Facts:

The appellant, Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah, a retired bank employee, sought a loan from the respondent's money lending company.

The loan was granted, but the appellant failed to repay within the agreed timeframe.

The respondent filed a complaint, leading to the framing of charges under various sections of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's inability to repay the loan automatically gives rise to criminal prosecution for cheating.

Whether there was fraudulent or dishonest intent by the appellant at the beginning of the transaction.

Validity of charges under Section 406 and Section 415 of the IPC.

Held:

The court emphasizes that at the stage of framing charges, the court must ensure a prima facie case against the accused. A cautious approach is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the accused's liberty.( Para 10)

Analyzing charges under Section 405 read with 406 of the IPC, the court notes that there was no clear case of entrustment, and the magistrate erred in issuing process for criminal breach of trust. The High Court failed to correct this error.( Para 12)

Regarding charges under Section 415 punishable under Section 420 of the IPC, the court stresses that the mere inability to repay a loan does not warrant criminal prosecution unless fraudulent or dishonest intent is proven from the beginning of the transaction.( Para 14)

The High Court's unnecessary moral observations are criticized, and the court expunges certain remarks that could be seen as casting aspersions on the appellant, maintaining that such suggestions need to be restricted.( Para 16)

The court sets aside the High Court's order, allowing the appellant's application under Section 482 of the CrPC and quashing the proceedings initiated based on the FIR.( Para 18)

Facts:

The petitioner, Ravi Agrawal, filed a writ petition under Article 32 as a Public Interest Litigation, raising concerns about the denial of benefits to handicapped individuals under the Jeevan Aadhar Policy. The petitioner, a differently-abled person, challenged Circular No. CO/CRM/PS/622/23 dated January 24, 2008, issued by the Income Tax Department, which restricted the payment of annuity to the disabled dependant only after the death of the parent or guardian.

Issues:

Whether the provision in Section 80DD, restricting the payment of annuity or lump sum amount to handicapped individuals to the period after the death of the parent or guardian, violates the fundamental right of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The judgment outlines Section 80DD of the Income Tax Act, which provides for deductions related to the medical treatment, training, and rehabilitation of a dependant with a disability. The focus is on sub-sections (1), (2), and (3) of Section 80DD.

The grievance of the petitioner revolves around Circular No. CO/CRM/PS/622/23 dated January 24, 2008, which restricts the benefit under the Jeevan Aadhar Policy to the period after the death of the parent or guardian. The petitioner argues that this denies handicapped individuals the opportunity to receive annuity during the lifetime of their parent or guardian.

The Jeevan Aadhar plan is detailed, highlighting that the policy does not have a maturity claim, and the amount is payable to the dependant only upon the demise of the proposer/life assured.

The petitioner contends that the denial of benefits during the lifetime of the parent or guardian violates the fundamental right of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.

The petitioner had lodged complaints before the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDA) and approached the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities. The Chief Commissioner directed the CBDT to reexamine the matter, but no action was taken.

The petitioner, dissatisfied with the responses, files the writ petition seeking specific amendments and reliefs.

Facts:

Under the Fourth Central Pay Commission, Scientists 'G' and 'H' had specific pay scales. The Fifth Central Pay Commission merged these scales into a single pay scale of Rs.18400-22400, designated as Scientific Officer 'H.' A special pay of Rs.2,000/- w.e.f. 01.01.1996 was sanctioned after peer review. Disputes arose over the treatment of this special pay in the computation of pension, leading to clarifications and legal actions.

Issues:

Whether the special pay of Rs.2,000/- and Rs.4,000/- should be considered part of the pay for pension computation, as directed by various tribunals and high courts.

Held:

The special pay of Rs.2,000/- or Rs.4,000/- was intended to be included in the definition of pay for pension computation under 1972 Rules, based on the nature and character of the benefit extended to scientists after peer review (Para 29).

The special pay of Rs.2,000/- was granted to address anomalies arising from the merger of pay scales and was not in line with the special pay definition in Fundamental Rule 9(25). Therefore, it should be included in the definition of pay under Rule 9(21)(a)(i) (Para 29).

