Facts:

The appellants owned a piece of land.

The respondent company proposed a joint venture for construction.

An agreement was signed, and the respondent was to complete construction within three years.

Construction commenced but was abandoned in 1999.

The appellants terminated the agreement in 2001.

A compromise and cancellation agreement was executed in 2004, and a portion of the security deposit was returned.

Dispute arose, leading to arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the arbitrator provided adequate opportunity for evidence and cross-examination.

Determination of the cost incurred by the respondent for the construction.

Validity of the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Held:

The Court, after a detailed examination of the proceedings, held that the arbitrator's procedure was flexible, and the parties had agreed to rely on affidavits and documents without cross-examination. The Court rejected the contention that the arbitrator denied proper opportunity for cross-examination. The Court also found that the arbitrator had considered the claim of the respondent regarding construction costs and rejected it due to lack of reliable evidence. The Court further emphasized that the delay and breach by the respondent had consequences, and the appellants were directed to pay a sum of Rs. 45,00,000 to the respondent, allowing them possession of the land.

Facts:

The case involves the conviction of appellants (accused no. 1 and 2) under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code for inflicting fatal knife blows on the stomach of the victim-deceased. Six accused were initially charged, and the incident occurred when the deceased, riding a motorcycle, was obstructed by all accused, leading to the fatal injuries.

Issues:

The quality of evidence, the credibility of eyewitness testimonies (PW-1 and PW-2), and the convictions of appellants in contrast to the acquittals of other accused. The defense raised concerns about deficiencies in the investigation, delay in FIR registration, and the absence of evidence regarding previous enmity.

Held:

The Supreme Court, under Article 136, refrains from reappreciating evidence unless a manifest error of law or procedure is demonstrated or the conclusion of lower courts is evidently perverse. (Para 12)

The testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, the eyewitnesses, were extensively cross-examined but remained unshaken regarding the appellants' involvement in inflicting fatal injuries. The Court upheld their credibility, emphasizing the distinct role of the appellants. (Paras 15-16)

Discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses about the condition of the deceased when admitted to the hospital do not undermine the case, considering medical reports confirming the semi-conscious state. The Court rejects the argument of uniformity in witness reactions. (Para 23)

The Court dismisses the appeal, upholding the concurrent view of the Trial Court and the High Court on the appellants' guilt. The so-called deficiencies pointed out by the appellants in the investigation are deemed insignificant. (Para 22)

The delay in registering FIR was considered and rejected by the Trial Court, with the Supreme Court upholding this finding. The Court relies on the contemporaneous record to support the absence of delay. (Paras 24-26)

The defense's contradictory stands regarding the cause of injuries were dismissed as baseless, with the Court highlighting the lack of evidence supporting these claims. The acquittal of accused in cross-cases related to another incident does not impact the appellants' guilt in the present case. (Paras 27-28)

Facts:

Lt. Col. Sameer Singh, an Army officer, was considered for Permanent Secondment to DGQA.

His case was not recommended by the Quality Assurance Selection Board (QASB) based on the TARs for the years 2014-15 and 2015-16, indicating he was 'NOT YET FIT' and 'NOT FIT' respectively.

Singh filed a writ petition, asserting that he fulfilled the criteria of the Office Memorandum dated 12.05.2011.

The Delhi High Court ruled in favor of Singh, holding that TARs could not be considered.

Issues:

Whether TARs should be taken into consideration for Permanent Secondment, post the implementation of the office memorandum dated 12.05.2011.

Held:

The court upheld the judgment of the Delhi High Court, dismissing the appeal. The key points include:

The office memorandum dated 12.05.2011 specifically lays down criteria for Permanent Secondment, superseding all previous instructions, including the one from 08.04.2004.

The court rejected the argument that the earlier memorandum should still apply, emphasizing that the 2011 memorandum is broader and supersedes all previous instructions.

The court highlighted that even though a letter in 2014 emphasized the importance of TARs, it could not override the clear language of the 2011 memorandum, which did not include TARs as a criterion.

The TAR may be considered for grading an officer for Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) but cannot be considered for Permanent Secondment, as per the office memorandum of 2011.

Facts:

In response to an advertisement for recruitment on the post of Sub-Inspector, the respondent, despite being a minor when charged with offenses under IPC, was selected. The respondent disclosed the past criminal case, resulting in his acquittal.

