Facts:

The case involved a dispute over commercial premises in Mumbai, initially leased under a conducting agreement.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff for eviction of the defendants, which was upheld in subsequent proceedings.

The defendants filed a First Appeal before the High Court, offering an undertaking to vacate the premises by a specified date during the appeal process.

The defendants later sought extensions of time to vacate the premises, citing various reasons, including educational pursuits of family members.

Issues:

Whether the defendants abused the legal process by repeatedly seeking extensions to delay vacating the premises.

Whether the undertaking provided by the defendants during the appeal process precluded them from questioning the judgment on its merits.

Held:

The court held that the defendants' repeated attempts to delay vacating the premises constituted an abuse of the legal process. Despite earlier undertakings, the defendants utilized various legal avenues to prolong their occupation, disregarding clear findings against them. The court condemned such abuse and emphasized the importance of deterring frivolous litigation.

The court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions filed by the defendants and directed them to vacate the premises by a specified date. It warned of civil and criminal consequences for non-compliance. Additionally, the defendants were ordered to pay arrears for the use of the premises and substantial costs to the respondents.

This judgment reaffirmed the principle of deterring abuse of the legal process and emphasized the duty of courts to firmly deal with frivolous filings. It underscored the importance of expeditious resolution of disputes and maintaining the integrity of the legal system.

Facts:

The case concerns two Civil Appeals arising from a Special Leave Petition filed against a judgment of the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court.

The dispute arose over the awarding of a contract for mechanization of berths at Paradip Port Trust.

The appellants contested the judgment of the High Court, which allowed a Writ Petition filed by the second consortium of bidders.

Issues:

The interpretation of a clause in the tender documents regarding the eligibility of bidders, specifically concerning the participation of the first consortium in the bidding process.

Held:

The Court held that the clause in question applies only when there is a single private operator in a port. It emphasized the importance of giving weightage to all words in the clause, including "only one private operator." The Court reiterated the principle of judicial restraint in reviewing administrative actions and contractual matters, emphasizing that courts should not interfere unless the decision is arbitrary, perverse, or mala fide. It also stressed that the owner or employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is best qualified to understand and interpret them.

Decision: The High Court's interpretation of the clause was deemed erroneous, and its decision was set aside. The Court allowed the Civil Appeals, thereby upholding the decision of the Paradip Port Trust to award the contract to the first consortium. The writ petition filed by the second consortium was dismissed.

Facts:

The first respondent borrowed Rs. 64,000/- from the appellant and issued cheques in lieu of the borrowed amount.

The cheques were dishonored, and the appellant followed the procedure under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by issuing legal notices to the first respondent.

The notices were returned with postal endorsements indicating non-service or refusal.

The Trial Court convicted the first respondent under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, a decision upheld by the Appellate Court.

The High Court reversed these judgments on the grounds that the statutory notice was beyond the prescribed limitation period.

Issues:

Whether the notices issued by the appellant to the first respondent complied with the requirements of Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

Whether the High Court's decision to set aside the conviction under Section 138 was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act and emphasized the importance of the notice requirement within fifteen days of receiving intimation of dishonor from the bank.

The Court held that the first notice sent by the appellant was effective and deemed to have been served on the first respondent. The second notice, although sent beyond the stipulated period, was deemed as a reminder of the respondent's obligation to discharge the liability. Since the complaint was filed within the stipulated time under Clause (b) of Section 142 of the N.I. Act, Section 138 read with Section 142 of the N.I. Act was attracted.

The Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and disposed of the appeal with directions for the first respondent to deposit a specified amount in lieu of suffering imprisonment.

Facts:

The appellant, Oil & Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. (ONGC), filed an appeal challenging a decision of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity.

The appeal was presented to the Supreme Court after a delay of 71 days, which was previously condoned by the Court.

During the hearing, the respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the condonation of the delay.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the appeal can be condoned under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and if so, to what extent.

Whether the delay can be condoned using provisions like Section 5 of the Limitation Act or Article 142 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court examined the provisions of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, which provide for a limitation period of 60 days for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court. The proviso to Section 125 allows for an additional period of 60 days if sufficient cause is shown. However, the Court emphasized that this additional period cannot exceed 60 days. Referring to previous judgments, the Court held that the statutory limitation provided in Section 125 is mandatory and cannot be extended using provisions like Section 5 of the Limitation Act or Article 142 of the Constitution.

The Court further noted that the delay in filing a review application before the tribunal was also beyond the statutory limitation period, indicating a lack of due diligence on the part of the appellant.

Ultimately, the Court upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondent and dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that when the delay is statutorily not condonable, it cannot be condoned. There is no impediment to considering the preliminary objection at a later stage.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The employee, while working with the Management, submitted a certificate purportedly issued by the Indian Institute of Bankers, claiming to have passed the CAIIB Part-II Examination. Based on this certificate, the employee started receiving additional monetary benefits.

The Disciplinary Authority, after finding in a domestic enquiry that the certificate was forged, dismissed the employee from service.

The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court upheld the dismissal, but the High Court directed reinstatement with 50% back wages, citing lack of evidence proving the employee's knowledge of the forgery.