The Court dismissed the appeals, emphasizing that the earlier orders passed by tribunals and high courts, including the inclusion of special pay in the pay for pension computation, had been implemented by the government. The principle of res judicata or estoppel was not applicable (Para 22, 25).

FACTS:

The Appellant-State issued a Letter of Acceptance on 12.12.2008 for a works contract to M/s. G. F. Toll Road Pvt. Ltd.

Disputes arose, and arbitration was invoked as per the Concession Agreement.

Respondent No. 1 appointed a retired Engineer-in-Chief as their nominee arbitrator, and the Appellant-State nominated a retired Engineer-in-Chief as well.

The Indian Council of Arbitration (ICA) raised objections to the Appellant's nominee, claiming potential bias due to his past employment with the State.

ISSUES:

Whether the objection to the arbitrator's nomination based on his past employment is justified.

Applicability of the pre-amended 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Procedure for appointing a substitute arbitrator as per Section 15(2).

HELD:

The objection to the nominee arbitrator being a former employee over 10 years ago was deemed unjustified. Mere allegations of bias are insufficient grounds for removal.

The pre-amended 1996 Act is applicable, and the objection based on the 2015 Amendment Act was deemed untenable.

The court emphasized Section 15(2), stating that a substitute arbitrator must be appointed according to the rules applicable to the original arbitrator. The ICA's appointment of an arbitrator on behalf of the Appellant was unjustified.

REFERRED CASES:

ACC Ltd. v. Global Cements Ltd, (2012) 7 SCC 713

Locabail Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties, 2000(1) All ER 65

Re Medicaments and related Classes of Goods (No.2), 2002(1) All ER 465

Facts:

Late Smt. Shyal Devi purchased land in 1958.

Title Suit filed in 1992 due to alleged interference by Bihar State Road Transport Corporation.

Previous litigation established possession but not title.

Electricity Sub-station construction initiated in 2015 on disputed land.

Smt. Shyal Devi passed away in 2014, and her sons (Respondent Nos. 1 to 3) filed Title Suit No. 45/2015 seeking an injunction.

Issues:

Validity of Writ Petition challenging orders of Civil Courts.

Prima facie case for granting interim injunction.

Ownership and possession of disputed suit property.

Public interest vs. Private interest in constructing Electricity Sub-station.

Held:

The court does not unsettle the judgement of the High Court on the ground of maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article 227 due to procedural reasons.

Respondents failed to establish a prima facie case justifying the grant of an interim injunction. The previous finding of possession did not confer title, and the Plaintiffs did not specify the area under dispute.

The court emphasized that the findings of previous litigation were against the Plaintiffs, and the refusal to grant a Temporary Injunction was justified. The Electricity Sub-station construction was on land registered in the name of the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation.

The balance of convenience favored the Electricity Board due to the completion of the Sub-station, ready to benefit around 1 lakh people. Respondents could be compensated if entitled under Section 67 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The judgement of the High Court directing status quo was set aside. The court stated that these findings were prima facie in nature and would not influence the trial of the case.

FACTS:

The appellant, Barara Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Ltd., terminated the services of the respondent, a peon, on 01.07.1985.

A reference was made to the Labour Court by the State, at the respondent's instance, to decide the legality of the termination.

The Labour Court, by award dated 03.02.1988, found the termination illegal and awarded compensation to the respondent.

Both parties challenged the award in writ petitions, which were dismissed by the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondent is entitled to claim re-employment under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The applicability of Section 25(H) in the context of the respondent's case.

HELD:

The respondent filed a representation in 1993, claiming re-employment based on the regularization of other peons' services. The Labour Court held against the respondent, stating Section 25(H) did not apply.

The court, after considering the facts and legal provisions, found that the respondent had accepted compensation for the termination, concluding the matter.

Section 25(H) applies when an employer proposes to fill vacancies, giving preference to retrenched employees. The court clarified that regularization of an already employed person doesn't constitute filling a vacancy.

The Labour Court's decision was deemed justified, setting aside the High Court's order directing re-employment. Section 25(H) did not apply to the respondent's case.

FACTS:

The appellant, Barara Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Ltd., terminated the services of the respondent, a peon, on 01.07.1985.

