Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the main accused, in an illicit relationship with the appellant, committed the murder of the appellant's husband with the help of an absconding accused. The appellant was accused of remaining silent and absconding with the main accused. While the main accused was convicted under Section 302 and 201 of the IPC, the appellant was only convicted under Section 201 and sentenced to two years RI. The High Court suo motu enhanced the appellant's sentence to seven years.

Issues:

Whether the appellant actively participated in causing the disappearance of evidence under Section 201 of the IPC.

Whether the High Court's enhancement of the appellant's sentence was justified.

Held:

The court emphasized the requirement of strong circumstantial evidence to lead to the only inference that the accused committed the crime.

It is mandatory for the prosecution to prove that the accused actively participated in causing the disappearance of evidence under Section 201 IPC. Mere suspicion or assumptions are insufficient for conviction.

The court rejected the notion that remaining silent and absconding with the accused would constitute sufficient evidence to prove guilt under Section 201. The prosecution failed to establish the appellant's active involvement in causing the disappearance of evidence.

Despite the presence of circumstantial evidence, including the testimony of an eyewitness, the court found that the prosecution did not adequately prove the appellant's guilt under Section 201.

The trial court's failure to establish the appellant's mens rea and motive for the offense undermined the conviction under Section 201.

The High Court's decision to enhance the appellant's sentence was criticized as prejudiced and based on assumptions rather than proper reasoning.

The court emphasized the importance of proportionate sentencing and the need to avoid miscarriages of justice in exercising sentencing discretion.

Despite generally refraining from interfering with concurrent findings, the court intervened due to the reliance on surmises and conjectures in both lower courts.

As the prosecution failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and considering the appellant had already served the sentence imposed by the trial court, the High Court's order was set aside.

Facts:

The appellant, a school management trust, terminated the services of respondent No. 1, an assistant teacher, based on serious charges against him.

An inquiry committee appointed by the school management upheld the charges.

Respondent No. 1 challenged the termination order before the School Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal.

Respondent No. 1 then filed a writ petition before the High Court, which set aside the termination order and allowed him to withdraw his writ petition based on a resolution by a rival group within the school management.

The appellant appealed against the High Court's decision before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in considering internal disputes within the school management committee while deciding on the legality of the termination order.

Whether the High Court should have focused solely on the legality of the termination order passed by the School Tribunal.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in considering internal disputes within the school management committee while deciding on the legality of the termination order. The Court emphasized that the main issue for the High Court to decide was the legality of the order passed by the School Tribunal, which upheld the termination.

Therefore, the Court set aside the High Court's decision and revived the writ petition for consideration on its merits, focusing solely on the legality of the termination. The Court also instructed that respondent No. 1 should not be allowed to work during the pendency of the writ petition unless the termination order was set aside by a competent court. Additionally, the Court granted liberty to the management committee to resolve their internal disputes through appropriate legal means.

Facts:

The writ petition (Criminal) No. 129 of 2012 was filed concerning fake encounter killings and the use of excessive force by police personnel and armed forces in Manipur, alleging the deaths of 1,528 persons. Documentation found inadequate led to the issuance of directions to complete the documentation. Information on 655 deaths was collected, which were investigated by various commissions, judicial inquiries, and authorities. The petition also highlighted the plea of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) for the implementation of its communications and guidelines, and the enforcement of its orders.

Issues:

The maintainability of the petition filed by a third party.

The adequacy of compensation paid to the next of kin.

Whether delays/laches should prevent the re-opening of investigations.

The constitution of a Special Investigating Team (SIT) and its composition.

The role of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in investigating fake encounters.

Implementation of NHRC's communications and guidelines.

The constitution of State Human Rights Commissions.

The publication of NHRC's Annual Reports.

Held:

The Court rejected the argument that incidents of considerable vintage shouldn't be re-opened for investigation due to delay. It emphasized that crimes involving possible innocence cannot be overlooked because of lapse of time.

