Facts:

The case involves criminal proceedings under Sections 265, 267, 420, 34, 120B, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC, Sections 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, and Sections 12/30 of the Weights and Measures Act, 1976 and Legal Metrology Act, 2009.

Issues:

The applicability of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, in relation to offenses under the IPC.

The scope of Section 153 of the Cr.P.C. in cases involving weights and measures.

The jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

Held:

Applicability of Legal Metrology Act vs. IPC The Legal Metrology Act, 2009 is deemed a special Act vis-à-vis the IPC. Section 3 of the Act overrides provisions of Chapter XIII of IPC for offenses and penalties. Section 51 clarifies that IPC provisions related to weight and measures offenses do not apply to offenses punishable under the Act. Therefore, an accused cannot be charged for the same offense under Chapter XIII of IPC if the offense is established under the Legal Metrology Act (Para 31, 33, 34, and 36).

Scheme of the Act The Act primarily addresses non-standard weights and measures and tampering with standards. Offenses under IPC, such as cheating, and those under Sections 467, 468, 471, and 34, are not covered by the Act. Prosecution for such offenses is maintained as they are not inconsistent with the Act (Para 35).

Inapplicability of Section 153 of Cr.P.C. Section 153 of the Cr.P.C. is made inapplicable under the Act, as the power of search and seizure is vested in designated authorities. Therefore, the entire Cr.P.C. is inapplicable in prosecutions under the Act (Para 31).

Jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Directions of the High Court against the accused's interest and orders for disciplinary action against officials in a Section 482 petition exceed the High Court's jurisdiction and are quashed (Para 36).

Decision: Partly allowing the appeals, the Court held that offenses under Sections 265 and 267 of IPC are liable to be quashed. The High Court's directions against the accused and disciplinary action orders are beyond its jurisdiction and are quashed. The investigating agency has the authority to charge the accused for such offenses or any other offense through a supplementary report or during the trial (Para 36).

Facts:

Dispute arising from a partnership where an FIR was filed on 17.11.2017, alleging siphoning of funds and business improprieties.

Arbitration Petition filed by the appellant under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking appointment of an Arbitrator based on the partnership deed dated 30.01.2015.

High Court, relying on 'A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam and Others,' dismissed the Section 11 application, citing the nature of the dispute involving serious allegations of fraud as unsuitable for arbitration.

Issues:

Whether the nature of the dispute, with allegations of fraud, is fit for arbitration proceedings.

Applicability of the principles laid down in 'A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam and Others' to the present case.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarifies that the relevant law is in paragraph 25 of 'A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam and Others.' It emphasizes the distinction between serious allegations affecting the entire contract and "simple allegations" related to internal affairs. The court concludes that the disputes are arbitrable as they fall under "simple allegations," and the Section 11 application is maintainable.

The court holds that the disputes raised between the parties are arbitrable, and thus, a Section 11 application under the Arbitration Act is maintainable.( Paragraph 7)

The judgment under appeal is set aside, and with the consent of the parties, Justice Amareshwar Sahay is appointed as the sole arbitrator to resolve all disputes.( Paragraph 8)

The court emphasizes that nothing in the judgment will affect the ongoing investigation pursuant to the FIR.( Paragraph 9)

The appeal is disposed of.( Paragraph 10)

Facts:

The appellant, Mohammed Fasrin, appealed against his conviction under various sections of the NDPS Act, particularly for offenses related to financing illicit traffic and harboring offenders. The case primarily relied on the appellant's alleged involvement in international smuggling of contraband substances.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to prove the appellant's involvement in the alleged offenses.

The admissibility and voluntariness of the confessions made by the co-accused and the appellant.

The strength and reliability of the evidence linking the appellant to the commission of the offense.

Held:

The court found that the prosecution failed to present substantial evidence against the appellant. The evidence relied upon was the statement of a co-accused, which lacked corroboration, and the appellant's alleged confession, which raised concerns about its voluntariness. The court, even if assuming the admissibility of the confession, held it to be insufficient as the prosecution did not establish its voluntary nature and failed to provide corroborative evidence. Therefore, both the trial court and the High Court were deemed to have wrongly convicted the accused. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of both lower courts was set aside. The accused, who was already on bail, had his bail bonds discharged.

Facts:

The case involved seven accused, including appellant-accused 'M' and 'S.' Initial charges were not framed against 'M' and two others, but subsequent proceedings under Section 319 Cr.P.C. resulted in charges being framed. An attempt under Section 321 Cr.P.C. to withdraw the case against them was declined. The trial court relied on the testimony of injured eye-witnesses (PWs 5 and 6), medical evidence, and rejected the defense plea of alibi and false implication, leading to the conviction of all seven accused.

Issues:

The reliability of the prosecution's case, the rejection of the plea of alibi, and the impact of the Governor's pardon on the proceedings.

