Facts:

The case pertains to alterations made to a vehicle and the subsequent legal implications. The appellants, Regional Transport Officer and others, challenged the High Court's judgment, asserting that the court unduly emphasized rules over Section 52(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 52(1) post-amendment in 2000. The appellants contended that the High Court failed to acknowledge the prohibition of alterations beyond the manufacturer's original specifications.

Held:

The amendment to Section 52(1) explicitly prohibits alterations beyond the manufacturer's specifications, including changes to tires of higher capacity.

The provisos to Section 52(1) allow for modifications to the engine under certain conditions, and the Central Government possesses the authority to prescribe specifications for such alterations.

Section 52(2) grants State Governments the power to permit alterations under specific circumstances.

Alterations made without the approval of the Registering Authority, as permissible under Section 52(3), require reporting within 14 days.

Rule 92(1) of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules must be subservient to Section 52 of the Act, ensuring no alterations contrary to the original specifications.

Rule 126 focuses on vehicle fitness tests, emphasizing compliance with AIS: 017-2000.

Rules in Chapter V act as additional safeguards, prohibiting alterations as per Section 52(1).

The High Court erred by prioritizing rules over Section 52(1), and Circular No. 7/2006 should be interpreted in alignment with this perspective.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, with the Court holding that the High Court's decision did not correctly interpret the law. The Rules should be subservient to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly Section 52(1).

Facts:

The appellant, Hansraj, and his brother Bansraj were Bhumidhars of Plot No.677.

Consolidation proceedings were initiated, and the Assistant Consolidation Officer proposed chaks to both the appellant and respondents on Plot No.677.

Dispute arose over the allocation on the pitch road, leading to objections from respondents.

The Consolidation Officer allowed objections, allocating chaks on the northern side to respondents and placing the appellant on the southern side away from the pitch road.

Issues:

The equitable distribution of land during consolidation, especially concerning the appellant's claim for a portion on the pitch road.

The respondents argued for chaks according to their possession, leading to objections to the initial proposal.

Held:

The appellant, being the original tenure holder, had a right to claim allocation on a part of the plot on the pitch road.

The Assistant Consolidation Officer initially proposed chaks on the pitch road for all parties.

The Consolidation Officer's decision to allocate chaks in favor of the respondents was reversed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Deputy Director, Consolidation.

Lack of partition under Section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 indicated that all co-sharers had rights to the plot.

The High Court erred in setting aside the orders of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Deputy Director, Consolidation, as their decisions were based on spot inspection and resulted in an equitable distribution on the pitch road.

The High Court's justification, citing the location of the house of one petitioner and the appellant's pumping set, was disregarded as the Settlement Officer had already addressed this by allocating chaks accordingly.

The orders of the High Court were unsustainable, and the appeals were allowed. The writ petition filed by the respondents was dismissed.

Facts:

Group 'D' workers engaged on a casual basis at the Regional Training Institute, Allahabad sought regularization since 1986.

The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) issued directions for the preparation of a seniority list and exploring the possibility of regularization.

The High Court observed that there was no positive direction for regularization but directed to consider the possibility. It upheld the accommodation of the first 20 casual laborers based on seniority.

In 2008, new recruitment rules came into force. Despite directions, juniors were regularized, leading to a new application before CAT.

Issues:

Breach of seniority in regularization as per CAT directions.

Alleged discrimination and arbitrary action in favoring juniors.

Held:

CAT held Union of India breached directions by regularizing juniors and not adhering to seniority.

Union of India's defense rejected; Tribunal directed equivalent regularization benefits to applicants as given to their juniors from the same date.

Regularization to be in available vacancies based on category, no back wages, but notional pay fixation allowed.

High Court affirmed CAT's decision, stating Union of India frustrated earlier orders by regularizing juniors, directing consideration even in other establishments if posts not available at the Institute.

Facts:

M/s. Lohiya Agencies, a merchant dealing in 'gypsum board,' was assessed for the years 2006-07 and 2007-08. The Tax Department alleged tax evasion, claiming that 'gypsum board' should be taxed at 12.5% instead of the declared 4%. The dispute arose from the interpretation of Entry 56 of Schedule IV of the RVAT.

Issues:

Whether 'gypsum board' falls within the amended Entry 56, taxed at 4%, or in the residuary Entry 1 of Schedule V, taxed at 12.5%.

Held:

The Additional Commissioner initially held that 'gypsum board' falls under the residuary Entry, subject to 12.5% taxation.

The High Court reversed the decision, relying on the expanded definition of 'gypsum in all its forms' in Entry 56.

The manufacturing process of 'gypsum board' involves dehydration, mixing with additives, and forming a composite material.

The court considered the term 'in all its forms,' interpreting it broadly to include 'gypsum board' within Entry 56.

The court emphasized that the legislature's conscious decision to create a separate Entry for 'gypsum board' in 2014 supported the interpretation that it was distinct from the residuary Entry.

The court dismissed the appeals, allowing each party to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the parity of pay scales between Head Clerks and Internal Auditors in the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited. The Internal Auditors claimed historical parity, arguing that a revision in the pay scale of Head Clerks disrupted the long-standing equality between the two positions.

Issues:

The entitlement of Internal Auditors to claim pay scale parity with Head Clerks, irrespective of differences in recruitment, qualifications, and job responsibilities.

The Internal Auditors contended that the revised pay scale for Head Clerks disturbed the established parity.

