Facts:

The deceased, Het Ram, went missing after being last seen with the appellant, Raja.

Suspicion arose regarding the appellant's involvement in the disappearance and probable murder of Het Ram.

Investigation led to the recovery of incriminating evidence, including blood-stained clothes and a knife, based on a disclosure statement made by the appellant.

Motive for the crime was suspected to be the appellant's anger over an alleged illicit relationship between Het Ram and the appellant's brother's wife.

Issues:

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the recovery of evidence based on the appellant's disclosure statement is admissible in court.

Held:

The court emphasized that in cases relying on circumstantial evidence, the chain of events leading to the crime must be firmly established, leaving no reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt.

The last seen theory, supported by witness testimonies, provided a strong circumstantial link between the appellant and the deceased.

The recovery of evidence, including blood-stained clothes and a knife, based on the appellant's disclosure statement, was deemed admissible in court.

The court highlighted the significance of motive in cases based on circumstantial evidence, and in this case, the suspected motive of the appellant's anger over an alleged illicit relationship further strengthened the prosecution's case.

After thorough analysis of the evidence and arguments, the court found the appeal to be devoid of merit and upheld the appellant's conviction. The appeal preferred by the Appellant is totally devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

Bajrang Bahadur Singh, a petitioner, was elected to the State Legislative Assembly from an Assembly Constituency. The Governor declared that Singh had incurred disqualification under Section 9A due to entering into contracts with the State after his election. Consequently, a notification was issued declaring Singh's seat vacant, and an election schedule was announced to fill the vacancy. Singh filed a writ petition challenging the disqualification. Subsequently, a notification was issued to notify the election to fill the Assembly Constituency. The High Court stayed the election process through an interim order.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 9A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, regarding the disqualification of legislators holding government contracts. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the High Court in interfering with the election process was also in question.

Held:

The court held that Acquisition of a disqualification under Article 191 of the Constitution immediately vacates the seat occupied by the disqualified legislator by operation of law.

The Governor's decision under Article 192 is to determine whether the legislator acquired the disqualification, not to remove the legislator from the Legislature.

The disqualifying event makes the legislator cease to be a Member of the Legislature from the date of acquiring the disqualification, and cessation of the disqualifying factor does not reinstate the legislator without reelection.

The clause "if and for so long as" in Section 9A means that the disqualified legislator can contest elections again if the disqualifying event ceases to exist.

The purpose of Section 9A is to maintain the purity of the legislature and avoid conflicts of interest among legislators.

High Courts have the authority and jurisdiction under Article 226 to adjudicate disputes, and their interference in election processes can be justified in certain circumstances.

The interim order by the High Court staying the election process was justified, but the Election Commission is obligated to hold a bye-election within six months of the vacancy. In view of the dismissal of the transferred case, the special leave petition is disposed of.

Facts:

Chennai Properties and Investment Ltd., the appellant, was a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act with the main objective of acquiring properties in Chennai and letting them out. The appellant declared the rental income from these properties as business income in its tax return. However, the assessing officer disagreed, contending that the income should be treated as rental income from house property. The matter was subject to various appeals, leading to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

• Whether the income derived from letting out properties should be classified as business income or rental income from house property.

Held:

The court analyzed the company's Memorandum of Association, which outlined acquiring and letting out properties as its primary purpose. Additionally, all income for the relevant assessment year came from letting out these properties. Referring to relevant case law, the court emphasized that the determining factor is the nature of the company's activities related to the properties. The court concluded that letting out properties constituted the business of the appellant, and thus, the income derived from this activity should be classified as business income. The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and that of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was restored. The appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

Ravinder Kaur and Anil Kumar got married on August 14, 1991. Anil Kumar filed for divorce twice, and the second divorce petition resulted in an ex-parte decree of divorce on January 8, 1994. Ravinder Kaur claimed she was unaware of this decree until June 23, 1994, when Anil Kumar married another woman. She then applied to set aside the divorce decree, which was granted on February 19, 1996, effectively restoring their marriage.

Ravinder Kaur filed multiple legal complaints against Anil Kumar, including one under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code for continuing sexual relations between January 8, 1994, and June 23, 1994. However, Anil Kumar was discharged, and no trial occurred in relation to this complaint.

Ravinder Kaur filed a second complaint against Anil Kumar under various sections of the IPC, including Sections 493 (deceitful cohabitation) and 494 (bigamy), among others.

Issues:

Whether the second complaint filed by Ravinder Kaur against Anil Kumar is barred by the principle of double jeopardy as per Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code?

Whether the charges under Sections 493 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code are applicable in the given circumstances?

Held:

The applicability of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code and concludes that since no trial had taken place in the earlier complaint, double jeopardy does not apply. Thus, the second complaint is not barred. Paragraph 10 analyzes the charges under Sections 493 and 494 of the Indian Penal Code. It concludes that while the charge under Section 493 is not applicable due to the restoration of the marriage, the charge under Section 494 (bigamy) is compoundable. Paragraph 13 presents the court's decision to compound the offense under Section 494 and direct Anil Kumar to pay compensation to Ravinder Kaur, which she agrees to. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant, Rajan, appealed against the quashing of criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents, Joseph and others, arising from the death of Ammini, a maid who died due to an electric shock from a washing machine while working at the respondents' house. The appellant alleged negligence on the part of the respondents, while investigations revealed no negligence regarding the maintenance of the washing machine.

Issues:

Whether the actions of the respondents constituted an offense under Section 304A of the IPC, and if so, whether compensation should be awarded to the appellant.

