Facts:

Mr. Sanjay Jain, the appellant, had joined Air India Ltd. in 1992 and resigned in 2006 after completing his mandatory five-year service period.

Dispute arose when Air India did not accept his resignation, claiming it was not effective.

Mr. Jain filed a writ petition in the High Court, seeking payment of pending dues.

Issues:

Whether Mr. Jain's resignation became effective upon completion of the notice period, as per Standing Orders.

Whether acceptance of resignation by Air India was necessary.

Held:

The court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, particularly Standing Orders 17 and 18 framed by Air India. The court held that:

"It is right of a workman to serve and resign also by serving notice of 30 days. The bond to serve was only for five years as stipulated in the order of his appointment.

"No disciplinary proceeding was pending or contemplated against an employee in the case when he resigned. The resignation became effective on the lapse of 30 days period.

"In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law and on consideration of the provisions contained in Standing Order 18 in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that appellant has rightly terminated the relationship by serving the requisite notice for resignation.

The court allowed Mr. Jain's appeal, quashed the High Court's judgment, and directed Air India to pay him the pending dues, including provident fund and gratuity, with applicable interest rates.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act regarding the maintainability of an application by a borrower before the actual possession of secured assets is taken by banks/financial institutions.

Issues:

Whether an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, initiated by a borrower, is maintainable before physical or actual possession of secured assets is taken by banks/financial institutions .

Held:

The Court held that the scheme of Section 13(4) read with Rule 8(1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, allows for the borrower to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal at the stage of the possession notice referred to in Rules 8(1) and 8(2).

Possession under Section 13(4)(a) includes both constructive possession (as in Rules 8(1) and 8(2)) and physical possession (as in Rule 8(3)). Section 17(3) empowers the Debts Recovery Tribunal to provide reliefs, including restoration of possession. The Act provides recourse to borrowers against wrongful actions of secured creditors.

The Act aims to enable secured creditors to recover debts outside the court process, subject to statutory conditions. Borrowers can approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal if secured creditors fail to adhere to the Act's provisions.

Appendix IV-A recognizes that Rules 8(1) and 8(2) refer to constructive possession, while Rule 8(3) refers to physical possession. Borrowers can approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal at the stage of the possession notice as per Rules 8(1) and 8(2) .

Decision: The Court held that an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act is maintainable by a borrower before the actual possession of secured assets is taken by banks/financial institutions. This is in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the relevant Rules. The appeals are accordingly allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, Babasaheb Maruti Kamble, was convicted for offenses under Sections 302, 376(2)(f), and 342 of the Indian Penal Code.

He was awarded the death penalty for the offense under Section 302 by the trial court, which was confirmed by the High Court.

The appellant filed a review petition seeking a review of the order dismissing the special leave petition in limine.

Issues:

Whether special leave petitions challenging death sentences should be dismissed without providing reasons.

The necessity of affording a hearing to the accused on the question of sentencing, particularly in cases involving the death penalty.

The procedural fairness and the thorough examination of cases involving capital punishment.

Held:

The Court acknowledges the importance of providing reasons when dismissing special leave petitions, especially in cases involving death sentences.

It emphasizes the need for an independent examination by the Supreme Court in cases where death sentences are awarded, unbound by the findings of the lower courts.

The Court reiterates the significance of affording a hearing to the accused on the question of sentencing, considering mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

It holds that special leave petitions challenging death sentences should not be dismissed without providing reasons, at least concerning the death penalty.

The Court allows the review petition and recalls the order dismissing the special leave petition in limine, restoring the special leave petition to its original number for further consideration.

Facts:

Reena Hazarika, the appellant, was convicted under Section 302 IPC for allegedly murdering her husband.

The prosecution's case was based on circumstantial evidence, primarily relying on the "last seen theory" to establish the appellant's presence with the deceased at the time of the incident.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution established a prima facie case against the appellant based on circumstantial evidence.

Whether the court adequately considered the defense presented by the appellant under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).

Held:

The entirety of the discussion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of evidence available coupled with the manner of its consideration, leaves us satisfied that the links in the chain of circumstances in a case of circumstantial evidence, cannot be said to have been established leading to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant was the assailant of the deceased, incompatible with any possibility of innocence of the appellant. The possibility that the occurrence may have taken place in some other manner cannot be completely ruled out.

The appellant is therefore held entitled to acquittal on the benefit of doubt. We accordingly order the acquittal and release of the appellant from custody forthwith, unless wanted in any other case.

Facts:

The Nagpur Improvement Trust decided in 1968 to dispose of 44.61 acres of surplus land, subsequently acquiring the land from various owners.

The respondent, Sheela Ramchandra Tikhe, applied in 1975 for re-allotment of the entire 44.61 acres.

Initially, the Trust decided to allot the entire 44.61 acres to the respondent, but due to various correspondences and negotiations, only 24 acres were finally allotted in 1982.

