Facts:

The Respondent, a Turkish company, was contracted for pipeline construction in Bangladesh and subcontracted the Petitioner, a US company, for Horizontal Directional Drilling works. Disputes arose regarding payment, leading the Petitioner to invoke arbitration. The Respondent failed to respond, prompting the Petitioner to file for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the arbitration agreement between the parties was valid.

Whether the court should appoint an arbitrator due to the failure of the Respondent to respond to the arbitration invocation.

Held:

In the circumstances, we hereby appoint Mr Justice FM Ibrahim Kalifulla, former judge of the Supreme Court of India to act as a sole Arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement. The learned arbitrator shall be at liberty to determine the fees payable to him for the arbitration. The Arbitration Petition is accordingly disposed of in the above terms.

Facts:

The petitioners, Lokesh Katara and another, were working as Systems Officers and Systems Assistants on a contractual basis since 2009. They sought absorption into regular positions following the sanctioning of posts and an amendment to recruitment rules by the High Court of Gujarat.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court can entertain a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in this matter, or if the appropriate remedy lies within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.

Held:

The Supreme Court declined to entertain the Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, as the petitioners had an alternative remedy available to them through the High Court under Article 226. The Court dismissed the petition, leaving it open for the petitioners to pursue their case before the High Court if they chose to do so.

FACTS:

The petitioners, who were advocates, filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking guidelines to curb acts of discrimination against individuals from the north-eastern states. They highlighted instances of discrimination reported in the media since 2009, emphasizing the need for systemic measures to address the issue.

ISSUES:

Whether guidelines are needed to address discrimination against individuals from the north-eastern states.

What steps should be taken by the government to address racial discrimination and promote equality.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that guidelines were necessary to address discrimination against individuals from the north-eastern states. It emphasized the obligations of the government under Article 15 of the Constitution and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The court ordered the formation of a Committee under the Ministry of Home Affairs to monitor and redress issues related to racial discrimination faced by citizens from the north-eastern states. This Committee would meet regularly to review the implementation of measures to address racial discrimination and would be accessible to grievances, suggestions, and complaints.

The court also directed the Committee to monitor the implementation of recommendations from the Bezbaruah Committee and take necessary action against incidents of racial discrimination or violence. Sensitivity and inclusion in society were emphasized as crucial to addressing the underlying issues of racial discrimination. The judgment underscored the government's non-negotiable obligation to promote racial equality through constitutional rights, fundamental duties, statutory provisions, and international obligations. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of.

REFERRED CASES:

C Masilamani Mudaliar Vs. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami Thirukoil, (1996) 8 SCC 525

Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241

Facts:

The appellant filed an Original Application (OA) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), challenging the decision of the Departmental Promotional Committee (DPC) to keep the result of his promotion in a sealed cover.

The appellant was facing criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The High Court set aside the CAT's order, prompting the appellant to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the adoption of the sealed cover procedure by the DPC was justified.

Whether the case of the appellant should be reconsidered for promotion in light of subsequent developments.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the adoption of the sealed cover procedure by the DPC was justified as the chargesheet had been filed before a criminal court before the DPC meeting. However, it emphasized the necessity of timely review of such cases, which had not been conducted in the appellant's case. Therefore, the Court directed the respondents to reconsider the appellant's case for ad-hoc promotion within one month, taking into account the developments after the judgment of the High Court. The Court also closed the contempt petitions and did not impose any costs.

This decision is based on the principles laid down in Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109 and other relevant cases cited in the judgment.

Facts:

Harshita Bhasin and Mukul Bhasin, married on July 11, 2007, have two children.

Living separately since July 2013 due to a matrimonial dispute.

Mukul Bhasin filed for dissolution of marriage and custody of children under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.

Harshita Bhasin filed a habeas corpus petition before the Calcutta High Court seeking interim custody of the children.

Calcutta High Court directed Mukul Bhasin to bring children to Kolkata fortnightly for Harshita Bhasin's visitation.

Issues:

Stressful travel schedule for the children due to visitation arrangements.

Request for modification of visitation orders by Mukul Bhasin.

Held:

The Court, after considering the stressful travel schedule for the children and the request for modification of visitation orders, made the following directives:

Mukul Bhasin shall travel with the children to Kolkata on a Sunday in the first fortnight of every month to facilitate Harshita Bhasin's visitation rights.

Harshita Bhasin shall have visitation rights in New Delhi in the second fortnight of every month.

Mukul Bhasin shall deposit Rs. 40,000 per month into a nominated bank account of Harshita Bhasin by the seventh day of every month to cover her travel and hotel expenses.

Harshita Bhasin shall make her own travel arrangements to and from New Delhi and for her stay. She shall collect the children from the chambers of Ms. Udita Seth, Advocate, in New Delhi and return them to Mukul Bhasin at the same place.

The Interlocutory Application is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

Greaves Cotton Limited (the appellant) and United Machinery and Appliances (the respondent) were parties to an agreement containing an arbitration clause.

