Facts:

The appellant, Misra and Co., filed an appeal against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, which dismissed their application under Article 227 challenging the order and judgment of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Durgapur, dated 06.07.2015.

Issues:

The execution of a decree awarded to the appellant and whether the execution application was barred by limitation.

Held:

The court held that despite the delay caused by objections raised by the respondent, the execution application filed on 30.06.2006 was beyond the twelve-year limitation period.

The court expressed concern over the respondent's prolonged litigation tactics, emphasizing the need for conciliatory approaches to resolve disputes. The respondent was called upon to propose a conciliatory solution to compensate the appellant. The case was adjourned for six weeks to allow the respondent to file an affidavit addressing the court's observations.

REFERENCED CASES:

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Rasal Singh, (1976) 2 SCC 179

West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation Vs. Swadesh Agro Farming and Storage Pvt. Ltd., (1999) 8 SCC 315

Facts:

The case involves a civil appeal against a judgment related to the execution of a decree concerning agricultural land.

The decree was based on a judgment and decree passed in 1965 in favor of the respondents.

The appellants raised objections to the execution of the decree, including issues related to time bar, subsequent events, lack of notice, and failure to deposit money as per the decree.

During the appeal, the appellants primarily raised a legal point regarding the effect of a 1973 amendment to the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920, on the validity of the decree.

Issues:

Whether the 1973 amendment rendered the decree null and void.

Whether the objection regarding the amendment was raised in a timely manner.

Whether the decree remained valid despite subsequent changes in law.

Held:

The objection regarding the 1973 amendment was raised for the first time during the appeal and had not been raised at any previous stage of the proceedings.

The suit and appeal had been decided before the 1973 amendment came into force, and therefore, the amendment did not affect the validity of the decree.

The retroactive nature of the amendment applied only to pending proceedings or cases initiated after the amendment came into force.

Since the suit and appeal had been finalized before the amendment, it did not affect their outcome.

Additionally, the 1973 amendment applied only to the State of Punjab, whereas the case arose from the State of Haryana, and there was no evidence to suggest that the amendment had been extended to Haryana.

Therefore, the submission questioning the decree as being nullity was devoid of merit and was rejected.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, emphasizing that executing courts cannot go behind a decree and that factual objections should have been raised during the trial rather than in execution proceedings.

The appeal, which fails and is hereby dismissed.

Facts:

The dispute concerns the ownership of land in Survey No. 129/45/D in Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. The appellant claims ownership based on a compromise decree and subsequent sale deed. The respondent, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, contests this claim.

Issues:

The rightful ownership of the land in Survey No. 129/45/D and clarifying any association between the appellant and a separate land dispute in Survey No. 403.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after careful examination of the arguments presented by both parties and the relevant legal provisions, concludes that the appellant's title to Survey No. 129/45/D is valid.

The Court finds no connection between the disputed land in Survey No. 129/45/D and the land dispute in Survey No. 403. Consequently, the Court sets aside the Division Bench's order and reinstates the directions given by the single Judge in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

The appellant filed a petition under Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001, seeking various reliefs.

A preliminary objection was raised regarding the jurisdiction of the court where the petition was filed.

The District Judge dismissed the preliminary objection, but a Revision Petition before the High Court was allowed, setting aside the District Judge's judgment.

The interpretation of "District Court concerned" under Section 23 of the Act was the subject of dispute.

Issues:

Whether the phrase "District Court concerned" in Section 23 refers only to the principal District Court of the place where the society is registered.

Whether the general principles of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to determine the jurisdiction of the District Court under the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the phrase "District Court concerned" under Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001, should be interpreted in line with the general principles of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court reasoned that when a special enactment does not specify the territorial jurisdiction of a court, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the District Court should be determined based on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The judgment referred to various precedents, including National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., emphasizing that when a statute directs an appeal to a court already established, the appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was set aside, and it was held that the District Court concerned, as mentioned in Section 23 of the Act, does not refer solely to the principal court of original jurisdiction of one particular place. The appeal was allowed.

Decided on : 16-08-2017

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Sridhar Potaraju, Prabhat Kumar, Ms. Ankita Sharma, Siddhartha Thalukdar, Advocates, for the Appellants; Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Y. Vismai Rao, K. Sharat Kumar, Ms. Savita Singh, Sibo Sankar Mishra, K. Subba Rao, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Abhay Pratap Singh, Vipin Nair, P.B. Suresh, Advocates, for the Respondents

Cases Referred

Stridewell Leathers P Ltd. Vs. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages P Ltd., (1994) 1 SCC 34

Secretary of State for India Vs. Chellikani Rama Rao, (1916) I.L.R. 39 Madras 617

National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Vs. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., (1953) SCR 1028

National Telephone Co., Ltd. Vs. Postmaster-General, (1913) A.C. 546

R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar Vs. Ra. Chandrasekhara Thevar, (1947) 74 I.A. 264

Facts:

The respondents filed a money suit against the appellants for recovery of a certain amount. The appellants sought to amend their written statement under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC. The Trial Court and the High Court dismissed the application for amendment.

Issues:

Whether the Courts were justified in rejecting the appellants' application for amendment of their written statement.

