Facts:

The case involves an application under Sections 11(4) to 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, concerning an arbitration clause in an unstamped sub-contract. The arbitration clause's existence is in question due to its unstamped nature.

Issues:

Whether an unstamped arbitration clause in a sub-contract can be recognized as "existing" as a matter of law?

How does the introduction of Section 11(6A) affect the applicability of mandatory provisions under the Stamp Act?

What is the procedure to be followed when an arbitration clause is unstamped, and an application under Section 11 is filed?

Held:

The court holds that the arbitration clause in an unstamped agreement or conveyance does not have an independent existence. Section 11(6A) does not negate the applicability of mandatory provisions under the Stamp Act, as established in SMS Tea Estates case.( Para 15, 16)

An arbitration clause in an agreement is not considered to exist if the agreement is not enforceable by law, emphasizing that the SMS Tea Estates case remains unaffected by the amendment of Section 11(6A).( Para 19)

The arbitration clause in the sub-contract does not "exist" as a matter of law until the document is duly stamped, dismissing the argument related to Section 11(6A) dealing with "existence."( Para 24)

Harmonious construction between the Maharashtra Stamp Act and Section 11(13) of the 1996 Act is necessary, ensuring expeditious disposal of both stamp duty issues and arbitration applications.( Para 26)

Suggests a procedure: The High Court must impound unstamped instruments, hand them to stamp authorities for prompt resolution, and upon payment of stamp duty and penalty, parties can proceed with the arbitration application.( Para 27, 28)

The judgment of the High Court is set aside, remitting the matter to be decided in light of this judgment.( Para 29)

Facts:

The case involves cross appeals in the nature of Civil Appeal No. 6600 of 2015 and C.A. No. 1954 of 2019.

The appellant is the insurance company, and the central issue is whether the age of the deceased or the age of the dependents should be the basis for calculating the multiplier in the case of a bachelor's death.

Issues:

The determination of the multiplier in the case of a motor accident resulting in the death of a bachelor.

The question is whether the age of the deceased or the age of the dependents should be considered for calculating the multiplier.

Held:

The court affirms that in the case of a bachelor's death, it is the age of the deceased that should be the basis for calculating the multiplier.

The focus for determining the claim is on the deceased and what contribution he would have made to the dependents if alive.

The judgment emphasizes the importance of applying a uniform settled principle to avoid confusion and litigation.

The court dismisses the appeal filed by the insurance company, finding it without merit.

Regarding the claimants, no interference is called for as they have already been granted more than a reasonable amount for future prospects.

Both appeals are dismissed, and the parties are left to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The appellant-assessee, involved in the manufacture of goods falling under Chapter 24 of the Schedule of The Central Excise Act, 1944, charged customers invoices for the price of goods plus Dharmada, a charitable donation.

The Superintendent of Central Excise issued show cause notices and demanded duty on Dharmada, claiming it as part of the price for the sale of manufactured goods.

The Adjudicating Authority initially held that Dharmada was not part of the trading receipts and dropped the demand for excise duty.

Another show cause notice was issued by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad, calling for penalty and interest.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that Dharmada was liable to be included as part of the assessable value.

The Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) partly allowed the appeal, but upheld the inclusion of Dharmada in the assessable value.

Issues: Whether Dharmada collected by the appellant, being an optional payment made by the buyer, can be regarded as part of the transaction value for the sale of goods.

Held and Decision:

The nature of the transaction involves the sale of goods, and the consideration is the price paid for the goods.

Excise duty is charged on the transaction value, which includes the amount paid as price for the goods.

The term "transaction value" is defined to mean the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold, excluding amounts like excise duty and other taxes.

Dharmada, being a voluntary donation earmarked for charity and credited as such, does not constitute consideration for the transfer of goods.

The Court relied on precedent (Bijli Cotton Mills) stating that amounts received for Dharmada and earmarked for charitable purposes are not regarded as income of the assessee but are held under an obligation to spend the same for charitable purposes.

The Court distinguished the case from Tata Iron & Steel, where a surcharge was added as an element of price, unlike Dharmada, which is meant for charity.

The Dharmada collected, being an optional payment made by the buyer, cannot be regarded as part of the transaction value for the sale of goods.

