Facts:

The appellant, Ms. X, appealed against the grant of bail to the second respondent, a film producer accused of sexual exploitation and rape.

The complainant alleged that the accused had made false promises of marriage and had forced himself upon her on multiple occasions.

The High Court had granted bail to the accused considering various factors including the consensual nature of the relationship, lapse of time between the alleged incidents and filing of the complaint, and the medical condition of the accused.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in granting bail to the accused.

Whether there are any supervening circumstances which would warrant the cancellation of the bail granted by the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail but ordered an enhancement of the personal bond amount to Rs. 10 lakhs. The Court found no supervening circumstances justifying bail cancellation. The lodging of the second FIR shortly after the grant of bail lacked detail and clarity and thus was not sufficient to warrant cancellation.

The Court emphasized the distinction between rejection of bail and cancellation of bail, stating that very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for the latter. Therefore, the appeal was disposed of with the modified condition regarding the personal bond.

Facts:

The case involved the revival of Super Bazar, monitored by the Supreme Court over several years.

M/s Writers and Publisher Pvt. Ltd. (WPL) sought a refund of their investment in the revival.

A court order dated 29 March 2016 directed the refund of WPL's entire investment with interest at 6% per annum, subject to deduction of profits made during the arrangement.

Disputes arose regarding the implementation of this order, particularly the disallowance of interest on share capital and the adjustment of losses incurred by Super Bazar.

Issues:

Whether the interpretation of the court's earlier order regarding the refund of WPL's investment was correct.

Whether the Official Liquidator (OL) had violated any part of the court's directions.

Held:

The court held that interest at 6% per annum should be allowed on WPL's entire investment, including share capital. It emphasized that the order envisaged an exit for WPL and directed deduction of profits earned, not adjustment of losses incurred.

The court disposed of the contempt petition against the OL, finding that the OL had acted in accordance with the court's directions.

All concerned parties were directed to act in accordance with the court's interpretation of the earlier directions.

Facts:

Kiran Pal Singh, the appellant, was elected as the Pramukh of the Kshettra Panchayat Vikash Khand Gulawati, District Bulandshahr, in 2015. Some members of the panchayat initiated a no-confidence motion against him under Section 15(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961. The District Magistrate/Collector issued a notice to convene a meeting of the panchayat for consideration of the motion. Subsequently, the no-confidence motion was passed by 32 votes against the appellant.

Issues:

The appellant challenged the validity of the no-confidence motion before the High Court and subsequently the Supreme Court, arguing that the second notice of no-confidence motion was impermissible under Section 15(12) of the Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the High Court. The Court held that the prohibition under Section 15(12) would only apply if the conditions precedent specified in the provision were satisfied, namely, if the motion was not carried out as per the provisions of Section 15 or if the meeting could not be held for want of quorum. Since neither of these conditions were met in the present case, the prohibition under Section 15(12) did not apply.

Furthermore, the Court emphasized the importance of democratic decentralization and stability in rural governance, highlighting provisions in the Act that ensure the stability of local governance structures while also providing mechanisms for accountability and removal of office bearers when necessary.

Facts:

The Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Association challenged a judgment of the High Court of Kerala, which denied their claim for parity in retirement age with Public Prosecutors.

The appellant argued that Assistant Public Prosecutors should retire at 60, similar to Public Prosecutors, as their duties and functions were similar.

The respondent state contended that the appointment processes and service conditions of Assistant Public Prosecutors and Public Prosecutors were distinct, with Assistant Public Prosecutors being government employees entitled to service benefits, including pension, while Public Prosecutors were appointed by the government for fixed terms and were not entitled to such benefits.

Issues:

Whether Assistant Public Prosecutors are entitled to parity in retirement age with Public Prosecutors.

Whether the claim for parity creates anomalies or discrimination among government employees.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that there was no infirmity in the High Court's decision rejecting the claim for parity in retirement age between Assistant Public Prosecutors and Public Prosecutors. The Court emphasized the qualitative differences in appointment processes and service conditions between the two positions. Assistant Public Prosecutors were appointed through competitive examinations and were government employees entitled to service benefits, while Public Prosecutors were appointed by the government for fixed terms and were not considered government employees.

Regarding the alternative plea to forego pension for extended service till 60 years, the Court declined to issue such a direction to the State Government, stating it could create anomalies and discrimination among government employees. However, it left the decision to the State Government, allowing the appellant to make representations for consideration.

The appeal was dismissed, and no order as to costs was made.

Facts:

The deceased's legal representatives filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, alleging that the deceased died in a motor vehicle accident involving a truck owned by the appellant. The insurance company opposed the claim on grounds that the vehicle was driven without a valid permit and other breaches of the insurance policy.

