Facts:

An accident occurred involving a vehicle registered in the name of Vijay Kumar. The vehicle hit Smt. Jai Devi and her nephew Nitin, resulting in Nitin's death and injuries to Smt. Jai Devi. Despite the vehicle being sold to subsequent owners, the registration records still showed Vijay Kumar as the owner. Compensation was awarded by the tribunal, but Vijay Kumar appealed, claiming he should not be held liable.

Issues:

Whether the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for accidents even after selling the vehicle if the change of ownership is not updated in the registration records.

Interpretation of Section 2(30) and Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 regarding the definition of 'owner' and the procedure for transfer of ownership.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the registered owner remains liable for accidents involving the vehicle until the change of ownership is reflected in the registration records. Even if the vehicle is sold, if the transfer is not updated, the registered owner is considered liable under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to ensure victims of accidents are not burdened with tracing successive transfers.

The Court rejected the High Court's ruling and upheld the tribunal's decision, holding Vijay Kumar, as the registered owner, liable to compensate the victims. Therefore, the liability to pay compensation remained with Vijay Kumar.

Facts:

Rithwik Energy Generation Pvt Ltd entered into a PPA with the Government of Karnataka for a mini hydro-electric power plant.

The appellant and Bangalore Electricity Supply Co Ltd (BESCOM) signed a PPA, but the State Commission did not approve it due to quota exhaustion.

The appellant sought approval for selling electricity to another party under Open Access provisions.

The appellant issued a notice of termination to BESCOM, citing defaults in payments and failure to open a Letter of Credit.

Legal proceedings ensued before the State Commission and the Appellate Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the notice of termination issued by the appellant complied with the requirements of Clause 9.3.2 of the PPA.

Whether subsequent events and compliance with contractual obligations affected the validity of the termination.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the rulings of the Appellate Tribunal.

The Supreme Court held that substantial compliance with Clause 9.3.2 of the PPA was not sufficient, emphasizing the importance of both parts of the clause: specifying the event of default and calling upon the respondent to remedy it within 30 days.

The appellant's argument regarding the validity of the notice of termination was rejected.

The Court upheld the lower authorities' decisions, highlighting the significance of adhering to contractual obligations and specific requirements outlined in the PPA.

Facts:

The appellant, a manufacturer of home appliances, offered discounts to its distributors based on their performance. The assessing authority disallowed the quantity discount offered by the appellant, leading to appeals and subsequent litigation.

Issues:

Whether discounts offered by the appellant to its distributors are admissible as deductions from the total turnover for tax purposes.

Interpretation of Rule 3(2)(c) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Rules 2005 regarding the eligibility of trade discounts for deduction.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that all trade discounts are allowable as permissible deductions from the total turnover for tax purposes. It emphasized that taxable turnover is net of deductions.

The Court referred to its earlier decision in Southern Motors v. State of Karnataka and emphasized that trade discounts should not be disallowed merely because they are not payable at the time of each invoice or deducted from the invoice price.

Therefore, the appellant should be entitled to a deduction of the trade discount in computing the taxable turnover, following the parameters laid down in its earlier judgment.

Facts:

The appellant, Madhu Patekar, appealed against the High Court's confirmation of his conviction under Section 302 IPC for burning Latabai alive. The prosecution's case relied on two dying declarations made by Latabai, accusing the appellant of the crime. The incident stemmed from a dispute over cooking food.

Issues:

The appellant contested the validity of the dying declarations, claiming they were fabricated.

He argued that there were doubts about the voluntariness of the declarations and questioned the reliability of the evidence against him.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after examining the dying declarations and legal precedents, concluded that they were admissible and credible. The court emphasized the importance of dying declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule and stated that they could form the sole basis for conviction if they inspired confidence.

The court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts and dismissed the appeal.

Facts:

The petitioner, IQ City Foundation, sought the renewal of permission for the establishment of a medical college in Burdwan, West Bengal, with an annual intake of 150 students.

The Medical Council of India (MCI) had conducted inspections and granted permission for the establishment of the medical college for the academic years 2013-14 to 2016-17.

The MCI recommended against renewing permission for the academic year 2017-18 due to deficiencies found during an inspection.

The petitioner contended that the deficiencies were remediable and challenged the decision.

Issues:

Whether the deficiencies found during the inspection warranted non-renewal of permission for the medical college.

Whether the MCI's approach contradicted the relevant laws and regulations governing medical colleges.

Held:

The court held that while the MCI's power should not be restricted during compliance verification inspections, it emphasized the importance of providing reasons for decisions to ensure objectivity and stability.

The Central Government was directed to provide the petitioner with a further opportunity for hearing and to consider the matter with the assistance of the Oversight Committee. Subsequently, the Central Government upheld the earlier decision not to renew permission for the academic year 2017-18, citing significant deficiencies.

However, the court directed that the petitioner's request for renewal should be considered for the following academic year (2018-19), and any bank guarantee furnished should be treated as a deposit for the next inspection.

Facts:The petitioners, cardiac surgeons at AIIMS, filed a petition under Article 32, seeking determination of their seniority in comparison to the fourth respondent based on a Policy of 1997. They contended that their grades were higher than those of the fourth respondent at the time of their selection as Additional Professors.

Issues:

Whether the delay in seeking legal remedies affects the petitioners' claim.

The interpretation of the Policy of 1997 concerning selection processes.

Whether the ranking assigned to the petitioners breached the Policy of 1997.

