Facts: The case involved a dispute regarding the restoration of land to persons belonging to scheduled tribes under the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974.

Issues: The main issue revolved around the validity of the revisional proceedings initiated under the Act and the interpretation of the statutory provisions concerning the restoration of land to scheduled tribes.

Held and Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for fresh consideration. It emphasized the importance of impleading all necessary parties, including the State of Maharashtra and the relevant authorities, for a proper defense and effective assistance in cases concerning welfare legislations for scheduled tribes. The Court clarified the scope of revisional powers under the Act and directed the High Court to reconsider the writ petition, ensuring the inclusion of all necessary parties. It urged expedited disposal of the case within six months.

Facts:

The election schedule for General Election 2012 of Councilors under the Act was published on February 2, 2012.

Smita Subhash Sawant (the Appellant) and Jagdeeshwari Jagdish Amin (Respondent No. 1) contested the election from Ward No. 76 for Municipal Corporator.

The election was held on February 16, 2012, and the results were declared on February 17, 2012.

Respondent No. 1 filed Election Petition No. 129 of 2012 on February 28, 2012, challenging the election of the Appellant.

The main contention was whether the petition was filed within the limitation period prescribed by Section 33(1) of the Act.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 33(1) regarding the starting point of the limitation period for filing an election petition.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the list prescribed under Section 28(k) of the Act was available for sale or inspection on February 17, 2012.

Therefore, the limitation period for filing the election petition began on February 17, 2012, and ended on February 27, 2012.

Since the election petition was filed on February 28, 2012, it was beyond the limitation period and thus barred by limitation.

The Court emphasized that Section 33(1) is controlled by Section 28(k) only and does not include Section 10 or 32 for deciding the limitation issue.

It highlighted the importance of interpreting the statute's language plainly and unambiguously, without adding or subtracting any words.

The appeal was allowed, and the election petition filed by Respondent No. 1 was dismissed as barred by limitation, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 9 of the West Bengal Kerosene Oil Control Order, 1968. It concerns a show cause notice issued to an agent by the SubDivisional Controller, Food and Supplies (SCFS), regarding discrepancies in the distribution of superior kerosene oil.

Issues:

The competent authority to initiate disciplinary action as per.

The jurisdiction to cancel or suspend licenses of agents and dealers.

The time limit for passing orders under.

Held:

The power to grant licenses to agents and dealers is different under Paragraphs 5 and 6 respectively. The Director alone has the authority to grant a license to an agent, while the license of a dealer can be granted by either the Director or the District Magistrate.

The jurisdiction to cancel or suspend licenses is vested in the Director and the District Magistrate, as per a composite paragraph. However, a harmonious reading of the provisions indicates that the authority who grants the license should have the authority to cancel or suspend it.

A purposive interpretation of the Control Order is necessary to uphold legislative intent and avoid absurd results. It would be incongruous to allow a District Magistrate to cancel or suspend a license granted by the Director.

The term "District Magistrate having jurisdiction" in Paragraph 6 refers to the same authority who has the power to grant licenses to dealers. Thus, the Director alone has the authority to issue show cause notices and pass orders under Paragraph 9.

Orders under Paragraph 9 must be passed within 30 days from the date of serving the show cause notice or suspension of the license. The order comes into effect upon communication to the agent or dealer.

Interpreting the words "date of the order" in Paragraph 10 purposively, it is concluded that the order's effectiveness is determined by its communication to the concerned party. Nullifying orders based on communication delays would frustrate the purpose of the Control Order.

Decision: The order issued by SCFS remains valid, and the respondent is granted liberty to prefer an appeal within the prescribed period to the State Government.

Facts:

The Assessee, a Public Charitable Trust, filed its return for the Assessment Year 1994-95 declaring 'nil' taxable income, claiming deductions under Section 11 of the Income Tax Act.

The Assessing Officer allowed the deduction for actual expenditure made by the Trust but denied the deduction for the amount set apart for charitable purposes as it exceeded 25% of the total income.

The Assessee appealed against the denial of deduction for the amount set apart for charitable purposes.

Issues:

Whether the Assessee is entitled to deductions for actual expenditure and for setting apart a portion of income for charitable purposes under Section 11 of the Income Tax Act?

What is the interpretation of the provisions of Section 11 regarding the deduction for the amount set apart for charitable purposes?

Held:

The Court outlined the three stages for claiming deduction from income under Section 11, namely actual expenditure, setting apart 25% of total income, and investment in Government securities for the remaining amount.

The Court held that the Assessee's option exercised in the return itself for setting apart an amount exceeding 25% of the total income was erroneous. The deduction for the amount set apart for charitable purposes should be limited to 25% of the total income.

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the lower courts, and directed the Assessing Officer to recompute the taxable income in accordance with the judgment, limiting the deduction for the amount set apart for charitable purposes to 25% of the total income.

