Facts:

The appellant, K S Rajan (now deceased), owned land in the District of Kottayam, Kerala.

The State of Kerala acquired land, including the appellant's, for a development scheme.

Various legal proceedings ensued, involving determination and challenges to compensation rates.

Issues:

Whether the compensation rates determined by the lower courts for different types of land were just and proper.

Whether discrepancies in compensation rates compared to those awarded to other landowners in similar acquisition proceedings warranted modification.

Held:

The Court found that the compensation rate for wet land awarded by the High Court was unjustified.

Referencing a previous determination by the Reference Court, where wet land was valued higher for other landowners in the same acquisition proceedings, the Court modified the compensation for wet land.

Compensation rates for dry and chira land were upheld.

The appellant was entitled to statutory compensation as per the revised rates.

The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeals, modifying the High Court's order regarding compensation for wet land, and upheld the compensation rates for dry and chira land.

Facts:The original applicant claimed that the project proponent had undertaken construction activities in violation of the Environmental Clearance granted for the project and various municipal laws. Subsequently, the National Green Tribunal (NGT) directed the project proponent to pay environmental compensation costs. An appeal was made against this order. Meanwhile, the project proponent filed a review application challenging the NGT's order, which was decided by a different Bench.

Issues:

Whether the review petition should have been heard by the same Bench that originally decided the matter.

The implications of not hearing a review petition by the original Bench.

The applicability of procedural rules, including Rule 22 of the National Green Tribunal (Practices and Procedure) Rules, 2011, and Order XLVII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Held:

The Court held that a review petition should ordinarily be heard by the same Bench that originally decided the matter. It should not be heard by any other Bench unless it is impossible or impracticable for the earlier Bench to hear the matter. In cases where a party contends that certain arguments were not considered, the review application should be heard by the original Bench.

It was emphasized that judicial authorities, including the NGT, are expected to address all contentions raised before them. If a party alleges that some contentions were not considered, it must file a review application, which should be heard by the same Bench that originally heard the matter.

Sub-rule (3) of Rule 22 of the National Green Tribunal (Practices and Procedure) Rules, 2011, provides for the disposal of review applications by circulation. Thus, there is no impediment to the matter being circulated before the same Bench that heard the original matter.

The power of review is distinct from appellate power and should be exercised only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Therefore, judicial discipline mandates that review applications be heard by the same Bench.

Order XLVII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, suggests that reviews should normally be heard by the same Bench that passed the original order, for various reasons including maintaining consistency, appreciating the matter, and preserving judicial discipline. All the appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

Marriage between the appellant (Siddaling) and the deceased (Kavitha) occurred on 6th May 2002.

Kavitha committed suicide by jumping into a well within four months of the marriage, on 17th September 2002.

Allegations of dowry harassment and cruelty against the appellant, including an illicit relationship with another woman, were raised.

The trial court convicted the appellant and his father under various sections, but the High Court acquitted the father and reduced the charges against the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions amounted to abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC.

Whether the conviction under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC should be upheld.

Held:

The appellant's continued illicit relationship with another woman, as proven by witness testimony and documentary evidence, caused psychological distress to the deceased, leading her to suicide.

The High Court's decision to maintain the appellant's conviction under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC was upheld.

Leniency in sentencing was denied due to the seriousness of the offense and the circumstances of the case.

The appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

The appellants, parents of the deceased driver, filed a claim petition seeking compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, following a fatal accident involving their son's car.

The Tribunal awarded compensation, but the insurer appealed against this decision, and the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order.

Issues:

Whether compensation can be awarded under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, when the victim is the driver responsible for the accident.

Held:

The Court held that in proceedings under Section 163A of the Act, the insurer cannot raise any defense of negligence on the part of the victim to counter a claim for compensation. This interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent behind Section 163A, which aimed to ensure final compensation within a limited time frame, without extensive consideration of fault liability. The Court referred to the judgment in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar & Anr., wherein it was established that permitting a defense of negligence by the insurer would be inconsistent with the legislative purpose of Section 163A. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and reinstating the Tribunal's order. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

The appellant, Santosh Devi, along with her children, filed a claim petition seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, after her husband, Puran Chand, died in a road accident caused by a government Jeep. The deceased was 38 years old and engaged in the business of selling desi ghee and namkin bhujia. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) initially assessed his monthly income at Rs. 1,200 and awarded compensation accordingly. On appeal, the High Court increased the compensation but made deductions in interest.

Issues:

Assessment of the deceased's income by the MACT.

Application of multiplier and deductions for personal expenses by the High Court.

Calculation of future prospects and total compensation.

Held:

The Court held that the assessment of the deceased's income at Rs. 1,200 per month by the MACT was low. Considering the nature of the business and other circumstances, the income was reassessed at Rs. 2,500 per month.

Additionally, a multiplier of 16 was applied as the deceased was 38 years old. Following the decision in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, an amount of 40% was added for future prospects. Consequently, the total compensation was recalculated to Rs. 5,23,000, including conventional heads.

The appellants were entitled to interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition. The appeal was allowed in favor of the appellants.