Held:The Court noted a significant delay of over twelve years from the recruitment in 2005 to the filing of the petition in November 2017. Despite representations to AIIMS, the petitioners did not pursue legal remedies promptly. The delay was considered unreasonable, especially as the petitioners were aware of AIIMS's consistent position on seniority. Thus, the delay weighed against the petitioners. (Para 17)

The Court interpreted the Policy of 1997, emphasizing that while the gradings by the Selection Committee and technical experts are considered, the final selection "may be made" based on these gradings. This implies an objective assessment, not solely a mechanical totalling of grades, and necessitates considering all relevant aspects, including expert views. The Court clarified that while expert views are valuable, they are not binding, and the Selection Committee must evaluate them along with other relevant circumstances. (Para 20-21)

The Court found that the Selection Committee had considered candidates' performance, records, and the opinion of technical experts while making recommendations in 2005. Therefore, the ranking assigned was not in breach of the Policy of 1997. It deemed unsettling the seniority position after over twelve years unfair, especially since both petitioners and the fourth respondent had been promoted to Professor, with the fourth respondent consistently ranked higher. (Para 22)

Decision: The petition was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Dataram Singh, was accused of cheating the complainant of a substantial amount of money.

A First Information Report (FIR) and a complaint case were lodged against the appellant for offenses under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The appellant was not arrested during the investigations, and there was a considerable delay in the filing of the charge sheet against him.

Despite apprehensions of arrest, the appellant cooperated with the legal proceedings and eventually appeared before the trial judge.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be granted bail considering the circumstances of the case.

Whether the denial of bail was justified by the lower courts.

Held:

The grant of bail is the general rule, and it should be judiciously exercised by considering various factors, including the accused's conduct during investigations, past criminal record, poverty status, and other relevant circumstances.

Bail should not be withheld as a punishment, and conditions for bail should not be so strict as to make it illusory.

Despite opposition from the complainant, the appellant's conduct during the investigative process, lack of evidence suggesting flight risk or obstruction of justice, and absence of prior involvement in illegal activities warranted the grant of bail.

The court emphasized that its decision to grant bail should not be construed as an opinion on the merits of the allegations against the appellant, which would be determined during the trial.

Ultimately, the court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the appellant, leaving it to the trial judge to impose reasonable conditions for bail.

Facts:

The appellant's land was reserved for public purpose under a development plan. A purchase notice was issued under Section 49(1)(e) of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966. The State Government confirmed the purchase notice and indicated that proceedings for the acquisition of land would commence within one year. However, despite a proposal for acquisition being submitted, no further action was taken. The appellant contended that since no action had occurred, the proposal for acquisition had lapsed, and the land should be returned to the owner. The Commissioner, however, maintained that the acquisition proposal was still in process, and there had been no lapse.

Issues:

Whether the reservation and acquisition proposal for the appellant's land have lapsed due to inaction by the authorities.

The interpretation and application of Sections 49, 126, and 127 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 in this context.

Held:

The object of Section 49 is to impose an obligation to acquire land once a purchase notice is received. While there may not be specific timelines after Section 49(7), the Act should be read in conjunction with Sections 126 and 127. Once the appropriate authority makes the necessary application to acquire the land within the specified time, the provisions of Sections 126 and 127 come into play.( Paragraph 12, 13)

Section 126 outlines the procedure for acquiring land for public purposes, and Section 127 deals with the lapse of proceedings if no action is taken within the prescribed period.( Paragraph 14)

Under Section 126(4), the State Government may make a declaration for acquisition within a reasonable time from the application. If no declaration is made within the specified period, the aggrieved person can approach the court. Section 127 provides for the lapse of proceedings if no action is taken within ten years from the publication of the plan.( Paragraph 15, 16)

In cases under Section 49, if the appropriate authority fails to apply for acquisition within the specified time, the reservation will be deemed to have lapsed. Similarly, if no action is taken within ten years of plan publication and a purchase notice is served, the proceedings will lapse.( Paragraph 24)

Considering the prolonged delay and lack of action by the authorities, the reservation and acquisition proposal for the appellant's land were deemed to have lapsed. This decision was made to ensure complete justice between the parties under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. However, in future cases under Section 49, the procedure outlined in Section 127 must be followed to avoid lapsing of proceedings.( Paragraph 31)

Facts:

Interlocutory Applications (IAs) were filed following an order passed by the Supreme Court on 14th December 2017 in the case of Ajayinder Sangwan vs. Bar Council of Delhi.

These applications sought various reliefs including clarification, impleadment, direction, intervention, and modification concerning the conduct of elections by different State Bar Councils.

Issues:

The court were diverse, including concerns raised by the Advocate General for the State of Tamil Nadu regarding the conduct of elections, requests for modification of election schedules, and requests for inclusion in electoral rolls.

Held:

The court dismissed the applications seeking clarification and intervention regarding the conduct of elections in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, as a committee had already been constituted to oversee the elections.

The court pre-poned the date of election for the Bar Council of Kerala from 25th March 2018 to 18th March 2018, considering the festival day falling on the original date.

Applications seeking permission for advocates from Maharashtra and Goa to cast votes in New Delhi were rejected due to the finalization of the election schedule.

The request to reschedule the election date for the Bar Council of Rajasthan was denied, as there were insufficient grounds to do so.

An application for inclusion in the electoral list for the Bar Council of Delhi was rejected due to non-compliance with document submission requirements.

The court rejected a request to direct the Bar Council of India to hold elections for the State Bar Council of Telangana, as the council had not yet come into existence.