Facts:

The appellant, Lloyd Electric and Engineering Limited, disputed the liability to pay Central Sales Tax (CST) at a rate of 2 percent or 1 percent for the period from April 1, 2009, to June 17, 2009, based on the Industrial Policy of the State of Himachal Pradesh.

The Industrial Policy provided for a concessional rate of CST at 1 percent for eligible industrial units until March 31, 2009. The government decided to extend this concession until March 31, 2013, or until CST was phased out.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is liable to pay CST at 2 percent or 1 percent for the period from April 1, 2009, to June 17, 2009, based on the State's Industrial Policy.

Interpretation of notifications issued by the Excise and Taxation Department regarding the applicability of the concessional CST rate.

Held:

Defines the decision of the Court: "The State Government cannot speak in two voices. Once the Cabinet takes a policy decision to extend its 2004 Industrial Policy in the matter of CST concession to the eligible units beyond 31.03.2009, upto 31.03.2013, and the Notification dated 29.05.2009, accordingly, having been issued by the Department concerned, viz., Department of Industries, thereafter, the Excise and Taxation Department cannot take a different stand.

Concludes the decision: "Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside. It is declared that the Appellant shall be entitled to the concessional rate of CST @ 1 per cent with effect from 01.04.2009 till 31.03.2013 until it is duly varied by the State Government.

Facts:

The case revolves around a claim for refund of duty under the Central Excise Act. The order on the refund application of the respondent had been passed on 06.06.1989, which predates the amendment to Section 118. Despite the refund order, the appellant had not refunded the amount, leading to the filing of a writ petition in the High Court for the initiation of contempt proceedings against the defaulting officers.

Issues:

Whether the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11B applies retroactively to refund orders passed before the amendment to Section 118?

Whether the Assistant Commissioner has jurisdiction to investigate unjust enrichment in cases where the refund order predates the amendment to Section 118?

Held:

The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11B applies only when an application for refund was pending at the time of the amendment to Section 118. If no application was pending, and the refund order had already been passed before the amendment, the proviso doesn't apply.

In the instant case, the refund order was passed before the amendment to Section 118 came into operation. Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner is obligated to implement the refund order without investigating unjust enrichment.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming that the doctrine of unjust enrichment doesn't apply retroactively to refund orders passed before the amendment, and the Assistant Commissioner is bound to implement such orders without investigating unjust enrichment.

Facts:

Dr. Reddy's Laboratories imported diagnostic equipment from Bio Systems, Barcelona, Spain, classified as "auto analysers" for automatic blood sample analysis. Customs authorities seized the goods, disputing their classification as "auto analysers" and claiming they were "photometers".

Issues:

Whether the imported equipment qualified as "auto analysers" under customs regulations, considering the functionality and technical specifications.

Held:

The Court reinstated the Commissioner of Customs' decision, affirming that the imported equipment met the criteria of "auto analysers" despite some manual elements in the process. The Court criticized the CESTAT's reasoning and dismissed the revenue's appeal against the penalty imposed.

Facts:

The appellants, who are Master's Degree/Degree holders serving as Section Officers Grade-I in the Public Health Engineering Department, challenged a letter issued by the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms, Government of Manipur, regarding the initiation of direct recruitment for Assistant Engineers.

Issues:

The proper application of recruitment rules, compliance with government policies regarding recruitment, and the alleged violation of constitutional provisions.

Held:

The Supreme Court disposed of the appeals, directing that the appellants' case would be considered for promotion against the promotion quota, as they were high in the seniority list. The Court upheld the High Court's decision and did not delve into other issues raised by the appellants.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the specific performance of an agreement for the sale of immovable property.

The agreement in question was written on a quarter sheet of paper and produced before a Magistrate in a criminal proceeding.

Issues:

Whether the agreement written on a quarter sheet of paper is enforceable for specific performance.

Whether the plaintiff has sufficiently proven the existence of a concluded agreement for the sale of immovable property.

The appropriate exercise of judicial discretion in granting specific performance.

Held:

The Court acknowledges that a decree for specific performance can be granted based on an oral contract but emphasizes the heavy burden on the plaintiff to prove consensus ad idem between the parties.

Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act preserves judicial discretion in granting specific performance, which should be exercised based on sound judicial principles.

The High Court's reliance on the agreement written on a quarter sheet of paper was deemed incorrect due to issues with its format and execution. Additionally, the failure to consider discrepancies and legal proceedings related to the agreement was criticized.

Evidence from a criminal proceeding cannot serve as conclusive proof in a civil case, and the High Court erred in not considering this.

Decision: The Court overturned the decision of the High Court, ruling that the case did not warrant the discretionary relief of specific performance in favor of the plaintiff-respondent.