Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the computation of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, following a fatal accident. The deceased's income, future prospects, and conventional heads of compensation are central to the dispute.

Issues:

The determination of just compensation under sections 163-A, 166, and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The application of appropriate multipliers and future prospects in computing compensation.

The quantification of conventional heads of compensation such as loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses.

Held:

The court held that just compensation should be determined based on fairness, reasonableness, and equitability, guided by the principles established in the Sarla Verma case and reaffirmed in the Reshma Kumari case.

Future prospects should be added to the income of the deceased, with specific percentages based on age and employment status. T

he court outlined detailed percentages for different age brackets and employment types. Conventional heads of compensation should not be determined on a percentage basis. The court specified reasonable figures for loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses, with provisions for periodic enhancement.

Judicial discipline demands that decisions be consistent with previous judgments of co-equal or larger benches. A decision can be considered per incuriam if it overlooks relevant legal precedents.

Decision: The court provided clear guidelines for computing compensation in motor vehicle accident cases, emphasizing fairness, consistency, and adherence to legal principles.

Facts:

The case pertains to the murder of an activist who had been protesting against illegal mining in and around the Gir Forest Sanctuary in Gujarat. The appellant and his nephew were implicated in the murder, leading to a trial where a significant number of witnesses turned hostile.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in ordering a de novo trial under Article 226.

Whether the strictures against the Presiding Officer were warranted.

Whether the bail granted to the appellant should be cancelled due to alleged threats to witnesses.

Held:

The High Court's decision to order a de novo trial under Article 226 was justified considering the exceptional circumstances where witnesses turned hostile due to potential threats or inducements. However, the entire retrial was not deemed necessary, and only crucial witnesses need to be re-examined.

The court emphasized the importance of a victim-centric approach in criminal justice, balancing the rights of the accused with the interests of the victim and society at large. The aim is to ensure a fair trial and convict the actual perpetrators of the crime .

While the observations about the role of the trial court judge were warranted, the strictures against the Presiding Officer were considered excessive, especially considering his imminent retirement and lack of cogent evidence against him .

The prima facie case for cancellation of bail was established due to allegations of threats to witnesses and the complainant's family. Therefore, the appellant's bail was temporarily cancelled until crucial witnesses are re-examined, and additional conditions were imposed upon his release .

Decision: The Court directed a retrial of the case, re-examining only crucial witnesses, and modifying the strictures against the Presiding Officer. The appellant's bail was temporarily cancelled, with conditions imposed upon his release pending further trial proceedings .

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between SEDCO FOREX INTERNATIONAL INC., represented by Mr. Navin Sarda, and the Commissioner of Income Tax in Meerut. The dispute revolves around the tax treatment of income derived from the exploration of mineral oils in India.

Issues:

The court pertain to the interpretation and application of Sections 44BB and 4488 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, regarding the taxability of specific types of income related to the exploration of mineral oils.

Held:

The court examined the provisions of Section 44BB, which starts with a non-obstante clause, indicating that the formula for computing income under this section is to be applied regardless of other provisions. The court clarified that a sum equal to 10% of specified amounts shall be deemed as profits and gains of such business chargeable to tax under the head 'profits and gains of the business or profession'. (Para 42, 43, 44)

It was established that mobilisation fees paid for moving a rig from a foreign location to an offshore site in India are taxable under Section 44BB, as they fall under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of the said section. The court reasoned that such fees are paid for services and facilities provided in connection with the extraction of mineral oil in India. (Para 47, 48)

The court reiterated the principles of taxability for non-residents as outlined in Section 9 of the Income Tax Act, emphasizing that non-residents are taxed in India only on income attributable to operations within Indian territory. (Para 38, 39)

Regarding the reimbursement for tools lost during operations, the court concluded that such reimbursement is not taxable under Section 44BB, as it doesn't fall under the specified amounts mentioned in sub-section (2). (Para 51)

Facts:

Land in various villages was acquired for development purposes by the State of Haryana.

Notifications were issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, followed by declarations under Section 6 of the Act.

The Collector classified the land into two categories based on the Belting System and fixed compensation rates.

Reference petitions were filed by landowners seeking enhancement of compensation, which were dismissed by the Additional District Judge.

Appeals were filed before the High Court, which partially allowed them, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the application of the Belting System for determining compensation was justified.

Whether the sale deeds of nearby land should be the basis for determining compensation.

Whether the compensation awarded by the lower courts required enhancement.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the application of the Belting System for determining compensation, considering the nature and extent of the acquired land. It was deemed a justified method, especially when dealing with large chunks of land with varying characteristics. The Court found that the sale deeds of nearby small plots were not suitable for determining compensation for large areas and thus rejected them as the basis for compensation calculation.

The Court modified the compensation rates, setting them at Rs. 45,00,000/- per acre for one category of land and Rs. 35,00,000/- per acre for another, along with statutory compensation as awarded by the lower courts.

The decision was based on principles established in previous cases such as Union of India v. Mangatu Ram (1997) 6 SCC 59 and Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited v. G. Mohan Reddy (2010) 15 SCC 412.

Facts:

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement to sell property with the respondent.

The agreement contained provisions regarding the forfeiture of earnest money in case of breach by either party.

The key issue was whether specific performance could be granted based on the terms of the agreement and Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Issues:

Whether specific performance could be granted in the absence of explicit clauses in the agreement regarding the option for specific performance.

Held:The Supreme Court held that specific performance could be granted based on the interpretation of the agreement terms and Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The omission of a clause explicitly stating the option for specific performance in the agreement does not preclude the possibility of seeking specific performance, especially when the agreement provides for forfeiture of earnest money with an equal amount as penalty/damages.

The court emphasized that the purpose of naming a sum as damages in the agreement is to secure performance, not to provide an option for payment in lieu of specific performance.

