Facts:

The appellant, Manjeet Singh, purchased a second-hand Tata open truck insured by the respondent insurance company. The truck was stolen by passengers who were given a lift by the truck driver. The insurance company repudiated the claim on the grounds of breach of policy terms due to unauthorized passengers.

Issues:

Whether giving a lift to passengers constituted a fundamental breach of the insurance policy.

Whether ongoing arbitration proceedings between the finance company and the appellant affected the appellant's rights against the insurance company.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the act of giving a lift to passengers, although a breach of policy terms, was not a fundamental breach that would nullify the insurance policy.

Furthermore, the Court found that ongoing arbitration proceedings between the finance company and the appellant did not affect the appellant's rights against the insurance company.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the insurance company to pay 75% of the insured amount along with interest and additional compensation to the appellant. The amount was to be deposited before the District Forum, with priority given to settling the finance company's claim if not already resolved through arbitration.

Facts:

The case pertains to the applicability of the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) scheme for PBORs in the Indian armed forces. The dispute arises from differing interpretations regarding the effective date of the MACP scheme, whether it should be implemented from January 1, 2006, or from September 1, 2008. The 6th Central Pay Commission recommended changes to the pay structure, pay bands, grade pay, and pension, which were accepted by the Central Government through a resolution dated August 30, 2008.

Issues:

Whether the MACP scheme, being part of the pay structure, should be applicable from January 1, 2006, as per the government resolution, or from September 1, 2008, as argued by the Union of India to prevent potential financial implications for employees.

Held:

The court held that the MACP scheme should be applicable from January 1, 2006, based on the government's resolution accepting the 6th CPC recommendations. The resolution clearly stated that changes in pay structure, pay bands, grade pay, and pension would be effective from January 1, 2006. The court emphasized that the MACP scheme is part of the pay structure and affects grade pay and pension, as supported by Annexure-I of the resolution.

The court dismissed the government's argument regarding potential financial implications and stated that the intention of the government, as reflected in the resolution, was clear. Additionally, administrative instructions issued later, such as the letter of May 30, 2011, contradicting the resolution, were deemed invalid. The court found no merit in the appeals and disposed of them accordingly.

Facts:

A works contract was awarded by the Union of India to M/S. Susaka Pvt. Ltd.

Disputes arose between the parties, leading to arbitration proceedings.

The Arbitral Tribunal partly allowed the claims of M/S. Susaka Pvt. Ltd.

The Union of India challenged the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Bombay High Court.

The Single Judge partially allowed the appeal, modifying the award of interest on certain claims.

M/S. Susaka Pvt. Ltd. appealed against the modification before the Division Bench, which set aside the Single Judge's order.

The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the Arbitral Tribunal was justified in awarding interest on various claims.

Whether the Union of India waived or abandoned its objection regarding interest payments.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Union of India had waived its objection regarding interest payments by not raising it at earlier stages of the proceedings. The court noted that the Union of India did not appeal the part of the Single Judge's order that rejected their application under Section 34 of the Act in relation to other claims. Therefore, the court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the decision of the High Court and the arbitral award in favor of M/S. Susaka Pvt. Ltd.

The court emphasized the principle of waiver and held that parties must raise objections at appropriate stages of proceedings. Since the objection regarding interest payments was not raised earlier, the appellant could not raise it for the first time in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The State Government of Maharashtra introduced a subsidy scheme in the form of exemption of entertainment duty for newly set up Multiplex Theatre Complexes for three years, followed by a reduced rate of 25% for the subsequent two years.

The scheme aimed to promote the construction of Multiplex Theatre Complexes to address the declining occupancy in traditional cinema theatres.

Issues:

Whether the subsidy provided to Multiplex Theatre Complexes should be classified as a capital or revenue receipt under the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The Court held that the subsidy provided to Multiplex Theatre Complexes constitutes a capital receipt. The purpose test was applied to determine the nature of the subsidy, focusing on whether it was intended to assist in setting up new units or expanding existing ones.

The Court observed that the objective of the subsidy scheme was to facilitate the construction of new cinema houses, aligning with the purpose of capital investment.

It was emphasized that the point of time at which the subsidy is paid, the source of the subsidy, and the form of subsidy are irrelevant in determining its nature.

The Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue, affirming that the subsidy provided by the State Government was indeed of a capital nature and not a revenue receipt.

Facts:The respondent was charged under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. He approached the High Court seeking the summoning of material not included in the chargesheet under Section 91 of the CrPC. The High Court allowed this application, contrary to the decision of the trial court. The appellants challenged this decision in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to allow the summoning of material not part of the chargesheet under Section 91 of the CrPC was contrary to established law.

Whether the defense could be considered at the stage of framing charges, potentially leading to a mini-trial.

