Facts:

The case involved four agreements related to the commissioning of a Photovoltaic Solar Plant. Two agreements were with M/s. 'JI' dated 01.02.2012, one with appellant no.2 dated 05.03.2012, and another with appellant no.3 dated 14.03.2012. All agreements contained arbitration clauses except the one dated 05.03.2012. Disputes arose regarding default in rent payment by appellant no.3 and fraud allegations against appellant no.2.

Issues:

Whether the agreements are interconnected and subject to arbitration?

Can arbitration be refused based on the seriousness of fraud allegations?

Are directives needed for lease rental payments?

Held:

The court held that all four agreements were interconnected, forming a single commercial project. The main agreement dated 14.03.2012 was identified as the principal agreement, while the others were ancillary.

Arbitration cannot be refused solely based on the seriousness of fraud allegations unless they are significant. In this case, the allegations were not deemed serious enough to reject arbitration.

Directives were issued for appellant no.3 to pay lease rentals as per the terms of the Equipment Lease Agreement and for future lease rentals.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal, referring all four agreements and involved parties to arbitration. Appellants were directed to pay lease rentals and future lease rentals for the equipment as per the terms of the Equipment Lease Agreement.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over a piece of land between M/S Eureka Builders (the appellants) and the legal representatives of Gulabchand s/o Veljee Dand (the respondents). The land, originally belonging to three individuals (referred to as three PATIL), was sold through Court Auction proceedings in 1942 and through direct purchase in 1943 to Shah Veljee Kanjee. Legal battles ensued regarding the ownership of the land, with Shah Veljee Kanjee's legal representatives ultimately being recognized as the rightful owners. Appellants, claiming through three PATIL, contested the suit filed by Shah Veljee Kanjee's legal representatives for partition and possession of the land.

Issues:

Whether the respondents proved their subsisting title over the land at the time of filing the suit.

Whether the appellants, claiming through original holders (three PATIL), established their right to the land.

The effect of re-grant orders made by the State in favor of original holders (three PATIL) in 1973.

Held:

The Court held that the respondents had established their subsisting title over the land, while the appellants failed to prove their claim through original holders (three PATIL).

The Court emphasized the principle that a person can only transfer rights in property which they themselves possess. It was found that the rights of original holders (three PATIL) were extinguished due to their failure to file suit within the limitation period, as per the Limitation Act.

Additionally, the Court rejected the appellants' argument regarding re-grant orders, stating that the rights of original holders were extinguished by efflux of time. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court.

Facts:

The State Public Service Commission advertised posts of School Lecturers for various subjects under the Secondary Education Department. After conducting the examination, the Commission published answer keys and invited objections from candidates. Certain candidates, including the appellants, raised objections regarding the correctness of certain questions. The Supreme Court directed a re-examination of specific questions by experts. An Expert Committee was constituted for this purpose.

Issues:

Whether the objections raised by the appellants regarding certain questions were satisfactorily addressed by the Expert Committee?

Whether the Commission should revise the entire result of all candidates or only of those who approached the Court?

Held:

The Expert Committee satisfactorily addressed all objections raised by the appellants regarding certain questions. The Commission accepted the report of the Expert Committee and revised the result of 311 appellants accordingly. Therefore, the Expert Committee's report, which has been accepted by the Commission, needs to be implemented.

The Commission should revise the entire result of all candidates (except those already selected) based on the corrected key answers. Candidates who appeared in the examination and whose key answers were correct are entitled to have their results revised. It would be inequitable not to extend this benefit to candidates who did not approach the Court but relied on the actions taken by the Commission and its Expert Committee.

Decision: The Court directed the Commission to revise the results of all candidates (except those selected) based on the corrected key answers and publish the revised results for all candidates.

Facts:

The Lingam at the Mahakaleshwar Jyotirlinga temple in Ujjain has been experiencing erosion due to water and impure materials used in rituals.

A writ petition and application were filed seeking directions for the preservation of the Lingam and the appointment of an Expert Committee.

An Expert Committee comprising members from ASI/GSI was constituted by the court to investigate the deterioration of the Lingam and propose conservation measures.

The Expert Committee submitted a report highlighting the causes of deterioration and providing recommendations for remedial measures.

The temple committee passed resolutions to protect and preserve the Lingam, including restrictions on certain materials used in rituals and improvements in sanitation and water quality.

Issues:

Whether the court's intervention is warranted to ensure the preservation of the Lingam without interfering with religious rituals.

How to balance the significance of religious practices with the imperative to protect cultural heritage and ancient monuments.

Held:

The court clarified that its intervention aims to ensure the preservation of the Lingam without interfering with religious rituals.

The Expert Committee's report highlighted the deterioration of the Lingam and provided recommendations for conservation measures.

The temple committee resolved to implement measures to protect and preserve the Lingam, including restrictions on certain materials used in rituals.

The court emphasized the importance of preserving the Lingam while respecting religious practices and avoiding further damage.

The temple committee was directed to prepare a concrete plan for further improvement, including modernizing facilities and manufacturing pure offering materials.

Decision: The court disposed of the appeal, directing the temple committee to implement the resolutions and recommendations for the preservation of the Lingam. It also instructed ASI/GSI teams to submit a follow-up report on improvements made. Any misreporting of the court's orders would be viewed seriously.

