Facts:

The appeals stemmed from judgments of the High Court of Delhi where an independent arbitrator was appointed for disputes between the parties instead of adhering to Clause 64 of the General Conditions of Contract, as per the agreement.

Issues:

The High Court's decision to appoint an independent arbitrator, deviating from the agreement's stipulation under Clause 64.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that when an agreement specifically provides for the appointment of named arbitrators, the appointment should adhere to the agreement's terms. The High Court erred in appointing an independent arbitrator, disregarding Clause 64 of the General Conditions of Contract.

In the judgment, the Court explicitly states, "When the agreement specifically provides for the appointment of named arbitrators, the appointment should be in terms of the agreement. The High Court, in our view, was not right in appointing an independent arbitrator ignoring Clause 64 of the General Conditions of Contract."( Para No. 15)

The Court further directed, "The appellant is directed to appoint the arbitrator in terms of Clause 64(3) of the agreement within a period of one month from today under intimation to the respondents-contractors."( Para No. 16)

Facts:

The respondent, M/S. Krishna Wax (P) Ltd., faced a search at its registered office and factory premises. Allegations included manufacturing activities without proper procedures and clearing excise duty. A writ petition was filed, contesting the department's authority, claiming no manufacturing activity.

Issues:

The jurisdiction of the Department to proceed with the matter. The respondent contended that the notice was invalid as the preliminary objection was not decided.

Held:

The High Court directed the Department to decide the preliminary objection before addressing other issues. An Internal Order dated 15.03.2006 was issued, stating the jurisdiction to proceed. However, the Act doesn't mandate such prima facie determinations. The Department's decision not to communicate the Internal Order independently was justified.

Decision: The appellate order and the Tribunal's decision were set aside. Proceedings based on the show cause notice were directed to a logical conclusion. The respondent was given three weeks to respond, presenting materials supporting its case. The matter would proceed in accordance with the law.

FACTS:

The Appellant trust had acquired flats from the Respondent for the purpose of providing hostel facilities to nurses employed by the trust's hospital. Due to alleged poor building quality, the structure became dilapidated, and the trust vacated the flats in 2002. The trust filed a complaint seeking compensation for annual loss of rent, cost of reconstruction, and future loss of rent.

ISSUES:

Whether the Appellant trust qualifies as a 'consumer' under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?

Whether the complaint is barred by limitation?

HELD:

The court held that the Appellant trust is a 'consumer' under Section 2(1)(d) for the specific transaction. The purchase of flats for providing accommodation to nurses does not qualify as a 'commercial purpose.' The court rejected the argument that the hostel facilities were indirectly connected to the commercial purpose of the hospital's operation. The court remanded the matter to the National Commission for further consideration.

REFERRED CASES:

Cheema Engineering Services vs. Rajan Singh, (1997) 1 SCC 131

Kalpavruksha Charitable Trust vs. Toshniwal Brothers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 512

Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, (1995) 3 SCC 583

Paramount Digital Colour Lab vs. Agfa India Private Limited, (2018) 14 SCC 81

Spring Meadows Hospital vs. Harjol Ahluwalia through K.S. Ahluwalia, I (1998) CPJ 1

Synco Textiles Pvt. Ltd. vs. Greaves Cotton and Company Limited, (1991) 1 CPJ 499

Facts:

The testator executed a Will bequeathing immovable property to his eldest daughter. Probate was obtained 20 years later with no objection certificates attached. Subsequently, a partition suit was filed by the younger daughter against the eldest daughter, claiming the property was gifted by the mother. The partition suit was dismissed, and the property was later sold by legal heirs of the eldest daughter. The appellant, daughter of the testator's younger daughter, filed for the revocation of probate.

Issues:

Delay in filing the revocation application.

Lack of citation to the younger daughter in probate proceedings.

Genuineness of the no objection certificates.

Alleged lack of awareness of probate proceedings by the appellant.

