Facts:

The respondent worked as a daily wager in the R & B Department of the State for approximately 18 years.

The State terminated the respondent's services without following the due procedure prescribed in law.

The respondent raised a dispute almost 15 years after his alleged termination before the Labour Court.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the daily-wage worker was illegal, and if so, what relief is appropriate, considering the nature of the employment and the circumstances surrounding the termination.

Held:

After hearing counsels, the court is inclined to allow the appeal in part and modify the impugned order.( Paragraph 8)

The court determines that the case falls within the parameters set by previous decisions in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs Bhurumal and District Development Officer vs. Satish Kantilal Amerelia.( Paragraph 9)

The court quotes the rationale from Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, emphasizing that automatic reinstatement with back wages is not applicable when the termination is due to procedural defects, such as the violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.( Paragraph 10)

Highlights reasons for the decision: respondent worked as a daily wager for a few years, had no right to claim regularization, no right to continue as a daily wager, and raised the dispute after a significant gap.( Paragraph 11)

Concludes that lump sum monetary compensation is just, proper, and reasonable in full and final satisfaction of the claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.( Paragraph 13)

Specifies the amount of compensation as Rs. 1,00,000/- to be paid by the appellant (State) to the respondent within three months.( Paragraph 14)

The appeal succeeds, and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The Labour Court's Award is modified accordingly.( Paragraph 15)

Facts:

Birla Institute of Technology (BIT) is the appellant, and the State of Jharkhand and Others are the respondents.

Respondent No.4, a teacher, claimed gratuity from BIT under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The controlling authority ordered BIT to pay gratuity to respondent No.4.

BIT appealed, but both the appellate authority and the High Court upheld the order.

Issues:

Whether the appellant (BIT) is liable to pay gratuity to a teacher under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Held:

The Supreme Court relied on the precedent set in Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (2004) 1 SCC 755, which held that teachers are not employees under Section 2(e) of the Act.

The High Court erred in distinguishing the precedent on the grounds of applicability to primary teachers only. The Supreme Court clarified that the distinction is not valid, emphasizing that teachers, in general, are not intended to be covered by the Act.

The Court reiterated that the definition of "employee" under the Act does not include teachers, irrespective of the type of educational institution they work in.

The High Court's decision was set aside, and the appeal by BIT was allowed.

The application made by respondent No.4 before the controlling authority under the Act was dismissed as not maintainable.

Facts:

The appellant filed a civil suit seeking recovery of Rs.74,66,107, under Order 33 Rule 1 of the Code, claiming indigence and inability to pay ad valorem court fees.

Issues:

The respondents contested, asserting the appellant's ability to pay court fees. The Trial Court rejected the plea for indigence. Subsequent appeal to the High Court affirmed the decision.

Held:

Upon examination of Orders 33 and 44, the Court found the appellant's case falling under Order 33 Rule 11 read with Order 44 Rule 3(2). The rejection by the Trial Court didn't bar the appellant from filing an appeal under Order 44 Rule 1.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case for an inquiry under Order 44 Rule 3(2). The Appellate Court must determine if the appellant became indigent since the decree appealed from.

Facts:

Raj Kumar worked as a daily wager in the State PWD Department from June 1986 to May 1987.

The State terminated his services without following due procedure.

Raj Kumar filed a petition in the Labour Court, Haridwar, challenging the termination after almost 25 years.

The Labour Court awarded Rs. 30,000 in compensation.

The High Court modified the award, directing reinstatement without back wages.

The State appealed, contesting the modification.

Issues:

Legality and correctness of Raj Kumar's termination.

Whether reinstatement without back wages is appropriate.

Held:

The Court, after hearing both parties, decides to allow the appeals in part and modify the impugned order.( Para 9)

The Court relies on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 and District Development Officer vs. Satish Kantilal Amerelia (2018) 12 SCC 298, establishing the principle that reinstatement with full back wages isn't automatic, especially in cases of daily-wage workers.( Para 10)

The Court cites Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, stating that in cases of procedural defects like violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, automatic reinstatement may not be appropriate, and monetary compensation should suffice.( Para 11)

Given that Raj Kumar worked as a daily wager for a short period, had no right to regularization, and raised the dispute after 25 years, the Court finds his case aligns with the principles laid out in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited.( Para 12)

The Court deems it just, proper, and reasonable to award Rs. 1,00,000 to Raj Kumar in full and final satisfaction of his claim, modifying the Labour Court's award from Rs. 30,000 to Rs. 1,00,000.( Para 14)

The State is directed to pay Rs. 1,00,000 to Raj Kumar within three months from the date of the judgment.( Para 16)

Conclusion: The appeals succeed in part. The impugned orders of the High Court are set aside, and the Labour Court's award is modified as indicated above.

