Facts:

An altercation between the appellant Ranjit Sarkar and the deceased Anil Das occurred on June 17, 2007, over the draining of rainwater through a paddy field. During the altercation, Ranjit Sarkar struck Anil Das on the head with a wooden file, resulting in severe injuries. Anil Das succumbed to his injuries the following day. The appellant was charged under Section 302 IPC for the offence.

Issues:

The court was to determine the appropriate charge applicable to the actions of the appellant, Ranjit Sarkar, in the altercation that led to the death of Anil Das.

Held:

In the above facts and circumstances, having re-assessed the depositions of witnesses and other evidence on record, we are of considered opinion that the act on the part of the Appellant is covered by Part I of Section 304 Indian Penal Code. Therefore, we set aside the conviction and sentence Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. Instead, the Appellant Ranjit Sarkar is convicted Under Section 304 Part I, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years. With this modification in the conviction and sentence, the appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

Sharadamma filed a suit for declaration of title and restoration of possession in 1998, which was dismissed. She filed an appeal against this decision. During the pendency of the appeal, she transferred her interest in the property to her daughter, who further transferred it to another person.

Issues:

Whether the appellant loses the right to continue an appeal if they transfer their interest in the subject matter of the appeal during its pendency.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that merely transferring interest in the property during the appeal process does not automatically deprive the original party of the right to continue the appeal. Under Order 22, Rules 10 and 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, the suit or appeal may be continued by or against the person upon whom the interest has devolved, with the leave of the court. There cannot be a penalty of dismissal of the suit or appeal solely based on the failure of the assignee to file an application for impleadment and to continue the proceedings. It affirmed that it would be open to the assignor to continue the proceedings for the benefit of the assignee. Additionally, even if no step is taken by the assignee, the suit may be continued by the original party, and the person upon whom the interest has devolved will be bound by the decree, especially if they had knowledge of the proceedings.

Facts:

The case involves a complaint filed by Nimra Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd. against the International Advanced Research Centre for Powder Metallurgy and New Materials (ARCI) and its officials under Section 420 of the IPC, alleging cheating due to ARCI's failure to achieve targeted specifications outlined in a technology transfer agreement.

Issues:

Whether the actions of ARCI and its officials constitute the offense of cheating under Section 420 of the IPC.

Held:

The court highlighted the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offense of cheating under Section 420 of the IPC. It emphasized that to establish cheating, it's essential to prove fraudulent or dishonest intention at the outset of the transaction.

The court examined the terms of the technology transfer agreement and concluded that it was experimental in nature, with no commitment from ARCI to provide the specified products.

It was noted that ARCI had put in efforts to improve the technology, as evidenced by correspondence indicating their attempts to achieve the required specifications.

The court considered the roles of the officials from ARCI, emphasizing that they were acting in their official capacities and did not stand to receive personal benefits from the transaction.

Additionally, the court pointed out that the agreement contained an arbitration clause, indicating that disputes were intended to be resolved through arbitration, further emphasizing the civil nature of the dispute.

Therefore, the court held that the allegations in the complaint did not constitute the offense of cheating, and it quashed the criminal proceedings against ARCI and its officials.

Facts:

The case involved a tragic incident at Uphaar Cinema resulting in loss of lives and injuries due to a fire. The appellants were convicted under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Cinematograph Act.

Issues:

The quantum of sentence, with differing opinions between Justice T.S. Thakur and Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra.

Held:

The Full Bench decided to enhance the sentence to the maximum period of two years under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. However, instead of imprisonment, the appellants were directed to pay a fine of Rs. 30 crores each. If the fine is paid within three months, the sentence would be reduced to the period already undergone.

The fines imposed on the appellants were directed to be given to the Chief Secretary of the Delhi Government for setting up a new trauma center or upgrading existing trauma centers managed by the Government of NCT of Delhi. Similar directions were given in another appeal involving H.S. Panwar, with a fine of Rs. 10 lakhs.

Facts

The dispute arose between the Union of India (UOI) and Reliance Industries Limited & others regarding arbitration proceedings under Product Sharing Contracts (PSC) for Tapta and Panna Mukta oil and gas fields. The arbitration agreement stipulated that it would be governed by English law, with the juridical seat of arbitration in London.

UOI initiated arbitration proceedings in London due to disputes under the PSC. Subsequently, UOI filed a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to set aside the arbitration award. The High Court initially deemed the petition maintainable.

Issues:

Whether Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is applicable in arbitration proceedings when the juridical seat is outside India and governed by foreign law?

Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to jurisdictional issues intertwined with mixed questions of fact and law?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is not applicable when the arbitration agreement excludes its application by necessary implication and when the juridical seat of arbitration is outside India, governed by foreign law. In this case, as the arbitration agreement explicitly stated that it would be governed by English law and the juridical seat was in London, Part I of the Act was held inapplicable.

The plea that res judicata does not apply to jurisdictional issues was dismissed as the jurisdictional issue here was intertwined with mixed questions of fact and law, making res judicata applicable.

Decision: The application under section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was dismissed as an abuse of the court process. This was because it was filed after an adverse judgment from the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Thus, the order of the High Court was upheld.