The submission suggesting bias in inquiries due to local pressures was rejected. The Court stated that casting serious aspersions on the independence of authorities in Manipur was unwarranted.

The Court dismissed the argument against the maintainability of the petition filed by a third party, affirming the right to access justice. It emphasized that constitutional jurisprudence does not permit shutting the door on such persons.

The Court rejected the notion that compensation paid to the next of kin should halt further proceedings. It emphasized that compensation cannot override the law.

The Court directed the constitution of a Special Investigating Team (SIT) to investigate the cases, excluding officers from the Manipur Police due to concerns about potential bias.

The Court directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate the fake encounters and excessive use of force, setting a deadline for completion of investigations.

The NHRC's role as a protector and monitor of human rights was emphasized, and the Court accepted the need for effective investigations based on NHRC guidelines.

The Court accepted NHRC's concerns about non-enforcement of its guidelines and stressed the importance of respecting human rights, including posthumously.

The Court noted the NHRC's difficulties due to inadequate staff and urged the Union of India to address them promptly.

The Court directed the Union of India to consider and remedy NHRC's concerns, ensuring its effective functioning.

The Court expressed disappointment over non-compliance with NHRC's compensation directives, urging states to abide by NHRC's orders.

While not mandatory, the Court highlighted the importance of constituting State Human Rights Commissions for the protection of life and liberty.

The Court expressed disappointment over the NHRC's failure to publish annual reports and urged their prompt availability.

Facts:

Parvez Khan died in a road accident while driving a vehicle insured by Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

Compensation was claimed by Abdul Khalid, father of the deceased, before the Workmen Compensation Commissioner.

The High Court set aside the compensation award, questioning whether Parvez Khan was an employee of the defendant.

Issues:

Whether the liability of the insurer ceases when a vehicle is transferred to another person.

Whether Parvez Khan was an employee of the defendant.

Interpretation of relevant sections of the Motor Vehicles Act and Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after hearing arguments from both parties, upheld the decision of the Workmen Compensation Commissioner. It emphasized that the liability of the insurer does not cease even if the vehicle is transferred to another person, as long as the vehicle was insured at the time of the accident.( Paragraph 16)

The court referred to Section 157 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which states that the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate shall be deemed to have been transferred in favor of the person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred with effect from the date of transfer.( Paragraph 17)

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and restoring the compensation awarded by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner to the claimants. The court directed the Commissioner to ensure payment of the compensation to the claimants.( Paragraph 18)

Facts:

The appellant, an 84-year-old, and the respondent, a 62-year-old, were involved in a dispute regarding their relationship.

The respondent initiated proceedings under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, claiming to be the appellant's wife/companion.

Various legal proceedings were initiated by the respondent seeking relief under the D.V. Act, including appeals and petitions before the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the interim order permitting the respondent to occupy the appellant's premises was justified.

Whether the transfer of proceedings from the lower court to the High Court was appropriate.

Held:

The Court found that the interim order allowing the respondent to occupy the appellant's premises couldn't be sustained as the parties had never lived together in that household (Para 18).

The Court concluded that there was no merit in transferring the proceedings from the lower court to the High Court, as it deprived the appellant of valuable rights (Para 23).

The orders permitting the respondent to occupy the premises and transferring the proceedings to the High Court were set aside. The Chief Justice of the High Court was directed to nominate any Additional Sessions Judge in Bangalore to hear the appeal expeditiously (Para 26).

The appeals were allowed, and each party was directed to bear its own costs (Para 27).

Facts:

The appellant, heir of Mukhtiar Singh (since deceased), appealed against his conviction under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The original accused, a police officer, was alleged to have demanded and received bribes from the complainant in exchange for favoring him in an ongoing investigation.

The prosecution alleged that the accused demanded Rs. 3,000 initially and later Rs. 2,000 to file a report of exoneration.

