Facts:

M/s. Lohiya Agencies, a merchant dealing in 'gypsum board,' was assessed for the years 2006-07 and 2007-08. The Tax Department alleged tax evasion, claiming that 'gypsum board' should be taxed at 12.5% instead of the declared 4%. The dispute arose from the interpretation of Entry 56 of Schedule IV of the RVAT.

Issues:

Whether 'gypsum board' falls within the amended Entry 56, taxed at 4%, or in the residuary Entry 1 of Schedule V, taxed at 12.5%.

Held:

The Additional Commissioner initially held that 'gypsum board' falls under the residuary Entry, subject to 12.5% taxation.

The High Court reversed the decision, relying on the expanded definition of 'gypsum in all its forms' in Entry 56.

The manufacturing process of 'gypsum board' involves dehydration, mixing with additives, and forming a composite material.

The court considered the term 'in all its forms,' interpreting it broadly to include 'gypsum board' within Entry 56.

The court emphasized that the legislature's conscious decision to create a separate Entry for 'gypsum board' in 2014 supported the interpretation that it was distinct from the residuary Entry.

The court dismissed the appeals, allowing each party to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the parity of pay scales between Head Clerks and Internal Auditors in the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited. The Internal Auditors claimed historical parity, arguing that a revision in the pay scale of Head Clerks disrupted the long-standing equality between the two positions.

Issues:

The entitlement of Internal Auditors to claim pay scale parity with Head Clerks, irrespective of differences in recruitment, qualifications, and job responsibilities.

The Internal Auditors contended that the revised pay scale for Head Clerks disturbed the established parity.

Held:

Equation of Posts and Revision of Pay Scale: The court held that the equation of posts and the revision of pay scales fall within the government's domain. The matter should be left to the discretion and expertise of the Pay Committee and the Government, considering the nature of duties and responsibilities. Judicial review is not applicable to the conclusion reached by expert bodies like the Pay Anomaly Committee.

Burden of Proof for Parity: The burden of proof in establishing parity in pay scales and the nature of duties and responsibilities lies with the person claiming such right. The court emphasized that the claimant must produce material to prove the similarity in the nature of work performed.

Differences in Duties and Responsibilities: The duties and nature of work of Head Clerks and Internal Auditors were deemed entirely different. Head Clerks held more administrative responsibilities, disbursing salaries, and overseeing the entire establishment, while Internal Auditors audited billing in the Revenue Department of the Sub-division Office.

Conscious Exercise of Option: The court highlighted that the exercise of option for promotion as Internal Auditor was a conscious decision by employees, considering the promotional avenues and higher pay scales available in the Internal Auditor position.

Time-Bound Promotional Scales: Internal Auditors were granted time-bound promotional scales on completion of service, which was not available to Head Clerks. This was considered a relevant factor in justifying the differences in pay scales.

Identity for Parity: The court emphasized that a mere difference in service conditions does not constitute discrimination. Complete identity between the two posts is necessary for claiming parity in pay scale.

Facts:

Appellants claimed to hold licenses under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949, engaged in selling liquor in Mumbai suburb. Sealing of shops occurred due to an FIR for home delivery of liquor.

Issues:

Legality of sealing orders, violation of license conditions, bias concerns against the Commissioner State Excise.

Held:

The High Court quashed sealing orders and an interim order, directing the Commissioner State Excise to decide appeals on merits. However, it made adverse remarks against the Commissioner.

The Supreme Court held that while the High Court rightly declined to transfer appeals, it should have confined its reasoning to legal grounds and not made adverse remarks.

Adverse remarks against the Commissioner were expunged.

The High Court's directions anticipating adverse orders and removing seals were set aside, respecting the appellate authority's independence.

The pending appeals (212/2018 and 221/2018) should be heard and decided by the Commissioner State Excise within three months without influence from the Supreme Court or High Court remarks.

Facts:

The appellant was accused of dowry death under Sections 498(A) and 302 of IPC.

The Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant, finding insufficient evidence of dowry demand.

The High Court reversed the acquittal, convicting the appellant based on prosecution evidence.

The deceased's family alleged ill-treatment, dowry demands, and accused the appellant of setting her on fire.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supported charges under Sections 498(A) and 302 IPC.

Whether the High Court correctly reversed the Sessions Judge's acquittal.

Held:

The High Court rightly convicted the appellant under Sections 498(A) and 302 IPC.

The evidence, including testimonies of the deceased's family, established dowry demands, ill-treatment, and the appellant's culpability.

The appellant's actions leading to the death were deemed homicidal, not accidental.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

Appellant (Kamal Kumar) filed a civil suit for specific performance against the respondents (Premlata Joshi and Others) regarding the suit land.

