Facts:

Both direct appointees and promotees were initially appointed on an ad hoc basis without following a regular process.

Amendments were made to the rules governing appointments to regularize these ad hoc appointments.

The core dispute revolved around the lack of consultation with the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (UPPSC) during the confirmation of ad hoc appointments.

Issues:

Whether the lack of consultation with the UPPSC during the confirmation of ad hoc appointments rendered the appointments illegal.

Whether the appointments were irregular and could be cured through retrospective consultation with the UPPSC.

Determination of seniority based on the date of continuous officiation for promotees and the date of joining for direct recruits.

Held:

The Court held that while the lack of consultation with the UPPSC was a clear irregularity, it did not render the appointments illegal. The Court directed the State Government to consult with the UPPSC within two months to cure the defect. Depending on the outcome of the consultation, the seniority list would be adjusted accordingly. The Court emphasized that this decision should put an end to further litigation on the matter.

Facts:

Shankareppa Pattar, son of the appellants, was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 14.04.2008.

The accident occurred due to negligence, causing Shankareppa to sustain fatal injuries while traveling in a jeep.

The Tribunal awarded compensation to the claimants, holding the owner of the vehicle liable and directing the insurance company to pay, with the liberty to recover from the owner.

The High Court reversed the Tribunal's decision, holding only the owner liable for compensation, citing Article 142 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Interpretation of liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 regarding compensation in cases of breach of policy conditions.

Whether the doctrine of "pay and recover" applies in this case.

Held:

The Tribunal's decision directing the insurance company to pay compensation and recover from the owner is consistent with the principles established in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and subsequent cases.

The High Court erred in exonerating the insurance company from liability and directing the claimants to recover compensation solely from the owner.

The insurance company is directed to pay the enhanced compensation to the claimants and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle.

The recovery process can be initiated before the concerned Executing Court without the need for filing a separate suit.

Facts:

Col. IVS Gahlot, an officer in the Armed Forces Medical Services (AFMS), filed an appeal challenging the decision of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Principal Bench, Delhi, which dismissed his statutory complaint against non-promotion.

The appellant claimed that he was denied marks for his Ph.D. degree in Anthropology, Post Graduate training qualification from G.S.V.M. Medical College, Kanpur, and Master's degree in Personnel Management from Pune University.

The appellant contended that the promotion policy, issued in 2004 and amended in 2006, was not applicable to him as it was reviewed before the stipulated five years.

The appellant argued that his Ph.D. degree from Berhampur University should have been recognized for marks allocation, and his Post Graduate training program should have been considered for marks as well.

Issues:

Whether the amendment to the promotion policy in 2006 was valid.

Whether the Ph.D. degree obtained from Berhampur University and the Post Graduate training program fulfilled the eligibility criteria for marks allocation.

Held:

The amendment to the promotion policy in 2006 was valid, as the employer has the authority to change promotion policies as needed.

The Ph.D. degree obtained from Berhampur University was not recognized by the Medical Council of India, as required by the promotion policy, and thus, the appellant was not eligible for marks allocation based on this qualification.

The appellant failed to fulfill the necessary conditions for allocation of marks for his Post Graduate training program, as there was no evidence of a structured full-time training program during study leave.

Consequently, the Court upheld the decision of the Armed Forces Tribunal to dismiss the appellant's statutory complaint, and the Civil Appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The State Government acquired land for public purposes.

Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) initiated proceedings under Section 11 of the Act and passed an award.

Legal challenges by original landowners were dismissed.

Original landowners applied under Section 48(1) of the Act to the Revenue Minister for releasing the land from acquisition.

Revenue Minister partially released the land from acquisition.

Original landowners transferred the land to respondent no.1.

Respondent no.1 filed another application under Section 48(1) of the Act for the release of the remaining portion of the land from acquisition.

Revenue Minister granted this request, deleting the land from acquisition proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the State had the authority to release acquired land after possession had been taken.

The legal validity of the orders issued by the Revenue Minister for releasing the land.

The abuse of power by the Revenue Minister in invoking Section 48 of the Act.

Whether the landowners' filing of the writ petition constituted an abuse of the judicial process.

The implications of the bargain regarding the release of part of the land to the landowners.

Held:

The Court held that once possession of acquired land is taken by the State, it vests absolutely with the State, precluding the State from withdrawing from the acquisition proceedings.

The orders issued by the Revenue Minister for releasing the land did not create any legal rights in favor of the landowners.

The Revenue Minister exceeded their authority by invoking Section 48 of the Act to release the land after possession was taken by the State, constituting an abuse of power.

The court noted that the landowners' filing of the writ petition was an abuse of the judicial process since earlier litigation had concluded against them.

The release of part of the land to the landowners and retention of the remaining land constituted a bargain, precluding further release. Additionally, after the State obtained possession, releasing the remaining land under Section 48 was legally impossible.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, ruling against the actions of the Revenue Minister and emphasizing the importance of understanding the legal implications of possession and the limitations on the State's power to release acquired land once possession is taken.

Facts:

In 2008, the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) published a scheme and preliminary notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act, acquiring lands for providing civic amenities like roads, etc. Writ petitions were filed in 2014, alleging that the State Government and the BDA had not taken any steps to issue a final notification or develop the land for five years. The Single Bench allowed the writ petitions and quashed the notification regarding the lands of the appellants. The writ appeals were dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the time constraints of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are applicable to the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976?