Issues:

Whether the respondent was entitled to the decree granted by the trial court for the allotment of the remaining 20.61 acres of land.

Whether the appellate court was justified in considering the issue of limitation, even though it wasn't raised before the trial court.

Held:

The court held that the allotment of land by the Trust was subject to statutory Rules, namely, Nagpur Improvement Trust Land Disposal Rules, 1955 and 1983.

There was no firm allotment of the entire 44.61 acres to the respondent, as only 24 acres were allotted in 1982.

The Rules in force at the time of disposal governed the allocation of land, and any further allotment after the enforcement of the 1983 Rules must comply with statutory rules.

Since the respondent's claim for allotment of the remaining 20.61 acres was not covered by Rule 5(2) of the 1983 Rules, the trial court's decree in her favor was contrary to statutory Rules.

The appellate court was justified in considering the issue of limitation, even though it wasn't raised before the trial court, in accordance with Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, ruling that the respondent was not entitled to the decree granted by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. Any further allotment of land after the enforcement of the 1983 Rules must comply with statutory rules, and the respondent's claim did not meet the criteria laid down in those rules.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against a judgment passed by the High Court affirming the appellant's conviction under Section 302 IPC and other related offenses.

The incident took place on 03.01.1986, where the appellant, along with other accused individuals, was alleged to have been involved in the murder of the victim. The charges framed against the accused included Sections 302, 302/34, 323, and 323/34 IPC.

Issues:

The absence of a specific charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against the appellant and whether this absence caused prejudice or failure of justice to him.

Held:

The Court held that the absence of a charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC did not vitiate the appellant's conviction unless it resulted in prejudice or failure of justice. The appellant's understanding of the gist of the charges against him was evident from his defense throughout the trial.

Despite the absence of a specific charge, the appellant was well-aware of the allegations and had a fair opportunity to defend himself.

Therefore, no prejudice or failure of justice was shown to have been occasioned. The Court relied on various precedents, including Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab, emphasizing that technicalities should not override the substance of justice. The appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant, Jangir Singh, was accused of shooting and killing Jaswant Singh, a colleague in the Punjab Home Guard, during an altercation over a borrowed sum of money. Initially acquitted by the trial court, the High Court reversed the decision, leading to this appeal.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions constituted legitimate self-defence or exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defence, leading to the death of the deceased.

Held:

The appellant's actions, while prompted by a perceived threat, exceeded the legitimate exercise of the right to self-defence, resulting in the death of the deceased. Therefore, the conviction under Section 302 IPC was set aside and converted to Section 304 Part I of the IPC, considering the excessive use of force.

Decision: The appeal stands disposed of with the modified conviction, and the appellant is directed to be released immediately if not required in any other case.

Facts:

On 22 March 2007, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court disposed of a reference made under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 by the 3rd Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence of death imposed on certain accused, while sentencing others to imprisonment for life. Appeals were filed before the Supreme Court, resulting in the dismissal of some appeals and the enhancement of sentences for others. Review petitions were subsequently filed, leading to the reopening of the review petitions based on the decision of the Constitution Bench in Mohd. Arif v Registrar, Supreme Court of India, 2014 (9) SCC 737.

Issues:

The denial of an opportunity for certain accused to be heard by the Bench before their appeals were decided, leading to a violation of their rights to legal representation and fair trial.

Held:

The Court recalled the judgment and order dated 30 April 2009, which awarded the death sentence to certain accused and confirmed the sentence of death imposed by the High Court on others.

The Court also recalled its earlier judgment dismissing the appeals filed by certain accused. It held that the accused who were not represented by counsel during the hearing were deprived of an opportunity to be heard, necessitating the recall of the judgment. Consequently, the criminal appeals were restored to the file of the Court for fresh hearing. The Court granted permission to the concerned accused to file appeals against the judgment of the High Court convicting them, if advised.

The execution of the death sentence imposed by the High Court was suspended pending the disposal of the appeals. The Court directed the Registry to call for the records and disposed of the criminal miscellaneous petitions accordingly.

Facts:

Ghanshyam Sharma claimed to have worked as a casual helper for Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. from June 10, 1976, to July 30, 1977.

He alleged that his services were orally terminated on July 31, 1977.

The dispute led to a reference to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Labour Court ruled in Sharma's favor, ordering his reinstatement with continuity of service.

Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. challenged this decision in the High Court, leading to conflicting judgments at the Single Judge and Division Bench levels.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in reinstating the Labour Court's award.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the facts and circumstances, modified the Labour Court's award.

It found that reinstating Sharma with back wages and continuity of service was not appropriate due to the short duration of his employment and lack of evidence regarding his subsequent employment status.

Instead, the Court directed Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. to pay Sharma a lump sum compensation of Rs. 50,000 under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

This compensation was deemed reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case, including the monthly salary paid to Sharma during the legal proceedings.

The company was instructed to pay the compensation within three months from the date of the Supreme Court's order.