Facts:The Municipal Council Neemuch invited tenders for the lease of a piece of land, and Mahadeo Real Estate emerged as the highest bidder. Objections were raised, leading the matter to the State Government for approval under Section 109 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipality Act, 1961.

Issues:

The Commissioner pointed out anomalies, including insufficient competition and the possibility of a bidder cartel.

The State Government re-examined the issue, authorized the Commissioner to make an appropriate decision, and directed the Municipal Council to invite fresh tenders.

Held:In the present case, the Commissioner acted rightly as a custodian of public property, pointing out anomalies and ensuring larger public interest. The State Government re-examined the issue and authorized the Commissioner appropriately.

The High Court's interference in the absence of illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety was improper. The Commissioner and State Government's actions were legal, proper, and in the public interest.

The decision set aside by the High Court was in larger public interest, ensuring the Municipal Council's higher revenue by enlarging competition. The State Government's authorization to the Commissioner was valid and legal.

The High Court failed to consider relevant material and wrongly concluded that the decision of the authorities was not in the public interest. The Supreme Court, finding no such parameters for interference, allowed the appeals and quashed the High Court orders.

Facts:

Advertisement No. 3 of 2010 was published for seven posts of Assistant Professor.

None of the candidates were appointed to the posts.

Advertisement No. 3 of 2011 was published for six posts of Assistant Professor.

The appellant and the writ petitioner were applicants in both advertisements.

The writ petitioner challenged the appointment of the appellant, alleging a lack of credit for "publications."

The High Court directed the University to add five marks for "publications" to the writ petitioner's score.

Issues:

Fairness and reasonableness of the selection process.

Whether the writ petitioner was wrongly denied marks for "publications."

Held:

The Court held that the selection process conducted by the University was not fair and reasonable. It directed the University to re-examine the selection process by constituting an Expert Committee. This Committee would consider the "publications" of the candidates from advertisement No. 3 of 2011, making suitable recommendations and creating a joint merit list for all categories. The appointments of candidates already selected were not to be disturbed, except for the appellant, whose appointment was subject to the University's decision based on the Expert Committee's recommendations. The Court hoped that the University would finalize the revised selections within six months.

Facts:

Appellant entered into an Agreement to purchase the property for Rs. 50 lakhs, paying an advance of Rs. 1 lakh.

Appellant relied on the approval of a Rs. 50 lakhs loan by ICICI, subject to execution of an Agreement to Sell on a stamp paper of Rs. 50/-, which was not done.

Trial Court dismissed the suit, finding the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness.

High Court affirmed, emphasizing self-serving statements without supporting evidence.

Issues:

Whether the appellant proved readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

Validity of the dismissal of the suit by lower courts.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments, held:

Mere bank assessment for a loan on another property was insufficient proof of financial capacity.

Approval of the loan was conditional on executing an Agreement to Sell, which was not fulfilled.

Appellant's self-serving statements about financial capacity without evidence were insufficient.

The appeals were dismissed, upholding lower court findings.

The Court ordered the return of Rs. 3.5 crores deposited by the appellant with accrued interest.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Appellants, colleges and associations, contended that NGOs were not covered under the Act, and the Act intended to cover only government and its instrumentalities.

The key question was whether non-governmental organizations substantially financed by the appropriate government could be considered a 'public authority' under the Act.

Issues:

Whether NGOs substantially financed by the appropriate government fall within the definition of 'public authority' under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Held:

The Court analyzed Section 2(h) carefully, distinguishing between the first and second parts of the definition.The first part covers authorities, bodies, or institutions of self-government established or constituted in specific ways, while the second part includes bodies owned, controlled, or substantially financed by the appropriate government and non-governmental organizations substantially financed by the government.The inclusive clause in the second part expands the definition, indicating Parliament's intention to cover bodies beyond the four categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (d).( Para 16)

The Court held that an NGO substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by funds provided by the appropriate government would be a public authority under the Act.( Para 22)

'Substantial' was interpreted to mean a large portion, not necessarily more than 50%.The determination of substantial finance is a question of fact, considering both direct and indirect financing, evaluating the value of benefits such as land provided at discounted rates.( Para 27)

Whether an NGO is substantially financed is a factual question, considering if the organization can effectively carry out its activities without government financing.The Act's purpose is to bring transparency and probity in public dealings, justifying citizens' right to inquire about the use of government funds by NGOs.( Para 28)

Decision: Civil Appeal No. 9828 of 2013 was dismissed.Civil Appeal Nos. 9844-9845 of 2013, 9846-9857 of 2013, and 9860 of 2013 were remitted to the High Court for determining whether the institutions are substantially financed or not.High Court to consider writ petitions filed in 2013, giving priority to the matter.

Facts:

Smt. Chando and Sita Ram sold land to late N.D. Chaudhary through a registered sale deed dated 24th January 1973.

Late Kesho Ram exchanged his plots with the land sold to N.D. Chaudhary through a registered deed of exchange dated 2nd March 1974.

Legal proceedings were initiated during consolidation proceedings, challenging the validity of the sale deed and exchange deed.

Issues:

Validity of the registered sale deed dated 24th January 1973.