Facts:

The respondents filed a suit for the declaration of title and possession. The appellants contested, claiming abandonment of the land by the respondents, issuance of lease to the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, and possession since then. The trial court dismissed the suit based on the patta-lease (Ex.D-20), stating it was issued to the appellants' predecessor, and the respondents' entries in revenue records were dubious. The first appellate court doubted Ex.D-20, decreeing the suit. The High Court affirmed the first appellate court's findings.

Issues:

Validity of the patta-lease (Ex.D-20).

The authenticity of the respondents' claim to the suit land.

Alleged connivance with the patwari for entries in revenue records.

Admissibility and interpretation of additional evidence.

Held:

In an Article 136 appeal, concurrent findings are generally not interfered with unless shown to be perverse. Interference is warranted when the findings are patently unreasonable (Para 10).

Plaintiffs, in a suit for title and possession, must succeed on the strength of their title. The burden lies on them to establish their title, which they failed to do (Para 13).

The admissions in the written statement about the lease to the plaintiffs' fathers do not absolve the plaintiffs from proving their continued entitlement to the patta-lease (Para 14).

Section 58 of the Evidence Act allows the court discretion to require admitted facts to be proved. Mere allegations of fraud do not rebut the presumption of genuineness under Section 90 (Para 15).

The evidence and records establish that the suit land was abandoned by the respondents' fathers, leading to an auction and lease issuance to the appellants' grandfather. The patta (Ex.D-20) is presumed genuine under Section 90 (Paras 16-19).

Revenue records consistently favor the appellants, strengthening their case. Entries in favor of the respondents for two years are insufficient, and findings of revenue authorities support the appellants' claim (Para 20).

The respondents failed to produce any document proving Ex. D-20 as forged. The Commissioner's order and other evidence establish connivance in entries, discrediting the respondents' case (Paras 22-23).

The findings of misconduct by the patwari, as per Ex.D-1, were ignored by the lower courts. Production of additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27, is permissible under specified circumstances (Paras 26-28).

The order of the Tahsildar dated 28.07.1971 is accepted as additional evidence, as it directly relates to the dispute and is referred to in Ex.D-1. Other additional documents are not admitted (Paras 30-31).

The High Court erred in dismissing the appeal without proper consideration of evidence and materials on record. The findings of revenue misconduct were crucial, and the High Court did not weigh the evidence adequately (Para 42).

Facts:

Dispute over promotions to the post of Junior Management Scale II in Mahakoshal Kshetriya Bank.

Rules formulated under Section 29 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, governed the promotions.

The Rules prescribed a selection process involving a written test, interview, and performance appraisal reports for the preceding five years.

The eligibility criteria and mode of selection were defined, but no minimum qualifying marks were specified for the interview and performance appraisal reports.

Issues:

Disagreement on the application of the seniority-cum-merit principle.

Challenge to the decision fixing a benchmark of minimum 12 marks in the interview and performance appraisal reports.

Held:

The learned Single Judge set aside the promotion list, directing the preparation of a fresh list with minimum cut-off merit marks, emphasizing seniority-cum-merit.

The Division Bench, without finding any irregularity, dismissed the appeals and ordered a fresh promotion exercise.

Both the Single Judge and Division Bench erred in holding that fixing minimum qualifying marks for interview and performance appraisal violates the seniority-cum-merit principle.

Relying on precedent, it was established that fixing benchmarks based on aggregate performance is permissible and does not contradict seniority-cum-merit.

The Division Bench's decision to set aside the entire selection test was unwarranted, as there was no finding of its vitiation.

The appeals were allowed, and the judgments of the Single Judge and Division Bench were quashed. The respondent-authority was directed to prepare a fresh promotion list, considering those who met the minimum qualifying criteria, following seniority.

Facts:

FCI advertised for the post of Assistant Grade-II (Hindi) with specific eligibility criteria.

The original writ petitioner applied, was shortlisted, and ranked sixth in the merit list.

Despite being ranked, the petitioner did not receive a final letter of appointment and was not on the selected list.

The denial was based on the petitioner's failure to produce an experience certificate for one year's translation work from English to Hindi and vice-versa.

