Facts:The case involved a dispute between the State of Uttar Pradesh and Jai Bir Singh regarding the interpretation of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Issues:

The correct interpretation of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Held:The decision to refer the matter to a larger bench was made after careful consideration of the arguments presented and the implications of the issue.

The bench recognized the serious doubts raised about the correctness of a previous case and deemed it necessary for a larger bench to address the matter. As a result, the appeals were ordered to be placed before a Bench comprising Nine-Judges, to be constituted by the Chief Justice.

Facts:

The appellants, associated with the Mid Day newspaper, published articles alleging impropriety by Justice Y.K. Sabharwal and his family members.

The High Court of Delhi initiated contempt proceedings suo motu based on these articles, alleging that they lowered the image of the judiciary.

Issues:

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings for alleged contempt of the Supreme Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings for contempt of the Supreme Court. Article 129 of the Constitution explicitly grants the Supreme Court the power to punish for its own contempt. This power, coupled with the principle that a court of record possesses inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt, reinforces the exclusive authority of the Supreme Court in matters of its own contempt.

Therefore, the order passed by the High Court was deemed to be without jurisdiction and was set aside.

Facts:

The petitioners, twenty-nine men, worked as porters for the Indian Army in border areas under challenging conditions.

Despite long years of service, they were not treated as regular employees and were denied minimum pay-scales.

Previous legal proceedings had not resulted in a clear resolution regarding their regularization.

Issues:

Whether the porters were entitled to regularization and fair treatment.

What steps could be taken to improve the working conditions and welfare of the porters.

Held:

The Court recognized the valuable support provided by the porters to the Indian Army and acknowledged their challenging working conditions. However, it refrained from issuing a mandamus for regularization but encouraged the government to take proactive measures in consultation with the Armed Forces.

The Court issued directions to enhance the proposed scheme for the porters' welfare, including revisiting minimum wages, providing regular medical facilities, and improving compensation and severance benefits. The government was also directed to consider a proposal for regularization, ensuring security of tenure for a reasonable proportion of porters who complete a stipulated minimum tenure of service.

Facts:

Bhushan Power & Steel Limited applied for a mining lease for iron ore.

State Government disallowed the application, leading to dismissal of a writ petition.

Special Leave Petition (SLP) was filed, and the Supreme Court allowed it on March 14, 2012.

Supreme Court directed the State Government to recommend the case to the Central Government for the mining lease.

Contempt petition filed, alleging non-compliance by the State Government.

Subsequent orders emphasized State Government's obligation to comply with the earlier direction.

Issues:

Whether the State Government fulfilled its role in sending recommendations to the Central Government?

Whether the petitioner's application was protected under Section 10A(2)(c) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957?

Whether the letter issued by the State Government constituted a 'Letter of Intent'?

Held:

The court emphasized the State Government's role was to recommend, and the ultimate authority rested with the Central Government. Since the State Government sent the necessary request to the Central Government, the direction of March 14, 2012, stood complied with. As the Central Government was not a party in the contempt proceeding, no specific direction was given to it.( Para 14 and 15)

Analyzing the Mines and Minerals Acts, the court considered the eligibility of applications under Section 10A(2)(c) of the Act. The Amendment Act, 2015, introduced changes, making all applications received prior to January 12, 2015, ineligible. Exceptions were carved out for specific categories of applications.( Para 15, 16, and 21)

The court scrutinized the nature of the letter sent by the State Government, determining that it was recommendatory and not a 'Letter of Intent.' The court clarified that for the State Government to enter into any lease agreement, previous approval from the Central Government was essential.( Para 23, 24, and 25)

The court closed the contempt petition, stating that the State Government had fulfilled its obligation by sending the necessary letter of request to the Central Government. The Central Government's consideration of recommendations was beyond the scope of the contempt petition.( Para 26)

Facts:

The suit property was acquired by VG as a permanent grant for constructing a house.

Dispute arose between the appellants (owner's brother and others) and the respondents (children and son-in-laws of the owner) regarding ownership and possession of the property.

Issues:

Ownership and possession of the suit property.

Admissibility of the respondents' claim for specific performance and mandatory injunction.

Whether the relief of demolition of the appellants' construction on the suit property should be granted.

Held:

The respondents successfully proved ownership of the suit property inherited from VG through appropriate documents. The claim of co-ownership in the suit property by the defendants was dismissed as the plaintiffs claimed sole ownership (Para 15-17).

The plea regarding the real owner of the property being someone other than VG was rejected due to lack of evidence (Para 18).

Plaintiffs' possession over the suit property was affirmed despite occasional absence (Para 20).

