Facts:

The Competent Authority under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (MISA) directed the detention of 'R' on 5.11.1974, prior to the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA), coming into force on 13.12.1974. On 19.12.1974, the Competent Authority under COFEPOSA directed further detention. The detenu's son filed a writ of habeas corpus on 29.4.1975. Proclamation of Emergency on 25.6.1975, subsequent amendments to COFEPOSA, and the enforcement of SAFEMA on 25.1.1976 were critical developments. Emergency was lifted on 21.3.1977, leading to the revocation of detention orders on 22.3.1977.

Issues:

The applicability of SAFEMA to the case of 'R' concerning the detention orders under COFEPOSA during the Emergency period.

Held:

The order of detention under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA could be made to prevent activities prejudicial to foreign exchange. The maximum period of detention varied based on declarations under Section 9 and Section 12A of COFEPOSA.

Section 2 of SAFEMA applied to persons with orders of detention under COFEPOSA, subject to the proviso in Section 2(2)(b). The substantive provision would not apply if the order was revoked during specified periods outlined in the proviso.

Part (i) of the proviso to Section 2(2)(b) dealt with cases where Section 9 or Section 12A of COFEPOSA did not apply. In this case, neither Section 9 nor Section 12A applied, making SAFEMA applicable.

The order of detention was not revoked under any proviso conditions nor set aside by a competent court. SAFEMA provisions applied, as per Part (i) of the proviso.

The High Court rightly observed that the detention "had run right through the duration or continuance of the emergency." The failure to agitate the matter on merits during the pendency of the writ petition was noted.

The representation dated 17.01.1975, rejection communicated on 11.02.1975, and the absence of grievances regarding communication of grounds or identical grounds weakened challenges to the detention order under COFEPOSA.

The Competent Authority and the Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA found the properties mentioned in the schedules illegally acquired and forfeited. The Writ Petition deserved to be rejected.

Facts:

The appellant was enrolled in the Corps of Signals of the Indian Army as a Radio Mechanic on 18 February 1971.

On 18 August 1981, he was discharged from military service under Army Rule 13(3) on account of being placed in a low medical category.

The appellant claimed to suffer from a Chronic Duodenal Ulcer due to his participation in Operation Cactus Lilly in 1971.

The appellant moved the Armed Forces Tribunal for the grant of war injury pension, which was declined based on the view that the disability was not attributable to participation in action.

The appellant sought disability pension for the period between 1996 and 2014.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be granted disability pension between 1996 and 2014?

Held:

On 26 November 2018, the Court allowed the appeal for consideration of disability pension between 1996 and 2014.

The chart submitted by the respondents indicated varying assessments of disability over the years, leading to the denial of disability pension from 24 March 1995.

With effect from 30 January 2014, the appellant's disability was assessed at 20% on a permanent basis for life by the Military Hospital, Danapur Cantt.

The Court found the denial of disability pension for the period between 24 March 1995 and 30 January 2014 misconceived, considering the previous order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal rounding off the disability element.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant directed to be granted arrears on account of disability pension between 24 March 1995 and 30 January 2014 in accordance with applicable rates.

Facts:

The first respondent was married to Vijay Kumar Jindal in 2010, and they have two children.

The first respondent filed a petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeking maintenance.

The complaint alleges that the house where the couple resided belonged to a joint family, and the appellant and his deceased brother carried on a joint business.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the brother of the deceased spouse, can be held liable for maintenance under the Act.

Held:

The appellant contested the basis of liability, arguing that the joint business with the deceased brother does not justify directing him to pay maintenance.

The court found sufficient averments in the complaint, especially in paragraph 10, indicating a joint family setup, joint business, and shared household.

The court clarified that the fulfillment of Section 2(f), Section 2(q), and Section 2(s) requirements would be a matter of evidence at trial.

An order for interim maintenance was justified based on the material available at this stage.

The court disposed of the appeal, emphasizing that the order does not preclude a final adjudication on the merits of the complaint.

Facts:

Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1-3) filed a suit seeking perpetual injunction against the defendants, including the appellants (Defendant Nos. 1 and 2).

Appellants contested the suit, and the Trial Court dismissed it. The First Appellate Court upheld the dismissal.

Plaintiffs appealed in the High Court, which allowed the appeal, setting aside the lower court's decision and decreeing perpetual injunction.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the plaintiffs' second appeal and decreeing perpetual injunction.

Validity of concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court.

Held:

The High Court erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court had rightly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove the necessary elements for perpetual injunction.

Possession by one co-sharer is deemed possession by all, unless denial of rights, exclusion, and ouster occur for the statutory period.

The plaintiffs did not establish exclusive possession, and the appellants, as purchasers from a co-sharer, had the right to defend their title and possession.

The High Court failed to appreciate the legal and factual context and wrongly interfered with the concurrent findings. The appeal was allowed, and the Trial Court's judgment dismissing the suit was restored.