Held:

Although two accused were acquitted with the benefit of doubt, their acquittal does not mitigate the prosecution case against the remaining five accused, including the appellants. Acquittal of co-accused is not determinative of the guilt of others. The substance of the prosecution case remains intact.( Para 9)

The prosecution's case heavily relies on the testimony of injured eye-witnesses PW-5 and PW-6. Their consistent and reliable accounts, along with medical evidence, formed the basis of the conviction. The defense's attempt to discredit these witnesses was unsuccessful, and the trial court's reliance on their testimony was upheld.( Para 10)

The defense introduced a plea of alibi, supported by a witness (DW 5) and a complaint, but the trial court rejected it after thorough evaluation. The absence of the plea during cross-examination and the appellant's failure to assert non-presence at the crime scene in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. weakened the alibi.( Para 11)

The appellant's plea of alibi lacked credibility, as witnessed by DW-9 and other defense witnesses. The trial court and High Court rightly discarded these witnesses as unreliable. The plea of alibi was considered an afterthought and dismissed accordingly.( Para 12)

The absence of the recovery of the weapon used by the appellant-accused 'M' does not undermine the prosecution's case. The appellant's role as the leader of the unlawful assembly was established beyond doubt, justifying the conviction.( Para 13)

The unlawful assembly, comprising at least five accused, including the appellants, had a common object to attack and cause harm to the complainant party. The motive was linked to the appellant-accused 'M's pursuit of a rape and murder case. The assembly's actions constituted an unlawful assembly, engaging in rioting with deadly weapons and causing grievous bodily injuries.( Para 14)

FACTS:

The respondent floated tenders for the execution of work on a water treatment plant.

Three work orders were assigned to the appellant on different dates.

The contracts had a common arbitration clause, and the appellant claimed non-payment under the contracts.

The respondent delayed responding to the appellant's representations regarding outstanding payments.

The appellant approached the Settlement Committee, and after no response, requested the appointment of an arbitrator in 2002.

ISSUES:

Whether the Arbitration Applications were barred by limitation?

Applicability of the 1940 Act or the 1996 Act to the Arbitration Applications.

HELD:

The court addressed the facts, issues, and background of the case, leading to the appeals from the High Court's judgment dismissing the Arbitration Applications.( Paragraphs 1-4)

The court discussed the applicability of the 1940 Act or the 1996 Act, emphasizing the commencement of arbitral proceedings as per Section 21 of the 1996 Act.( Paragraphs 5-6)

The court examined the limitation under Section 43 of the 1996 Act and applied principles from relevant precedents to determine the starting point for the limitation period.( Paragraphs 7-8)

The court discussed the negotiation history between parties and clarified the need to plead and place on record such history for determining the "breaking point" when settlement becomes impossible.( Paragraphs 9-11)

The court found an element of mala fide conduct in the appellant's case and held that the Arbitration Applications were barred by limitation.( Paragraph 12)

REFERRED CASES:

Decided on : 03-09-2019

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11(6), 43(3), 85, 21, 85(2)(a), 43, 43(1), 43(3) - Arbitration Act, 1940 - Section 8(2) - Contract Act, 1872 - Section 28 - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 114(g) - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Payment of dues - Appointment of arbitrator - Appellant’s own default in sleeping over his right for 14 years will not constitute a case of ‘undue hardship’ justifying extension of time under Section 43(3) of the 1996 Act or show ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act - Appellant should have approached the Court for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8(2) of the 1940 Act within the appropriate limitation period - This Court agree with the High Court’s observation that the entire dispute seems concocted so as to pursue a monetary claim against the respondents, taking advantage of the provisions of the 1996 Act - Appeal dismissed.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Mr. S.D. Singh, Advocate, Mrs. Bharti Tyagi, Advocate, Mr. Jitender Singh, Advocate, Mr. Ram Kripal Singh, Advocate, Ms. Shweta Sinha, Advocate and Mr. Vishwajit Singh, Advocate, for the Appellant; Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advocate, for the Respondent.

Cases Referred

Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2001) 6 SCC 356

Grasim Industries Limited vs. State of Kerala, (2018) 14 SCC 265

Hari Shankar Singhania and Others vs. Gaur Hari Singhania and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 658

Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi vs. Delhi Development Authority, (1988) 2 SCC 338

Milkfood Ltd. vs. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd, (2004) 7 SCC 288

Panchu Gopal Bose vs. Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta, (1993) 4 SCC 338

Shetty's Constructions Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Konkan Railway Construction and Another, (1998) 5 SCC 599

Shree Ram Mills Ltd. vs. Utility Premises (P) Ltd., (2007) 4 SCC 599

State of Orissa and Another vs. Damodar Das, (1996) 2 SCC 216

Sunder Kukreja and Others vs. Mohan Lal Kukreja and Anr., (2009) 4 SCC 585

Union of India vs. Momin Construction Company, (1997) 9 SCC 97

Facts:

The dispute originated in 1987 when the appellants' predecessor filed an application seeking a declaration that "Bakers Choultry" is his private property. A rock inscription within the choultry indicated its management by the community of bakers for the benefit of others, with restrictions on alienation. The predecessor had previously claimed the choultry to be a "specific endowment" in earlier proceedings but later withdrew the application.

