Facts:The appellant, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, imports crude oil into Bihar and converts it into petroleum products. When these products enter the local area of Patna, Entry Tax is paid. The appellant sells some products to other oil marketing companies (OMCs) like BPCL and HPCL from its Patna branch.

Issues:

The appellant's claim for set off of VAT against Entry Tax paid upon sales to OMCs.

The interpretation of Section 3(2) of the Bihar Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use, or Sale Therein Act, 1993 is central to the dispute.

Held:The five conditions necessary for the claim of set off under Section 3(2). These conditions include the liability to pay tax under the VAT Act, incurring tax liability at specified rates, and the reduction of tax liability to the extent of tax paid under the Act.

Confirms the fulfillment of Condition (i) as the appellant is a registered dealer liable to pay tax under the VAT Act.

Discusses the non-fulfillment of Condition (ii), stating that the appellant, though an importer of scheduled goods, is not liable to pay VAT as per Bihar's notification.

onfirms the non-fulfillment of Condition (iii) due to the absence of a VAT levy on the appellant.

Elaborates on Condition (iv), highlighting the requirement for the sale of imported scheduled goods by the appellant, which is not met when sales are made to BPCL and HPCL.

Addresses Condition (v), emphasizing that the set off is person-specific, not goods-specific, which the appellant fails to meet.

Dismisses the appellant's argument of discriminatory treatment, clarifying that differential treatment between VAT set off and Entry Tax does not constitute clear and hostile discrimination.

Directs the appellant to approach the Appellate Tribunal with relevant documents to challenge the demand notices issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.

Decision:The Court rules against the appellant's claim for set off of VAT against Entry Tax and provides an opportunity to challenge the demand notices concerning Entry Tax payments.

Facts:

The selection process for District & Sessions Judges in the Kerala Higher Judicial Service in 2015 involved a written examination and a viva-voce (interview). The appellant challenged the fixing of minimum marks for the viva-voce after the completion of the selection process, arguing that it amounted to changing the rules after the game was played.

Issues:

Whether the introduction of minimum marks for the viva-voce after the completion of the selection process is permissible under the existing rules and regulations.

Held:

The Court held that the introduction of minimum marks for the viva-voce after the completion of the selection process was impermissible, as it amounted to changing the rules of the game after it was played. The Court referred to the case of K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh, where a similar situation had arisen, and the Supreme Court had ruled against such changes. The Court also noted the case of Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, which had questioned the correctness of the decision in K. Manjusree. Given this difference of opinion, the Court decided to refer the matter to a larger bench for further consideration and clarification. Therefore, the Court ordered that the case be heard along with Tej Prakash Pathak to resolve the issue.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Articles 16(4), 16(4A), and 16(4B) of the Constitution of India, alongside consideration of precedents such as Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, E.V. Chinnaiah vs. State of A.P., and M. Nagaraj vs. Union of India.

Issues:

Whether the test of backwardness should be applied to SC/ST categories and the application of the creamy layer principle in situations of competing claims within the same races, communities, groups, or parts thereof of SC/ST notified by the President under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The court decided that due to the complexity of the questions involved, the case should be heard by a Bench in accordance with the constitutional mandate under Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India. The files were ordered to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India immediately for appropriate action. Additionally, the court stated that the question of interim relief should also be considered by the Constitution Bench, and parties were permitted to mention the urgency before the Chief Justice of India.

Decision: The decision involved referring the case to a Bench in accordance with Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India and allowing parties to seek interim relief from the Chief Justice of India.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the auction settlement of a plot of land in Powai, Mumbai, by MHADA.

The Respondent had a pre-existing right to settlement with MHADA, but the Appellant was the highest bidder in response to an advertisement.

Various legal proceedings were initiated by both parties challenging the actions of MHADA and each other.

Issues:

Whether the Respondent's claim for settlement without open advertisement was legally justified.

Whether political influence affected the negotiations and decisions made by MHADA.

Whether the bid of the Appellant was valid despite a court order favoring the Respondent.

Whether changes in land usage regulations warranted a fresh tender process.

Held:

The Respondent's claim for settlement without open advertisement was unfounded in law.

The negotiations by MHADA with the Respondent appeared to have been influenced by political factors.

The bid of the Appellant was provisionally accepted, but no final allotment was made due to a court order in favor of the Respondent.

Changes in permissible land usage from commercial to residential mandated a fresh tender process.

The value of the property had significantly increased since the initial advertisement due to changes in regulations and market conditions.

The Respondent was not entitled to interest on its deposit, which was to be refunded, while the Appellant was entitled to interest on its deposit up to a certain date.

