Facts:

The respondents, engaged in the process of bottling Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinders, claimed benefit under Sections 80HH, 80-I, and 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The Assessing Officers disallowed the deduction, contending that bottling LPG did not constitute "production" or "manufacture."

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) overturned the Assessing Officers' decision, considering the complexity of LPG bottling process.

Issues:

Whether bottling of LPG qualifies as "production" or "manufacture" under relevant sections of the Income Tax Act.

Whether the respondents are eligible for deduction under the said provisions.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the process of bottling LPG constitutes "production" for the purposes of Sections 80HH, 80-I, and 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The court noted that the definition of "manufacture of gas" under the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004 includes bottling of compressed gas, supporting the conclusion that bottling LPG amounts to production.

Furthermore, previous High Court judgments have consistently upheld this view, and the department did not challenge those decisions. The Court distinguished previous cases cited by the Revenue, emphasizing the broader scope of "production" compared to "manufacture." Consequently, the appeals of the Revenue were dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants, who held positions as Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Chairperson/Chief Executive Officer, were accused of criminal misconduct by abusing their positions as public servants. They allegedly conspired to procure pecuniary advantage by allotting a government guest house plot to the Deputy CEO after converting it against regulations.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were guilty of conspiracy and corruption under the relevant sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Penal Code.

Held:

The evidence presented in the case established a prior concert of minds between the appellants in converting the guest house plot to residential and allotting it to the Deputy CEO. Various actions, such as converting plots in violation of rules, securing allotments at lower rates, and frequent alterations of plots, demonstrated a concerted effort to gain pecuniary advantage (Para 46).

The role of the co-accused Chairperson/CEO was found to be complicit in aiding the Deputy CEO to obtain the plot at a lower premium. Their involvement in various stages of the irregularities indicated their involvement in the conspiracy (Para 47).

On review of the evidence and materials on record, the trial court and the High Court both concluded that the appellants had abused their positions to convert the plot improperly and allot it to the Deputy CEO for personal gain. The concurrent findings of the lower courts were upheld (Para 48).

Initially, the appellants were sentenced to three years' imprisonment and fined under Section 120-B IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Para 50).

Considering the time elapsed since the offense, the surrender of the plot, and the impact on the appellants' employment and retirement benefits, the sentence was reduced to two years for both appellants (Para 52).

Decision: The appeals were partly allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two years for both appellants.

Facts:

The appellant, Neera Yadav, held the position of Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer (CCEO) of NOIDA (New Okhla Industrial Development Authority). The prosecution alleged that she abused her position by engaging in grave irregularities related to allotments and conversions of land in NOIDA. This included manipulating allotment procedures, making irregular changes in site plans, and securing benefits for herself and her relatives.

Issues:

Whether Neera Yadav abused her position as a public servant for personal gain, as alleged by the prosecution.

Held:

The prosecution successfully proved that Neera Yadav abused her position as a public servant to benefit herself and her relatives.

Specific instances of misconduct included submitting incomplete and ante-dated applications for plot allotments, manipulating layout plans to enlarge her plot, and securing allotments for her daughters through irregular means.

Nepotism, as a form of corruption, was deprecated by the Court.

The court upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court based on proper appraisal of facts and evidence.

Considering the discretionary power under Section 427 of the CrPC, the court deemed it inappropriate to order concurrent sentences for multiple convictions, given the nature of Yadav's offenses and legislative policy favoring consecutive sentences.

Decision: The court partly allowed the appeal, upholding Yadav's conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The court reduced her sentence to two years of rigorous imprisonment. It declined to order concurrent sentences for her multiple convictions.

Facts:

The petitioners, medical colleges, sought permissions to establish new medical colleges and admit students for the academic year 2016-17. Inspections by the Medical Council of India (MCI) highlighted deficiencies, leading to the Central Government disapproving the schemes for the academic year 2016-17. Subsequently, the Oversight Committee granted conditional approval subject to specified conditions. However, the MCI recommended debarment of colleges for the academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19, leading to a series of hearings and communications.

Issues:

Whether the decision to cancel conditional permissions lacked proper reasoning and adherence to principles of natural justice.

Whether the petitioners were afforded a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing as mandated by law.

Whether the recommendations/views of oversight bodies, including the Oversight Committee, were adequately considered.

Held:

The court held that the decision to cancel permissions lacked proper reasoning and procedural fairness. It emphasized the importance of providing a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing before disapproving a scheme for establishing a medical college, as mandated by Section 10A(4) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.

The court ordered the Central Government to reconsider the matter afresh, taking into account all relevant recommendations and views, and afford the petitioner colleges a fair opportunity of hearing. This process was directed to be completed within a period of 10 days.

The decision underscores the obligation of decision-making authorities to adhere to principles of natural justice and provide a fair opportunity for hearing before taking adverse actions against educational institutions.

Facts:

A claim petition was filed seeking compensation for a road accident death.

The Madras High Court ordered an investigation into the allegation of false claims.

The CBI filed a charge sheet against several accused.

