Facts:

The case involved a deadly assault on Lalni @ Raj Kumar, resulting in his death. The incident occurred in 1982 after an altercation between the deceased and the appellants, who resided next door. The deceased's cattle had strayed into the fields of the accused persons, leading to abuse and confrontation earlier in the day. The altercation escalated, resulting in the fatal assault on the deceased by the appellants and others.

Issues:

The appellants challenged their conviction under Sections 147, 148, 149, and initially Section 302 IPC.

The primary issue was whether the evidence supported the conviction and the severity of the sentence.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction under Sections 147, 148, and 149 IPC but modified the conviction under Section 302 IPC to one under Section 304-Part I IPC. The court reduced the sentence for the offence under Section 304-Part I/149 IPC to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. Other sentences were affirmed. The court observed that while the accused were aware of the likely consequences of their actions, there was no pre-meditation or prior concert to commit murder. The incident occurred in a heated moment, and tensions were escalated by the deceased as well.

The court considered the lengthy time since the incident and the lack of a common object to eliminate the deceased. Therefore, the sentence was reduced based on the circumstances of the case. The appeal is thus partly allowed.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 16th June 2000, where the deceased, Debol Kumar Ghosh, was shot dead at the CPI(M) Party Office.

Appellant Anjan Dasgupta and co-accused Biswanath Paul were convicted under Section 302/34 IPC by the Calcutta High Court.

The prosecution case relied on eyewitness accounts and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant challenged his conviction on various grounds, including the alleged ante-timing and ante-dating of the FIR and delay in dispatching it to the Magistrate.

Issues:

Whether the FIR was ante-timed and ante-dated, leading to adverse inferences against the prosecution.

Whether the delay in dispatching the FIR to the Magistrate affects the authenticity of the prosecution's case.

Whether the eyewitness accounts are credible and sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court held that:

The FIR was not ante-dated or ante-timed, as there was evidence to suggest prompt registration after the incident. The delay in dispatching it to the Magistrate did not undermine its authenticity. (Para 22-23)

The eyewitness accounts were consistent and corroborative, despite minor discrepancies. The High Court's re-appreciation of evidence was proper, leading to a finding of guilt. (Para 31-36)

The judgment of the High Court was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed. (Para 37)

Referred Cases

Apren Joseph Alias Current Kunjukunju Vs. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114

Pala Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1972) 2 SCC 640

Rabindra Mahto Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2006) 10 SCC 432

Facts:

The appellant, a contractor licensed by Nagar Nigam, Jaipur, has been using minerals purchased from the open market for construction work.

Various Government Orders by the State of Rajasthan were issued regarding the deduction of 2% royalty from bills of contractors for the use of minerals in construction work.

The appellant challenged these orders through a writ petition, primarily contesting a letter dated 26.03.2002 that sought compliance with existing circulars requiring the payment of royalties for minerals used in construction work.

Issues:

Whether the courts adequately considered the specific issues raised by the appellant in the writ petition.

Whether the liability to pay royalty rests solely with holders of mining leases or permits.

Whether the appellant should be required to pay royalty for minerals used in construction work, considering they were purchased from the open market.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the disposal of the writ petition did not fully consider the specific issues raised by the appellant. The Court found that the appellant primarily challenged the letter dated 26.03.2002, which emphasized compliance with existing circulars, rather than the circulars themselves. As the appellant did not directly challenge the circulars, the Court declined to adjudicate on broader policy issues related to royalty payments. Instead, the appellant was directed to approach the mining engineer with evidence to establish that royalties were paid for the minerals used in construction work. The mining engineer was instructed to consider the representation and make a decision, preferably within three months.

Facts:

UCO Bank issued a sale notification under the SARFAESI Act for properties mortgaged by members of Scheduled Tribes in Tripura.

Respondents contested the sale notification, citing Section 187 of the Tripura Act of 1960, which prohibited banks from transferring mortgaged properties to non-members of Scheduled Tribes.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the SARFAESI Act prevail over the Tripura Act of 1960 in the context of sale of mortgaged properties.

Whether the sale notification complied with the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.

Held:

The Court held that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act prevailed over those of the Tripura Act of 1960 regarding the sale of mortgaged properties. The Court reasoned that the SARFAESI Act, being a central legislation, superseded the state legislation, and its provisions did not contain any restriction on the category of buyers for such properties (para. 18).

The Court also found that the sale notification complied with the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, as the bank had obtained valuation reports and fixed reserve prices before the auction sale (para. 21).