Trial Court dismissed the suit, and the High Court affirmed the decision in the first appeal.

Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court under Article 136.

Issues:

Whether a valid and concluded contract existed between the parties.

Whether the appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

Whether the appellant was entitled to specific performance or any alternative relief.

Held:

The grant of specific performance is discretionary and equitable.

The two Courts below held that the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness, a crucial factor for specific performance.

Concurring findings of facts by the lower Courts are binding, and no perversity or illegality was identified.

The material questions for specific performance, as per Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the Specific Relief Act, were duly considered by the lower Courts.

The appellant did not establish readiness and willingness, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant was granted permission under Rule 11C of the Cable Television Network (Amendment) Rules, 2012, to operate as an MSO in the DAS notified areas.

The permission was revoked on 03.09.2014, citing denial of "security clearance" by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The appellant challenged the cancellation through a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the cancellation of permission was justified based on the denial of "security clearance"?

Whether the principles of natural justice were violated by not providing prior notice before the cancellation?

Held:

The cancellation order was passed in conformity with Rule 11C of the Rules, as security clearance was a mandatory requirement for permission.

The principles of natural justice were not violated, and the appellant was not entitled to claim prior notice before the cancellation.

The appeal was found devoid of merit and dismissed. The appellant was given the liberty to apply for fresh permission in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The respondent worked as a daily wager in the R & B Department of the State for approximately 18 years.

The State terminated the respondent's services without following the due procedure prescribed in law.

The respondent raised a dispute almost 15 years after his alleged termination before the Labour Court.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the daily-wage worker was illegal, and if so, what relief is appropriate, considering the nature of the employment and the circumstances surrounding the termination.

Held:

After hearing counsels, the court is inclined to allow the appeal in part and modify the impugned order.( Paragraph 8)

The court determines that the case falls within the parameters set by previous decisions in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs Bhurumal and District Development Officer vs. Satish Kantilal Amerelia.( Paragraph 9)

The court quotes the rationale from Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, emphasizing that automatic reinstatement with back wages is not applicable when the termination is due to procedural defects, such as the violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.( Paragraph 10)

Highlights reasons for the decision: respondent worked as a daily wager for a few years, had no right to claim regularization, no right to continue as a daily wager, and raised the dispute after a significant gap.( Paragraph 11)

Concludes that lump sum monetary compensation is just, proper, and reasonable in full and final satisfaction of the claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.( Paragraph 13)

Specifies the amount of compensation as Rs. 1,00,000/- to be paid by the appellant (State) to the respondent within three months.( Paragraph 14)

The appeal succeeds, and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The Labour Court's Award is modified accordingly.( Paragraph 15)

Facts:

Birla Institute of Technology (BIT) is the appellant, and the State of Jharkhand and Others are the respondents.

Respondent No.4, a teacher, claimed gratuity from BIT under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The controlling authority ordered BIT to pay gratuity to respondent No.4.

BIT appealed, but both the appellate authority and the High Court upheld the order.

Issues:

Whether the appellant (BIT) is liable to pay gratuity to a teacher under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Held:

The Supreme Court relied on the precedent set in Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (2004) 1 SCC 755, which held that teachers are not employees under Section 2(e) of the Act.

The High Court erred in distinguishing the precedent on the grounds of applicability to primary teachers only. The Supreme Court clarified that the distinction is not valid, emphasizing that teachers, in general, are not intended to be covered by the Act.

The Court reiterated that the definition of "employee" under the Act does not include teachers, irrespective of the type of educational institution they work in.

The High Court's decision was set aside, and the appeal by BIT was allowed.

The application made by respondent No.4 before the controlling authority under the Act was dismissed as not maintainable.

Facts:

M/S Paulbro Leathers Private Limited defaulted on a loan from Punjab Financial Corporation.

The matter was settled as per the one-time settlement policy on 01.04.2003, with a Chartered Accountant determining the outstanding balance.

A dispute arose post-settlement regarding the precise liability and the amount paid by the respondent.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the demand raised by Punjab Financial Corporation.

Whether the dismissal of the application for review by the High Court was justified.

Held:

The appeals are allowed, and the case is remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision on the writ petition. (Paragraph 13)

Disagreement with the High Court's reasoning for allowing the writ petition, emphasizing the need to examine the dispute arising from the settlement terms. (Paragraph 14)

Suggestion that if there are disputes or ambiguities in the Chartered Accountant's report, they should be addressed separately. (Paragraph 17)

Emphasis on examining the issue on its merits before quashing the demand, highlighting the necessity for a categorical finding on how the respondent fulfilled the settlement terms.( Paragraph 18)