The trial court convicted the accused, and the conviction was affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution successfully proved the charge against the original accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the evidence presented established the essential elements of the offense under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Held:

The court analyzed the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense and scrutinized the legal precedents related to proving demand for illegal gratification. It found inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the charge against the original accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court were set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:The Special Judge hearing criminal cases related to illegal allocation of coal blocks directed to frame charges against the appellant. The appellant challenged this before the High Court, which dismissed the petition citing non-maintainability due to a previous order dated 25.07.14 passed by the Supreme Court. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court seeking to recall or revisit the said order, claiming denial of access to justice.

Issues:

Whether the order passed by the Supreme Court restricting jurisdiction of the High Court is valid.

Whether the appellants' right to file a revision petition is unduly restricted by the said order.

Whether the order violates Article 14, Article 21, and the principles of natural justice.

Whether the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, prohibit granting stays of proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court, invoking its powers under Article 136 read with Article 142, passed an order limiting the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters related to coal block allocation cases. This order was upheld in a previous case, and considering the width and ambit of the investigation and the larger public interest, such a restriction was deemed permissible.

The order effectively shifts the forum for seeking relief from the High Court to the Supreme Court. While this may restrict the appellants' entitlement to file revision petitions in the High Court, it does not deny them remedies altogether. The appellants can approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 for redressal.

The classification of coal block allocation cases as a separate category is justified, considering their unique nature and the large-scale corruption involved. Such differential treatment does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

The order does not violate Article 21, as no procedural safeguard has been denied to the appellants. Their right to life and liberty is not curtailed, but rather placed in the proper perspective, considering the seriousness of the allegations against them.

The order does not impinge on the appellants' right to access justice under Article 32 and Article 142. While the forum for seeking relief may have changed, their rights remain intact.

The restrictions on granting stays of proceedings are upheld, given the specific provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, aimed at expediting trials related to corruption cases.

Facts:The dispute arose from an ex-parte decree sought to be set aside under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC. It involved a residential house in Munger, District Bihar, originally owned by Hira Mistry, the appellant's father. Eviction proceedings were initiated against a tenant, Surendra Narayan Sinha, which went through various stages of litigation. An agreement to sell the property between Hira Mistry and Vijay Kumar was allegedly made in 1983, during the eviction proceedings. Subsequently, a specific performance suit was filed by Vijay Kumar, resulting in an ex-parte decree in 1987. Despite efforts made by the courts, Vijay Kumar was not found to be present either in court or at the property.

Issues:

Whether the ex-parte decree should be set aside under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC considering the peculiar circumstances and doubts regarding Vijay Kumar's existence and intentions.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside previous court orders and the ex-parte decree, directing that the original suit be heard on its merits and disposed of within one year. Status quo as to possession was ordered to continue until the suit was finally decided.

The court, after considering the facts and circumstances, concluded that Vijay Kumar's actions seemed to be aimed at obstructing the final decree of eviction obtained by the landlord, and hence, it was just to set aside the decree.

The judgment highlighted the court's commitment to ensuring justice and fairness in resolving disputes, even in cases with complex and unusual circumstances.

Facts:

The case involves acquisitions made by the appellant in 2014 and whether they were exempt from open offer obligations under Regulation 10 of the SEBI Takeover Regulations of 2011.

Issues:

Whether the acquisitions made by the appellant in 2014 were exempt from open offer obligations and the interpretation of Regulation 10 in this context.

Held:

The Court examined Regulation 10(1)(a) and emphasized that acquisitions must be pursuant to inter se transfers among qualifying persons, specifically named as promoters in the shareholding pattern filed by the target company. The Court rejected the appellant's argument to consider the object of the regulation, emphasizing that clear statutory language should prevail unless there is ambiguity.

Ultimately, the Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, dismissing the appeals on the grounds that the literal language of Regulation 10 did not exempt the acquisitions made by the appellant in 2014 from open offer obligations.