Held:

The Court examined the nature of the proposed amendment and its impact on the ongoing trial. It observed that the proposed amendment sought to elaborate and amplify the defense already pleaded in the written statement, without introducing any new defense or withdrawing any admission. The Court noted that allowing the amendment would not prejudice the plaintiffs, as the burden of proof remained on them. Considering the ongoing trial and the interests of justice, the Court held that the defendants should be permitted to amend their written statement.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the defendants were allowed to incorporate the proposed amendment. The plaintiffs were also given an opportunity to amend their plaint and adduce further evidence if desired. Additionally, the Trial Court was directed to ensure expeditious disposal of the suit, preferably within six months from the date of appearance of the parties.

Facts:

The appellant, a constable in the Maharashtra Police Department, was detained under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons Engaged in Black Marketing of Essential Commodities Act, 1981 by an order dated 10.10.2016 passed by the Commissioner of Police.

The detention order did not specify the period of detention.

The appellant challenged the detention order before the High Court of Bombay, bench at Aurangabad, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 132 of 2017, which was dismissed.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the detention order was flawed because it did not specify the period of detention, citing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary.

The respondent-State's counsel supported the High Court's reasoning.

Issues:

Whether the detention order, which did not specify the period of detention, is valid under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981.

Interpretation of the prescribed procedure for detention orders under the Act.

Comparison with the judgment in Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary regarding detention orders.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the detention order without specifying the period of detention was unsustainable and violated the prescribed procedure under the Act.

Referring to the Cherukuri Mani case, the Court emphasized the need for strict interpretation and compliance with the prescribed procedure.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the detention order dated 10.10.2016, and ordered the detenu to be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in any other case.

Decided on : 17-07-2017

Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 - Section 3(1)

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Devadatt Kamat, Rajesh Inamdar, Javedur Rahman, Mehtaab Singh Sandhu, Ms. Devina Sharma, Gautam Talukdar, Advocates, for the Appellant; Mahaling Pandarge, Nishant Katneshwarkar, Advocates, for the Respondents

Facts:

The petitioners, Om Sai Punya Educational and Social Welfare Society, sought a writ of mandamus directing the respondent, All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), to issue a Letter of Approval for their college, Anant Institute of Business Studies (AIBS), for the academic year 2017-2018. However, their application was rejected by AICTE.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners were entitled to approval for the academic year 2017-18 and if AICTE was at fault for any delay.

Held:

The Court held that AICTE's adherence to statutory timelines and regulations was mandatory, and it could not grant approval beyond the specified deadline. The academic year had already commenced, and any indulgence to the petitioners would affect larger public interests.( Para 5)

The Court rejected the argument that deficiencies noted in the inspection reports contradicted earlier findings, stating that the later report, based on site inspection, was final. The petitioners' conduct, including obstruction during previous inspections, was considered.( Para 8)

The Court clarified that the Supreme Court's direction did not mandate AICTE to grant approval for the academic year 2017-18. Approval for AIBS for the academic year 2018-19 was appropriate, given the removal of deficiencies after the deadline.( Para 9)

The Court emphasized that the petitioners' awareness of shared facilities and land, coupled with their delayed withdrawal of the AIM proposal, contributed to the situation. The Court concluded that no relief could be granted to the petitioners, considering their conduct and the statutory timelines.( Para 11)

Accordingly, this petition being devoid of merits is dismissed.( Para 12)

Facts:

The suit property, previously used as 'Abadi', was declared 'Chakout' (outside the consolidation scheme).

One of the four co-tenure holders sold his share to the respondents.

The remaining three brothers filed a suit alleging the sale was void as permission from the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was not obtained as required by Section 5(c)(ii) of the Act.

Trial court dismissed the suit, stating no permission was required since the land was outside the consolidation scheme.

First appellate court allowed the appeal, holding that Section 5(c)(ii) applied.

Defendants' second appeal was dismissed.

Issues:

Whether permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was required for the sale of the suit property as per Section 5(c)(ii) of the Act?

Held:

The Court held that the purpose of the consolidation scheme is to consolidate agricultural holdings, excluding Abadi land and groves.

If land is not subject to consolidation proceedings, no permission is required for its transfer, even if it is part of the tenure holder's holding.

The suit property being 'Chakout', outside the consolidation scheme, did not require permission for sale, as clarified in para 8 of the judgment.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the Single Judge's decision.

Facts:

Sunder Marketing Associates formed a joint venture (JV) with Karamjeet Singh and Co. Ltd. (KJSL) to bid for a mining lease.

The JV won the bid but later sought cancellation of the contract or transfer of the lease to Sunder Marketing Associates alone.

Legal actions ensued, including a writ petition in the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner should be allowed to surrender the mining lease and under what conditions.

Compliance with relevant rules and regulations for surrendering mining contracts.

Held:

The Supreme Court criticized the irregularities in transferring the lease from the JV to Sunder Marketing Associates alone.

Compliance with Rules 25 and 41(v) of the Rules for surrendering mining contracts was mandated.

The petitioner was permitted to continue mining operations until November 30, 2017, with the obligation to implement a mine closure plan thereafter.

Continued payment of royalties until November 30, 2017, and settlement of all dues of employed persons were mandated.

The State Government was instructed to enforce all applicable laws, with the Chief Secretary held responsible for any lapses.

Any unrecovered security deposit was deemed forfeited to the state.

The petition for special leave was disposed of in accordance with the court's directives, modifying the High Court's judgment to reflect the specified terms.