Facts:

The interlocutory application pertained to the infrastructure of courts, especially subordinate courts. Previous orders had directed certain states to provide information regarding pending projects, land acquisition, utilization of government lands, and steps for project completion. Despite various adjournments, progress in infrastructure development was noted, but areas requiring immediate attention remained.

Issues:

The inadequate infrastructure in court complexes, particularly in interior parts of the country, and the subsequent hindrance it posed to access to justice.

The court needed to address the need for urgent improvement and set guidelines for future infrastructure development.

Held:

The Court emphasized the critical role of infrastructure in the efficient functioning of the judiciary and ensuring access to justice for all citizens. It noted that infrastructure development had been relatively low-priority and required an overhaul.

The Court issued comprehensive directives, including the provision of basic amenities, accessibility for differently-abled individuals, efficient crowd management, adequate parking facilities, residential accommodation for judicial officers and staff, solar power installation, CCTV installation, video conferencing facilities, and medical facilities in court complexes.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of the criteria for appointment to the post of Director General of Medical Service (Army) [DGMS (Army)]. The respondent, Maj. Gen. Manomoy Ganguly, fulfilled the eligibility criteria for the post and had adequate administrative experience. However, there were issues regarding the application of the criteria of "inter-se seniority cum suitability."

Issues:

Interpretation of the criteria of "inter-se seniority cum suitability."

Assessment of the respondent's suitability for the post of DGMS (Army).

Fairness and objectivity in the application of the selection criteria.

Held:

The term "inter-se seniority cum suitability" implies that both seniority and suitability should be considered equally for the appointment to the post of DGMS (Army).

"Suitable" in service jurisprudence means being fit or appropriate for the specific post based on calibre, competence, attributes, skills, and experience.

Assessment of "inter-se suitability" involves identifying the most suitable candidate among eligible officers based on the job profile, requirements, and the candidate's qualifications and experience.

In the present case, there was not proper and valid consideration in applying the criteria of "inter-se seniority and suitability." Despite the respondent meeting the eligibility criteria and having adequate administrative experience, the assessment of suitability was not fair and objective.

While setting aside the direction of the Tribunal to appoint the respondent straightaway, the case was remitted back to the Raksha Mantri for reconsideration. This implies that the decision of appointing the DGMS (Army) should be made after a fair and objective assessment of both seniority and suitability, in accordance with the established criteria.

Facts:

The appellants were irregularly appointed employees seeking regularisation after serving more than 10 years.

The High Court denied their regularisation based on a cut-off date from a previous judgment.

The appellants argued that the State's selective regularisation was discriminatory.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to regularisation despite not meeting the cut-off date.

Whether the State's actions were discriminatory.

Held:

The Court emphasized the intent of previous judgments to curb irregular appointments and provide a one-time measure for long-serving employees. It criticized the State's exploitation of irregular appointments and stressed the need for fair treatment of employees.

The Court held that a pragmatic interpretation of the Regularisation Rules was necessary, allowing regularisation for those who completed 10 years of service by the promulgation date of the Rules, unless there are valid objections. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State was directed to decide on regularisation within four months.

The Court advised the State to prioritize regular appointments to avoid circumventing the process.

Facts:

The appellants, including a gynecologist, a pediatrician, and a hospital administrator, were involved in attending to a victim who had been brought to the hospital in an advanced stage of pregnancy.

The victim's mother brought her to the hospital when she complained of stomach pain, and it was discovered she was in the advanced stage of pregnancy.

Issues:

Whether the appellants had prior knowledge of the alleged rape of the victim.

Whether the appellants failed in their obligation to report the offence under the POCSO Act.

Held:

The court held that there was no evidence to implicate the appellants. The charges against them were primarily based on their alleged failure to report the offence under the POCSO Act, despite having knowledge. However, the court found no evidence to support this allegation.

The court emphasized that the term "knowledge" under the POCSO Act implies information received by a person, not deductions or assumptions. It was noted that appellant no. 1 attended to the victim upon her admission to the hospital for delivery without prior knowledge of her age or the circumstances of her pregnancy. Appellant no. 2 had no contact with the victim, and appellant no. 3, the hospital administrator, had no direct involvement with the victim or the circumstances of her admission.

The court concluded that mere suspicion or likelihood of suspicion is insufficient to charge a person with an offence and quashed the proceedings against the appellants.

Facts:

The High Court of Delhi directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to convert preliminary enquiries into First Information Reports (FIRs)/Regular Cases (RCs) and expedite the investigation.

