Facts:

In 1999, the Rourkela Steel Plant (RSP) introduced a Voluntary Retirement Scheme.

In 2002, SAIL introduced the "Sail Scheme for Leasing of Houses to Employees," excluding ex-employees.

Ex-employees, who were allotted quarters under the VRS, sought long-term leases, which were denied by SAIL.

The matter was taken to court, where the High Court directed SAIL to consider allotting quarters on a long-term sub-lease basis to the ex-employees.

SAIL appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether ex-employees under the VRS scheme have a right to long-term leases for the quarters.

Whether subsequent developments and changed circumstances affect the applicability of the 2002 lease scheme.

Held:

The Court held that the changed circumstances, including significant infrastructural developments and future expansion plans of RSP, rendered the 2002 lease scheme inapplicable to ex-employees.

The Court noted that no legal right vested in ex-employees under the 2002 scheme and found it unreasonable to compel SAIL to grant long-term leases in light of the current shortage of accommodation and future expansion plans.

Therefore, the Court allowed SAIL's appeal, setting aside the High Court's order. However, the Court directed the ex-employees to remain in occupation of the quarters for 33 months from the date of the judgment, after which they were instructed to vacate the quarters peacefully and hand them over to the competent authority of RSP.

Facts:

The case of MAXOPP INVESTMENT LTD. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI (Civil Appeal Nos. 104-109 of 2015) involved the interpretation and application of Section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 14A and whether the disallowance of expenditure related to exempted income applies to investments made to gain control of investee companies or those made as stock-in-trade.

Held:

The deduction of expenditure under Section 14A is not allowed if it has been incurred in relation to income that is not part of the total income under the Income Tax Act.

The dominant purpose for which an investment into shares is made by an assessee may not be relevant for interpreting Section 14A. Even if the investment is made to gain control of the investee company, if dividend income is earned, the expenditure attributable to earning that dividend income has to be disallowed.

The principle of apportionment of expenses comes into play for interpreting Section 14A, regardless of whether the shares are held to gain control or as stock-in-trade.

When shares are held as stock-in-trade, the main purpose is to trade and earn profits. Even if dividend income is earned incidentally, it is exempt from tax. Thus, the expenditure incurred in acquiring such shares needs to be apportioned.

Before applying the theory of apportionment under Section 14A, the Assessing Officer (AO) needs to record satisfaction that the suo moto disallowance under Section 14A by the assessee was not correct. This is particularly relevant when the assessee has apportioned the expenditure in the return, but the AO disagrees.

Decision: The decision of the court emphasizes that Section 14A applies to dividend income irrespective of the purpose of investment, and the principle of apportionment of expenses is to be applied. The judgment clarifies the obligations of the Assessing Officer and provides guidance on the treatment of expenditure related to exempted income.

Facts:

A motor accident occurred on 15th December 2011 involving a parked gas tanker and a car.

The claimants alleged that the accident was caused by the negligent parking of the gas tanker in the middle of the road without proper indicators or lights.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the claimants, holding the gas tanker driver solely responsible for the accident.

The High Court modified the Tribunal's decision, finding contributory negligence on the part of the car driver and reducing the compensation.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's reversal of the Tribunal's finding on contributory negligence was justified.

The standard of proof required in motor accident claim cases compared to criminal cases.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the High Court's decision to reverse the Tribunal's finding lacking justification and based on a flawed assessment of the evidence.

It reinstated the Tribunal's finding, holding the gas tanker driver solely responsible for the accident.

The Court directed the payment of enhanced compensation to the claimants without deduction for contributory negligence.

The appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant and his father-in-law were injured in a motor accident caused by the negligent driving of a bus owned by the respondent corporation.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation to the appellant, which was challenged before the High Court.

The High Court upheld the compensation awarded by the Tribunal but increased the rate of interest on the compensation.

The appellant filed a review petition, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in not considering the appellant's income from other sources while calculating the compensation.

Whether the appellant's claim for compensation towards damage to his car was supported by evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in not considering the appellant's income from other sources, such as commission and interest, while calculating the compensation. The Court relied on precedents to emphasize that loss of taxable earning should be considered for determining just compensation. The Court recalculated the compensation under the heads 'loss of income' and 'loss of future income', resulting in an enhanced compensation amount of Rs. 2,85,966/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum.

The Court rejected the appellant's claim for compensation towards damage to his car as there was no supporting evidence provided.

The appeals were allowed to the limited extent of granting enhanced compensation as indicated above, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

Ajit Singh, aged 23 at the time of the accident, died in a motor accident on 22-09-2009. His parents, aged between 40 to 45, filed a petition for compensation. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal calculated Ajit Singh's income as Rs. 4,200/- per month and applied a multiplier of 15, considering the age of the deceased's parents. This decision was appealed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, where it was partly allowed, with the multiplier being adjusted to 14 based on the age of the parents. The appellants contested this decision, arguing for a multiplier of 18 based on the age of the deceased.

Issues:

The determination of the appropriate multiplier for calculating compensation in the motor accident claim case.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the multiplier should depend on the age of the deceased, not the dependents. Referring to previous judgments, particularly Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr., 2009 (6) SCC 121, and Munna Lal Jain and Anr. vs. Vipin Kumar Sharma and Ors., 2015 (6) SCC 347, the Court held that the multiplier should be chosen with reference to the age of the deceased.

The Court directed the respondents to pay compensation using a multiplier of 18 instead of 14 applied by the High Court. Consequently, the compensation amount was adjusted to Rs. 6,80,400/- instead of Rs. 5,29,200/-. The rate of interest was also modified to 9% per annum instead of the previously granted 6% per annum.