The respondent filed a civil suit seeking damages, while the appellant invoked the arbitration clause and filed an application under Section 5 read with Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, requesting reference of the dispute to arbitration.

The High Court rejected the application, stating that by seeking an extension of time to file the written statement, the appellant waived its right to seek arbitration.

Issues:

Whether filing an application for an extension of time to file a written statement constitutes the submission of the first statement on the substance of the dispute under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that filing an application for an extension of time to file a written statement does not constitute the submission of the first statement on the substance of the dispute. The court emphasized that the intention of the legislature was not to include such procedural steps as constituting the first statement on the substance of the dispute. Therefore, the appellant had not waived its right to object to the jurisdiction of the judicial authority by seeking an extension of time.

The court highlighted that before deciding on the application under Section 8, the High Court should have considered factors such as the existence of an arbitration agreement, whether the disputes fell within the scope of arbitration, and whether the reliefs sought in the suit could be granted in arbitration.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court, and requested the High Court to reconsider the application in light of the observations made by the Supreme Court, except for the points already addressed in the judgment.

Facts:

India is home to the largest child population globally, with a significant portion being adolescents. Recent reports indicate a concerning increase in substance abuse among young children.

Issues:

The alarming rise in substance abuse among children in India and the lack of comprehensive policies to address this issue effectively.

Held:

The court emphasizes the necessity for a comprehensive National Plan to address substance abuse among children, facilitating coordinated intervention by Union and State governments.

Lack of reliable data on the number of substance abuse victims in India is highlighted as a significant deficiency, hindering effective policy interventions.

The Union Government is directed to conclude a national survey on drug abuse within six months to gather accurate data.

The Union Government is mandated to finalize a national policy on drug demand reduction within six months, addressing capacity building, education, awareness, accreditation of de-addiction centers, and specific vulnerabilities, especially concerning children.

Incorporating aspects of substance abuse awareness and sensitization into the school curriculum is emphasized, with authorities urged to consider measures to protect children from substance abuse.

Decision: The court issues directives aimed at addressing substance abuse among children in India through comprehensive policy formulation, data collection, and educational interventions.

Facts:

The complainant filed a complaint against the accused persons, described as Printer and Publisher, Managing Director, and Chairman of a newspaper, based on a news article published in the newspaper.

Issues:

Whether the Magistrate conducted the necessary inquiry before summoning the accused persons, as required by Section 202 of the Cr.P.C.?

Whether the Magistrate considered the provisions of Section 7 of the Press Act in issuing the summoning orders?

Whether the High Court's decision to discharge one of the accused persons was justified?

Held:

Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. was amended in 2005 to include provisions regarding summoning accused persons residing beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. The amendment aims to prevent false complaints and mandates the Magistrate to conduct an inquiry or direct an investigation before issuing summons (Para 22, 24).

The summoning order in this case did not reflect any such inquiry as required by Section 202. The Magistrate did not adequately consider the provisions of Section 7 of the Press Act, which was necessary before summoning the accused persons (Para 25, 26, 27).

Although the argument based on Section 202 was raised for the first time before the High Court, it is permissible to raise pure legal issues at any stage of proceedings, especially those related to jurisdiction. Thus, the Court directed the Magistrate to reconsider the matter concerning the accused persons and make necessary orders (Para 28, 30, 31).

Decision: The Court allowed the appeals, quashed the notice against one of the accused (A-1), and directed the Magistrate to conduct further inquiry regarding both accused individuals (A-1 and A-2) to determine if summonses should be issued against them.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the states of Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu regarding the allocation of river water from the Cauvery River. The dispute was adjudicated by the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, and its decision was challenged through appeals filed by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution by the concerned states before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals challenging the decision of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal.

Interpretation of Section 6(2) of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, regarding the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Determination of the legislative intent behind Section 6(2) and its effect on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.

Held:

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals challenging the decision of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal. The jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is not barred by Section 11 of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, once a water dispute has been adjudicated by the tribunal .

The definition of "water dispute" as per Article 262(1) of the Constitution, read with provisions of the 1956 Act, changes once adjudicated by the tribunal, losing its nature as a dispute. Thus, appeals under Article 136 are maintainable .

Section 6(2) of the 1956 Act, introduced by an amendment in 2002, provides that the tribunal's decision shall have the same force as an order or decree of the Supreme Court. However, this does not oust the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; its purpose is to ensure the enforceability of the tribunal's award .

Legislative intent behind Section 6(2) was to give binding effect to the tribunal's award, not to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Parliament did not intend to create any embargo on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction .

Principles of statutory interpretation apply to understand the legislative intent behind Section 6(2). The interpretation should serve the purpose of giving binding effect to the tribunal's award, not restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction .

Decision: The Civil Appeals challenging the decision of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal are maintainable before the Supreme Court. The Court has jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to hear such appeals and review the tribunal's decision.