Facts:

The case involved a dispute between the Union of India (lessee) and Bengal Shrachi Housing Development Limited (lessor) regarding the liability to pay service tax for commercial premises under clause 6 of the lease deed.

Issues:

Determination of the liable party for paying service tax in the lease agreement.

Interpretation of relevant sections, acts, rules, and articles in deciding the liability.

Held:

The Finance Act, 1994, and Service Tax Rules, 1994 govern the liability of service tax payment. (Para 12)

As per Rule 2(1)(d) of the Service Tax Rules, the lessor is liable for paying service tax in cases where the service of renting immovable property is agreed to be provided by the lessor. (Para 13)

The taxable event is the provision of the service (renting out immovable property), and the liable person is the service provider (lessor). (Para 18, 21)

The expression "primarily leviable upon" in clause 6 of the lease deed refers to the taxable person, i.e., the person liable to pay the tax, which in this case is the lessor. (Para 24)

Despite legal provisions, the Court considered the sanction letter from the Government of India and a subsequent letter indicating the Union of India's acknowledgment of liability to pay service charges. (Para 34, 35)

Consequently, while legally, the lessor is primarily liable for paying service tax, the Court declined to exercise discretion in favor of the Union of India, upholding the judgment based on factual grounds. (Para 36)

Decision: The judgment of the High Court was set aside on legal grounds but upheld on factual grounds, considering the express acknowledgment of liability by the Union of India.

Facts:

The case involved an incident in 1980 where six accused persons were involved in a confrontation with two individuals, resulting in injuries to one and death to the other.

The accused were charged under various sections of the IPC including Sections 147, 148, 302, 324/149, and 325/149.

The trial court convicted five accused and sentenced them, while one accused was acquitted.

The High Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the accused, modifying their sentences but upholding their convictions.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's modification of the sentences was appropriate, specifically in the case of the respondent, Tribhuwan.

Whether the time already spent by the respondent in jail should be considered as part of his sentence.

Held:

The Court held that while the High Court was correct in upholding the conviction of the respondent, Tribhuwan, it erred in fully setting aside his jail sentence. The Court affirmed the mandatory nature of both jail sentences and fines upon conviction under Section 325 IPC.

However, considering the time already served by the respondent in jail (40 days), and the extensive delay in legal proceedings (37 years), the Court reduced the respondent's sentence to the time already served, along with a fine. If the fine had been paid, no additional jail time would be required.

This decision was based on the interpretation of Sections 325 IPC and 428 of the CrPC, as well as the precedent set in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali (2001) 6 SCC 311. The appeal thus is allowed

Facts:

The dispute arose over the ownership and possession of a plot of land (referred to as "the suit land") in Panchkula. The plaintiff (appellant) claimed rights to the suit land based on an agreement dated 24.04.1980 and an alleged will in his favor by the original owner. The defendants (respondents) denied the existence of the agreement and will and asserted their ownership over the suit land.

Issues:

The validity of the agreement and will presented by the plaintiff, the ownership rights of the defendants, and the legality of the sale of the suit land to a third party.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and dismissed the appeal. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of the agreement and will, thereby lacking any title to the suit land. It was determined that the plaintiff's suit was misconceived and barred by limitation, as it was filed almost 12 years after the agreement's execution. The Court emphasized that the proper remedy for the plaintiff should have been to file a civil suit for specific performance of the agreement immediately after its execution or within three years from the date of execution. Since the plaintiff failed to do so and sought relief other than specific performance, the suit was deemed misconceived and rightly dismissed.

Relevant Paragraphs from Judgment:

Decided on : 06-11-2017

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) - Section 100

Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Sections 9 and 100—Civil suit—Locus Standi to file—Appellant who failed to prove agreement had no prima facie case in his favour to file a suit nor he had even any locus to file suit in relation to suit land once agreement was held not proved—Proper remedy of appellant was to file a civil suit to claim specific performance of agreement in question in relation to suit land and such suit should have been filed immediately after execution of agreement or/and within three years from date of execution—Suit filed by appellant almost after 12 years from date of agreement was a misconceived suit and was rightly dismissed—Appeal dismissed.

