Facts:

The appellant-landlord filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction against the tenant, partially decreed by the trial court.

Another action for eviction was initiated by the landlord on grounds of unauthorized construction by the tenant.

Appeals against the suits were dismissed, with the High Court also dismissing civil revision applications.

Issues:

Whether the application of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC was correct without proper proof of the earlier suit's plaint.

The validity of the High Court's decision regarding the application of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC and its failure to address the merits of the case.

Held:

The Court held that the application of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC requires proper proof of the earlier suit's plaint. The failure to provide such proof renders the plea unsustainable.

This principle was reiterated based on the decisions in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal and Jichhu Ram v. Pearey Pasi. Consequently, the matter was remitted to the High Court for reconsideration on merits, with instructions to dispose of the civil revision application within six months.

The appeal relating to eviction was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court in that regard was set aside. However, the appeal arising out of the refusal of the order of injunction was dismissed.

Facts:

Transparency International India and the Centre for Media Studies filed a writ petition based on a study highlighting corruption issues, including in the lower judiciary in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Kangan, initiated action against several parties, including Transparency International India and the Centre for Media Studies, based on an article published in "Greater Kashmir" alleging corruption in the lower judiciary.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate to initiate contempt proceedings.

The response of the petitioners to the show cause notices.

The legality of enforcing attendance through arrest.

Held:

The court ruled that any court affected by general allegations could make a reference to the High Court for contempt proceedings. The jurisdiction of the High Court extends to cases involving contempt of subordinate courts, even if the allegations are not specific to individual judges or courts. (Para 18)

The Judicial Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to enforce attendance through arrest. The petitioners' response to the show cause notices was acknowledged, and the magistrate was directed to proceed in accordance with the law. The court clarified that while the magistrate could continue proceedings, the petitioners were free to enter their appearance before the magistrate. (Para 20)

The court recognized the petitioners' contention regarding the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989, and directed the magistrate to consider their submissions if intending to proceed under certain provisions of the Ranbir Penal Code. (Para 21)

Proceedings against Admiral R.H. Tahiliani were deemed to have abated due to his demise. (Para 22)

The writ petition and pending applications were disposed of accordingly.( Para 23)

Facts:

The case involves the acquisition of land by the State of Haryana for a public purpose, specifically for setting up an Industrial Model Township.

Disputes arose regarding the determination of compensation for the acquired land, which was allotted to Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL).

The High Court permitted the post-acquisition allottee to be impleaded as a party in the compensation determination process and allowed additional evidence to be presented.

Issues:

Whether a post-acquisition allottee of land has the locus to be heard in the determination of compensation.

Whether the allowance of additional evidence and remand by the High Court was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the post-acquisition allottee does not have the locus to be heard in the determination of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Once the land vests in the State for a public purpose, any subsequent allottee has no right to contest the compensation.

The allowance of additional evidence and the subsequent remand by the High Court was unjustified, as there was no ground for permitting additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

The matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with the law. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The appellant and respondent entered into an agreement for the sale of a property.

The sale was not completed as agreed upon, leading to the respondent filing a suit for specific performance.

The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, which was upheld by the Principal District Judge, Villupuram.

The appellants appealed the decision, contending that specific performance should not be ordered due to certain circumstances giving the plaintiff an unfair advantage.

Issues:

Whether specific performance of the contract should be ordered.

Whether circumstances justify compensation in lieu of specific performance.

Held:

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of specific performance, guided by judicial principles (Paragraphs 8 and 9).

The court found that certain circumstances, including the involvement of the respondent's father in money lending and the disparity in property values, made it inequitable to enforce specific performance (Paragraphs 10 and 11).

The court set aside the decree for specific performance and directed the appellants to pay Rs. 15 lakhs to the respondent in lieu of specific performance, with interest accruing at a rate of 9% per annum if not paid within two months (Paragraph 12).

The appeal was allowed, and no order was made regarding costs (Paragraph 14).

Facts:

The case involved appeals against a judgment by the High Court of Gauhati at Guwahati regarding enhancement of compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagaon.

The victims were involved in a fatal accident while traveling as passengers in a Tata Sumo vehicle.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation, holding the Tata Sumo driver negligent but absolving the insurance company from liability due to the victims being classified as "gratuitous passengers."

The claimants appealed seeking enhancement of compensation and liability of the insurance company.

Issues:

Whether the insurance company, United India Insurance Company Ltd., should be held liable for compensation to the claimants.

Application of the principle of "pay and recover" in such cases.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the principle of "pay and recover" should be applied, directing the insurance company to initially pay the awarded sum to the claimants.

Subsequently, the insurance company was entitled to recover the paid amount from the owner of the offending vehicle, Tata Sumo, in the same proceedings.

This decision was based on previous precedents, including National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur & Ors., National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Challa Upendra Rao & Ors., and Manager, National Insurance Company Limited v. Saju P. Paul & Anr.

The Court found no merit in the insurance company's arguments against granting relief to the claimants, considering the similarity of facts to previous cases and the pendency of reference to a larger Bench, which did not affect the applicability of established principles.

Therefore, the appeals were allowed, and the judgment of the High Court was modified accordingly.