Held:

Equation of Posts and Revision of Pay Scale: The court held that the equation of posts and the revision of pay scales fall within the government's domain. The matter should be left to the discretion and expertise of the Pay Committee and the Government, considering the nature of duties and responsibilities. Judicial review is not applicable to the conclusion reached by expert bodies like the Pay Anomaly Committee.

Burden of Proof for Parity: The burden of proof in establishing parity in pay scales and the nature of duties and responsibilities lies with the person claiming such right. The court emphasized that the claimant must produce material to prove the similarity in the nature of work performed.

Differences in Duties and Responsibilities: The duties and nature of work of Head Clerks and Internal Auditors were deemed entirely different. Head Clerks held more administrative responsibilities, disbursing salaries, and overseeing the entire establishment, while Internal Auditors audited billing in the Revenue Department of the Sub-division Office.

Conscious Exercise of Option: The court highlighted that the exercise of option for promotion as Internal Auditor was a conscious decision by employees, considering the promotional avenues and higher pay scales available in the Internal Auditor position.

Time-Bound Promotional Scales: Internal Auditors were granted time-bound promotional scales on completion of service, which was not available to Head Clerks. This was considered a relevant factor in justifying the differences in pay scales.

Identity for Parity: The court emphasized that a mere difference in service conditions does not constitute discrimination. Complete identity between the two posts is necessary for claiming parity in pay scale.

Facts:

The appellants, Babu Lal and Devi Lal, were convicted under Section 302 and 120B IPC for murder and conspiracy.

The case was based on circumstantial evidence, with an extra-judicial confession by co-accused Babu Lal.

The circumstances included a missing person report, suspicious activities of the accused, and alleged conflicts over money transactions.

Issues:

Reliability of circumstantial evidence.

Admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession.

Whether the circumstances collectively lead to a conclusive hypothesis of guilt.

Held:

The Court emphasized the need for circumstantial evidence to be conclusive, consistent only with the guilt of the accused.

Extra-judicial confession, being weak evidence, requires corroboration and caution in reliance.

If two views are possible based on circumstantial evidence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the one favorable to them.

The circumstances in this case, though raising suspicion, did not form a complete and coherent chain to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecution failed to elevate the case from "may be true" to "must be true."

The appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt, and their convictions were set aside.

FACTS:

The appellant filed a Criminal Writ Petition in 2002, seeking registration of a criminal complaint regarding the wrongful killing of his son by the police.

Delhi High Court directed CBI to register a complaint and investigate.

CBI filed a Closure Report in 2008, which was not accepted by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

Cognizance was taken against thirteen police officers, and the matter was committed to the Court of Sessions.

Accused filed Revision Petition, leading to petitions before the Delhi High Court.

High Court directed the Magistrate to reconsider cognizance, leading to multiple rounds of petitions and orders.

The High Court eventually dismissed the Appellant's petition in 2014, with the liberty to approach the Sessions Judge.

ISSUES:

The appropriate forum for revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 of Cr.P.C.

The delay in the legal proceedings.

HELD:

The Court acknowledged the prolonged nature of the case, emphasizing the need for speedy justice.

The Court refrained from deciding on the question of law regarding concurrent revisionary jurisdiction.

The order of the High Court was set aside, and the case was restored before the High Court with a request for expeditious consideration.

The Court clarified that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the case.

Liberty was granted to approach the Supreme Court again if any party was aggrieved by the High Court's order.

Facts:

The case involved the divestment of the Director, CBI, Alok Kumar Verma, of his powers, functions, duties, and supervisory role by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the Government of India.

Issues:

The authority of the CVC and the Government to take such actions without obtaining prior consent from the Committee under s.4A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act.

Held:

The legislative intent behind the CVC Act, 2003, and the amendments to the DSPE Act was to ensure the independence of the Director, CBI. Parliament followed the directions of the court in Vineet Narain and further amended the DSPE Act through the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, emphasizing the need for a High Power Selection Committee for the Director's appointment.( Para 32)

Sections 4A and 4B of the DSPE Act aim to completely insulate the Director, CBI, from extraneous influences, upholding the integrity of the CBI. The requirement of "previous consent of the Committee" in Section 4B(2) is crucial to prevent arbitrary interference with the Director's functioning.( Para 34)

Orders divesting powers from the Director, CBI, were set aside. The Committee under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act will reconsider the matter. Until then, the Director is directed to refrain from major policy decisions, limiting activities to routine functions.( Para 39-41)

FACTS:

Appellants sought a permanent injunction against the respondents from using their patented technology and trademark.

A sub-licence agreement was terminated due to disputes over licence fees/trait values.

Defendants claimed protection under the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001 (PPVFR Act).

The learned Single Judge issued an injunction, but the Division Bench delved into patent validity and excluded certain claims under Section 3(j) of the Patents Act.

ISSUES:

Validity of the patent and the grant of injunction.

Applicability of the PPVFR Act and its relation to the Patents Act.

Summary adjudication on complicated patent issues.

HELD:

Complicated issues cannot be subjected to summary adjudication.

The Division Bench's examination of the counter claim on patent validity was beyond its jurisdiction.

The suit involves complex questions requiring technological and expert evidence, which should be considered at the final hearing.

The injunctive relief granted by the Single Judge was deemed in order and merits no interference during the suit's pendency.

The order of the Division Bench was set aside, restoring the Single Judge's order, and the suit was remanded for disposal in accordance with the law.

REFERRED CASES:

Alka Gupta vs. Narender Kumar Gupta, (2010) 10 SCC 141