Facts

The case involved an appeal by the landlord (Popat & Kotecha Property & Ors) against the respondent-tenant (Ashim Kumar Dey) regarding eviction for defaulting on payment of municipal taxes under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

Issues:

Whether a tenant who defaulted in payment of their share of municipal taxes, as apportioned by the landlord, would be in default of rent, rendering them liable to eviction.

Held:

The Court held that the obligation to pay municipal taxes as an occupier fell upon the tenant, as per the amended Act. The court observed that the relevant clauses in the rent agreement were superseded by this statutory obligation. The respondent-tenant had been served a notice to pay his share of municipal taxes but had not remitted the amount due. The trial court dismissed the landlord's claim, and the High Court upheld the decision, stating that the landlord needed a formal order of rent enhancement from the Rent Controller. However, the Supreme Court held that the respondent-tenant's default was evident, and the High Court erred in imposing the requirement of a formal rent enhancement order. The court allowed the appeal and granted the landlord's application for eviction of the respondent-tenant.

Facts:

The case involves Jaypee Infratech Limited (JIL), a real estate developer, defaulting on its dues to IDBI bank, leading to the initiation of a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against JIL. Home buyers, distinct from financial and operational creditors, raised concerns regarding the recognition of their interests in the CIRP. The Court was approached by the home buyers seeking pro-rata disbursement of funds deposited by JIL among buyers seeking refunds.

Issues:

Recognition of the rights of home buyers in the CIRP process.

Whether directing preferential payment to home buyers seeking refunds is legally permissible during CIRP.

Consideration of the interests of secured creditors and the overall resolution process under the IBC.

Validity and applicability of RBI's recommendations regarding the initiation of CIRP against JAL.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the legitimate grievances of home buyers seeking refunds but declined to grant their plea. It emphasized the legal impermissibility of directing preferential payments to a specific class of financial creditors during CIRP.

Furthermore, the Court highlighted the injustice to secured creditors and the lack of overall benefit to the resolution process if refunds were directed to a specific class of creditors. It noted the preference of a majority (92%) of home buyers for possession of their purchased homes.

The Court underscored the importance of protecting the interests of lenders, particularly banks and financial institutions, as intended by the IBC. It also accepted RBI's recommendation to initiate CIRP against JAL, considering its financial distress and the need for timely resolution.

Facts:

The case pertains to the implementation of reforms in the administration of cricket, as proposed by a committee chaired by Justice R. M. Lodha. These reforms were accepted by the Supreme Court in a previous judgment. The Committee of Administrators (CoA) was tasked with drafting a Constitution for the BCCI to implement these reforms. Various stakeholders provided suggestions on the draft Constitution, which were considered by the court.

Issues:

The court included membership criteria for the BCCI, representation of certain cricket associations, the number of selectors, the imposition of a cooling-off period for office bearers, and other administrative matters.

Held:

The court decided to restore full membership in the BCCI to three cricket associations each in the State of Maharashtra (Maharashtra, Mumbai, and Vidarbha) and in Gujarat (Gujarat, Baroda, and Saurashtra) due to their significant contributions to nurturing talent for cricket in India. However, the status of full members was not granted to the National Cricket Club and the Cricket Club of India.

Full membership was also granted to the Railway Sports Promotion Board (Railways), Services Sports Control Board (Services), and the Association of Indian Universities due to their notable contributions to Indian cricket. Representatives for Railways, Services, and the Association of Indian Universities should be former cricketers elected by respective associations of former players.

The number of selectors was increased from three to five to ensure a broader selection pool and better talent evaluation across the country. Selectors must meet specific criteria related to their cricketing experience.

The court mandated a cooling-off period of three years after an individual has held the post of an office bearer for two consecutive terms either in a State Association or in the BCCI or a combination of both. This is to prevent the concentration of power and encourage a wider body of experienced administrators.

The Apex Council is entrusted with professional management through appointed officers. Disqualifications clauses in the draft Constitution were approved with modifications, and any future amendments to the Constitution should be approved by the Supreme Court.

Facts:

PW-4 Sumeet Asthana lodged a complaint with the Vigilance Officer of Indian Airlines, alleging that he was asked to contact Babji (A-1) of M/s Varun Movies to arrange a confirmed flight ticket.

A-1 demanded Rs. 2,100/- for a confirmed ticket, which was higher than the actual fare of Rs. 1646/-.

The Vigilance Officer reported the matter to the Superintendent of Police, CBI Hyderabad, stating that A-1 and A-2 were cheating the public.

Based on the evidence of PW-4 and PW-2, the Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, a decision confirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to establish the offence under Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act?

Held:

In order to establish the offence under Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it must be proven that the accused accepted gratification as a motive or reward for inducing a public servant to perform an official act.

The evidence presented by the prosecution was vague regarding the recipient of the money and whether they were a public servant.

Insufficient evidence was presented to demonstrate that the money was received to influence a public servant.

Without convincing evidence, the conviction under Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be sustained.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted. The bail bonds of the appellant, who was on bail, were discharged.