The respondent, an advocate, was implicated for misrepresentation and producing false evidence.

Issues:

Whether the bar under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the CrPC applies when the High Court directs an investigation into a specified offence.

Held:

The interpretation of the bar under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the CrPC. It emphasizes that the purpose of the bar is to protect against frivolous complaints by private individuals and that the expression "the public servant or his administrative superior" includes the High Court.

The Court reasoned that when the High Court directs an investigation into a specified offence, it is equivalent to the direction of an administrative superior public servant to file a complaint in writing, thus overriding the statutory bar. Therefore, the protection intended by Section 195 against frivolous complaints is already addressed when the High Court finds it necessary to investigate a matter in the public interest.

The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned order, and directed that proceedings be concluded within six months due to the prolonged duration of the case.

Facts:The case involves an appeal against the acquittal of respondent no. 2 in a murder case. The appellant, Rajkishore Purohit, brother of the deceased, contested the acquittal of respondent no. 2, who was initially convicted under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by the Sessions Judge but later acquitted by the High Court.

Issues:

The determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the common intention among the accused to commit the crime, particularly in light of respondent no. 2's acquittal by the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of respondent no. 2 by the High Court was erroneous and ordered the restoration of his conviction under Section 302/34 IPC. The court concluded that the evidence, including the conduct of respondent no. 2 before, during, and after the incident, pointed towards the existence of common intention among the accused to commit the crime. It emphasized that the absence of overt acts or possession of weapons by respondent no. 2 did not necessarily negate his involvement or common intention. This decision was supported by established legal principles regarding common intention and relevant precedents, as cited in the judgment.

The court further directed respondent no. 2 to surrender immediately to serve the remaining period of his sentence, considering the time he had already spent in custody.

Facts:

The petitioner, a medical college, applied for the renewal of permission for its MBBS course batch for the academic year 2017-18.

Assessors found deficiencies during an inspection, leading to the Medical Council of India (MCI) recommending against renewal to the Central Government.

Despite a favorable opinion from the Central Government's Hearing Committee, the matter was referred back to the MCI for further review.

The MCI's Compliance Verification Assessment identified additional deficiencies, resulting in another recommendation against renewal.

The Central Government, through an order, rejected the renewal of permission, prompting the petitioner to challenge the decision under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the power of the MCI can be restricted in its assessment when sent back by the Central Government for compliance verification.

Whether the decision of the Central Government was reasoned and fair.

Held:

The power of the MCI cannot be restricted by laying down an absolute principle that limits the scope of assessment to only the mentioned items during compliance verification .

The Central Government's direction for compliance verification should not be interpreted as a limited remand .

It is obligatory for the Central Government to provide reasons for its decisions, ensuring fairness in the process .

The Central Government is directed to afford a further opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-college and to take assistance from the newly constituted Oversight Committee .

Decision: The Court directed the Central Government to afford a further opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-college and emphasized the importance of providing reasoned decisions and ensuring fairness in the process.

Facts:

The appellants sought execution of a decree for permanent injunction. They applied for police protection in the execution proceedings under Section 151 of the CPC. The Execution Court granted the application, but the High Court intervened, claiming the application should have been filed under Order XXI, Rule 32 of the CPC.

Issues:

Whether the application for police protection in execution proceedings, filed under Section 151 of the CPC, was valid.

Whether the High Court's interference with the Execution Court's order was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the exact provision invoked is not crucial as long as the Execution Court has jurisdiction and follows the proper procedure. The Court cited previous cases where technicalities in filing applications were not grounds for rejection if the court had jurisdiction. Therefore, the High Court's interference was deemed unjustified. The execution of the decree would not prevent a suit for specific performance from being tried separately. Pending applications were disposed of, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a PIL filed in the Bombay High Court questioning concessions granted for building development in Mumbai.

The High Court issued various orders, including directing re-examination of concessions by the Municipal Commissioner.

Challenges and appeals were filed by both parties against the High Court's orders, with subsequent legal proceedings initiated.

Issues:

Whether PIL No.17 of 2017 should be transferred from the Bombay High Court to the Supreme Court for joint consideration with pending Special Leave Petitions.

Whether interim orders passed by the High Court should be upheld or modified in light of the transfer of PIL No.17 of 2017.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the transfer of PIL No.17 of 2017 to the Supreme Court was necessary for joint consideration with pending Special Leave Petitions. The Court observed that the issues raised in the PIL were already under scrutiny in the Special Leave Petitions, and early resolution of these disputes was in the interest of public safety and the parties involved. Therefore, the Transfer Petition was allowed, and PIL No.17 of 2017 was transferred to be heard along with pending Special Leave Petitions.

Regarding the interim orders passed by the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions subject to the observation that parties could seek alteration or modification of the interim orders before the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that the concerns raised by both parties, including the financial burden on respondent No.6, were significant but should be addressed within the context of the transferred PIL and pending Special Leave Petitions.

In result, Transfer Petition is allowed and the SLPs are dismissed subject to observations as made above.