Facts:

Marriage solemnized in 2006 between the appellant-wife and respondent-husband.

In 2009, a son named Krish alias Master Krishav Gautam was born.

In 2012, the respondent-husband filed a divorce petition under Section 13(1)(ia)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Trial Court decreed the divorce petition ex-parte, directing the son to be admitted to Col. Satsangi's Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi.

Appellant-wife filed an appeal against the ex-parte order.

Dispute arose regarding the school where the child should study, leading to conflicting directions.

Issues:

Custody and schooling arrangements for the child.

Violation of court orders regarding the child's education.

Maintenance for the appellant-wife.

Held:

The boy, Krish @ Master Krishav Gautam, expressed a desire to continue studying in his old school, Global International School, Shahjanpur.

In the interest of the child's welfare, he cannot be compelled to join Col. Satsangi's Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi.

High Court directions regarding the child's admission were set aside.

The appellant-wife is directed to elect one forum for maintenance.

The respondent-husband, being the natural father, is granted visitation rights. He can take the child on Sundays and public holidays.

The child is allowed to continue studying at Global International School, Shahjanpur.

High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal expeditiously.

Facts:

The appellant, G. Ramesh, filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against Vainqueur Corporate Services, a partnership firm.

The complaint alleged dishonour of cheques issued by the accused (partners) for data entry work.

The High Court, through a petition under Section 482 of CrPC, quashed the proceedings, stating inadequacy in averments to implicate criminal liability.

Issues:

Whether the complaint contained sufficient averments to implicate the first respondent (partner) under Section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The misinterpretation by the High Court of considering the first accused as a company instead of a partnership firm.

Held:

The complaint sufficiently describes the nature of the partnership, the business conducted, and the role of each accused in relation to the dishonoured cheques.

The High Court's error in considering the first accused as a company is acknowledged, and it is clarified that the first accused is a partnership firm.

Averments in the complaint meet the requirements of Section 141(1), holding the first respondent liable for the offence.

Quashing of the criminal case against the first respondent by the High Court is deemed erroneous.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment and order of the High Court.

Facts:

Atul Chandra Das, through his legal representatives, filed appeals against the dismissal of his suit for ejectment and the decreeing of the title suit.

Das claimed ownership of a property based on a sale and subsequent decree for specific performance.

The respondents, legal heirs of the previous owner, contested Das's claim, asserting a mortgage by conditional sale.

Issues:

Whether the transaction was a sale or a mortgage by conditional sale.

Applicability and inconsistency between Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 37A of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.

Jurisdiction and application of the State Act to the suit.

Held:

The court found that the State legislature intended to override the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act by enacting Section 37(A) of the State Act.

Despite inconsistency, Section 37(A) of the State Act prevails in the State due to the assent given by the President under Article 254(2).

Das's claim of ownership was rejected, and the mortgage by conditional sale was upheld.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

Facts:

Bhana, the original owner of the disputed properties, had two marriages and children from both wives.

A gift of the suit land was made to Smt. Banti, Bhana's second wife, in 1950 for maintenance, leading to mutation in her favor.

Litigation ensued between the parties, challenging the gift, and a civil suit in 1953 upheld reversionary rights of the son, Darshan Singh.

Bhana executed a will in 1973, bequeathing his estate to plaintiffs, excluding Smt. Banti and the appellant (Ajit Kaur).

The trial court held that Banti became the absolute owner after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs.

Issues:

Validity of the will dated 5th January 1973.

Applicability of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Reversionary rights and possession over the disputed property.

Held:

The Court examined the validity of the will dated 5th January 1973, and the appellate court's findings on a subsequent will dated 21st February 1973 were considered. The latter was held to be not legally executed and proved.

The Court discussed Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, emphasizing that possession must be under some vestige of a claim, right, or title. Mere possession would not confer pre-existing rights.

The effect of mutation in revenue records was clarified, stating that it does not create or extinguish title. The court highlighted that fiscal proceedings do not confer a right of acquisition.

The Court rejected the appellant's claim of absolute ownership based on possession at the time of the Act's enforcement, as the possession lacked a valid claim, right, or title.

Facts:

The respondent filed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, against the appellants' predecessors-in-title.

The application was based on a partnership dated 05.07.1960, named "Gupta Bus Service," which later dissolved due to disputes.

The appellants contended that, being an "unregistered partnership," the application under Section 20 of the Partnership Act was not maintainable.

Issues:

Whether the application for arbitration is maintainable considering the partnership in question is an unregistered partnership.

Held:

The Civil Judge overruled the appellants' objection, stating that the application is maintainable.

The High Court upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case for fresh consideration.

The High Court failed to consider the law laid down in Krishna Motor Service vs. H.B. Vittala Kamath (1996) 10 SCC 88.

The matter should be reconsidered in light of the mentioned decision, and the High Court is urged to dispose of the writ petition expeditiously.