Issues:

• The denial of appointment based on a criminal case registered in the past against the respondent.

Held:

The charges were related to the respondent's actions as a minor, and it was not disputed that he was acquitted.

Even if convicted, being a minor during the alleged offenses protected the respondent from job deprivation.

The Juvenile Justice Act emphasizes a fresh start for juveniles, erasing past records, with exceptions for special circumstances.

The case against the respondent did not involve the suppression of convictions or charges.

The respondent, having disclosed the charges and acquittal, was not subject to job deprivation.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the orders of the Single Judge and Division Bench.

Facts:

The case involves the appellant, P. Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep, challenging the non-furnishing of electronic records, specifically the contents of a memory card/pen drive, during the criminal investigation. The appellant contends that such records should be treated as documents within the meaning of the Evidence Act.

Issues:

Whether electronic records, such as those on a memory card/pen drive, qualify as documents under the Evidence Act?

What is the obligation of the investigating officer regarding furnishing documents to the accused under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

How to balance the right to a fair trial of the accused with the right to privacy of the victim, especially in cases of sensitive offenses like rape?

The interpretation of ongoing statutes, particularly the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held:

The classification of an article as a 'document' is based on information inscribed, irrespective of the medium. The definition of 'evidence' in Section 3 of the Evidence Act includes electronic records, supported by Section 65B, Section 29 of IPC, and the General Clauses Act.

The investigating officer is obligated to forward all documents, including electronic records, to the Magistrate under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The Magistrate's duty under Section 207 is to furnish copies to the accused, and the ground of voluminosity cannot be invoked for electronic records.

While balancing the accused's right to a fair trial with the victim's privacy, the court may justify providing inspection of documents rather than copies, especially in cases of rape.

The contents of a memory card/pen drive are deemed documents, and the accused is entitled to receive a cloned copy for an effective defense.

Electronic records are documents based on the information they contain, and various legal precedents support their admissibility.

The Criminal Procedure Code is an ongoing statute, and courts should interpret it to continuously update its wordings for compatibility with contemporary situations.

In balancing fundamental rights, a mechanism is needed to allow the accused to verify the genuineness of electronic records. Conditions may be imposed to prevent misuse.

Accused can seek a second expert opinion from an independent agency like CFSL, ensuring confidentiality. The court must issue suitable directions to balance interests.

The case involves an intra-conflict of fundamental rights—right to a fair trial and the right to privacy of the victim—requiring a balanced approach.

The accused is entitled to copies of statements and documents, but the court must consider the nature of the offense and principles underlying relevant legal provisions.

The court may issue suitable directions to meet the ends of justice, ensuring a multipronged approach to safeguard both parties' interests.

The contents of the memory card/pen drive, being electronic records, must be regarded as documents. The accused should generally be given cloned copies for an effective defense.

Preliminary objections regarding the disclosure of victim identity are addressed, recognizing the accused's right to fair trial mandated by Section 207 of the Code.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the competence of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (APERC) to determine wheeling charges, grid support charges, and the applicability of government orders providing incentives for non-conventional energy resources.

Issues:

Competence of APERC to determine wheeling charges.

APERC's authority to levy grid support charges.

The binding nature of government orders on incentives for non-conventional energy resources.

Held:

Competence of APERC to Determine Wheeling Charges: Section 11 of the Reforms Act empowers the Commission to regulate various aspects related to electricity, including wheeling charges. The Commission has the legislative power to fix such charges, superseding contractual agreements. Regulations framed under the Reforms Act grant the Commission the authority to prescribe tariffs and charges, and there is no violation of principles of natural justice in doing so. The High Court's interference was unwarranted, as the Commission's determination of specific tariffs was proper and in accordance with the law.

APERC's Authority to Levy Grid Support Charges: Under s.11 read with s.26 of the Reforms Act, fixed charges, including grid support charges, are leviable at the instance of a distribution company, and the Commission has the power to determine them. The Commission's order regarding grid support charges is upheld.

3. Binding Nature of Government Orders on Incentives: Government orders providing incentives for non-conventional energy resources were not binding perpetually, and the Commission had the power to review tariffs and incentives. The plea of promissory estoppel is not applicable as there was no unequivocal commitment beyond a specified period.

Facts:

The Calcutta High Court, by judgment and order dated 23.06.1998, directed that contract casual laborers would be entitled to payment of wages equivalent to Class IV employees.

