Facts:

The property in question was let out by the original landlord to the tenants through a registered rent agreement.

The rent agreement provided for a fixed term of ten years, with an option for renewal for a further five years at an increased rent.

Upon the expiration of the initial lease term, the lease was not renewed, and the landlord issued a notice seeking vacant possession of the property.

The tenants contested the eviction suit, arguing that they had made efforts to renew the lease and had deposited rent arrears in court.

The trial court and the High Court both dismissed the landlord's suit, finding no grounds for eviction.

Issues:

Whether the tenants' continued possession of the property after the expiration of the lease term was lawful.

Whether the tenants' subletting of the property violated the terms of the rent agreement.

Held:

The tenants' continued possession of the property after the expiration of the lease term was unlawful due to the non-renewal of the lease agreement.

The tenants' subletting of the property to a third party constituted a violation of the terms of the rent agreement.

The Court did not delve into the issue of default in rent payment as the decision to evict the tenants was based on other grounds.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the landlord's appeal, directing the tenants to vacate the premises within one year.

Facts:

The respondent filed a suit for specific performance against the appellants regarding two agreements to purchase a share of land.

The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court decreed it in favor of the respondent.

The appellants appealed to the High Court, which affirmed the lower court's decision.

The appellants then appealed to the Supreme Court, raising various contentions, including the validity of the agreements, readiness and willingness of the respondent, and the applicability of statutory provisions.

Issues:

Validity and enforceability of the agreements.

Readiness and willingness of the respondent.

Applicability of statutory provisions, including Section 31 of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the arguments raised by both parties and the findings of the High Court. It upheld the High Court's conclusions on the validity of the agreements, readiness and willingness of the respondent, and the issue of limitation. However, it did not allow the appellants to raise a new plea regarding the applicability of Section 31 of the Act, as it was not raised before the lower courts and was a mixed question of law and fact.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the judgment of the High Court.

Facts:

The dispute arose from recovery proceedings initiated by Bank of India against M/s Sona Aluminium Finishers (P) Ltd. The matter was decreed in favor of the bank, and recovery proceedings were transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) as per the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Respondent No. 1, Yadav Consultancy Services, was appointed as "Court Commissioner" by the Recovery Officer of DRT to oversee the possession of the auctioned property.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the DRT, the validity of proceedings before the MSMEDF Council, and disputes regarding payment of charges for security services.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the DRT had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and the order directing recovery of charges from auction purchasers was valid. The proceedings before the MSMEDF Council were found to be improper given the jurisdiction of the DRT. The High Court's judgment and the award passed by the MSMEDF Council were set aside. The bank was permitted to recover the amount withdrawn by the respondent, and the respondent was allowed to pursue charges against the auction purchasers.

Facts:

The appellant, B. Sunitha, issued a cheque towards the fee of the respondent advocate, which was dishonoured. The appellant contested the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, arguing that there was no legally enforceable debt due to the exorbitant and unethical nature of the fee claimed by the advocate.

Issues:

Whether charging a percentage of the decretal amount as advocate's fee was against public policy and professional ethics,

Whether the mere issuance of a cheque establishes a legally enforceable debt, and if the burden of proving the fee contract lies with the advocate or the client.

Held:

The Court held that charging fees based on a percentage of the subject matter in litigation is against public policy and professional ethics, citing various precedents and legal principles.

The Court emphasized the fiduciary relationship between an advocate and a client, stating that the burden of proving the fee contract lies with the advocate if disputed by the client.

Proceedings initiated against the appellant were deemed an abuse of the process of law and were quashed due to the advocate's claim being against public policy and professional misconduct.

The Court referred to the broader issue of declining professional norms in the legal profession and called for legislative reforms to strengthen the regulatory framework governing advocates.

The Court highlighted the importance of maintaining ethical standards in the legal profession to ensure access to justice and uphold the rule of law, citing relevant reports and recommendations of the Law Commission of India.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 80IB of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which provides for deductions for profits and gains from specified industrial undertakings. The appellant, Mis. ACE Multi Axes Systems Ltd., claimed the benefit of deduction under Section 80IB(3) but was denied by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 11 (I), Bangalore, on the grounds that the appellant ceased to be a small scale industrial undertaking during the relevant period.

Issues:

Whether an industrial undertaking that ceases to be a small scale industrial undertaking during the relevant period is eligible for the deduction under Section 80IB(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

Whether the incentive provided by Section 80IB is contingent upon the continuation of eligibility conditions?

Whether the object of the law is to encourage industrial expansion and permit incentives even if the industrial undertaking ceases to be small scale?