Issues:

Whether "Bakers Choultry" qualifies as a specific endowment under the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act.

The validity of the rock inscription and its implications on the choultry's status.

Held:

The court held that the "Bakers Choultry" and its rock inscription constitute a "specific endowment" as defined under the Act. The rock inscription, providing for the feeding of Brahmins during religious festivals, qualifies as a religious charity. The court rejected arguments of vagueness and secular nature, emphasizing divestment of the right to receive income. The predecessor's inconsistent claims were deemed disingenuous.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision that the "Bakers Choultry" is a specific endowment under the Act and not the private property of the appellants. The court provided a detailed analysis of the relevant legal provisions and previous decisions related to religious endowments.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by Uber India Systems Pvt. Ltd. against the Competition Commission of India. The appellant was alleged to be abusing its dominant position in the relevant market, particularly in the National Capital Region (NCR), by offering unreasonably high incentives to drivers, resulting in a loss per trip.

Issues:

The primary issue is whether Uber's actions constitute an abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. The court also considered the definition of 'dominant position' as per Explanation (a), predatory pricing under Section 4(2)(a), and other relevant provisions.

Held:

The court decided not to interfere with the appeals based on the information provided, specifically a statement indicating that Uber was incurring a loss of Rs. 204 per trip for certain cars in its network. The court observed that this information prima facie suggests an abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.

In reaching this decision, the court referred to the definition of 'dominant position' in Explanation (a), which involves a position of strength enabling an enterprise to operate independently of competitive forces or affect competitors or the market in its favor. The court also noted that if an enterprise is making a loss for trips made, it could prima facie fall under the definition of abuse of dominant position.

The court emphasized the prohibition of unfair prices, including predatory pricing, under Section 4(2)(a). If a dominant position directly or indirectly imposes an unfair price, abuse of dominant position is attracted.

The appeals were dismissed with no orders as to costs, and the Director General was requested to complete the investigation within six months from the date of the judgment.

Facts:

The appellant, Union of India, challenges the impugned judgments based on an alleged error in applying the precedent of Madishetti Bala Ramul case to the National Highways Act. The argument hinges on the distinction between the Land Acquisition Act and the National Highways Act, particularly in the context of awards made by competent authorities.

Issues:

Whether the judgment erroneously applied the Madishetti Bala Ramul precedent, which is specific to the Land Acquisition Act, to the National Highways Act.

The nature and challengeability of awards made by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act and the contrasting scheme under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act.

Held:

After considering the arguments presented by both sides, the Court holds that the impugned judgments are incorrect. The Court emphasizes the distinction between the Land Acquisition Act and the National Highways Act regarding the challengeability of awards. Under the Land Acquisition Act, an award made by the Land Acquisition Officer is considered an offer on behalf of the government and cannot be challenged by the government (Section 25). In contrast, the scheme under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act allows the amount determined by the competent authority to be challenged through arbitration.

The Court decides to set aside the impugned judgments and remand the cases to be decided under Section 37 jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act by the Punjab & Haryana High Court. The Chief Justice of the Punjab & Haryana High Court is requested to constitute a bench to hear related matters at the earliest. The appeals are allowed.

Facts:

Appellant, Ex-Sepoy Ram Khilawan, discharged on August 31, 1993, due to "CNS (IN) Seizure."

Discharge under Rule 13(3)(III)(iii) of Army Rules, 1954, for medical unfitness, not under residual clause (v).

Discharge proceeded without reference to Invalidating Medical Board.

Issues:

Whether the discharge of the appellant adhered to the prescribed procedure under Army Rules?

Applicability of Rule 13(3)(III)(v) in the discharge.

Held:

The discharge of the appellant was not under the residual clause (v) but under clause (iii) of Rule 13(3)(III) of the Army Rules. As the discharge was solely based on medical unfitness, it required adherence to the procedure laid down in Rule 13. Since the discharge proceeded without reference to the Invalidating Medical Board, it was deemed legally unsustainable.

The appellant, in accordance with General Principles of Army Order 46 of 1980, is entitled to be retained for ten years, and he would be deemed to be discharged only on October 22, 1997. Consequently, the appellant became entitled to pension, in addition to the disability pension granted for a period of five years. However, no arrears of salary were granted for the period up to the date of discharge due to "no work, no pay." Arrears of pension for a period of three years prior to filing the Writ Petition were directed to be paid to the appellant within six months from the date of the order.