Held:

The High Court erred in concluding there was inordinate delay without establishing prior knowledge of probate proceedings by the appellant. No finding supports the assertion of filing with inordinate delay.( Para 20)

No delay can be imputed to the appellant, who filed the revocation application promptly after inspecting PLA records in 2011.( Para 21)

Probate of an unregistered Will was granted without issuing citations to legal heirs, raising questions about procedural adherence.( Para 25)

Rule 5A requires the mention of family members in probate applications. Rule 9 mandates citation to rightful parties, but it is specified for letters of administration, not probate.( Para 27)

Section 283 confers discretion on the District Judge to issue citations. While discretion exists, it must be exercised with care based on case specifics.( Para 31)

Probate proceedings lacked cautious consideration, relying on notarized no objection certificates without proper verification.( Para 34)

The suit for partition filed in 1984 did not reference the Will or probate proceedings, casting doubt on the alleged consent given in probate by the younger daughter.( Para 35)

The Single Judge erred in not issuing a citation to the younger daughter and mechanically granting probate without verifying the genuineness of no objection certificates.( Para 36)

The High Court's order is set aside, and the application for revocation is allowed. The probate is revoked, reviving the PLA application before the Single Judge.( Para 39)

The High Court's decisions only pertain to the revocation proceedings. The matter should be considered concerning the appellant's application for revocation.( Para 40)

Facts:

The plaintiff purchased a property where the predecessors of defendants No.1 and 2 were tenants. After the purchase, defendants No.1 and 2 continued as tenants. The plaintiff, through a communication dated 06.12.1986, informed defendants No.1 and 2 about the purchase, seeking payment of rents. Upon the defendants' failure to pay, the plaintiff initiated a civil suit for eviction.

Issues:

Defendants No.1 and 2 contended that, following the death of the original tenant, the two sisters, legal heirs, were not made defendants. Additionally, they argued that the suit property was agricultural, falling under the MTAL Act, and the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction.

Held:

The Trial Court and the Appellate Court assessed the evidence and recorded findings based on oral evidence and documents. The finding that defendants No.1 and 2 were defaulters and not entitled to continue as tenants was not considered perverse.

The claim of the two sisters to be considered as tenants under the statutory tenant was deemed belated, lacking support in the evidence. The sisters did not take steps in earlier proceedings to establish their rights.

The contention that the suit property was agricultural and governed by the MTAL Act was dismissed. No document indicated that the MTAL Act's procedure was followed, and the claim of the predecessor of defendants No.1 and 2 becoming the landlord by operation of law was unsubstantiated.

The executing court, considering the order of the High Court, rejected the claim that the suit property was agricultural, and the entry in the 7/12 extract was not sufficient evidence.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 13-B of the Rent Act and its extension to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The matter arose from the Notification dated 09.10.2009, issued under Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act, extending Section 13-B and related sections.

Issues:

The validity of the extension, the legislative competence of the State Legislature of Punjab, and the reasonability of Section 13-B. The classification of Non-Resident Indian landlords as a separate category and its compliance with Article 14 were also contested.

Held:

The court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 13-B and its extension to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It affirmed that the extension fell within the ambit of conditional delegation and was valid. The challenge based on excessive delegation, separation of powers, and the law of agency was rejected.( Para 1-18)

The court discussed the legislative competence of the State Legislature of Punjab, emphasizing that the Amendment Act was well within its scope. The power to extend laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, as per Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act, rested with the Central Government, and it was deemed permissible.( Para 19-28)

Addressing the reasonability of Section 13-B, the court emphasized the statutory safeguards and checks in place. It highlighted the restrictions and conditions imposed on landlords seeking eviction, ensuring the genuineness of their need and preventing frivolous evictions.( Para 29-38)

The court dismissed the argument that Section 13-B created an arbitrary classification, stating that it was not unconstitutional under Article 14. It reasoned that the legislation aimed to balance the rights of Non-Resident Indian landlords and tenants through specific policy objectives.( Para 39-44)

The court concluded by rejecting the challenges to the classification, affirming the constitutionality of Section 13-B.( Para 45)

FACTS:

The Commissioner of Police, Aurangabad, passed an order to detain the respondent as a 'dangerous person' under Sections 3(1) and (2) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act. The State Government approved the order, and it was challenged by the respondent before the High Court, which quashed and set aside the detention order on the ground that the specified 12-month detention period was in breach of Section 3 of the Act.

ISSUES:

The interpretation of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act and whether mentioning a 12-month detention period in the order rendered it contrary to the Act.