Facts:

The case involved a search conducted by the Income Tax Department at the premises of the assessee and a related business entity, M/s. ECIL. During the search, evidence was found indicating that the assessee had made a cash payment of Rs. 95.16 lakhs to M/s. ECIL, which was not accounted for.

Issues:

Whether the cash payment discovered during the search should be included in the block assessment as undisclosed income.

Held:

The court analyzed relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, particularly Section 158BB, which governs the computation of undisclosed income for block assessments. It was emphasized that undisclosed income for the block period should be based solely on evidence found during the search or related proceedings. The power of survey under Section 133A allows for the collection of evidence at connected premises, which can be utilized in block assessments. The court referred to precedents, including the decision in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Hotel Blue Moon, to highlight the purpose and scope of block assessments.

The court concluded that the cash payment discovered during the search could be included in the block assessment. It was noted that evidence found during a search or survey, even if conducted at related premises, can be used in block assessments. The decision was based on a strict interpretation of relevant provisions and precedents.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeals filed by the Revenue, setting aside the orders of the High Court and restoring the orders passed by the Assessing Officer for block assessment. However, it was mentioned that the parties would bear their own costs.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by the accused, Murugan, against his conviction for offenses under Sections 364 and 302/34 of the IPC.

Murugan and another individual named Kumar were accused of kidnapping and murdering Murugan's uncle.

Kumar died before the trial, and thus, only Murugan's case proceeded.

The prosecution presented circumstantial evidence linking Murugan to the crime, including his presence with Kumar and the victim on the night of the incident.

Issues:

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to uphold Murugan's conviction.

Whether Murugan's denial of involvement without offering any explanation for the circumstances against him affects the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after reviewing the evidence and legal arguments, upheld Murugan's conviction. The Court emphasized the importance of circumstantial evidence and the theory of "accused last seen in the company of the deceased" as strong circumstances against the accused.

The Court found that Murugan's presence with Kumar and the victim, along with other circumstantial evidence, established a chain of events leading to a strong conclusion against him. Murugan's failure to explain the circumstances against him further supported his conviction.

Therefore, the Court dismissed Murugan's appeal, affirming his conviction for the offenses charged.

Facts:

The appellant, Union of India, challenged an arbitration award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The respondent raised a jurisdictional objection, arguing that Indian courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's application.

The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appellant's application, and the Division Bench upheld the decision.

The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court, which identified the central question regarding the determination of the "seat" and "venue" of arbitration proceedings when only the venue is specified in the arbitration agreement.

Issues:

Whether Indian courts have jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

How to determine the "seat" and "venue" of arbitration proceedings when only the venue is specified in the arbitration agreement.

Held:

The Supreme Court refrained from making findings on the issues raised in the appeal and decided to refer the case to a larger bench for further consideration. It exercised its power under Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, to refer the case to a larger bench due to the complexity and importance of the legal question regarding arbitration agreements.

Therefore, the Court did not provide a definitive ruling on the jurisdictional question or the determination of the "seat" and "venue" of arbitration proceedings. Instead, it left these matters to be addressed by the appropriate larger bench.

Facts:

The appellant and the respondents had entered into a Partnership Agreement dated 09.11.2005, which included Clause 15 stating that disputes would be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. When a dispute arose, the appellant sought to refer the matter to arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("1996 Act"). The trial court and the High Court rejected the application, citing the reference to the 1940 Act in the partnership agreement.

Issues:

Whether an arbitration clause referring to the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, in a partnership agreement executed after the enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, would be governed by the 1996 Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that if arbitral proceedings had not commenced before the enactment of the 1996 Act, the 1996 Act would govern the arbitration proceedings, regardless of any reference to the 1940 Act in the arbitration agreement. The court emphasized the importance of the parties' agreement to refer disputes to arbitration and held that incorrect references to previous arbitration acts would not invalidate the arbitration agreement.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the lower courts and allowed the appeal, directing the matter to be dealt with by the trial court under the provisions of the 1996 Act. The parties were directed to appear before the trial court for effectuating the arbitration agreement.

Facts:

The State of Kerala imposed guidelines limiting consideration of applications for CBSE affiliation, including requirements of minimum land area and student enrollment.

Legal challenges were raised by school managements against these guidelines.

The case was brought before the Supreme Court as Special Leave Petition Nos. 18475-18476 of 2013.

Issues:

Whether the guidelines imposed by the State of Kerala on schools seeking CBSE affiliation were arbitrary and lacking a rational basis.

Whether the guidelines were consistent with the CBSE Affiliation Bye-laws and other relevant regulations.

Held:

The requirement of a minimum of 3 acres of land for obtaining an NOC for CBSE affiliation, as imposed by Kerala, was arbitrary and lacked a rational basis.

Similarly, the mandate of a minimum enrollment of 300 students for schools seeking CBSE affiliation was also found to be arbitrary and not supported by any rational nexus with quality education or CBSE bye-laws.

The Court emphasized the need for flexibility and pragmatic considerations in education regulations, contrasting Kerala's inflexible requirements with the CBSE's approach.

For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these petitions which are accordingly dismissed. The interim applications stand disposed of.