Facts:

The Roads and Buildings Department of the State of Telangana floated a tender for the construction of a BT Road.

The tender conditions required bidders to own a "Batch Type Hot Mix Plant" within 100 kilometers from the last point of working reach.

The appellant and the fourth respondent participated in the tender process, submitting necessary documents.

Dispute arose regarding the distance of the Hot Mix Plant owned by the appellant, leading to a complaint by the fourth respondent.

Chief Engineer, in response to the complaint, called for verification reports from Superintending Engineers in different regions.

Issues:

The re-verification of the distance of the Hot Mix Plant, as contested by the fourth respondent.

Whether the Chief Engineer's actions, including seeking reports from independent authorities, were in accordance with the tender conditions and legal procedures.

Held:

The learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the re-verification undertaken by the Chief Engineer was not illegal, as there were no specific mala fides against any individual. The judge observed that the tender conditions permitted objections, and the authorities acted reasonably in getting re-verification done based on a complaint. The learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition.

The Division Bench, however, found fault with the report of the Superintending Engineer, Warangal, and criticized the Chief Engineer for seeking a second report from the Superintending Engineer, Karimnagar, outside the jurisdiction. The Division Bench allowed the intra court appeal, directing the award of the work based on the report submitted by the Superintending Engineer, Warangal.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnal, and Carpet India, Panipat, regarding the interpretation of Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant contends that supporting manufacturers should be treated on par with direct exporters for the purpose of claiming deductions under Section 80HHC.

Issues:

Whether supporting manufacturers are entitled to deductions under Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, and if so, whether their eligibility is on par with direct exporters.

The court also considers the applicability of previous judgments, including Commissioner of Income Tax, Thiruvananthapuram vs. Baby Marine Exports, Kollam.

Held:

The court highlights the distinct parameters and schemes for claiming deductions under Section 80HHC for exporters (Section 80HHC(1)) and supporting manufacturers (Section 80HHC(1A)). The court emphasizes that the statutory scheme treats these entities differently.( Para 5)

The court overturns the decision in C.I.T. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, stating that it cannot be relied upon to conclude that supporting manufacturers are to be treated on par with direct exporters for the purpose of deduction under Section 80HHC.( Para 6)

The court allows the appeals in favor of the Revenue, setting aside the impugned judgments. In certain cases, the respondents are given the opportunity to demonstrate, with necessary facts, that they qualify as direct exporters and can avail of deductions under Section 80HHC(1) read with (3). These matters are remanded to the Appellate Tribunal for further consideration.( Para 7)

Facts:

The plaintiffs claimed half of the suit property and sought a declaration of rightful ownership, confirmation of possession, and correction of the entry in the Record of Rights. Despite the specific claim for half the property, the Additional Deputy Commissioner decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs based on the majority award of the Panchayat. The appellate authority and the Single Judge upheld the decision, and the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court was called upon to consider the applicability and validity of Wilkinson's Rules and the Bihar Kolhan Civil Justice (Regulating and Validating) Act, 1978.

Issues:

The validity of Wilkinson's Rules, the correctness of the decree awarding more than half the property, and the applicability of the Bihar Kolhan Civil Justice Act.

Held:

Applicability of Wilkinson's Rules: The court found it unnecessary to delve into the applicability and validity of Wilkinson's Rules for two reasons.

Claim for Half Property: The court observed that the plaintiffs claimed only half of the suit property. As the decree awarded more than this, the court held that it needed to be set aside to the extent that it exceeded the claim.

Bihar Kolhan Civil Justice Act: The court considered Section 2 of the Bihar Kolhan Civil Justice Act, validating past actions under Wilkinson's Rules and concluded that, given the Act's provisions, it was difficult to set aside the concurrent judgments based on Wilkinson's Rules.

Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of in accordance with the findings, emphasizing the need to set aside the decree exceeding the plaintiffs' claim for half the property.

Facts:

Arbitration proceedings initiated based on an agreement dated 28th April 2000.

Dispute arose regarding the time limit for the conclusion of arbitral proceedings.

Appellants argued that the arbitrator's mandate terminated as per the agreement's time limit.

High Court held that the appellants waived their right to an extension of time.

Issues:

Whether the time limit specified in the arbitration agreement is binding.

Whether the appellants waived their right to enforce the time schedule.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the time limit agreed upon in the arbitration agreement is binding. The court emphasized the importance of parties adhering to agreed-upon time limits in arbitration proceedings. As per Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the terms of the agreement, after the expiry of four months, the arbitrator became unable to perform the functions, and the mandate stood terminated. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. The respondents were given the liberty to address their grievances through appropriate legal avenues.

Facts:

Appellant Khuman Singh convicted under Section 302 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act.

Deceased Veer Singh, belonging to "Khangar" Scheduled Caste, objected to the appellant grazing buffaloes in his field, leading to a verbal altercation.

Appellant attacked the deceased with an axe during the altercation, causing his death.

Appellant sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court, affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the conviction under Section 302 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act.