Issues:

Whether the non-production of the experience certificate along with the application is fatal to the petitioner's case?

Whether subsequent production of certificates during verification should be considered?

Held:

The Division Bench, considering the distinction between essential requirements and the mode of proof, ruled that non-production of the certificate along with the application is not fatal.

The court emphasized that the essential is possession of the required qualification/experience before the given date, and the mode of proof is secondary.

The FCI's failure to call for additional evidence during document verification was noted, and the certificates subsequently produced were considered valid.

The Division Bench set aside the FCI's rejection and directed consideration of the petitioner for appointment on merit if other conditions are met.

Facts:

The Respondent manufactured goods falling under Chapter 72 of The Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, specifically Pig Iron and HR Coil Sheets.

Invoices included 'Dharmada,' a charitable donation from customers, credited to charity by the Respondent.

Issues:

Whether 'Dharmada' should be added to the assessable value for the payment of central excise duty.

Held:

The Deputy Commissioner, in a show cause notice, held that 'Dharmada' should be added to the assessable value.

The Commissioner (Appeals) affirmed this decision.

The CESTAT, in an appeal by the Respondent, overturned the decision, citing the precedent of Mohan and Co., Madras vs. CCE Madras.

The Supreme Court, in Civil Appeal No. 531 of 2008, considered the Collector vs. Panchmukhi Engineering Works case, asserting that 'Dharmada' should be a part of the assessable value.

The present case, linked to M/s D.J. Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik, held that 'Dharmada' cannot be included in the transaction value for assessments.

In view of the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 5282 of 2005, M/s D.J. Malpani vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik, the present appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent floated an e-public tender for call center services. The appellant, facing a show cause notice for blacklisting in another tender, participated and won the bid. The show cause notice alleged providing false information.

Issues:

Interpretation of clause 20(i) and 20(ii) regarding blacklisting in the tender.

Validity of the Business Continuity Certificate submitted by the appellant.

Held:

The Court held that clause 20(i) did not require disclosure of a show cause notice; initiation of blacklisting is a different stage. The format provided specific conditions for disclosure, and the appellant complied. The undertaking given by the appellant did not necessitate disclosure of a show cause notice. The Court emphasized the seriousness of blacklisting and the need for clarity in the tender format.(Para 13-28)

The Court rejected doubts raised by respondent No.3 on the Business Continuity Certificate, stating that disputes on such technicalities are better suited for suits, not writ proceedings. It cautioned against courts substituting their interpretation for that of the tendering authority. Respondent No.1's reluctance to accept the doubts also played a role in the decision.(Para 29-35)

The Court cautioned against routine challenges to tenders, emphasizing the need for efficiency in public sector contracts. It referred to precedents that highlight the Court's limited role in interpreting commercial contracts. The impugned order was set aside, and the writ petition dismissed.(Para 36-43)

Facts:

The complainant alleged providing a hand loan of Rs.6,00,000/- to the accused, who, in turn, issued a cheque dated 27.02.2012. The cheque was dishonored by the bank on 01.03.2012, citing insufficient funds. The trial court acquitted the accused, emphasizing the complainant's failure to prove financial capacity. However, the High Court overturned this decision, leading to an appeal.

Issues:

The complainant's capacity to lend Rs.6,00,000 to the accused, with the accused challenging the complainant's financial standing based on various transactions.

Held:

The Court summarily states principles established by the Supreme Court regarding Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Notably, the execution of a cheque implies a presumption under Section 139 that it was for debt discharge, which is a rebuttable presumption.

The complainant admitted receiving Rs.8,00,000 as retirement benefits and making a payment of Rs.4,50,000 in 2010. The accused argued that within two years, the complainant disbursed Rs.18,00,000 to various individuals, questioning the complainant's financial capacity.

The burden to prove financial capacity shifted to the complainant due to a probable defense raised by the accused. The complainant's unsatisfactory responses during cross-examination and failure to explain financial capacity were noted.

The Court emphasized that the trial court's findings were based on evidence presented by the defense. The High Court's criticism of the trial court's decision as perverse was deemed unsustainable, and the original judgment was restored.