Facts:

The case involved the registration of a reference under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA). The respondent company, Zenith Infotech Limited, had its application for reference dismissed by the Registrar, Secretary, and Chairman of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). Subsequently, the High Court upheld an order of winding up against the respondent company.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the reference application by the Registrar, Secretary, and Chairman of the BIFR was lawful.

Whether the winding-up order against the respondent company foreclosed the proceedings under SICA.

Held:

The power to scrutinize an application prior to registration and subsequently register it lies with the Registrar or Secretary of the BIFR. However, this power does not extend to adjudicating whether a company qualifies as an industrial company under SICA. Adjudication of such a question is within the jurisdiction of a Bench of the BIFR. (Para 17)

The rejection of the reference application by the Registrar, Secretary, and Chairman of the BIFR was deemed non-est in law by the High Court. Therefore, the reference was considered pending before the BIFR, attracting the provisions of Section 252 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. (Para 18)

The winding-up order against the respondent company did not foreclose the proceedings under SICA. The enquiry under SICA is deemed to have commenced upon registration of the reference. Therefore, the winding-up proceedings would only terminate after orders under Section 481 of the Companies Act, 1956, are passed. However, this question became redundant due to the conclusion that the reference was pending at the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. (Para 19)

Decision: The Court disposed of the appeal, affirming the High Court's ruling. It clarified the procedural aspects of registering a reference under SICA and emphasized that the power of adjudication lies with the Bench of the BIFR rather than individual authorities. It also affirmed the continuation of proceedings despite a winding-up order, provided the reference was pending before the BIFR.(Para 20-21)

Facts:

Dispute between brother (appellant) and sister (respondent No. 1) over inherited property.

The suit property located in Satara village, District Aurangabad, Maharashtra, was claimed by respondent No. 1 as her share inherited from their late father under Mohammedan Law.

Appellant contended that the property was his self-acquired through a registered sale deed and denied respondent No. 1's claim.

Issues:

Whether the High Court correctly dismissed the second appeal at the admission stage, stating it did not involve substantial questions of law.

Whether the case involved questions of law, particularly regarding the interpretation of documents and their implications on property ownership rights.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in dismissing the second appeal without properly considering the substantial questions of law involved. The Court emphasized that when interpreting documents and examining their effects, it inherently involves questions of law. Therefore, it was obligatory for the High Court to decide such questions on merits, especially after framing substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 of the CPC.

The Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case back to the High Court for reconsideration on merits. It instructed the High Court to admit the appeal, frame appropriate substantial questions of law, and decide the appeal accordingly, considering the pleadings, findings of the lower courts, and the documents presented.

Additionally, the Court encouraged an amicable settlement between the parties and granted them liberty to renew their offers before the High Court, suggesting resolving the dispute within six months for the benefit of the family involved.

The Court clarified that its decision did not express any opinion on the merits of the controversy but focused solely on whether the second appeal involved substantial questions of law as defined by Section 100 of the CPC.

Facts:

The case involves the execution of a decree for permanent injunction against the legal representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor.

Issues:

Whether a decree for permanent injunction can be executed against the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor.

Held:

The court held that Section 50 CPC deals with the execution of decrees against legal representatives, including that of permanent injunction. It is to be read with Order 21 Rule 32 CPC, which provides the mode for execution of such decrees. (Para 11, 12)

The right adjudicated in the suit and the findings recorded for the grant of injunction, concerning heritable and partible property, benefit both the legal heirs of the decree-holders and bind the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor. Section 50 CPC allows execution against legal representatives when a judgment-debtor dies before satisfaction of the decree. (Para 26)

The court set aside the High Court's order and directed the executing court to proceed with enforcement of the decree under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC, including requiring the legal representatives to furnish an undertaking to abide by the decree. (Para 27)

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and the executing court's direction for an undertaking by legal representatives to abide by the decree was deemed proper.

Facts:

The case involved a matrimonial dispute between Jitender Arora & Ors. (appellants) and Sukriti Arora & Ors. (respondents). The wife obtained an ex parte divorce from a U.K. court, while the husband obtained a divorce from an Indian court. Subsequently, the husband shifted to India along with their daughter. The wife filed a Habeas Corpus petition seeking directions for the husband to hand over the custody of the daughter to her.

Issues:

The court was to determine the custody of the daughter in the context of the matrimonial dispute between the parents.

Held:

The paramount consideration in custody disputes is the welfare of the child. The daughter in this case, being 15 years old, is deemed mature enough to understand what is in her best interest (para 10, 12).

The daughter unequivocally expressed her desire to be with her father and stated her reluctance to go to the U.K. The court cannot risk sending her to a foreign country against her wishes, which may prove to be detrimental to her well-being (para 14).

Despite giving the mother ample chances, including temporary custody, she was unable to win over the confidence of the daughter. Therefore, the welfare of the daughter lies in the continued company of her father (para 15).

The High Court's decision to grant custody to the mother was based on abstract notions without considering the specific circumstances of the case. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court is set aside (para 16).

Considering the age of the child and the circumstances of the case, the court concluded that custody should be with the father. It is noted that within three years, the child would reach the age of majority and would have the freedom to decide her own course of action (para 17).

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. Custody of the child is granted to the father.