A reference was made to the Labour Court by the State, at the respondent's instance, to decide the legality of the termination.

The Labour Court, by award dated 03.02.1988, found the termination illegal and awarded compensation to the respondent.

Both parties challenged the award in writ petitions, which were dismissed by the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondent is entitled to claim re-employment under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The applicability of Section 25(H) in the context of the respondent's case.

HELD:

The respondent filed a representation in 1993, claiming re-employment based on the regularization of other peons' services. The Labour Court held against the respondent, stating Section 25(H) did not apply.

The court, after considering the facts and legal provisions, found that the respondent had accepted compensation for the termination, concluding the matter.

Section 25(H) applies when an employer proposes to fill vacancies, giving preference to retrenched employees. The court clarified that regularization of an already employed person doesn't constitute filling a vacancy.

The Labour Court's decision was deemed justified, setting aside the High Court's order directing re-employment. Section 25(H) did not apply to the respondent's case.

Facts:

The appellants entered into agreements to sell with the respondent, which were found to be insufficiently stamped. The trial court directed the payment of deficit duty and penalty. The High Court directed the trial court to levy the penalty at 10 times the deficit duty, relying on a previous judgment.

Issues:

Whether the trial court had discretion in imposing the penalty for deficit stamp duty, and whether the High Court's reliance on the previous judgment was correct.

Held:

The court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, particularly Sections 33, 34, 38, and 39. It found that while Section 34 mandates a penalty of 10 times the deficit duty, Section 39 provides discretion to the Deputy Commissioner to impose a penalty not exceeding 10 times the duty. The court upheld the High Court's interpretation but noted that Section 38 empowers the Deputy Commissioner to refund any portion of the penalty in excess of five rupees, indicating legislative intent for discretion in penalty imposition.

The court considered the circumstances of the case and the time it would take to seek a refund of penalty from the Deputy Commissioner. It decided to uphold the trial court's direction of payment of deficit duty with double the penalty, aiming to serve the ends of justice efficiently without prolonging the legal proceedings.

Therefore, the appeal was disposed of by approving the trial court's direction for payment of deficit duty with double the penalty instead of requiring the appellant to deposit 10 times the penalty and then seek a refund under Section 38.

Facts:

The appellant, Trust, acquired a parcel of land measuring 9797 sq. meters, including Plot No. CTS No. 97/A-5/2, with the intent of providing housing for weaker sections of society. Subsequently, the Trust constructed building A-1 on a sub-plot carved out of this land. The respondents, purchasers, took possession of flats within this building.

Issues:

Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in clarifying an order through a "Note for speaking to the Minutes" beyond the scope of correcting typographical or clerical errors.

Whether the High Court's order directing conveyance of 2700 sq. meters of land was sustainable.

Whether the respondents were entitled to the conveyance of land beyond the area specifically decreed by the Trial Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's clarification through a "Note for speaking to the Minutes" exceeded its jurisdiction as it essentially modified the original order beyond the scope of correcting typographical or clerical errors. Such notes are not meant for modifying or clarifying orders beyond their original scope. Therefore, the impugned order passed below the "Note for speaking to the Minutes" is set aside.

Furthermore, the High Court's orders directing the conveyance of 2700 sq. meters of land were deemed unsustainable. The Trial Court's decree did not direct the appellants to execute a deed of Conveyance for such an extent of land. Therefore, the High Court could not have passed any further order beyond the judgment and decree of the Trial Court without any cross-appeal or cross-objection by the respondents.

The Supreme Court also noted that the High Court's determination of 2700 sq. meters as the area for conveyance was unsupported by the evidence presented during the case. Even considering the map sanctioned by the Corporation and the Corporation's reply, the total plot area was 2593.70 sq. meters, out of which the building occupied only 1009.70 sq. meters. Thus, the High Court's order directing the appellants to execute the deed of Conveyance for 2700 sq. meters of land was not sustainable.

Consequently, the impugned orders passed by the High Court dated 23.12.14 below the "Note for speaking to the Minutes" were quashed and set aside. The order passed by the Divisional Registrar of Deemed Conveyance was modified to grant conveyance of only 1009.70 sq. meters of land, which was the built-up area of building A-1.