Facts:

Mr. Anurag Mittal filed an appeal against a decree of divorce obtained by him.

During the pendency of the appeal, a settlement was reached between Mr. Anurag Mittal and his former spouse, indicating his acceptance of the divorce decree.

Mr. Anurag Mittal filed an application for withdrawal of his appeal before the date of his second marriage to Mrs. Shaily Mishra Mittal.

Issues:

Whether the second marriage between Mr. Anurag Mittal and Mrs. Shaily Mishra Mittal during the pendency of the appeal against the decree of divorce was valid.

Interpretation of Sections 5(i) and 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Held

The validity of the second marriage hinges on the interpretation of Sections 5(i) and 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Mr. Anurag Mittal's application for withdrawal of the appeal effectively ended the appeal process and was deemed to have been withdrawn on the date of its filing.

The intentions of Mr. Anurag Mittal, evidenced by his acceptance of the divorce decree through the settlement and withdrawal of the appeal, played a crucial role in determining the validity of the second marriage.

The court concluded that the restriction placed on a second marriage under Section 15 did not apply in this case, given the circumstances and the principles of purposive construction.

The marriage between Mr. Anurag Mittal and Mrs. Shaily Mishra Mittal was held valid as the former spouse of Mr. Anurag Mittal could not be considered a living spouse at the time of the second marriage.

Decision: The court upheld the validity of the second marriage based on the withdrawal of the appeal and the intentions of the parties involved, as per the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Facts:

Suman Devi and Manisha Devi contested elections for the Ward Councilor post from Ward No. 18 of the District Council of Mahendergarh.

Suman Devi was declared the elected candidate, but Manisha Devi filed an Election Petition challenging her election under Section 176 of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994.

Subsequently, Manisha Devi withdrew the first petition and filed a second one after which Suman Devi filed another application for rejection on the ground of limitation.

Issues:

Whether the second election petition filed by Manisha Devi is barred by limitation under the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994.

Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, are applicable in this case.

Held:

The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act 1994 is a complete code for the presentation of election petitions. The statute has mandated that an election petition must be filed within a period of 30 days of the date of the declaration of results. This period cannot be extended. The provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 would clearly stand excluded.

The first respondent filed an election petition in the first instance to which there was an objection to maintainability under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. Confronted with the objection under Order 7 Rule 11, the first respondent obviated a decision thereon by withdrawing the election petition. The grant of liberty to file a fresh election petition cannot obviate the bar of limitation. The fresh election petition filed by the first respondent was beyond the statutory period of 30 days and was hence liable to be rejected.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the second election petition filed by Manisha Devi was dismissed.

Facts:

Respondent doctors, members of the Provincial Medical Service, sought voluntary retirement, which was not communicated by the State Government.

The doctors then filed writ petitions seeking the acceptance of their voluntary retirement.

Issues:

Whether the State Government's refusal to accept the doctors' voluntary retirement was justified under Rule 56(c) of the Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules.

Whether the decision of the State Government was in accordance with constitutional provisions and public interest.

Whether there was any discrimination between doctors of different services.

Whether the scarcity of doctors justified the State Government's decision to refuse voluntary retirement.

Held:

The explanation attached to Rule 56 clarifies that retirement decisions must be taken in public interest, applicable to both cases where the Government retires an employee and when an employee seeks voluntary retirement.

The concept of liberty not to serve cannot be absolute when public interest demands service, and retirement can be subject to certain conditions.

The State Government's decision to decline voluntary retirement considering public interest did not suffer from any arbitrariness.

The decision to refuse voluntary retirement was permissible under the rules and necessary for maintaining efficient medical services and fulfilling the State's obligations under the Constitution.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeals, ruling that the decision to decline voluntary retirement was permissible under the rules and necessary for maintaining efficient medical services and fulfilling the State's obligations under the Constitution.

Facts:

The appellant suffered damage due to flooding and filed a complaint against the respondent, an insurance company, for rejecting their claim.

The insurance policy required immediate intimation of loss, but the appellant informed the respondent after a considerable delay.

The respondent rejected the claim based on the breach of Clause 6 of the policy.

Issues:

Whether the respondent waived the condition of delay by appointing a surveyor.

Whether the delay in intimation of loss constituted a breach of policy terms.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the concept of waiver and concluded that the respondent had not waived the condition relating to delay stipulated in Clause 6 of the policy. The Court upheld the decision of the Commission, stating that the appointment of a surveyor did not constitute waiver. It emphasized the specific circumstances and policy clauses involved in distinguishing this case from previous judgments. Therefore, the appeals filed by the appellant were dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The Election Commission introduced NOTA for direct elections, such as Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies. However, its applicability to Council of States elections, which are indirect, was challenged under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether the introduction of NOTA in elections for the Council of States was constitutionally valid.