Held:

The court held that no offense under Section 304A of the IPC was made out as there was no negligence on the part of the respondents. However, considering the circumstances of Ammini's death and her socioeconomic background, the court directed the respondents to pay compensation to the appellant. The State Government had also decided to provide financial assistance to the appellant from the Chief Minister's Distress Relief Fund. Thus, the appeal was disposed of with directions regarding compensation.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal regarding the interpretation of provisions under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, focusing on Section 4(1)(a) proviso (iii) and Section 4(4)(c) between the amendment Acts of 1973 and 2000.

Issues:

Whether the transaction between the assessee company and its holding company constituted an arrangement to sell goods at a price below the normal price to evade or avoid tax, thus invoking proviso (iii) to Section 4(1)(a). Additionally, the interpretation of the definition of "related person" under Section 4(4)(c) was crucial to the case.

Held:

The Court clarified the requirements for proviso (iii) to Section 4(1)(a) to be applicable, emphasizing that three conditions must be cumulatively met. These conditions include the arrangement by the assessee to sell goods at a lower price, the commonality of such arrangements in wholesale trade, and the sale being either to or through a related person.

Regarding the definition of "related person," the Court highlighted the legislative intent to extend the definition to include various entities associated with the assessee, such as holding companies, subsidiary companies, relatives, distributors, and sub-distributors, to uncover the economic realities of transactions.

The Court elucidated that if price is the sole consideration for a sale, even when the buyer is a related person, Section 4(1)(a) applies. However, if there's evidence of price manipulation due to extra-commercial considerations, proviso (iii) may apply.

It was emphasized that Section 4 aims to value transactions at arm's length, with price being the sole consideration. Transactions with related persons undergo scrutiny to ensure they reflect market realities.

Proviso (iii) was deemed applicable only to tainted transactions, where there's an irrebuttable presumption of price manipulation.

Regarding the interpretation of "related person" in Section 4(4)(c), the Court explained the application of both de facto and de jure tests, extending the definition to include relatives and companies based on control.

The Court concluded that while the assessee and its holding company were related persons, there was no evidence of an arrangement to depress prices, and only a small portion of goods were sold to the holding company. Therefore, proviso (iii) didn't apply, and Section 4(1)(a) governed the valuation of goods.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to a scheme for the sale of coal through electronic auction (e-auction) by a Coal Company (CCL), a public sector undertaking. This scheme had been declared ultra vires in a previous case. Subsequently, directions were issued for the refund of excess amounts charged to coal consumers.

Issues:

Whether the decision of the Supreme Court in a previous case regarding the scheme for coal sale through e-auction is binding on all courts in the country.

Whether the coal company is obligated to refund excess amounts charged to coal consumers in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision.

Whether the coal company's attempts to defeat legitimate claims of citizens determined in previous litigations are justifiable.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the binding nature of its decisions on all courts within the territory of India. The decision rendered in a previous case regarding the coal sale scheme through e-auction was held to be binding on all courts in the country.

The benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in the previous case extends to all coal consumers, regardless of their participation in the case. Therefore, there is no justification to deny the benefit of the decision to the instant coal consumers based on parity with previous cases.

The coal company's attempts to defeat legitimate claims of citizens by raising untenable pleas were criticized by the Court. The company was directed to verify the claims of coal consumers and refund the excess amounts charged, along with 6% interest.

Facts:

The appellant, Voltas Ltd., was engaged in the business of executing jobs including the fabrication and installation of air-conditioning plants. A works contract was undertaken for the fabrication and installation of a water chilling plant at a customer's factory. The contract involved specific design parameters outlined in the work order.

Issues:

Whether the works contract should be taxed under Entry 2 or Entry 5 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969. Entry 2 pertained to the installation of air-conditioners, while Entry 5 covered the fabrication and installation of plant and machinery.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the works contract fell under Entry 5, which covered fabrication and installation of plant and machinery. Therefore, the contract should be taxed at the lower rate prescribed under that entry.

The Court emphasized the importance of considering the specific terms of the works contract and the nature of the tasks involved. The judgment underscored the principle that tax statutes must be interpreted strictly according to their language and intent, and that all relevant aspects of a transaction must be considered to determine the appropriate tax treatment. The Civil Appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 9A of the CPC (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1977, in relation to Order XIV Rule 2 of the CPC. The dispute arises from a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the court raised by the defendants.

Issues:

Whether Section 9A of the Maharashtra Amendment Act represents a departure from the procedure outlined in Order XIV Rule 2 of the CPC?

What is the scope of Section 9A concerning the determination of jurisdictional issues as preliminary issues?

How should the term "jurisdiction" be interpreted in the context of Section 9A?

What is the relationship between limitation and jurisdiction, particularly in cases where the court lacks jurisdiction?

Held:

The Court held that Section 9A of the Maharashtra Amendment Act represents a departure from the provisions of Order XIV Rule 2 of the CPC. While Order XIV Rule 2 confers power upon the court to pronounce judgment on all issues, Section 9A mandates the preliminary determination of jurisdictional issues, overriding the provisions of Order XIV Rule 2 (Para 56).

The scope of Section 9A is to decide the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the court as a preliminary issue, notwithstanding the provision contained in Order XIV Rule 2. However, in cases governed by Order XIV Rule 2, the court retains discretion to decide based on law as a preliminary issue (Para 57).

The term "jurisdiction" in Section 9A should be interpreted broadly, not confined to conventional notions of pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction. It encompasses various senses and draws meaning from its context (Paras 40-41).

The court clarified that in cases where the court lacks jurisdiction, it cannot acquire jurisdiction through consent or waiver of the parties. The Limitation Act, 1963, provides that suits filed after the prescribed period of limitation should be dismissed, even if the limitation period wasn't raised as a defense (Paras 43-44).

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the interpretation and application of Section 9A of the CPC (Maharashtra Amendment) Act in deciding jurisdictional issues as preliminary issues.