Held:The Supreme Court held that while ordinarily, the accused cannot invoke Section 91 of the CrPC at the stage of framing charges, the court has the authority to summon material not included in the chargesheet if the interest of justice demands it. However, this does not confer an automatic right to the defense to invoke Section 91 at this stage. The court emphasized that the necessity or desirability of summoning a document should be assessed concerning the stage when the request is made and the party making the request. The court set aside the view taken by the High Court and directed the trial court to proceed with the issue of framing charges based on the observations made. The trial court was instructed to handle the matter expeditiously and in accordance with the law.

This decision is in line with the observations made in Debendra Nath Padhi and Hardeep Singh cases, where the court emphasized the court's duty to uphold justice and the rule of law, even if it means summoning material not included in the chargesheet.

Facts:

The appellant, Prabhu Dutt Tiwari, was aggrieved by the quashing of an order summoning the respondents by the High Court.

The summoning order was issued by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court-19, Deoria, based on a complaint filed by the appellant.

The complaint alleged various offenses under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against the respondents.

The respondents challenged this order in a criminal writ petition before the High Court, which subsequently quashed the summoning order.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in quashing the summoning order issued by the Magistrate.

Whether there were sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused based on the evidence presented by the complainant at the stage of summoning.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the summoning order issued by the Magistrate. The Court emphasized that at the stage of summoning, the Magistrate's role is limited to determining whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused based on the available records and evidence presented by the complainant. In this case, the Magistrate had satisfied this requirement, and thus, the High Court's decision to quash the summoning order was incorrect.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. The party-respondents were directed to appear before the trial court within one month and be released on bail upon furnishing sufficient surety/sureties to the satisfaction of the trial court. Importantly, the Supreme Court clarified that its decision did not express any opinion on the merits of the case, leaving it open for the parties to pursue appropriate legal steps at the trial stage.

Facts:

The appellant (landlord) sought to recover property tax from the respondent (tenant) under Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act as arrears of rent.

The appellant claimed that the property tax exceeded the threshold for rent under the Rent Act, thereby forfeiting the tenant's protection under it.

The respondent contested, arguing that property tax cannot be considered part of the rent for eviction purposes under the Rent Act.

Issues:

Whether property tax recoverable under Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act can be considered part of the rent for eviction purposes under the Rent Act.

Held:

The Court emphasized the protective nature of the Rent Act, which aims to provide security to tenants against arbitrary eviction by landlords. It analyzed relevant provisions of both Acts and concluded that the Rent Act prevails over the NDMC Act in matters concerning eviction of tenants.

The Court rejected the landlord's argument that property tax should be considered part of the rent for eviction purposes, emphasizing that the Rent Act must prevail in landlord-tenant issues. It clarified that Section 67(3) of the NDMC Act only provides a right to recover tax as rent but does not override the protections afforded to tenants under the Rent Act. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision, and ruled that property tax recoverable from the tenant cannot be considered part of the rent for eviction purposes.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the classification of a contract between the Corporation and the appellants for the collection of Tehbazari Fee (tolls) and parking fees. The Corporation invited bids for this purpose, and the appellants' bids were accepted, leading to the execution of contracts.

Issues:

The classification of the contract and the applicable stamp duty under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the contract for the collection of tolls and parking fees fell within the definition of "Lease" under Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act. Therefore, the contract was chargeable to stamp duty as per the rates prescribed in Article 35 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act as "Lease." The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the decision of the High Court to uphold the stamp duty demand by the Collector of Stamps.

Facts:

The parties in this case, Prateek Gupta (appellant-father) and Shilpy Gupta (respondent-mother), were residing in the US with their two sons. However, due to irreconcilable marital issues, they began living separately since 2014. One of their children, Aadvik, was taken to India by the appellant-father when he was barely 2.5 years old and has been residing in India since then. At the time of the hearing, the child was a little over 5 years old. The respondent-mother sought custody of the child through a writ petition filed before the High Court, which directed the appellant-father to hand over custody to her.

Issues:

The custody of the child, Aadvik, who has been residing in India with the appellant-father.

The court needs to determine whether the welfare and best interests of the child are served by granting custody to the respondent-mother, who resides in the US, or allowing him to remain with the appellant-father in India.

Held:

Delineates the court's position on the paramount importance of the child's welfare and interest in custody disputes. The court emphasizes that the invocation of principles like comity of courts should be assessed based on the specific circumstances of each case, with the welfare of the child being the overriding concern.

Underscores the limited relevance of the doctrines of "intimate contact" and "closest concern" in cases where the child is uprooted from their native country and taken to a foreign environment.

Highlight the court's consideration of the child's integration into the Indian environment, the stability of his current living arrangement, and the potential harm caused by uprooting him from his familiar surroundings.

The court concludes that the child should continue in the custody of the appellant-father, subject to any future orders from a court of competent jurisdiction. The decision is based on the child's well-being and the lack of evidence suggesting immediate restoration of custody to the respondent-mother is necessary.