Held:

The Court observed that the Election Commission had derived its power to introduce NOTA from the pronouncement in PUCL's case, which pertained to direct elections. The decision in PUCL emphasized the concept of universal adult suffrage and the right of voters to choose any candidate or abstain from voting, which is applicable to direct elections. [Para 18]

In elections for the Council of States, voting is by open ballot, aiming to maintain party discipline and avoid cross-voting to ensure the purity of the election process. Party discipline is crucial in such elections, and the possibility of cross-voting and corruption is deemed obnoxious. [Para 19]

The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution was introduced to curb political defection. However, the introduction of NOTA indirectly undermines this purpose. [Para 22]

Democracy necessitates the purity of elections. NOTA in Council of States elections, where party discipline is paramount, would have a negative impact on the democratic process. [Para 23]

The concept of NOTA in elections for the Council of States contradicts the essence of democracy and the principles enshrined in the Constitution. [Para 27]

Decision: The Court held that the introduction of NOTA in elections for the Council of States was impermissible due to its potential to undermine the purity of democracy and exacerbate issues like defection and corruption.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute arising from the construction of a building. Respondent no. 1 was appointed as the developer for the property and later transferred the development rights to respondent no. 2. The appellant entered into an agreement with respondent no. 2, entitling the appellant to a share of the property. Disputes arose during construction, leading to a suit for specific performance by respondent no. 1 against the appellant and respondent no. 2.

Issues:

The validity and appropriateness of the interlocutory mandatory injunction issued by the High Court and the application of the principle of moulding relief.

Held:

The Court held that the order of mandatory interlocutory injunction issued by the High Court directing the appellant to hand over eight flats and sixteen parking spaces to respondent no. 1 was in excess of jurisdiction. Such an order can only be passed when circumstances clearly justify restoring the status quo ante.

The Court emphasized that the principle of moulding relief can only be applied at the time of considering final relief in the main suit, not at an interlocutory stage.

The High Court erred in applying the principle of moulding relief and granting a mandatory order at an interlocutory stage. The appellant could only be bound by the agreement executed with respondent no. 2 and not by agreements between the respondents. An interim mandatory injunction should only be granted when circumstances clearly demand it.

Decision: The Court set aside the order passed by the High Court and revived the ad-interim order until the final disposal of the suit or until modified by the High Court due to subsequent developments.

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit for eviction of the respondent from the premises for non-payment of rent.

The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the High Court overturned this decision, emphasizing the mandatory nature of Section 13(3) of the Rent Act.

Issues:

Whether compliance with Section 13(3) of the Act is mandatory in a suit for eviction based on default in rent payment.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing the mandatory nature of Section 13(3).

The court noted that the use of the word "shall" in the section imposes an obligation on the court to determine provisional rent, irrespective of any application.

Failure to comply with Section 13(3) would result in the loss of the tenant's valuable right.

Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's ruling.

Facts:

The case involved a writ petition brought by Kudrat Sandhu against the Union of India.

The Supreme Court had issued a clarification on 20 March 2018 regarding the tenure of Members and Chairpersons of Tribunals.

There was confusion regarding the age of superannuation of Members of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT).

Issues:

The interpretation of the Supreme Court's clarification regarding the tenure and age of superannuation of Members and Chairpersons of various Tribunals.

Held:

The Court clarified that Members of the ITAT would continue until the age of 62 years, and Presidents until the age of 65 years.

Similarly, Members of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) would continue until the age of 62 years, and Presidents until the age of 65 years.

Members of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) would hold office until the age of 65 years, while former Judges of the Supreme Court serving as Chairpersons would hold office until the age of 70 years.

The old rules/provisions would continue to apply in the case of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT).

The Union government was directed to provide a status report within two weeks regarding the position of each Tribunal, including vacancies and the stage of the selection process.

Facts: An arbitral proceeding took place between Kohinoor Transporters (Appellant) and the State of Uttar Pradesh (Respondent) under the Arbitration Act 1940, originating from a contract dating back to 1980 for civil works. The arbitral award, dated 20 July 1984, was made a Rule of the Court on 30 August 1986 by the Civil Judge, Dehradun. During execution proceedings, the respondent deposited a portion of the decretal debt. Subsequently, the Executing Court directed the respondent to deposit a further amount, which was contested. The High Court, during the course of the proceedings, ordered the appointment of a Chartered Accountant to review the financial details.

Issues:

Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the appointment of a Chartered Accountant in the execution proceedings?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had indeed exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the appointment of a Chartered Accountant. It emphasized that questions regarding the discharge or satisfaction of a decree must be determined by the Executing Court under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

The Court ruled that the High Court's directive for the appointment of a Chartered Accountant was inappropriate at that stage of the proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order.

It directed the High Court to dispose of the Civil Revision expeditiously, within three months from the date of the Supreme Court's order. No costs were awarded in the matter.