Whether irregularities and collusion in the land acquisition process affect the validity of the preliminary notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act?

Whether responsibility can be attributed for delays and attempts to manipulate the land acquisition process?

Whether the quashing of the preliminary notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act by the Single Judge was justified?

Whether the State Government and the BDA should proceed with the issuance of the final notification without further delay?

Held:

The primary objective of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 is planned development, and the Act has its own scheme. The time constraints of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are not directly applicable to the BDA Act. Applying the time frame of Section 11A of the LA Act would contradict the purpose of the BDA Act.

Irregularities and collusion in the land acquisition process were evident, but the responsibility for delays and attempts to manipulate the process lies with both landowners and authorities. Such actions obstruct planned development, contrary to the public interest.

The quashing of the preliminary notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act by the Single Judge was not justified, considering the attempts to manipulate the process and the responsibility for delays.

The State Government and the BDA are directed to proceed with the issuance of the final notification without further delay, upholding the scheme and notification under Section 17 of the BDA Act.

Facts:

The interlocutory application pertained to the infrastructure of courts, especially subordinate courts. Previous orders had directed certain states to provide information regarding pending projects, land acquisition, utilization of government lands, and steps for project completion. Despite various adjournments, progress in infrastructure development was noted, but areas requiring immediate attention remained.

Issues:

The inadequate infrastructure in court complexes, particularly in interior parts of the country, and the subsequent hindrance it posed to access to justice.

The court needed to address the need for urgent improvement and set guidelines for future infrastructure development.

Held:

The Court emphasized the critical role of infrastructure in the efficient functioning of the judiciary and ensuring access to justice for all citizens. It noted that infrastructure development had been relatively low-priority and required an overhaul.

The Court issued comprehensive directives, including the provision of basic amenities, accessibility for differently-abled individuals, efficient crowd management, adequate parking facilities, residential accommodation for judicial officers and staff, solar power installation, CCTV installation, video conferencing facilities, and medical facilities in court complexes.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of the criteria for appointment to the post of Director General of Medical Service (Army) [DGMS (Army)]. The respondent, Maj. Gen. Manomoy Ganguly, fulfilled the eligibility criteria for the post and had adequate administrative experience. However, there were issues regarding the application of the criteria of "inter-se seniority cum suitability."

Issues:

Interpretation of the criteria of "inter-se seniority cum suitability."

Assessment of the respondent's suitability for the post of DGMS (Army).

Fairness and objectivity in the application of the selection criteria.

Held:

The term "inter-se seniority cum suitability" implies that both seniority and suitability should be considered equally for the appointment to the post of DGMS (Army).

"Suitable" in service jurisprudence means being fit or appropriate for the specific post based on calibre, competence, attributes, skills, and experience.

Assessment of "inter-se suitability" involves identifying the most suitable candidate among eligible officers based on the job profile, requirements, and the candidate's qualifications and experience.

In the present case, there was not proper and valid consideration in applying the criteria of "inter-se seniority and suitability." Despite the respondent meeting the eligibility criteria and having adequate administrative experience, the assessment of suitability was not fair and objective.

While setting aside the direction of the Tribunal to appoint the respondent straightaway, the case was remitted back to the Raksha Mantri for reconsideration. This implies that the decision of appointing the DGMS (Army) should be made after a fair and objective assessment of both seniority and suitability, in accordance with the established criteria.

Facts:

The appellants were irregularly appointed employees seeking regularisation after serving more than 10 years.

The High Court denied their regularisation based on a cut-off date from a previous judgment.

The appellants argued that the State's selective regularisation was discriminatory.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were entitled to regularisation despite not meeting the cut-off date.

Whether the State's actions were discriminatory.

Held:

The Court emphasized the intent of previous judgments to curb irregular appointments and provide a one-time measure for long-serving employees. It criticized the State's exploitation of irregular appointments and stressed the need for fair treatment of employees.

The Court held that a pragmatic interpretation of the Regularisation Rules was necessary, allowing regularisation for those who completed 10 years of service by the promulgation date of the Rules, unless there are valid objections. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State was directed to decide on regularisation within four months.

The Court advised the State to prioritize regular appointments to avoid circumventing the process.

Facts:

The appellants, including a gynecologist, a pediatrician, and a hospital administrator, were involved in attending to a victim who had been brought to the hospital in an advanced stage of pregnancy.

The victim's mother brought her to the hospital when she complained of stomach pain, and it was discovered she was in the advanced stage of pregnancy.

Issues:

Whether the appellants had prior knowledge of the alleged rape of the victim.

Whether the appellants failed in their obligation to report the offence under the POCSO Act.

Held:

The court held that there was no evidence to implicate the appellants. The charges against them were primarily based on their alleged failure to report the offence under the POCSO Act, despite having knowledge. However, the court found no evidence to support this allegation.

The court emphasized that the term "knowledge" under the POCSO Act implies information received by a person, not deductions or assumptions. It was noted that appellant no. 1 attended to the victim upon her admission to the hospital for delivery without prior knowledge of her age or the circumstances of her pregnancy. Appellant no. 2 had no contact with the victim, and appellant no. 3, the hospital administrator, had no direct involvement with the victim or the circumstances of her admission.

The court concluded that mere suspicion or likelihood of suspicion is insufficient to charge a person with an offence and quashed the proceedings against the appellants.