Facts:

The State and its authorities (appellants) are defendants, and Gram Vikas Samiti, Shivdaspura (respondent) is the plaintiff in a civil suit for permanent injunction.

Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, granting permanent injunction against the appellants.

The first Appellate Court affirmed the Trial Court's decision, leading to the filing of the Second Appeal by the State in the High Court.

Issues:

The High Court dismissed the State's appeal in limine, stating that it does not involve any substantial question of law.

Lack of discussion and reasoning in the High Court's order.

Held:

The High Court's dismissal without assigning reasons and without discussing the case on facts or in law is deemed inappropriate.

The second appeal involves substantial questions of law related to State land, title, possession, and legal implications.

Remand the case to the High Court for a fresh decision, directing the High Court to admit the second appeal by framing proper substantial questions of law.

The High Court is instructed to issue notice of the appeal along with the framed substantial questions of law to the respondent and decide the second appeal on its merits.

The High Court should decide questions related to ownership, possession, and legality in light of legal principles, pleadings, and evidence.

The decision is made without expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy, leaving it to the High Court's unbiased consideration.

Facts:

Partition suit (154/1985) filed by Smt. Saroja Rani in Ranchi, challenged on jurisdiction.

Preliminary decree passed on 13 June 1990; final decree on 5 April 1991.

Respondent raised objections to execution based on lack of territorial jurisdiction.

Issues:

Whether an objection to territorial jurisdiction can be entertained in execution proceedings?

Application of Sections 21A and 47, Order 7 Rule 11, and Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC.

Held:

Jurisdiction objection doesn't go to inherent lack but must be raised at the earliest opportunity.

Conditions for raising jurisdiction objection: earliest opportunity and consequent failure of justice.

Execution court cannot go behind the decree; objections must be raised before the court of first instance.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the High Court's judgment is set aside. The executing court is directed to conclude the execution proceedings expeditiously.

Facts:

A complaint was lodged in 1983, and the case was put on trial under various sections of IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

After the investigation, charges were filed against the appellant and others.

The prosecution filed a petition to examine handwriting expert Mr. H.S. Tuteja in 2004, but his attendance for examination has been a persistent challenge.

Issues:

Whether the summoning of Mr. H.S. Tuteja, as sought by the prosecution, is justified.

The impact of repeated failures to secure the witness's attendance on the trial proceedings.

Held:

The court refers to Section 311 of CrPC, granting discretionary authority to summon witnesses. Emphasizes that such power should be exercised cautiously and only for strong and valid reasons.

Despite multiple opportunities given to the prosecution, they have been unable to ensure the presence of Mr. H.S. Tuteja.

The High Court's orders allowing the summoning of the witness are quashed. The appeal is allowed, and the application for summoning Mr. H.S. Tuteja is dismissed.

Decision: The orders of the High Court dated 04.05.2017, as well as of the Trial Court dated 05.12.2014, are hereby quashed, and the application filed by the Prosecutor for summoning Mr. H.S. Tuteja is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Madhav Hari Joshi, applied for a Jeevan Aastha Plan with LIC in 2009.

An extra premium of Rs. 10,000 was disputed, although the appellant had paid Rs. 1,75,000 against the regular premium of Rs. 1,65,000.

LIC retained the appellant's money for nearly five years without issuing a policy or initiating a refund.

Issues:

Dispute over the extra premium.

Delay in processing the proposal by LIC.

Non-issuance of the policy and failure to refund the appellant's money.

Held:

The appellant had paid the disputed extra premium as part of the total payment.

LIC failed to fulfill the remaining formalities promptly, leading to an unjustified delay.

The appellant's investment was linked to the equity market, and the delay deprived him of the benefits of market escalation.

A deficiency of service was established.

The National Commission's order was modified, and an additional amount of Rs. 2,00,000 was directed to be paid, in addition to the sum ordered by the National Commission.

Facts:

U.P. Jal Nigam Construction Division (Jal Nigam) retrenched workmen engaged in various categories.

The Writ Petition challenging the retrenchment was decided in 2009, directing preference to the petitioners in future selections.

Subsequent disputes arose leading to a series of contempt petitions.

Issues:

Whether the circular dated 07.04.2015 complied with the court's directions?

Did the order of the court mandate reinstatement or grant of regular pay scale?

Can the petitioners claim reinstatement without a specific court order to that effect?

Held:

The circular dated 07.04.2015 complied with the court's directions under Section 6Q of the Act.

Contempt cannot be invoked without a specific direction for reinstatement or regular pay scale.

The court's order did not mandate reinstatement; hence, petitioners cannot claim such relief.

The Group D posts available were subject to regular recruitment rules, not for direct appointment of retrenched workers.

Contempt petitions dismissed; the services of already engaged workmen remain unaffected.