The appeals lacked merit and were dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958 concerning the disqualification of individuals who have encroached upon government land or public property from being members of a Panchayat. Various judgments of the High Court of Bombay presented conflicting interpretations of whether family members of the original encroacher could also be disqualified under the Act.

Issues:

The crucial issue was whether family members of the original encroacher could be disqualified under the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958, based on the interpretation of the relevant provision.

Held:

The court attempted to reconcile the conflicting interpretations provided by different judgments of the High Court. It emphasized that the crucial factor for disqualification under the Act is whether the person continues to occupy the encroached land, regardless of whether they were the original encroacher or a family member. The court highlighted that encroachment is a continuous act, and if someone continues to occupy the encroached land, they should be considered an encroacher and subject to disqualification.

The court also noted that it is ultimately up to the legislature to clarify and specify the extent of conflicting interests and the scope of disqualification under the Act. If the legislature wishes to prevent individuals with conflicting interests from being members of the Panchayat, they should amend the law accordingly.

In conclusion, the court set aside the impugned judgments and disposed of the appeals, emphasizing the need for legislative clarification on the matter.

Facts:The appellants were initially engaged on a daily-wage basis in August 1993 and later appointed on a contractual basis in 1996. They were eventually appointed as regular employees on the minimum pay scale in 2000 and conferred temporary employee status with retrospective effect from October 1, 2002, in 2006. Despite a direction from the High Court to consider their regularization, their services were terminated in 2014.

Issues:

Whether the appellants' appointments were illegal or irregular.

Whether the appellants were entitled to regularization of their services.

Whether the termination of the appellants' services was justified.

Held:The court held that the appellants' appointments were irregular but not illegal. They were entitled to regularization as they had completed ten years of service, and temporary status had been conferred on them with retrospective effect. The court emphasized the need to adhere to fair employment practices and ordered the regularization of the appellants' services from October 2, 2002. The court also directed the payment of consequential benefits and arrears of pay within three months. The impugned judgment and the order terminating the services of the appellants were quashed, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:

The State of Tamil Nadu sought clarification of an Order dated 11 July 2017 regarding directions issued in a judgment delivered on 15 December 2016. The directions aimed to regulate the sale of liquor along national and state highways, including stretches within municipal areas. Subsequently, modifications were made to allow a reduction in the distance for liquor shops in certain areas.

Issues:

The interpretation and implementation of the directions issued by the Supreme Court regarding the prohibition of liquor sale along highways and within municipal areas.

Held:

The Court clarified that its directions were aimed at restricting liquor sale along highways connecting cities, towns, and villages, not within municipal areas. It upheld the validity of the notification issued by the Chandigarh administration re-classifying certain roads within the city. The Court's observations emphasized that licensed establishments within municipal areas were not prohibited by the directions. This clarification applied to all municipal areas, not just Chandigarh. The Interlocutory Applications seeking clarification were disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The incident involved a shooting on 12.12.1999, during a dispute over the sale of paddy.

Jairnail Singh allegedly shot and injured Akbar Ali.

The Trial Court convicted Jairnail Singh based on eyewitness testimony and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment.

The High Court reversed the Trial Court's decision, citing discrepancies and infirmities in the prosecution's case.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in reversing the Trial Court's decision.

Whether the discrepancies pointed out by the High Court were material and justified the acquittal.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to acquit Jairnail Singh.

The High Court's reasoning, which highlighted significant infirmities in the prosecution's case, was deemed just and proper.

The Supreme Court emphasized that unless the appellate court's decision is based on no evidence or perverse reasoning, it would not interfere with the decision.

Since the High Court provided cogent reasons for reversing the Trial Court's decision and acquitted the accused after carefully considering the evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State, affirming the acquittal of Jairnail Singh.

Facts:

Union of India sought the transfer of Writ Petition (Civil) No. 15798 of 2009 from the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad to the Supreme Court under Article 139(A) of the Constitution.

The Writ Petition challenged the constitutional validity of The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006 (Act No. 2 of 2007).

A similar Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 50 of 2008, was already pending before the Supreme Court, challenging the same Act.

Issues:

Whether the proceedings from the High Court should be transferred to the Supreme Court due to the similarity of issues raised in the pending Writ Petition.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that since there is already a substantive Writ Petition under Article 32 challenging the same Act pending before it, and considering the similarity of issues raised in both petitions, the proceedings from the High Court should be transferred to the Supreme Court.

This decision is based on the principle of judicial economy and avoiding conflicting judgments on the same issue. This is evident from para 5 of the judgment, where the Court states, "Since a substantive Writ Petition under Article 32 is pending before this Court where the vires of the same central statute is in issue, we accede to the prayer for transfer of the proceedings pending before the High Court to this Court." The Transfer Petition is accordingly disposed of.