FACTS:

Smt. Chandra Narayan Das filed a complaint against the appellants alleging multiple offenses under the Indian Penal Code.

The complaint was dismissed by the Magistrate, and subsequent appeals were made to the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court.

During the pendency of the case in the High Court, the original complainant, Smt. Chandra Narayan Das, passed away.

Legal representatives of the deceased complainant sought to be substituted in place of the original complainant to prosecute the case further.

ISSUES:

Whether legal representatives can be substituted to prosecute a case after the death of the original complainant.

The applicability of relevant provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the non-appearance or death of the complainant.

The discretion of the Magistrate to proceed with a complaint even after the death of the complainant.

HELD:

The High Court did not commit any error in allowing the legal heirs of the complainant to prosecute the Criminal Misc. Petition. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, do not explicitly prohibit the substitution of legal representatives after the death of the complainant. The Court cited Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and emphasized that even in the case of a summons-case, it is not mandatory to reject the complaint upon the death of the complainant. The Court further highlighted the absence of any provision in the Code indicating that a complaint in a warrant case should be rejected due to the death of the complainant. The Court referenced previous judgments such as Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra and Balasaheb K. Thackeray v. Venkat @ Babru to support the proposition that legal representatives can continue the prosecution after the death of the complainant. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The case concerned provisions of the Forester, Forest Guard, Ranger-Surveyor, Surveyor, Head Clerk, Accountant and Clerk-cum-Typist (Recruitment) Rules, 1987, specifically regarding eligibility criteria for participating in LDCE for promotion to the post of Forester.

Recruitment Rules stipulated that 75% of Forester posts were to be filled based on seniority-cum-fitness, while the remaining 25% were to be filled based on LDCE.

The requirement for participating in LDCE included completion of five years of service as Forest Guard and possession of a graduate degree.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of the requirement of being a graduate for participating in LDCE, particularly whether it violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The court held that the requirement of being a graduate for participating in LDCE violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

It noted that while the Department could prescribe eligibility criteria, introducing an additional requirement based on educational qualification was discriminatory.

The LDCE was meant to encourage accelerated promotion based on merit, and introducing a requirement for graduation without any quota reserved for graduates was unjustifiable.

The judgment declared the requirement of being a graduate for participating in LDCE unconstitutional.

However, it clarified that this ruling would not affect promotions already made under the existing rules.

For future promotions, the LDCE should be conducted afresh, allowing all eligible Forest Guards, irrespective of educational qualification, to participate.

Facts:

The employees acquired engineering degrees through distance education mode from Deemed to be Universities and sought promotion based on these degrees. The employer contended that the degrees were not valid as the institutions were not approved by AICTE.

Issues:

Whether qualifications obtained through distance education mode from Deemed to be Universities are valid for promotion, and whether AICTE's approval is necessary for such degrees to be recognized.

Held:

The distinction between "Technical Education" and "Technical Institution" as per the AICTE Act indicates that AICTE has authority over the parameters and norms of technical education, regardless of the institution imparting it.( Para 36)

AICTE has the exclusive jurisdiction over the decision of whether subjects leading to engineering degrees can be taught through distance education. Without explicit guidelines from AICTE permitting such courses, Deemed to be Universities cannot offer engineering degrees through distance education.( Para 38)

Deemed to be Universities started engineering courses through distance education mode without AICTE's approval, which was a violation of norms.( Para 39)

Deemed to be Universities, despite their status, cannot equate themselves with regular universities in terms of authority. They must still comply with AICTE regulations for technical education courses.( Para 42)

The Distance Education Council (DEC) created under the IGNOU Act had no authority to act as a regulator for other universities. Its permissions for distance education courses were illegal, especially without AICTE's involvement.( Para 44)