Thus, the Court set aside the High Court's decision and allowed the appeals filed by UCO Bank (para. 22).

Facts:

The case involved a dispute between Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. and M/s. Applied Electronics Ltd. regarding arbitration proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is applicable to appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Whether cross-objections by respondents are maintainable in such appeals.

Held:

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provides restrictions for challenging awards and emphasizes expeditious disposal, as evident from Section 37(3) and Section 5 of the Act.

On comparison with the Arbitration Act, 1940, it is noted that while the former Act intentionally excludes any provision for the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure, the latter explicitly stated such applicability. Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, reinforces this exclusion and establishes the Act as a complete code, barring the application of other laws like the CPC.

The provisions of the 1996 Act, particularly Section 5, indicate that no judicial authority shall interfere except where specifically provided in Part I of the Act. This further solidifies the understanding that the CPC cannot be invoked in matters governed by the 1996 Act, and consequently, cross-objections cannot be entertained.

Facts:

The deceased first respondent filed a suit for partition, claiming a share in the family properties.

The trial court accepted the execution of certain wills, but the High Court overturned this decision.

The High Court ruled on the devolution of property under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the partition of the family dwelling house.

The appellants challenged the High Court's decision before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Validity of the wills under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Applicability of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, to the devolution of property.

Partition of the family dwelling house.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing the importance of proper proof of wills and the application of relevant statutory provisions. It affirmed the increase in the share of the deceased coparcener's daughter under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the partition of the family dwelling house based on evidence of its partial occupation. The appeals were dismissed, with each party bearing its respective costs.

Facts:

The respondent-accused was facing trial on charges under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, and the Immoral Traffic Act. During the investigation, the respondent allegedly absconded, and there were complaints of intimidating witnesses against him. Subsequently, the respondent surrendered and filed a bail application, which was dismissed by the Trial Court but granted by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether there are any chances of the accused fleeing from justice or reasonable apprehension that the accused would tamper with evidence/trial if released on bail.

The liberty of the accused with the interest of society and ensuring a fair trial.

Held:

The respondent-accused is only an under-trial, and his liberty is a relevant consideration. However, the interest of society and the fair trial of the case are equally important. While courts must adopt a liberal approach to bail applications, in cases where there is a possibility of the accused interfering with a fair trial if released on bail, the public interest in fair trial outweighs the personal interest of the accused.

The High Court's decision to grant bail was contrary to principles of law. The respondent had avoided arrest during the initial stages of the case, and there were complaints of intimidation against witnesses. Despite crucial witnesses remaining to be examined, bail was granted. This decision did not appropriately consider the substantial aspects relevant to the case.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court granting bail to the respondent-accused.

Facts:

The appellant challenged the legality of proceedings initiated under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code, pertaining to contradictory statements made during judicial proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the High Court followed the correct procedure under Section 340 of the CrPC in initiating proceedings.

Whether the conditions for initiating proceedings under Section 340 CrPC were met.

Held:

The Supreme Court found procedural irregularities in the initiation of proceedings under Section 340 CrPC and decided to set aside the same in the interests of justice.

In Paragraph 13, the court noted that the High Court had not followed the correct procedure in forming the opinion that it was expedient in the interests of justice to file a complaint. The court found that the requirements under Section 340 CrPC were not fully met.

Referring to the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, the court emphasized that the decision to file a complaint under Section 340 CrPC should be based on the interest of justice and not in every case where an offence is alleged.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the initiation of proceedings under Section 340 CrPC was set aside.

Facts:

The appellants had been awarded compensation by the Labour Officer cum Workmen's Compensation Commissioner based on evidence, including disability certificates issued by a qualified medical practitioner.

The insurance company contested the compensation, alleging inadequate proof of injuries.

The High Court questioned the validity of the evidence, particularly the authenticity of the disability certificates.

Issues:

Whether the findings of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, based on disability certificates issued by a qualified medical practitioner, were valid.

Whether the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction by re-evaluating evidence and substituting its own findings regarding the percentage of disability.

Held:

The Court held that The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is the final authority on factual matters under the Act, and the Parliament has restricted the scope of appeal to substantial questions of law.

The disability assessments conducted by qualified medical practitioners were valid, and there was no evidence to suggest otherwise.

The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-evaluating evidence and substituting its own findings regarding the percentage of disability, which lacked a basis.

The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the order of the Labour Officer cum Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was reinstated.