Issues:

Whether the employee had knowledge of the forged certificate at the time of submission.

Whether the High Court erred in directing reinstatement with back wages based on the lack of evidence.

Held:

The Court held that there was sufficient evidence indicating the employee's awareness of the forgery. The court set aside the High Court judgment and allowed the appeal, reinstating the dismissal of the employee. However, it ruled that there would be no recovery of the wages and benefits already paid to her.

The court stated: "It is an admitted position that the certificate produced by the employee is a forged one. It has been categorically found by the Industrial Tribunal, on the basis of evidence, that the employee was fully aware of the fact that the document was a forged one. In such circumstances, there is no basis at all for the stand taken by the High Court that the Management did not establish that the employee had knowledge about the certificate being a forged one."

The court concluded: "The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. However, we make it clear that there shall be no recovery of the wages and benefits already paid to her."

Facts:

Gruesome murder involving decapitation.

Accused convicted by Sessions Court based on motive, last seen theory, recovery of body, accused absconding, and false information.

High Court acquitted accused, citing incomplete chain of circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

Whether motive, last seen theory, and other circumstantial evidence sufficiently establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Admissibility and credibility of evidence, including extra-judicial confessions.

Held:

Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we are of the view that it is very difficult for us to characterize the High Court judgment as perverse.

In our opinion, it seems that the motive for the crime has not been sufficiently made out.

The same goes for the last seen theory.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondents is also correct in stating that though recovery may have taken place, the extra judicial confessions to PWs 6 and 7, in any case being weak evidence, cannot be relied upon in the facts and circumstances of the case.

According to us, it does seem that PW-6 is a stock witness and the fact that the confession was made at the Police Station renders it inadmissible in evidence.

This, being the case, the mere fact that the two accused may have absconded immediately and the fact that false information may have been given about the whereabouts of the deceased are not enough to complete the chain of circumstances, in a case like the present one. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

Consignments were shipped to Bombay Port on a cash-against-documents basis. The consignees failed to lift the consignments, resulting in storage at the Port. The exporter sold the goods to the petitioner. The petitioner applied to Customs Authorities to file bills of entry and substitute bills of entry for the consignments. The Customs authority issued a detention certificate, mentioning detention for "bonafide operation of ITC formalities". The Port Trust issued demurrage charges for the storage of the goods.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was liable to pay demurrage charges for the period before acquiring title to the goods.

Whether the appellant was entitled to complete remission of demurrage charges due to delayed clearance by the Customs Department.

Held:

The Court held that the Port Trust's authority to recover dues was derived from various legal provisions, including the Contract Act, Bills of Lading Act, and Major Port Trusts Act.

The Court clarified that possession, not title, is crucial in bailment, and bailment can exist without a contractual relationship.

The petitioner, claiming through the consignor, was held liable for demurrage charges, as the Port Trust incurred expenses in connection with the bailment.

The Port Trust's decision to decline total remission of demurrage charges lacked rational consideration and sound policy. The Court set aside the decision and allowed the Port Trust to reconsider, ensuring proper reasons are recorded.

Decision: Partly allowing the appeal, the Court affirmed the Port Trust's authority to recover dues, clarified liability for demurrage charges, and emphasized the need for rational decision-making regarding remission.

Facts:

The appellant-accused was convicted of murdering his daughter allegedly due to her marriage to a person of a lower caste. The trial court acquitted him, but the High Court convicted him under Section 304 Part I IPC, sentencing him to 10 years of imprisonment. The Supreme Court issued a show cause notice for enhancement of sentence, despite the accused's request to withdraw the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented, especially that of PW18, was reliable enough to convict the accused of murder under Section 302 IPC, and whether the appellant could withdraw his appeal.

Held:

The Supreme Court decided against permitting the accused to withdraw the appeal, given the issuance of a show cause notice for enhancement of sentence. The Court must proceed with the substantive proceedings under the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code and its plenary jurisdiction.

The evidence of PW18 was found to be reliable and truthful, corroborated by other circumstances and evidence. This included the recovery of a blood-stained sickle matching the blood group on the deceased's clothes, indicating the accused's responsibility for the murder.

None of the exceptions in Section 300 IPC were found to apply to the case, leading to the conclusion that the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of his daughter.

Considering the circumstances, including the advanced pregnancy of the deceased, the Court ruled out the death penalty, sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment.

Accordingly, appeal filed by the accused is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Chhanga @ Manoj, along with other accused, was convicted under Section 34 read with Section 307 IPC for attempting to murder the victim by hurling bombs at a shop where the victim was present.

Issues:

The appellant contested the severity of the injuries inflicted and argued that his role was not active enough to warrant conviction under Section 307 IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, emphasizing that the severity of injuries is not the sole determinant of the charge under Section 307 IPC.

The intention to commit murder can be inferred from various factors, including the nature of the weapon used, the words spoken by the accused, and other circumstances surrounding the incident.

The Court dismissed the appeal and directed the appellant to surrender within two weeks to serve the remaining sentence.