FCI floated a tender for the appointment of a Handling and Transport Contractor for the Bikna Depot, including the supply of casual labor.

Despite pending appeals and the absence of a schedule of rates for casual labor in the contract, the respondent-contractor submitted a tender quoting 471% above the schedule rates.

FCI accepted the tender, and the contractor was appointed for a period of two years at the negotiated rate of 471% above the schedule rates.

Disputes arose regarding the payment of wages to casual laborers, leading to contempt proceedings, appeals, and various court orders.

Issues:

Whether the contractor is entitled to 471% above schedule rates (ASOR) for the supply of casual laborers, especially after a specific Supreme Court order regarding wages.

The determination of the profit receivable by the contractor from the contract.

Held:

The controversy primarily involves the interpretation of Clause 24 and whether the contractor is entitled to 471% ASOR for supplying casual laborers. The Supreme Court clarified that the wages for casual laborers shall be according to the rates specified in its order dated 14.01.2010 in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472-9473/2003, and the contractor is not entitled to 471% ASOR.( Paragraph 6)

The Division Bench directed the Chairman of FCI to determine the exact amount of wages payable, applying the Supreme Court order dated 14.01.2010, and to verify how the differential rates for casual laborers were determined between January and March 2000 and October to December 2001. The direction regarding profit determination was found unsustainable.( Paragraph 6.2)

Facts:

The Appellant marketed 'Orange Tammy Sugarless Jelly,' manufactured by a separate entity.

Inspection by Respondent No. 2 found 'sugar' in the Jelly, leading to misbranding allegations.

Delay in impleading the Appellant as co-accused under Section 20A.

Issues:

Interpretation of Sections 13(1), 13(2), and 13(3) concerning the procedure for challenging reports related to misbranding.

Comparison of definitions of 'adulterated' and 'misbranded' under Sections 2(ia) and 2(ix).

Analysis of the offence under Section 2(ix)(h).

Examination of Section 20A and its application.

Held:

Interpretation of Sections 13(1), 13(2), and 13(3): The court emphasized the integral role of the prescribed procedure (Sections 11-13) in cases of 'misbranding,' even if 'adulteration' is not alleged. The right to obtain a second opinion from the Central Laboratory under Section 13(2) applies regardless of the specific offence.

Comparison of Definitions (Sections 2(ia) and 2(ix)): Noted an overlap between 'adulterated' and 'misbranded,' providing examples where both offences may coexist. Emphasized the need for compliance with Sections 11-13 in certain situations.

Analysis of Section 2(ix)(h): Clarified that in cases of 'bearing the name of a fictitious individual or company as the manufacturer or producer,' analyzing the food article's contents may not be necessary, as the focus is on deceptive concealment of identity.

Power of Court under Section 20A: Affirmed the distinction between a 'vendor' and 'manufacturer,' explaining the purpose of Section 20A. The court held that the Appellant's impleadment for misbranding need not delve into shared common objects during the trial.

Facts:

Advertisement issued on 21st December 2018 for 65 posts of Assistant Engineer (Civil).

Screening test conducted on 30th June 2019 under the 2010 Rules.

Gauhati High Court struck down a portion of Clause 12.2 of the Assam Public Service Commission (Conduct of Business) Procedure, 2019.

Issues:

Applicability of rules for the ongoing recruitment process.

Challenge to Clause 12.2 of the 2019 Procedure.

Held:

The court considers the introduction of negative marking in the 2019 Procedure and the potential impact on candidates who took the screening test under the 2010 Rules.( Para 12)

The court cites precedents to establish the principle that the norms existing at the start of the selection process govern the selection, unless new rules have retrospective effect.( Para 13)

The court discusses the anomaly that would arise if the next segment of the selection is conducted under the 2019 Procedure, considering the differences in marking systems.( Para 14)

The court highlights Clause 12.2 of the 2019 Procedure, emphasizing the continuation of ongoing processes under the 2010 Rules.( Para 15)

The court emphasizes the need for a fair selection process, taking into account the candidates' lawful expectations and constitutional mandates.( Para 16)

The court addresses the potential confusion and unfairness if candidates are evaluated under both the 2010 Rules and the 2019 Procedure.( Para 17)

The court concludes that the recruitment process initiated in 2018 should be finalized under the 2010 Rules, setting aside the direction for the application of the 2019 Procedure.( Para 18)