Consideration of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC regarding sudden fight without premeditation.

Held:

The court found no evidence to establish that the offense was committed solely on the grounds of the victim belonging to a Scheduled Caste.

Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act set aside; appellant acquitted of this charge.

Conviction under Section 302 IPC modified to Section 304 Part II IPC, considering the incident as a sudden fight without premeditation.

Appellant, having served more than twelve years in jail, sentenced to the period already undergone.

The appeal was partly allowed, and the appellant ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Facts:

A dispute over water distribution for agricultural fields was brought before the Authorities under the Rajasthan Irrigation and Drainage Act, 1954.

The Appellant lost before the Authority and subsequently filed a suit challenging the order, which was dismissed by the Trial Court.

The Appellant appealed to the First Appellate Court, which allowed the appeal. The private Respondents then filed a Second Appeal in the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide disputes related to watercourses under the Rajasthan Irrigation and Drainage Act, 1954.

Whether the High Court erred in its interpretation of Section 53 of the Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court found an error in the High Court's interpretation and clarified that Section 53(2) explicitly allows the Civil Court to entertain and decide disputes related to watercourses.

The Civil Court's jurisdiction is subject to the condition that it cannot pass orders regarding crops sown or growing at the time of the order.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the High Court for reconsideration on merits.

The Second Appeal would be treated as filed in 2008 and given priority accordingly.

FACTS:

Land was acquired for highway construction under the National Highways Act, 1956.

Disputes arose regarding the compensation determined by the competent authority under Section 3G(1) of the Act, 1956.

The respondent filed an application for the appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) to the Central Government.

The Central Government appointed an Arbitrator after the respondent filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996.

ISSUES:

Whether the application under Section 11 of the Act, 1996, is maintainable when Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 provides for the appointment of an Arbitrator by the Central Government.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the Act, 1956, being a special enactment, prevails over the Act, 1996. The power to appoint an Arbitrator is exclusively vested in the Central Government under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956. The Court rejected the argument that the right of appointment was forfeited due to delay. The orders of the High Court were set aside, and the Central Government was directed to appoint an Arbitrator within 30 days. The appointed Arbitrator was instructed to adjudicate the dispute within a reasonable time but no later than six months after the respondent's presence in the proceedings.

REFERRED CASES:

Deep Trading Company vs. Indian Oil Corporation and Others, 2013(4) SCC 35

Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. vs. Essar Power Limited, 2008(4) SCC 755

Facts:

Land leased to Govind, Sadashiv, and Nivrutti.

Agreement to Sell in 1956, not culminating in a sale deed.

Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy Act deems tenants as purchasers.

Certificate issued under Section 32M in favor of Govind, Sadashiv, and Nivrutti.

Disputes over mutation in Nivrutti's name contested by Laxman's family.

Suit filed in 2003 claiming joint family rights.

Issues:

Validity of joint family rights in the land.

Whether the civil court should stay proceedings and refer to the Mamlatdar under Section 85 and 85A.

Held:

The court rejected the contention that the civil court should have referred the matter to the Mamlatdar. It emphasized that the Kabuliyatnama did not include Laxman as a tenant, and the certificate under Section 32M did not include his name. There was no ambiguity about Laxman's tenancy rights. The legal proceedings initiated by Laxman's grandsons were deemed an attempt to re-open a matter that could not be directly challenged – the certificate under Section 32M. The appeal was dismissed.

FACTS:

Appellant filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 20.04.1993.

Appellant claimed readiness and willingness to perform, but the first defendant did not execute the sale deed.

Expert opinion on the signature's genuineness was sought, and Trial Court preferred attesting witnesses' testimony over the expert opinion.

High Court relied on expert opinion and dismissed the suit.

ISSUES:

Validity of the first defendant's signature on the agreement of sale.

Reliability of expert opinion versus attesting witnesses' testimony.

HELD:

The Court emphasized the relevance of an additional receipt (Ext. A-2) related to earnest money, bearing the first defendant's signature, which the High Court did not consider.( Para 12)

DW-3 (brother of the first defendant) identified the disputed signature of the first defendant on Ext. A-1, supporting the appellant's case. The Court gave weight to DW-3's testimony, being acquainted with the first defendant's handwriting.( Para 14)

The Court criticized the High Court for not assigning valid reasons for disbelieving the attesting witnesses and emphasized that expert evidence should be approached cautiously.( Para 15)

Flaws in the expert's report were pointed out, such as the use of signatures obtained after the filing of the suit for comparison, leading the Court to question the reliability of the entire report.( Para 16)

The Court held that the High Court wrongly observed that the plaintiff did not produce evidence of demanding performance after the agreement, clarifying that the filing of the suit suffices as per the Specific Relief Act.( Para 17)

REFERRED CASES:

Alamgir vs. State (NCT, Delhi), (2003) 1 SCC 21

Magan Bihari Lal vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210

Murari Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704

Ram Chandra and Ram Bharosey vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 381

S. Gopal Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 4 SCC 596

Shashi Kumar Banerjee vs. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529