As a result, the appeal was allowed with modifications in the compensation amount and rate of interest. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

The writ petition (Civil) No. 473 of 2005 was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, highlighting the failure of various State Governments to implement provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2000. These provisions included the establishment of Child Welfare Committees, Juvenile Justice Boards, Special Juvenile Police Units, and Homes for children in need of care and protection.

Issues:

The petition was the lack of proper implementation of the Juvenile Justice Acts by the State Governments, leading to the deprivation of rights and welfare of children in need of care and protection.

Held:The court, after considering the arguments and concerns raised in the petition, issued various suggestions, recommendations, conclusions, and directions to address the issues at hand.

The court issued suggestions and recommendations regarding the National and State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR and SCPCRs). It emphasized the importance of filling up vacancies in these bodies promptly and urged the governments to give due importance to these bodies for the effective implementation of child welfare laws.

Regarding the State Child Protection Society and District Child Protection Unit, the court urged serious consideration for their constitution to involve all stakeholders in child welfare. It also noted the lack of effective functioning of these bodies in many places and the need for remedial steps.

The court emphasized the importance of proper selection and training of social workers and magistrates involved in Juvenile Justice Boards (JJBs) and Child Welfare Committees (CWCs). It stressed the need for adequate staff and facilities for effective functioning and highlighted the importance of quality legal aid for juveniles in conflict with the law.

The court emphasized the need for technology in improving the functioning of JJBs and CWCs. It noted the shortage of computers and peripherals in these institutions and urged the governments to address it. (Para 4)

Regarding the role of police, the court stressed the importance of appointing Child Welfare Police Officers and setting up Special Juvenile Police Units. It urged clear identification of duties and responsibilities of these units and officers.

The court highlighted the need for better infrastructure and management of Child Care Institutions. It recommended regular visits by District Legal Services Authorities to ensure proper functioning.

The court criticized the inadequate funding and lack of seriousness from some State Governments regarding the Juvenile Justice Fund.

The court suggested regular evaluations to monitor the implementation of the Juvenile Justice Act and ensure timely improvements.

The court issued a series of specific directions to various authorities and bodies involved in child welfare. It urged Chief Justices of High Courts to establish child-friendly and vulnerable witness courts in each district.

Facts:

On 03.03.2007, the deceased (Palani), aged around 21 years, was riding a motorcycle when he collided with a bus belonging to the respondent Transport Corporation, which was being driven in a rash and negligent manner. The deceased was unmarried and employed as a contract worker in Hyundai Car Company, Sriperumbudur.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's computation of compensation amount adequately accounted for future prospects, and if not, whether the appellants were entitled to further enhancement based on recent Supreme Court precedent.

Held:

The Court found that the High Court had not accounted for future prospects while computing the compensation amount under the head 'loss of dependency'. Referring to the decision in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Ors., the Court concluded that future prospects must be considered in determining compensation.

The Court modified the compensation awarded by the High Court, taking into account future prospects at the rate of 40% of the deceased's established income.

The additional compensation was directed to be deposited by the respondent Transport Corporation within a specified period.

Facts:

The State Transport Authority convened a meeting on 16.10.2014, where the Chairperson and two members were present, to hear an application for modification of time schedules for vehicle movement.

The decision was issued on 15.12.2014, signed by the Chairperson and only one member, as one member had been transferred.

The dispute arose regarding the validity of the decision made by only two members when all three had heard the application.

Issues:

Whether a decision made by the Chairperson and one member of the State Transport Authority, when all three members had heard the application, is valid under the relevant statutory provisions and precedents?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the decision made by the Chairperson and one member of the State Transport Authority was valid. The decision was in accordance with the statutory scheme and the principles established in relevant precedents. The court rejected the findings of both the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court, declaring the decision as invalid.

The court emphasized that the decision-making process of multi-member bodies typically involves expressing opinions by a majority vote of the members present. There was no provision requiring all members to sign the decision, and the absence of the signature of the third member did not invalidate the decision.

The court referred to the judgment of the Privy Council in Gokal ChandJagan Nath v. Nand Ram Das-Atma Ram, and the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. Shanta Rao v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad & Ors., which upheld decisions made by majority members, even if not all members signed the order.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the High Court, affirming the validity of the decision made by the State Transport Authority.

Decided on : 08-02-2018

Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 - Rule 63, Rule 65

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 68

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Arjun Garg, Manish Yadav, Rohit Chandra, Aakash N., Baij Nath Patel, Ms. Sweta, Ms. Romila, Advocates, for the Appellants

Cases Referred

A. Shanta Rao Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad, AIR 1985 A.P. 256

Gokal ChandJagan Nath Vs. Nand Ram Das-Atma Ram, AIR 1938 P.C. 292

Ramaswamy Nadar Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the interpretation of Section 16(5)(a) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.

There was a pending civil suit between the parties concerning the cancellation of a sale deed related to the premises in question.

Issues:

Whether a review under Section 16(5)(a) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, regarding an order concerning vacancy, is maintainable.

Held:

The Court clarified that Section 16 of the Act deals with the allotment and release of vacant buildings. It stated that a finding regarding vacancy is a pre-condition for an order under Section 16(1)(a) or (b). Therefore, if there is a wrong order regarding vacancy, it is open to review under Section 16(5)(a) as it is a statutory remedy.

The Court directed the trial court to expedite the disposal of the pending civil suit within six months and to ensure that the suit is tried on its own merits.

The Court ordered that the status quo with regard to possession shall continue until the suit is finally disposed of by the trial court.