Therefore, the court ordered specific performance of the agreement to sell the property, directing the appellant to pay a specified amount to the respondent within a specified timeframe. The court also clarified the terms regarding the payment of the remaining balance of the sale price and the delivery of vacant possession of the property. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Dispute over ownership and possession of a portion of a house in Nagpur, Maharashtra.

House initially owned jointly, later sold to the appellants, who requested the respondent to vacate.

Civil suit filed by appellants for declaration of title and possession.

Trial Court dismissed suit, finding respondent had perfected title through adverse possession.

First Appellate Court reversed Trial Court's decision, decreeing in favor of appellants.

High Court set aside First Appellate Court's decision, restoring Trial Court's judgment.

Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether respondent's possession constituted adverse possession conferring ownership rights.

Whether High Court's decision was legally sustainable.

Held:

There is no assertion on the part of the original defendant to claim ownership over the suit property or its part to the exclusion of the whole world including its true owners.

Second, it is not pleaded as to when and in what manner such assertion began.

Third, it is also not pleaded as to whether the assertion of ownership right was against the public at large or it was against its true owners.

Lastly, the burden being on Ajabrao (original defendant) to plead and prove the adverse possession, he failed to discharge the burden by any documentary evidence.

The appellants, on becoming the owners, withdrew the permission, which they had a right being the owners on the strength of registered sale deed dated 11.10.1985, Ajabrao's possession in the part of suit house became unauthorized.

Decision: Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's decision and restoring the judgment of the First Appellate Court. The appellants' suit was decreed in their favor, affirming their title over the suit house and ordering Ajabrao to vacate the occupied portion.

Facts:

The appellants, direct recruits appointed as ETOs based on the J&K Combined Competitive Examination, challenged the retrospective promotion granted to the private respondents, promotee ETOs, from dates predating the appellants' appointments.

The private respondents were promoted as ETOs on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission, with retrospective promotion from various dates between 01.05.2002 and 01.01.2004.

Dispute arose regarding whether promotees could be granted retrospective promotion and seniority from dates anterior to their appointments when they hadn't served in the higher post.

Issues:

Whether retrospective promotions to promotee ETOs, placing them senior to direct recruits, are permissible under the relevant rules.

Whether service rendered by promotees in lower posts could equate to service in the higher post for the purpose of retrospective promotions.

Held:

The Court held that the rules governing promotions and seniority mandate that a person can be promoted retrospectively only if they have actually worked in the higher post during the relevant period.

Retrospective promotion from dates when individuals were not even appointed in the cadre violates established principles and rules, and can potentially infringe upon constitutional provisions.

The concept of probation entails actual work against the post, which must precede formal promotion. Thus, retrospective promotion without prior service in the higher post is untenable.

Relying on precedents and the interpretation of relevant rules, the Court concluded that the promotees were not entitled to retrospective promotion as they had not served in the higher post before their regular appointments.

The judgment of the Division Bench granting retrospective promotion to the promotees was set aside, and the decision of the learned Single Judge was restored, disallowing retrospective promotion to the promotees.

The decision aligns with established legal principles and safeguards against arbitrary retrospective promotions, ensuring fairness and adherence to the law. The appeals are accordingly allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, Vishnu Bhagwan Agrawal, had jute stock insured, which was destroyed by fire.

Disputes arose regarding the value of the stock and the coverage amount under the insurance policy.

Arbitration proceedings were initiated, leading to conflicting opinions from two arbitrators and subsequent referral to an Umpire.

The Umpire concluded that the insurance policy was effectively increased based on the appellant's communication with the insurance company and determined the value of the stock based on its purchase price.

Issues:

Whether the Umpire's award was valid and in accordance with the law.

Whether the insurance policy terms could be changed through conduct rather than a written agreement.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Umpire's decision was reasonable and based on the evidence presented. The Court found no legal error or misconduct apparent in the award. Therefore, the judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the Umpire's award was upheld. The insurance company was directed to fulfill its obligations within three months. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the State Electricity Regulatory Commission's (SERC) exercise of inherent powers to extend the control period for a respondent company, Solar Semiconductor Power Company (India) Private Limited, under the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 2004. The dispute arises from the Commission's attempt to vary the terms of a power purchase agreement (PPA) between Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (GUVNL) and the respondent company.

Issues:

Whether the Commission has the inherent power to extend control periods and vary contractual terms under the Electricity Act, 2003, and related regulations.

Additionally, the case raises questions regarding the Commission's authority to regulate tariffs and ensure consumer protection in the electricity sector.

Held:

The Court clarifies that the Commission has the authority to determine tariffs and regulate electricity procurement under specific provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Regulations 80 to 82 of the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 2004, outline the Commission's inherent powers, which are limited to regulating its own procedures and preventing abuse of process.

The Court emphasizes that the Commission's inherent powers are not equivalent to those of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and can only be exercised where statutory provisions are silent.

While Regulation 81 allows the Commission to adopt procedures at variance with its regulations under special circumstances, any such deviation must be in conformity with the Electricity Act, 2003.

Regulation 82 grants the Commission powers to deal with matters not covered by regulations but does not authorize actions that conflict with statutory provisions.

The Court underscores the importance of consumer protection in electricity tariff determinations and highlights the procedural requirements for amending tariffs under the Electricity Act, 2003.

The Court concludes that the Commission cannot extend control periods or vary contractual terms beyond what is stipulated in the PPA, as doing so would exceed its statutory mandate.

Parties are granted liberty to pursue review under Section 94(1)(t) of the Electricity Act, 2003, for any errors or new information that may affect the Commission's previous decisions.

The judgment reaffirms the principles of upholding contractual obligations and ensuring fairness in regulatory proceedings within the electricity sector.