enactments if they are repugnant. The Court concluded that the Maharashtra Act cannot hinder the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code, as it directly conflicts with the objectives and procedures of the Code.

The Court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding the suspension of liability under the Maharashtra Act and non-payment due to the MRA, stating that these do not hold weight in the insolvency resolution process.

Facts:

The appellant's ancestors claimed possession of roughly 5 acres of land since 1930.

Proceedings were initiated against the appellants under various Acts, including the U.P. Zamindari Act and the U.P. Tenancy Act.

Eventually, proceedings were initiated under the Public Premises Act, alleging unauthorized occupation by the appellants.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were unauthorized occupants or non-occupancy tenants.

Whether the proceedings under the Public Premises Act were valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act for non-prosecution automatically conferred hereditary tenancy status upon the appellants.

As hereditary tenants, the appellants could not be considered unauthorized occupants under the Public Premises Act.

Therefore, all previous orders against the appellants were without jurisdiction.

The Court directed the return of possession of the land to the appellants and ordered that equivalent land with a lease should be made available to ex-servicemen currently occupying any part of the land.

The judgment under appeal was set aside, and the appeal was allowed in favor of the appellants.