Legality of the exchange deed dated 2nd March 1974 concerning compliance with Section 161 of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that while the exchange deed was void due to non-compliance with Section 161, the consequences of the void transaction did not restore rights to the appellants. The registered sale deed executed on 24th January 1973 remained valid, and the appellants could not claim any rights over the land in question. The Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismisses the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision, and affirms that the consequences of the void exchange deed do not revive the appellants' original rights over the land.

Facts:

The case involves the claim for grant-in-aid benefits by employees under the Orissa (Non–Government Colleges, Junior Colleges, and Higher Secondary Schools) Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994, following its repeal in 2004 and subsequent orders.

Issues:

Whether grant-in-aid can be claimed as a matter of right after the completion of the prescribed period.

The effect of the repeal of the Order of 1994 by the Order of 2004.

The constitutional implications under Article 14 concerning equality.

Held:

Grant-in-aid cannot be claimed as a matter of right but depends on fulfillment of various conditions. The Director has the authority to examine cases concerning posts filled up before June 1, 1994, and availing the benefit of grant-in-aid is discretionary for institutions.( Para 8)

The Order of 2004 repealed the Order of 1994, saving only the block grant for posts sanctioned before the repeal. Private institutions receiving grant-in-aid continue to receive it, but those not receiving it are entitled to block grant under specific conditions.( Para 21)

The repeal of a statute does not save a mere hope or expectation. Only rights acquired or accrued are unaffected. The right to obtain relief under a repealed act is not saved unless explicitly provided.( Para 24)

There is no concept of negative equality under Article 14. If a person does not have a right, they cannot claim equal treatment. The judgment rejects the argument for parity based on orders passed for other persons.( Para 30)

The provisions in the Order of 2004 make it clear that only the block grant is saved for institutions receiving grant-in-aid before the repeal. Orders in favor of employees based on the Order of 1994 are not sustainable.( Para 32)

Facts:

Appellant, a Judicial Officer, dismissed for passing orders favoring a lady lawyer and her clients due to a proximate relationship.

Suspension on 08.02.2001, dismissal on 15.01.2004.

Appellant challenges dismissal in writ petition, dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the penalty imposed on the appellant.

Interpretation of the term 'gratification' under Rule 5 of Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979.

Held:

The court emphasizes the first proviso of Rule 5, which mandates the penalty of removal or dismissal for accepting gratification other than legal remuneration.

Integrity is deemed crucial for judicial officers, and their behavior both inside and outside the court must adhere to high standards.

The officer's proximate relationship with a lady lawyer led to biased judicial orders, constituting a different form of gratification.

Judges must maintain impeccable integrity, and deviation from this standard warrants severe consequences.

The appeal is dismissed, upholding the officer's dismissal from service.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the imposition of "composition fee" and "extension fee" by the Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority (GLADA).

The reference arises from the doubt expressed by a two-Judge Bench regarding the correctness of the judgment in HUDA vs. Sunita (2005) 2 SCC 479.

Issues:

Whether the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) has jurisdiction to adjudicate the legality behind the demand for "composition fee" and "extension fee" by a developmental authority.

The validity of the interpretation provided in HUDA vs. Sunita (2005) 2 SCC 479.

Held:

The court holds that the interpretation in HUDA vs. Sunita (2005) 2 SCC 479 is overruled, and NCDRC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of statutory dues arising from a deficiency in service.( Paragraph 14)

The court acknowledges the confusion and emphasizes that non-fulfillment of conditions or standards required amounts to 'deficiency in services' under the Consumer Protection Act.( Paragraph 15)

The court notes that while statutory authorities have the power to levy fees, it does not prohibit consumer forums from evaluating the legality of such exactions or fulfillment of conditions.( Paragraph 16)

The court clarifies that not all statutory dues/exactions are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum, only those exacted for a service rendered.( Paragraph 20)

The court concludes that the determination of disputes concerning the validity of the imposition of a statutory due arising from a deficiency in service can be undertaken by consumer forums. The decision in HUDA vs. Sunita is overruled.( Paragraph 22)

Facts:

The Portuguese Civil Code, originating from foreign law, became applicable to the domiciles of Goa through the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Ordinance, 1962, and the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962.

Issues:

The status of the Portuguese Civil Code in Goa, the applicability of principles of private international law, and the scope of inheritance laws for Goan domiciles, especially in properties located outside Goa.

Held:

The Civil Code, while of Portuguese origin, is deemed an Indian law after the conquest and annexation of Goa. It is enforced in Goa through an Act of the Indian Parliament, making it an integral part of Indian laws. [Para 14-18]

The Portuguese Civil Code applies to properties of Goan domiciles wherever situated in India, and the Indian Succession Act or other laws are not applicable to such Goan domiciles. [Para 25-31]

Grant of probate by the High Court in Bombay, Goa, is limited to determining the genuineness of the will and does not affect inheritance rights governed by the Portuguese Civil Code. [Para 32-34]

The Portuguese Civil Code prevails over general laws of succession, being both a special and local law, and governs all properties of Goan domiciles within or outside Goa. [Para 30-31]

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the decision of the Single Judge of the High Court, and the order of the Court of Comarca Judge in Inventory Proceedings is restored. [Para 35]