Issues:

Whether the vehicle involved in the accident had a valid permit at the time of the accident.

Whether the insurance company can be held liable for the accident under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the insurance company cannot be held liable due to the absence of a valid permit for the vehicle at the time of the accident. It emphasized that the exceptions carved out in Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be equated with minor breaches such as absence of a license or carrying more passengers.

The court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the directions for the insurer to pay compensation with the right to recover from the owner and driver.

Facts:

The appellants filed writ petitions against Bank of Baroda, which were initially allowed by a Single Judge of the High Court but overturned by a Division Bench relying on a previous judgment. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a related case.

Issues:

Whether the decision of the Division Bench in overturning the Single Judge's judgment was valid and whether it should be affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Held:

The Court held that the decision of the Division Bench in overturning the Single Judge's judgment was valid, and it was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The appeals were dismissed in accordance with the judgment rendered in a related case, Union Bank of India v. United Bank of India Retirees' Welfare Associations and others.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation and private stage carriage operators regarding the grant of temporary permits on a notified route. The State Government had formulated a scheme for coordinated passenger road transport services, partially excluding private operators on the notified route. Respondent no.1, a private stage carriage operator, sought a temporary permit under the proviso to s.104 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, to run services for a specific route.

Issues:

The interpretation of the scheme formulated by the State Government and its implications on the grant of permits to private stage carriage operators.

Specifically, the court examines whether the temporary permit sought by respondent no.1 is permissible under the scheme and the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Held:

The court provides an overview of the legal framework governing the formulation of schemes under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, particularly Sections 99 and 100. It emphasizes the importance of adhering to approved schemes published by the State Government in matters involving permits for road transport services.

The court clarifies that the scheme grants exclusive rights to State Transport Undertakings (STUs) to operate on notified routes, with limited exceptions for private operators under certain conditions. It highlights the impermissibility of overlapping on notified routes beyond the specified limits outlined in the scheme.

The court distinguishes between intersection and overlapping, emphasizing that the scheme aims to exclude private operators from traversing notified routes beyond permissible limits. It underscores the necessity of preserving and protecting approved schemes in the public interest.

The court concludes that the temporary permit sought by respondent no.1 exceeds the permissible overlap on the notified route as per the scheme. Therefore, the court sets aside the temporary permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority.

Facts:

The retirees of the United Bank of India raised concerns regarding the differentiation in dearness relief based on the retirement dates of pensioners. They contended that denying full dearness relief to retirees before November 1, 2002, was unjustified. The High Court ordered the appellant bank to provide dearness relief to all pensioners at the same rate.

Issues:

Whether the differentiation in dearness relief rates between pre-November 2002 and post-November 2002 retirees was justified under the pension regulations.

Held:

The appellate court highlighted the distinct parameters governing each class of retirees (pre-November 2002 and post-November 2002) under the pension regulations.

It was clarified that the conferral of benefits followed different formulas and rates for the two classes of retirees, making it impractical to adopt a flat rate.

The court explained the rates and tapering formulas used for calculating dearness relief under Appendix II to the Pension Regulations.

It justified the differing rates by stating that the tapering formula aimed to provide larger benefits to retirees with lower basic pensions, gradually tapering down as the pension amount increased.

The court emphasized that each class of retirees was distinct and could not be treated as a homogeneous group, making it difficult to apply a uniform rate.

It noted that altering the established formulas or rates would render the entire scheme unworkable.

The court held that discontinuation of the tapering formula by the Reserve Bank of India did not automatically entitle pre-November 2002 retirees to benefits at the same rate as post-November 2002 retirees.

Facts:

Three persons died and five were injured allegedly in an attack by 17 individuals. The Sessions Court convicted four accused while acquitting the remaining 13. State appealed against acquittal, but High Court dismissed the appeals.

Issues:

Defects in framing of charges, failure to specify charges under relevant sections, lack of clarity in determining unlawful assembly and common object.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of precise framing of charges, especially in cases involving multiple accused and deaths. It noted the necessity of specifying charges under relevant sections of the Penal Code, particularly when invoking vicarious liability under Section 149.

The Court highlighted the significance of proving the existence of an unlawful assembly and its common object when applying Section 149 of the IPC. Failure to do so may result in offenders escaping punishment.

Regarding trial procedure, it clarified the distinction between "issues" and "charges," noting the lack of clarity in framing charges as a significant flaw in the trial process.

Despite acknowledging deficiencies in the trial procedure, the Court declined to reverse the acquittal of the accused individuals. Instead, it ordered compensation for the families of the deceased and injured witnesses, as a fresh trial after 26 years would not serve any useful purpose due to the deaths of some accused individuals.