Appellants (Union of India and Anr) challenged this decision, arguing that it exceeded the CBI's statutory limits.

Respondents (including Sunil Tripathi) contended that CBI investigation was warranted due to potential national and international ramifications of the allegations.

Issues:

Whether the direction to the CBI to convert preliminary enquiries into FIRs/RCs and expedite investigation is legally tenable.

Whether the CBI's investigation should be carried out by the State police.

Held:

The Court observed that the High Court did not adequately analyze the appellants' contention that there was no involvement of public servants or loss to public funds. The Court also noted that the High Court did not address the argument that the appellants couldn't change their stance after previously stating that the CBI was investigating.

Instead of deciding the contentious issues, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed reconsideration by the High Court, uninfluenced by the previous observations.

The Court clarified that it didn't express any opinion on the issues requiring adjudication by the High Court. The appeals were allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the case was restored to the High Court for fresh consideration. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

The appellants invested in a company run by the respondent, who failed to return their share. The respondent issued a promissory note and two cheques towards their dues, which were later dishonoured.

Issues:

Whether the cheques were issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt.

Whether the respondent successfully rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court reinstated the Trial Court's decision, holding the respondent guilty. The Court found that:

The respondent failed to produce credible evidence to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 139.

The promissory note clearly stated it was issued for a loan, and the respondent's defense regarding 10 blank cheques issued in 1995 was disbelieved.

The High Court erred in overturning the conviction, as the respondent couldn't prove the cheques were solely issued as security.

Thus, the Appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's decision and restoring the Trial Court's order of conviction and fine against the respondent.

Facts:

The appellant, Surinder Kumar Khanna, was convicted under Section 21(c) read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act based on the interception of a car carrying narcotic drugs.

The prosecution's case relied heavily on the statements of the co-accused, implicating the appellant in the drug trafficking.

Issues:

The appellant challenged the conviction primarily on the basis that there was insufficient evidence against him, apart from the statements of the co-accused.

Held:

The Court accepted the appeal and acquitted the appellant. It held that the confessional statements of the co-accused cannot be considered as substantive evidence against the appellant. Without any substantive evidence, the conviction of the appellant solely based on the statements of the co-accused was deemed inappropriate.

The law laid down in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar was followed. These cases establish that a confession of a co-accused cannot be treated as substantive evidence against another accused. It can only be used to lend assurance to other evidence against the accused. The Supreme Court reiterated that this principle should be applied unless there is a specific provision in the law making such confession admissible against another accused.

Facts:

The case involved a motor vehicle accident where the deceased, Satish, and the appellant, Anand, were injured in a collision with a speeding lorry.

Separate claim petitions were filed for compensation by the legal representatives of Satish and by Anand.

The Tribunal found the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the lorry driver.

Issues:

The liability of the insurance company to pay compensation, considering the lack of a valid permit for the offending vehicle to operate in Karnataka.

Held:

The High Court modified the compensation amount for Satish's legal representatives, increasing it based on a higher notional income assumption.

However, the High Court absolved the Insurance Company from liability for compensation.

The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, directing the Insurance Company to first pay the compensation amounts to the claimants, with liberty to recover from the owner of the offending vehicle.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's increase in notional income for Satish and maintained the compensation at the original amount determined by the Tribunal.

Facts:

The appellant, Lakshmi Sreenivasa Cooperative Building Society, filed a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement related to land. The courts below dismissed the suit due to the appellant's failure to prove the execution of the agreement, payment of earnest money, and possession of the property.

Issues:

Whether the appellant adequately proved the execution of the suit agreement, payment of earnest money, and possession of the property.

Whether the courts below erred in dismissing the suit for specific performance.

Held:

The High Court affirmed the findings of fact and conclusions recorded by the trial court against the appellant. The appellant failed to prove the execution of the suit agreement, payment of earnest money, and possession of the property.

The trial court's finding that the appellant failed to prove the execution of the suit agreements was based on indisputable facts, including the lack of examination of attestors and the scribe, unregistered agreements, denial by defendants, and absence of a relinquishment deed by vendees.

The appellant's failure to prove possession and the absence of a valid and subsisting agreement led to the dismissal of the suit. The court upheld the findings of both lower courts on material issues.

The appellant cannot obtain relief without proof of execution of suit agreements. Additionally, the request for refund of earnest money was rejected due to lack of evidence.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the findings of the lower courts. The appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their claims for specific performance of the sale agreement, leading to the dismissal of the suit.