Held:

The scheme of Section 80IB allows deductions for specified industrial undertakings, including small scale industrial undertakings, fulfilling conditions specified therein .

The incentive provided by Section 80IB is directly related to the eligibility conditions, and if an industrial undertaking does not remain a small scale undertaking or does not earn profits, it cannot claim the incentive .

The object of the law is to encourage industrial expansion within the specified category, and incentives cannot be availed by industrial undertakings that do not continue as small scale industrial undertakings during the relevant period .

Decision: The appellant, Mis. ACE Multi Axes Systems Ltd., is not eligible for the deduction under Section 80IB(3) as it ceased to be a small scale industrial undertaking during the relevant period. Permitting the incentive in such a case would be against the object of the law.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the interpretation of the term "originally inhabitants of the State of Assam" as mentioned in Clause 3(3) of the Schedule to the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issues of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003. The appellant sought directions from the Supreme Court regarding the understanding and identification procedure of persons falling under this category.

Issues:

Interpretation of the expression "originally inhabitants of the State of Assam."

Determination of the identification procedure for inclusion in the National Register of Citizens for individuals falling under this category.

Held:

The court elucidated that Clause 3(3) provides for a less strict process compared to Clause 3(2) for determining eligibility for inclusion in the NRC. The court clarified in paragraph 6 that the identification of originally inhabitants of Assam does not confer any special entitlement or benefits regarding citizenship. The inclusion in the NRC is solely based on proof of citizenship under the Constitution of India and the Citizenship Act. The Appeal is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The appellant entered into an agreement with the respondents' late father to purchase certain land.

The sale was not completed, leading to disputes over possession and ownership.

Legal proceedings ensued, including suits filed by both parties.

Issues:

Dispute over possession and ownership of the land.

Applicability of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

Entitlement to refund of earnest money.

Held:

The possession of the appellant became unauthorized and illegal after the dismissal of the suit for specific performance.

The appellant was not entitled to the protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act after the dismissal of the suit for specific performance.

The Trial Court and the High Court were justified in declaring the respondents as owners of the land and passing a decree for possession against the appellant.

The appellant was entitled to claim a refund of earnest money under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, and the respondents were directed to refund the amount within three months.

The appellant was directed to restore vacant possession of the land to the respondents within three months.

With these directions, the appeal stands finally disposed of.

Facts:

The High Court invalidated a certificate issued by the Gaon Panchayat (GP) Secretary, which was considered as a supporting document for inclusion in the National Register of Citizens (NRC) under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955.

The certificate acknowledged the change of residence of a married woman but did not establish citizenship.

The High Court's decision had the potential to affect numerous individuals applying for inclusion in the NRC.

Issues:

Whether the certificate issued by the GP Secretary is valid for inclusion in the NRC.

Whether the High Court's decision to invalidate the certificate was justified.

Held:

The Court held that certificate issued by the GP Secretary is valid for establishing a linkage between the holder and the person from whom legacy is claimed, subject to proper verification.

The certificate does not serve as proof of citizenship, but it facilitates the establishment of a link between the claimant and the legacy person.

The issuance of such certificates could fall within the jurisdiction of authorities under the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994.

The High Court's decision to invalidate the certificate was not justified, as the certificate had been agreed upon by all stakeholders involved in the NRC process and had the approval of the Union and State Governments.

The High Court's decision had the potential to affect a large number of citizens, and thus, the Supreme Court intervened to clarify the validity of the certificate.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order invalidating the certificate and allowed its limited use for establishing a linkage between the holder and the legacy person, provided the contents are duly verified.

Facts:

The appellant, Sutlej Construction, was awarded a contract by the respondent, Union Territory of Chandigarh, for earth excavation work.

The respondent terminated the contract alleging non-fulfillment of obligations by the appellant.

The appellant invoked the arbitration clause, leading to the appointment of an arbitrator.

The arbitrator partially allowed the appellant's claims while rejecting the respondent's counterclaims.

The respondent challenged the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the arbitrator's decision was valid and enforceable.

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the arbitral award.

Held:

In the opinion of the arbitrator, the performance of the contractual obligations by the appellant were dependent on reciprocal performances by the respondent.

The dispute in question had resulted in a reasoned award. It is not as if the arbitrator has not appreciated the evidence. The arbitrator has taken a plausible view.

The learned single Judge ought to have restrained himself from getting into the meanderings of evidence appreciation and acting like a second appellate court.

We have, thus, no hesitation in concluding that the impugned order cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside and the enforcement of the award in to is upheld.

The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the given facts of the case we do not impose costs.