The permissions granted by DEC to Deemed to be Universities for offering engineering degrees through distance education were illegal and could not be rectified by ex post facto approvals.( Para 45)

Degrees obtained by students enrolled during the academic sessions 2001-2005 from these Deemed to be Universities were suspended until they passed examinations supervised by AICTE-UGC.( Para 46)

Degrees of students enrolled after the academic sessions 2001-2005 were recalled and canceled, and the tuition fees were to be refunded.( Para 48)

An investigation was directed into the conduct of officials involved in granting illegal permissions, to be carried out by the CBI.( Para 49)

UGC was instructed to consider withdrawing the Deemed to be University status of the concerned institutions and to prevent unauthorized use of the term "University" by Deemed to be Universities.( Para 50)

The judgment highlighted issues of commercialization and lack of oversight in education, calling for immediate action to address systemic failures.( Para 52)

Facts: The case involved the alleged forgery of a letter dated 10.04.1992, purportedly issued by the Regional Manager of RIICO, Sriganganagar, which was filed in a civil court on 27.04.1992. The appellant filed an FIR under Section 420 IPC on 29.04.1992, alleging forgery. The investigation concluded that police could not investigate further due to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC. The appellant challenged this decision through various legal avenues.

Issues: The main issue was the interpretation of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC and its applicability to the case. Additionally, the court examined whether there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of forgery against the respondent.

Held and Decision: The Supreme Court held that the provision under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC would only apply if the offences listed therein were committed concerning a document after it had been produced in court. Since there was no evidence to suggest that forgery occurred after the letter was filed in court, this provision did not apply. The Court further observed that the lower courts had thoroughly considered the evidence and found no prima facie case of forgery against the respondent. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S. K.LAKSHMANYA AND COMPANY, filed returns for assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95.

Upon completion of assessment, interest under Sections 234(A) to (C) was levied.

The appellant sought waiver of interest due to hardship from the Settlement Commission, which partially waived the interest.

The Assessing Officer refused to grant interest on the refund, leading to appeals and subsequent legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to interest under Section 244(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, when a refund arises due to a partial waiver of interest by the Settlement Commission.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellant is entitled to interest under Section 244(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, when a refund arises due to a partial waiver of interest by the Settlement Commission. The court emphasized the automatic nature of the right to claim interest once statutory provisions are complied with, and rejected arguments that the Settlement Commission's power to waive interest does not extend to providing interest under Section 244(a).

The Court referred to previous judgments, including Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Sandvik Asia Ltd., to affirm the right of the assessee to claim interest on refunds. The Court concluded that a refund becomes due when an order reduces or waives tax or interest, entitling the assessee to interest. Therefore, the appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and ruling in favor of the appellant's entitlement to interest on the refund.

Facts:

The case involves a joint venture agreement between Venture Global Engineering LLC (V) and Tech Mahindra Ltd. (S), wherein both companies formed a joint venture company (JVC) with equal shareholding. Provisions in the agreement stipulated the purchase of shares by the non-defaulting shareholder in the event of default by the other, at book value. V declared bankruptcy, leading to arbitration proceedings where the arbitral award favored V. Subsequent disclosures revealed manipulation of V's balance sheet by its chairman and founder, inflating profits.

Issues:

Whether the arbitral award is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, and suppression of material facts.

Whether the award violates public policy, particularly regarding FEMA and other legal provisions.

The applicability of Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to international commercial arbitration.

Held:

Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre held that the arbitral award was obtained through misrepresentation and suppression of material facts, rendering it in violation of public policy under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. The acts of manipulation and fabrication of accounts by V's chairman amounted to an event of default under the joint venture agreement. The award was set aside, and the matter was concluded at the appellate level without the need for further litigation.

Justice Chelameswar disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the award was induced or affected by fraud. He criticized the lack of legal analysis and clarity in the trial court's judgment, particularly regarding the alleged violation of FEMA. Chelameswar upheld the High Court's decision to restore the award, emphasizing the need for reasoned decisions and avoidance of prolonged litigation.