The relief sought by the respondents for demolition of appellants' construction was deemed untenable due to wastage of expenditure. Instead, respondents were allowed to take possession of the house without demolition and compensate appellants for construction costs (Para 22-23).

Decision: Dismissing the appeals, the Court upheld the respondents' ownership and possession of the suit property and allowed them to take possession without demolition while compensating the appellants for construction costs.

Facts:

The case originated from a security breach at Sanganer Airport, Jaipur, where a passenger managed to board a flight with a revolver and live cartridges despite detention by airport security.

The Rajasthan High Court took suo moto cognizance of the incident and issued directions to include Chief Justices and judges of the High Court in the list of persons exempted from pre-embarkation security checks at airports.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's interference in security matters was justified.

Whether matters of security should be determined by government authorities or the judiciary.

Whether the inclusion of Chief Justices of High Courts in the list of exempted persons from security checks was appropriate.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's intervention in security matters was unwarranted and encroached upon the domain of the executive. Matters of security should be left to government authorities, as they require expertise and careful consideration of various factors. The Court emphasized that judicial interference in security policies is not justified, as courts lack the necessary expertise to formulate such policies. Furthermore, the inclusion of Chief Justices of High Courts in the list of exempted persons had already been implemented by the time the High Court issued its directions. Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment.

FACTS:

Century Textiles & Industries Limited ("writ petitioner") holds a mining lease in Chhattisgarh for limestone required for cement manufacturing.

The Power Grid Corporation of India Limited ("Power Grid") sought to erect transmission towers on the leased land to facilitate electricity distribution, parallel to an existing transmission line.

The writ petitioner objected, citing concerns over operational disruptions and loss of mining area.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, affirming the Power Grid's authority to erect towers.

ISSUES:

Whether the Power Grid's action violated relevant provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Rules, 2006.

Whether the High Court's direction for compensation determination by the District Collector was valid.

HELD AND DECISION:

The Court held that:

The Power Grid had obtained prior approval for the transmission line from the Central Government as required by Section 68 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The provision of Rule 3(1) of the Rules, 2006, requiring licensee consent, did not apply due to the powers conferred under Section 164 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The Court rejected claims of violation and upheld the Power Grid's actions. (Para 23)

The High Court's direction for compensation determination by the District Collector was improper. Section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, vests compensation determination authority with the District Judge, not the District Collector. Therefore, the direction was set aside, and the appropriate course for seeking compensation was through a suit before the District Judge, following Central Government guidelines. (Para 26)

Dismissed an appeal challenging the need for prior consent for laying transmission lines. (Para 28)

Facts:

The appellant, Sharat Babu Digumarti, was facing charges under Section 292 of the IPC for allegedly possessing obscene material in electronic form. However, proceedings under Section 67 of the IT Act were dropped against him.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, discharged under Section 67 of the IT Act, could still be proceeded against under Section 292 of the IPC.

Held:

The court observed that the material on record showed that the alleged possession of material constituted an electronic record under Section 2(l)(t) of the IT Act.( Para 18)

It was noted that the IT Act contains specific provisions related to obscenity in electronic form, such as Sections 67, 67A, and 67B, which provide for punishment for various forms of transmitting or publishing obscene materials electronically.( Para 24)

The court emphasized that the IT Act is a special law governing offenses related to electronic records and that Section 292 of the IPC must be interpreted in light of the provisions of the IT Act.( Para 25)

The court held that once special provisions covering a criminal act and the offender are provided for in the IT Act, the offender is exempted from the provisions of the IPC, including Section 292.( Para 28)

It was reiterated that special laws prevail over general laws, and the provisions of the IT Act regarding obscenity in electronic form override the provisions of Section 292 of the IPC.( Para 32)

The court concluded that the appellant, having been discharged under Section 67 of the IT Act, could not be proceeded against under Section 292 of the IPC.( Para 34)

Decision: The court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant.

Facts:

The incident involved the murder of Naurang, who was shot while riding his bicycle.

The accused individuals were Sube Singh, his brother Shama (the appellant), and another person identified as Jai Singh.

The dying declaration of the deceased implicated the accused persons, stating the circumstances of the incident.

Eyewitness testimony by Pyarelal (PW-3) also supported the prosecution's case.

Issues:

The admissibility and reliability of the dying declaration.

The credibility of the eyewitness testimony.

Held:

The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding the dying declaration and upheld the conviction based on it and the corroborating eyewitness testimony. The Court found no merit in the appellant's contentions regarding the procedural aspects of recording the dying declaration and held that it was admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872. Additionally, the Court found no evidence of false implication by the police and affirmed the findings of the trial court and the High Court.