Facts:

The case involved the appellant, Jasbir Singh, and the respondents, Tara Singh and others, who were tried under various sections of the Indian Penal Code for forgery of documents related to property ownership. The trial court had initially imposed a sentence, which was appealed by the respondents. The High Court reduced the sentence considering factors such as prolonged trial and the advanced age of the respondents.

Issues:

The appropriateness of the sentence imposed by the trial court and subsequently reduced by the High Court, considering the gravity of the offences and mitigating circumstances.

Held:

The Court, after reviewing the case, emphasized the importance of considering factors such as the gravity of the offence, mitigating circumstances, and societal perspective on justice in determining an appropriate sentence. The Court held that unless there are mitigating circumstances not considered by the trial court, arbitrary reduction of the sentence by the appellate/revisional court is not justified. Additionally, the Court stressed that the purpose of punishment should reflect society's demand for justice against criminals and that appropriate punishment must be proportional to the gravity of the offence committed.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment, and remitted the matter back to the High Court for passing an appropriate order in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The property in question was subject to proceedings under the Ceiling Act, with the maximum compensation payable for excess land declared under the Ceiling Act assessed at Rs. 2 lakhs.

Issues:

The valuation of the vacant land appurtenant to the property for wealth tax assessment purposes, considering the provisions and impact of the Urban Land Ceiling Act.

Held:

The valuation of the asset under consideration must be in accordance with Section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. This valuation should be based on the last day of the previous year, typically March 31, preceding the assessment year. The assessing officer is tasked with estimating the price the asset would fetch if sold in the open market, considering a hypothetical situation.

The property being subject to the Ceiling Act would depress its value. Thus, the valuation could not exceed Rs. 2 lakhs, the maximum compensation payable under the Ceiling Act for the relevant assessment years.

The excess land had not been acquired by the government under the Ceiling Act, but the process had commenced, and the maximum compensation payable was determined at Rs. 2 lakhs.

The assessing officer's valuation, without considering the impact of the Ceiling Act, was deemed incorrect. The restrictions and prohibitions under the Ceiling Act would depress the property's value.

Given the maximum compensation limit of Rs. 2 lakhs under the Ceiling Act, the estimated price of the property for wealth tax assessment purposes could not exceed this amount.

It's noted that the compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs pertains only to the excess land covered by the Ceiling Act. The valuation for wealth tax purposes should consider this amount for the excess land and add the market value of the remaining land.

Decision: The appeals were allowed.

Facts:

The plaintiffs-respondents sought to include property owned by the appellant Housing Board, under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, in a suit for partition. This property was originally held by an intermediary under Section 6 of the 1953 Act. The Subordinate Judge granted a temporary injunction against the property, despite the Housing Board not being party to the suit.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiffs-respondents had the right to include the Housing Board's property in the suit for partition.

Whether the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction against the Housing Board without their involvement in the suit proceedings.

Held:

The plaintiffs-respondents lacked the right to include the Housing Board's property in the suit for partition. The Subordinate Judge's decision to allow the amendment of the suit schedule was erroneous.

The grant of temporary injunction against the Housing Board's property by the Subordinate Judge was unjustified. Temporary injunctions can only be granted against parties to the suit. Furthermore, the grant of police protection without involving the Housing Board in the original suit proceedings was legally impermissible.

The Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain any suit concerning the property governed by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. Therefore, the temporary injunction was not binding on the Housing Board and could not be enforced against them or their agents.

Decision: The appeals of the appellant Housing Board were allowed. The interim order of temporary injunction was deemed not binding on the Housing Board. Moreover, the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to deal with the property in question, as per the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953.

Facts:

Kosha Investments Ltd. acquired shares of Snowcem India Ltd. (SIL), making it one of SIL's promoters.

SEBI conducted an investigation from June 1999 to August 1999, during which there was a notable increase in SIL shares' price and trading volume.

SEBI issued a show cause notice to Kosha Investments Ltd. alleging breach of Regulations of 1997.

SEBI found Kosha Investments Ltd. failed to make a public announcement as required by Regulation 11(1) after acquiring shares exceeding the permissible limit.

Kosha Investments Ltd. argued it was regularly involved in SIL shares' sale and purchase and did not exceed the 5% limit at any point.

The Tribunal ruled in favor of SEBI, stating Kosha Investments Ltd. had exceeded the 5% limit during the relevant period.

Issues:

Whether Kosha Investments Ltd. complied with Regulation 11(1) of the Regulations of 1997 after acquiring shares exceeding the permissible limit.

Whether Regulation 14(2) applies to postpone the requirement of public announcement until the conversion of securities into voting rights.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the findings of the Tribunal and SEBI. It held that Regulation 11(1) mandates a public announcement when the acquisition exceeds 5%, regardless of subsequent divestments within the financial year. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument regarding Regulation 14(2), as it was not raised before the original authorities and deemed it a desperate plea.

The Court's decision underscores the importance of complying with SEBI regulations regarding substantial acquisition of shares and takeovers, emphasizing the mandatory nature of such provisions.