HELD:

Interpretation of Section 3(2): The Court clarified that Section 3(2) relates to the period for which the order of delegation issued by the State Government is to remain in force and has no relevance to the period of detention. The legislature entrusted the power of detention to the State Government, allowing delegation for a maximum period of three months initially.

Validity of Detention Order: The Court emphasized that neither Section 3 nor Section 13 of the Act mandates the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained. Quoting T. Devaki vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, the Court stated, "the Act does not require the detaining authority to specify the period for which a detenu is required to be detained."

High Court's Error: The High Court's finding that the 12-month detention period in the order is contrary to Section 3 of the Act was deemed incorrect. The Court held that the High Court had misinterpreted Section 3(2) and set aside the decision on this ground.

Directions Issued by High Court: The Court deemed the directions issued by the High Court, including those related to legal aid, as unwarranted and set them aside.

REFERRED CASES:

T. Devaki vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1990) 2 SCC 456

Facts:

Multiple Writ Petitions (Civil) challenging the order of the Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, under Article 32. The petitioners, Karnataka MLAs, faced disqualification. The primary contention was the maintainability of the Writ Petition directly under Article 32.

Issues:

Whether the Writ Petition challenging the Speaker's order under Article 32 is maintainable?

The impact of resignation on disqualification.

The Speaker's discretion to reject resignations.

Held:

Establishes the importance of Article 32, an integral part of the Constitution, and emphasizes that Parliament cannot abrogate or take away its jurisdiction. Highlights the duty of all constitutional functionaries to adhere to their constitutionally circumscribed powers.

Petitioners challenged the order directly under Article 32, bypassing the judicial hierarchy. Acknowledges the Court's jurisdiction but advises parties to approach the High Court first, ensuring a considered verdict. Analysis of the extent of judicial review postponed.

Disqualification and resignation issues addressed. Disqualification relates back to the act of defection; resignation does not vaporize disqualification. Even if resigned, pending disqualification actions not impacted.

Legislator's right to resign highlighted. The 33rd Constitutional Amendment requires the Speaker's acceptance for a seat to become vacant. Speaker's limited discretion in rejecting resignations discussed.

Discussion on Speaker's discretion to reject resignations under Article 190(3)(b). The 33rd Constitutional Amendment confers discretion but limited to cases where the Speaker is not satisfied that the resignation is voluntary or genuine.

Defines "genuine" and "voluntary" in the context of resignation. Speaker's satisfaction based on objective material and subject to judicial review. Extraneous factors not permissible.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal by the Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India, against Subhash Chandra Agarwal. The matter was heard by a Constitution Bench comprising Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi and Justices N.V. Ramana, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Deepak Gupta, and Sanjiv Khanna.

Issues:

The primary issues addressed in this judgment include whether the office of the Chief Justice of India falls under the definition of a "public authority" as per the Right to Information Act, the interplay between transparency and judicial independence, and the application of the public interest test.

Held:

Office of Chief Justice as Public Authority (Para A): The judgment holds that the office of the Chief Justice of India is a public authority under the Right to Information Act, and the Chief Justice holds information pertaining to asset declarations in his capacity as Chief Justice. It establishes that the office is covered by the provisions of the Act.

Transparency and Judicial Independence (Para B): The judgment emphasizes that transparency does not undermine judicial independence. It asserts that judicial independence and accountability are interconnected, with accountability being a facet of judicial independence.

Public Interest Test (Para C): Justice Sanjiv Khanna delves into the public interest test, stating that the disclosure of information should depend on an authentic inquiry into whether the right to access and know outweighs the public interest in protecting privacy or third-party harm. It emphasizes that public interest is not fixed, requiring a case-specific assessment.

Independence of Judiciary (Para D): Justice N.V. Ramana discusses the expectation of privacy, factors influencing it, and considerations for assessing "public interest" under Section 8 of the RTI Act. The judgment clarifies that judicial independence does not mean insulation from the rule of law and recognizes the vital public interest in disclosing the basis for judicial appointments.

Assets Declaration and Public Confidence (Para Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud): Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud clarifies that the information sought regarding judges' assets does not constitute "personal information" engaging the right to privacy. It emphasizes the public interest in disclosing criteria for judicial appointments to foster public confidence and fulfill the mandate of the RTI Act.